Real estate advisory services: Growth and competition in Japan, Europe, and the United States, 1960-1990. by LaPier, Terrence Walter
REAL ESTATE ADVISORY SERVICES:
GROWTH AND COMPETITION IN 
JAPAN, EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1990
by
Terrence Walter LaPier
A Thesis 
submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London
Lent Term, 1995
UMI Number: U087133
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U087133
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I M-£s£ S
F
73(7
X.=? 1075 ,4^ ,
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the international growth and diversification of real estate 
advisory services in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan from 
over a 30-year period, 1960-1990. These four countries were selected because they were 
the most active in cross-border direct investment during this period, and intricate 
economic interdependencies among them prompted the greatest advancements in 
innovative real estate advisory services.
Economic and cultural differences and similarities among the four focal countries 
and their respective service professions provide the bases for evaluating the primary 
hypothesis: the internationalization of real estate advisory services were most efficiently 
and effectively achieved by firms that first built solid reputations in their home nations, 
and subsequently expanded into multiregional organizations by responding to the cross- 
border investment activities of existing and prospective multinational clients.
If leading firms in the focal countries expanded in domestic markets to capitalize 
on the national economy’s maturing real estate markets, then moved into foreign markets 
to capitalize on rising cross-border investment flows over the 1960-1990 period, the 
primary thesis raises a question about the relative significance of cross-border real estate 
investment to national economic conditions, generally, and to the growth of commercial 
real estate markets and sectoral employment in the focal countries, specifically. A 
secondary hypothesis, therefore, is tested to identify the relative impact of total cross- 
border real estate investment flows on employment levels in the commercial real estate 
sector in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan.
This thesis also examines the several dimensions of the economy and financial 
system affected by domestic and foreign investment in commercial real estate assets after
2
1960. For example, rising worldwide commercial property investment appeared to be 
an important factor in the escalation of corporate real estate values, in the growth of 
construction industries and related services sectors, in the changes in the net worth of 
major financial institutions, and in the asset diversification of insurance and pension fund 
portfolios. As part of this trend, the growth of international business and the rise in 
mergers and acquisitions also elevated cross-border direct investment activity in real 
estate as companies expanded into foreign markets.
This thesis explores the process by which property advisory services 
internationalized and gained an important role in the global service economy by 
counseling investors on the location and volume of investment activities, and thereby 
influencing the international flow of real estate investment funds. It also examines 
whether real estate advisory firms in the focal countries gained competitive advantage 
over the 30-year period due to the presence of two basic conditions: an international 
network of property professionals; and a diversified services practice—brokerage, 
property management, finance, facilities planning and development, and real estate sales 
and purchases.
By reviewing national fluctuations in cross-border direct investment in real estate, 
and periodic changes and major episodes in the foreign expansion of real estate advisory 
services in the focal countries, this thesis seeks to examine specific national factors that 
influenced effective internationalization in domestic property services. Basic principles 
in economic history provide the theoretical framework concerning competitive and 
comparative advantages among nations and particular organizations.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 P u r po se  o f  the  T h e sis
This thesis examined the international growth and diversification of real estate 
advisory services in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan during 
1960-1990, the 30-year period over which interntionalization was concentrated. 
Economic and cultural differences and similarities among the four focal countries and 
their respective service professions provided the bases for evaluating the primary 
hypothesis: the internationalization of real estate advisory services was most efficiently 
and effectively achieved by firms that first built solid reputations in their home nations, 
and subsequently expanded into multinational organizations by responding to the cross- 
border investment activities of existing and prospective multinational clients.
If leading firms in the focal countries expanded in domestic markets to capitalize 
on the national economy’s maturing real estate markets, then moved into foreign markets 
to capitalize on rising cross-border investment flows over the 1960-1990 period, the 
primary thesis raised the question about the significance of cross-border real estate 
investment to the growth of commercial real estate markets and sectoral employment in 
the focal countries. The secondary hypothesis explored the degree to which total cross- 
border real estate investment flows influenced real estate employment levels in the U.S., 
U.K., Germany, and Japan.1
Domestic and foreign investment in commercial real estate assets after 1960 
affected several dimensions of the economy and financial system. For example, rising
1 Employment statistics in the real estate sector are used as the economic indicator, or proxy, of 
domestic property market growth generally.
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worldwide commercial property investment appeared to be an important factor in the
escalation of corporate real estate values, in the growth of construction industries and
related services sectors, in changes in the net worth of major financial institutions, and
in the asset diversification of insurance and pension fund portfolios. As part of this
*
trend, the thesis suggested that the growth of international business and the rise in 
mergers and acquisitions also elevated cross-border direct investment activity in real 
estate as companies expanded into foreign markets.
Increasingly competitive and complex real estate markets over the 1960-1990 
period required international investors to become more conversant with the unique 
requirements of real estate assets. Rising demand for the "objective" counsel of property 
advisors skilled in property finance, development, and asset management services 
appeared to be incremental with the expansion of commercial property investment. Real 
estate advisory services, as explored in this thesis, covered diverse disciplines within the 
real estate profession: the sale and leasing of property; real estate finance; institutional 
investment; property and asset management; and, project management and construction. 
In light of the profession’s broad scope, the universe of firms included several types of 
organizations: full-service and fully diversified firms; "niche" firms with limited,
specialized practices; and other professional service firms, such as accountants, 
attorneys, mortgage lenders and financial counselors, which began to introduce specific 
real estate advisory service capabilities in the late 1960s.2
The client market was also unstructured. Typically the source of investment 
capital, clients commissioned real estate advisors for third-party counsel and for
See M.A. Hines, Marketing Real Estate Internationally (New York: Quorum Books, 1988), pp. 16- 
17, 77, 81, 142.
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specialized expertise about particular property and financial markets. Most property 
service firms advised both real estate and non-real estate entities—individual investors, 
multinational corporations, commercial and merchant banks, building societies in the 
U.K. and savings and loan associations in the U.S., insurance and pension funds, 
universities, local governments, securitized investment and unit trusts, and international 
developers and construction firms. The thesis explored the process by which property 
advisory services internationalized and gained an important role in the global service 
economy by counseling investors on the location and volume of investment activities, and 
thereby influenced the international flow of real estate investment funds. It also 
examined whether real estate advisory firms in the focal countries gained competitive 
advantage over the 30-year period due to the presence of two basic conditions: an 
international network of property professionals; and, a diversified services practice— 
brokerage, property management, finance, facilities planning and development, and real 
estate sales and purchases.
The thesis analyzed not just a few notable successes, but those firms that 
experienced moderate international growth and those that failed domestically and abroad. 
The focus of the analyses throughout the thesis was the international expansion of firms, 
firms’ mobility in foreign markets, and service dissemination across national borders. 
Indeed, the industry structure and the sector’s overall population were not much larger 
in 1990 than that in 1960, as reviewed in Chapter 3.3 The focal countries were largely 
dominated by domestic firms with domestic practices in 1960; only those firms that 
existed in 1960 and attempted to expand abroad or actually internationalized were 
evaluated. Firms selected for evaluation in the Chapter 4 collective profile and
0 See pages 107-115, and 122-23 following.
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Chapter 5 case studies were specifically identified based on the firm’s internationalization 
over^the 1960-1990 period and based on firm size in 1990. The thesis devoted limited 
attention to analyzing local and regional firms and domestic professional property 
services in an attempt to fulfill the explicit directive to evaluate only professional service 
firms in the real estate advisory service sector that internationalized during the 1960-1990 
period. Firms that failed in international expansion will be reviewed in Chapter 4.
Earlier published studies and research by others have extensively covered related 
fields (in allied service sectors, foreign direct investment, and industrial competitiveness 
in global markets), while real estate advisory services have received only nominal 
attention from economic analysts and historians. This principally stemmed from the 
relative newness of international real estate services in their modern form, as well as 
from limited primary data and inconsistent national statistics. What previous research 
was undertaken focused on national construction industries and residential markets, which 
had the greatest bearing historically on national public policies. The analyses presented 
in this thesis required parallel research of primary and secondary sources in the four 
countries, as well as compiling comparable statistical data from each of the four countries 
and 40 firms (10 firms from each focal country).
Scholars in the United States have devoted more attention to the history of real 
estate investment and real estate advisory services than have those in any other nation. 
Yet even this has occurred only in recent years. In the Summer 1989 edition of Business 
History Review. M.A. Weiss published a historiographical survey of the relevant 
literature in ‘Real Estate History: An Overview and Research Agenda’, arguing the 
merits of more ‘systematic, structural analysis of how the industry’s organization and
15
management have evolved’.4 Weiss correctly concluded that ‘real estate history still 
lacks-the type of sophisticated political-economic perspective that Alfred D. Chandler, 
Jr., brought to business history in The Visible Hand (1977)’,5 and earlier in Strategy and 
Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise (1962).
4
Periodic fluctuations in real estate market values altered the asset base of nations, 
according to recent research by Currie and Scott,6 with property values typically 
strengthening when national economies grew, and weakening during recessionary 
periods. One indicator of the potential relevance of scholarship on this subject concerned 
the enormous real estate portfolios owned by multinational corporations and global 
financial institutions, which constituted approximately 25 to 40 percent of overall 
corporate asset values. Another indicator was the long-held practice by Britain’s and 
Germany’s largest financial institutions, which invested in property and funded new 
development in the 19th century, and earlier. Japanese group companies, as well, 
sponsored real estate investment and investment advisory services since at least the 1920s 
and 1930s, as a means of gaining and controlling access to foreign distribution markets.7
One of the distinctive features of commercial real estate investment was the 
localized nature of property markets. Each unit of real estate was an illiquid and unique 
asset, whose value largely depended on the local economy and local property markets.
4 M.A. Weiss, ‘Real Estate History: An Overview and Research Agenda’, Business History Review. 
v. 63 no. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 241-82.
5 Ibid., p. 241.
6 S. Currie and A. Scott, ‘The Place of Commercial Property in the U.K. Economy’, a paper presented 
to the London Business School, January 1991.
7 On German Banking, see Deutsche Bank, "Bank - A Brief History", corporate report Frankfurt am 
Main, Dec. 1989; for Britain, see "Financial Institutions and the British Property Investment Market", 
1850-1980. Unpublished D. Phil thesis, Oxford University, P. Scott, 1992; for Japanese group
companies, M. Wilkins, "Japanese Multinations in the U.S.", Business History Review 64 (Winter
1990), pp. 595-96.
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Until the late 1980s real estate assets lacked a centralized or unified global market, such 
as that of corporate stocks and government securities. Moreover, historical 
documentation of this subject was limited by the lack of uniform government and 
industry data, both within domestic markets and among the four countries. In the
4
absence of consistent primary sources, the author relied on case studies of leading firms 
based in each of the focal countries, on cross-border direct investment statistics, general 
economic statistics, and on industry publications, professional journals, and press and 
consultancy reports from each country. While the deficiency of uniform and 
comprehensive information on property markets and real estate services limited previous 
research, it provided an ideal subject for examining international services trade theories 
and factors influencing the foreign expansion of certain service organizations.
Cross-border direct investment in real estate is defined as the international transfer 
of capital for the purpose of owning and controlling land or structures in a foreign 
country. Portfolio investment, by contrast, is defined as any other cross-border 
investment made that does not secure control over the investment.8 The standard 
definition established by the International Monetary Fund states that cross-border direct 
investment is a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that
In practice, if there is no unambiguous 10 percent minimum ownership criterion applied in an 
individual case, a qualitative judgment is typically made by the government statistical agency as to 
whether there is sufficient influence over the management of the enterprise or property to be classified 
as direct investment.
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of the investor, the investor’s purpose being to have an effective voice in the 
management of the enterprise.9 Because there is no universal system or method for data 
collection on cross-border direct investment, the specific definitions and data collection 
methodologies for the focal countries are reasonably but not strictly comparable, as 
explained in Appendix A.
At year-end 1990 the ten largest source countries of total cross-border direct 
investment were the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Germany, followed by several other 
European countries and Canada (Table 1). The four largest source countries, referred 
to as the focal countries in this thesis, accounted for over three-fifths of the total world 
stock of direct investment. The U.S. and U.K. have been the two largest sources of 
direct investment capital since at least 1960. But it was not until 1980 that Germany 
overtook the Netherlands as the third largest source of foreign investment capital, and 
not until 1986 that Japan superseded the Netherlands as the fourth largest source country. 
Japan went on to overshadow Germany in 1988 as the third largest source of direct 
investment abroad.
Table 2 presents the rank order of countries by the stock of outward direct 
investment in real estate, specifically, with Japan the largest investing country 
worldwide, followed by Germany, Canada, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. Few 
other countries provided separate data on cross-border direct property investment. And
9 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Manual. 4th Edition. Washington, DC, 1977, p. 
136. A direct investment enterprise is defined as an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in 
which a single entity (an individual, branch, partnership, association, estate, trust, corporation, 
government, or an associated group of individuals or group of organizations) from a source country 
owns a significant share of the voting securities (a minimum of 10, 20 or 25 percent, depending on 
the focal country), or an equivalent interest. Foreign investment in real property through a limited 
partnership is considered to be direct investment and reportable to government statistical agencies by 
the general partner. Foreign investment in a real estate investment trust, or property unit trust, in 
which no one entity owns at least 10 percent is not considered direct investment because no one 
individual or entity has sufficient ownership to influence management. See Appendix A for extensive 
discussion and definition.
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other major nations, such as France, the Netherlands, and Sweden did not identify real
estate-investment separately from investment in the financial and service sectors.10
Even though Canada and Switzerland recorded larger amounts of foreign direct
investment in real estate than the U.K. or U.S., neither country is examined extensively
*
in this thesis due to special circumstances: the great majority of Canada’s overseas real 
estate investment is located in the U.S., with only nominal amounts in the U.K. and 
other countries;11 Switzerland serves as a politically neutral and low-tax conduit for 
residents of third-party countries investing in both real estate and other assets in Europe 
and the U.S., and is not an ultimate source of direct investment capital. Moreover, the 
economic interdependencies among U.S., U.K., German, and Japanese markets prompted 
the greatest advances in real estate advisory services.
10 Inconsistent with International Monetary Fund standards, many countries, including the U.S., the 
U.K., and Japan, do not collect data on direct investment in non-commercial real estate, such as 
foreign investment by individuals in "vacation homes" intended for private use. Because of the 
private nature of many property transactions, especially by individuals, official country estimates of 
cross-border real estate investment likely are understated.
11 In addition, very little cross-border direct property investment is located in Canada. Thus, Canada’s 
real estate industry lacks a global orientation, even though Olympia & York recently developed one 
major project in the London area, Canary Wharf, which was reacquired by the international bank 
consortium in summer 1992.
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TABLE 1
W o r l d  S t o c k  o f  O u t w a r d  D ir e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  
b y  t h e  T e n  L a r g e s t  S o u r c e  C o u n t r ie s  
1990 R a n k  O r d e r
Ten Largest (Billions U.S. $1
Source Countries 1960 1973 1980 1990
United istates a 31.9 101.3 220.2 426.5
United Kingdom 12.4 27.5 79.2 244.8
Japan ^ 0.5 10.3 19.6 201.4
Germany 0.8 11.9 43.1 155.1
France ® 4.1 8.8 20.8 114.8
Netherlands 7.0 15.8 42.4 99.2
Canada 2.5 7.8 21.6 74.7
Switzerland 2.3 7.1 22.4 64.9
Italy 1.1 3.2 7.0 60.0
Sweden 0:4 3.0 7.2' 50.7
Subtotal, Ten
Largest Countries 63.0 196.7 483.5 1,492.1
Other Countries 4.7 14.4 33.4 152.1
All Countries 67.7 211.1 516.9 1,644.2
Amount at Year End
Percent Distribution  Rank
1960 1973 1980 1990 * •1960 1973 1980 1990
47.1 48.0 42.6 25.9 1 1 1 1
18.3 13.0 15.3 14.9 2 2 2 2
0.7 4.9 3.8 12.2 9 5 8 3
1.2 5.6 8.3 9.4 8 4 3 4
6.1 4.2 4.0 7.0 4 6 7 5
10.3 7.5 8.2 6.0 3 3 4 6
3.7 3.7 4.2 4.5 5 7 5 7
3.4 3.4 4.3 3.9 6 8 6 8
1.6 1.5 1.4 3.6 8 9 10 9
0.6 1.4 1.4 3.1 10 10 9 10
93.1 93.2 93.5 90.7 -- - - -
6.9 6.8 6.5 9.3 -- - -- -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 __ __ _ _
a Data for the United States exclude the negative U.S. direct investment position in the Netherlands Antilles
finance industry.
b Of the countries shown separately in this table, reinvested earnings data are not collected by Japan or France.
If reinvested earnings data were included, Japan’s estimated stock of direct investment abroad would have been 
about $218 billion at year end 1990. The outward stock for France would probably also have been slightly
higher, but not enough to change its rank order.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Recent Trends in International Direct 
Investment. August 1992.
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TABLE 2
S t o c k  o f  O u t w a r d  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  in  R e a l  E s t a t e  
^  b y  t h e  M a j o r  So u r c e  C o u n t r ie s , 1990 R a n k  O r d e r
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
1966 1975 1980 1985 1990
Japan 35 251 595 3,128 46,444
Germany 377 2,136 4,696 8,546 17,382
Switzerland — 573 964 1,300 8,000
Canada — — 2,195 3,385 3,385
United Kingdom — 2,795 a 3,320 c 4,141 4,560
United States 163 227 b 251 384 1,860
— Not available.
4 Data are for 1974 and include insurance.
b Data are for 1977.
c Data are for 1981.
Note: Data on outward direct investment in real estate are generally not available before 
1966. Only the United States has published data before 1966 (see Chapter 2, 
Table 3).
Source: For Japan, Ministry of Finance, Reported Outward and Inward Direct 
Investment. May/June issues; Germany, Monthly Report of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank: Canada, Statistics Canada, Balance of Payments Division, 
unpublished data based on Canada’s International Investment Position: 
Switzerland, Union Bank of Switzerland, Switzerland in Figures, and 
unpublished estimates from Union Bank; United Kingdom, Census of Overseas 
Assets: United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Survey of Current Business.
By reviewing national fluctuations in cross-border direct investment in real estate, 
and periodic changes and major episodes in the foreign expansion of real estate advisory 
services in the focal countries, this thesis seeks to identify and evaluate specific national 
factors that influenced effective internationalization in domestic property services.
1 .2  An alytic al  E ram ew ork
Classical economic theory regarded international trade as the competition among 
indigenous national resources: labor, land, and capital markets. Subsequent economic 
historians and business analysts, however, refined the discussion of competitive
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advantage in multiregional trade by increasingly emphasizing the coordinating function
of the*firm and its organizational structure as paramount to general market forces. In
real estate, where local markets play such a dominant role in an organization’s evolution
and growth, the response of service firms to market conditions in multiple regions,
%
multidivisional management structures, and diversified services are considered to be of 
considerable importance.
Recent research on international trade in services has further highlighted the 
critical role of the firm, its people, and its management structure as the more effective, 
and most efficient, coordinating element in marketplace transactions, especially that 
across borders. In 1937 R.H. Coase argued in his influential article, ‘The Nature of the 
Firm’, that a firm could choose among different mechanisms to expand into new products 
and/or new markets: ‘combination’ and ‘integration’.12 The choice of how much a 
firm grew in size and complexity, Coase argued, rested with the coordinating function 
of the ‘entrepreneur’, or the corporate manager, and the marginal benefits derived. 
There were the costs of buying additional services (or products) in the market, versus 
the costs of administration and management. Each entrepreneur had to forecast demand 
for his product and organize production relative to management’s capacity and the 
relative price of combination versus integration. In multiregional expansion, Coase 
observed, ‘the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an 
increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of 
the transactions’.13
12 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica new series IV (1937), pp. 46-47.
lj Ibid., pp. 45-46.
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In the decades following the publication of Coase’s article, British and U.S.
economists reinforced the definition of the firm as the organizational unit of a market
economy. One of the most important studies came 25 years later, when A.D. Chandler,
Jr., published extensive research findings on American industrial enterprises in Strategy
♦
and Structure (1962).14 Chandler observed that modern industrial firms increased 
administrative complexity and managerial hierarchies to promote further growth of an 
integrated, multidepartmental enterprise over widely dispersed regions.15 Chandler 
offered a liberal interpretation of any one firm’s market opportunities, which he argued 
were only limited in geography and scope by the firm’s ability to expand, manage, and 
innovate. In this way, Chandler concluded, a ‘new strategy required a new or at least 
refashioned structure if the enlarged enterprise was to be operated efficiently’.16
Yet as central as Chandler’s American model and case study approach are to this 
analysis of multinational real estate advisory service firms, the theoretical conclusions 
have more limited applicability because of Chandler’s focus on manufacturing 
enterprises. Research on professional services organizations by E. Davis and C. Smales, 
for example, identified important strategic and structural differences between 
international expansion in manufacturing and in service enterprises, focusing on 
accounting, law, and public relations firms in the 1980s. While global expansion among 
manufacturing enterprises involved products crossing borders to reach customers, Davis 
and Smales argued that the internationalization of services involved customers crossing
14 A.D. Chandler. Jr.. Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962).
15 Ibid., p. 33.
16 Ibid., p. 15.
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borders, thus removing ‘barriers to international mobility of factors’.17 In this way, 
knowledge and reputation constituted the imports and exports, rather than manufactured 
products. As a result, labor—or people-played an essential role in successful cross- 
border trade. The work of Coase, Chandler, and Davis and Smales, can suggest central
4
issues to be emphasized in evaluating the successful expansion of professional service 
firms in the global marketplace including: (1) identifying the economic and the
organizational factors that advanced globalization, and (2) identifying effective 
management strategies and structures that real estate advisory service firms in the focal 
countries used in international expansion.
A critical issue in an examination of international real estate advisory service 
firms, and a theme that will arise throughout this thesis, is that real estate, in all its 
manifestations, is ultimately a localized industry that requires expert knowledge and 
understanding of local property and investment markets. Whether regional, national or 
international in their scope, real estate advisory firms reviewed in the course of this 
study succeeded or failed on their collective local expertise, reputation, and professional 
relationships. These twin, and often competing, requirements for local responsiveness 
and a multinational organizational structure define the broad outlines for evaluating the 
relevant factors that have prompted and sustained the growth of international real estate 
services since 1960. Unlike capital and securities markets, real estate lacked a 
centralized market mechanism: each market, large and small, was discrete and fiercely 
independent. Thus, to a greater extent than other financial services, real estate advisory 
services depended on both market mechanisms and the firm as a coordinating element.
17 E. Davis, G. Hanlon and J. Kay, ‘Internationalization in Accounting and Other Professional 
Services’, Working Paper Series no. 78, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, 
(1990), p. 3; and, E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, 
Working Paper Series no. 66, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, (1989).
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International trade in services is actually an old phenomenon that only recently 
(sinces-about 1970) has been examined by economic analysts and business historians, 
notably L.T. Wells, Jr., M. Casson, G.P. Sampson, R.H. Snape and J. Kay.18 The 
scholarly works concerning the determinants of international trade by banks, professional 
service firms, and other multinational corporations, too extensive to be summarized here, 
provide background on the factors that have promoted the competitive advantage of 
nations, industries, and firms. Wells, among the most influential writers, argued that 
industrial trade theory, notably the Hecksher-Ohlin model (1933), which emphasized 
factor price differentials, failed to account for the fact that trade in services typically 
depended on the mobility of either the user or the provider of the service.19 Sampson 
and Snape further refined the discussion by noting that international trade could occur 
without the movement of either the provider or the receiver, simply the transfer of the 
service, be it oral advice or a written product.20 Real estate advisory services 
encompass all three types of "trade", thus sometimes requiring free movement of 
products, factors and/or users at all levels.21
Different types and levels of a firm’s expertise, and the management of these 
functions across wide-ranging geographic regions, could only be accomplished by people,
18 E. Merigo and S. Potter, ‘Invisibles in the 1960s’, Occasional Studies, OECD Economic Outlook. 
July 1970; L.T. Wells, Jr., ‘International Trade in Services’, Business History Review. Spring 1991, 
pp. 224-26.; M. Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness: A Systems View of International Business 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); and G.P. Sampson and R.H. Snape, ‘Identifying the Issues in 
Trade in Services’, The World Economy, v. 8 no. 2 (June 1985), pp. 171-82; G. Jones, British 
Multinational Banking. 1860-1990 (Oxford, 1993).
19 L.T. Wells, Jr., ‘International Trade in Services’, p. 225.
20 G.P. Sampson and R.H. Snape, o p . cit.. pp. 172-73.
21 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, such ideal conditions of comprehensive and liberal trade has not
historically and does not currently exist in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan.
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Chandler and Casson argued.22 Casson, especially, documented the central role of
laborrand a firm’s organizational philosophy in international -services trade and the
concomitant factor of ‘innovation through experience’.23 International trade in real
estate advisory services stemmed from not just the transfer of investment capital by a
♦
client, but ideally from open markets to permit cross-border mobility of service factors— 
investors and professional advisors—and service products—real estate advisory services. 
In this way, real estate advisory firms introduced innovations to capitalize on growing 
volumes of cross-border investment by and among certain investors and financial 
markets—pension and insurance funds, corporations, financial institutions, and securities 
and investment banks.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, different investor groups tended to prevail in 
different national markets at different times. An increasingly globalized financial 
environment was facilitated by the emergence of the Eurobond market after 1963, and 
by deregulated capital restraints in the 1980s. Thus the internationalization of real estate 
advisory services constituted one major sector of the evolution of globalizing financial 
services after 1960. Property advisory firms sought to advance their competitive 
standing by moving into new products (services) and new functions (foreign markets and 
foreign investor clients).24 Competitive advantage in innovative services, by both firms 
and nations, appeared to depend on a constantly growing volume of cross-border
22 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1977); and M. Casson, Global Research Strategy and International Competitiveness (London: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991), p. 11; and M. Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
(1990), p. 5.
25 M. Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness, p. 5.
24 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure, p. 14; and, R.W. Jones and F. Ruane, ‘Appraising the
Options for International Trade in Services’, Oxford Economic Papers, v. 42 no. 4 (Oct. 1990), 
pp. 672-687.
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investment activity, which then attracted the best advisors and investors. This, in turn, 
expanded the national market’s ability to attract new investors and professional skills, 
and to support ongoing innovation.25
International real estate advisory services are a relatively young profession, and 
cross-border direct investment in property was not officially recorded by national 
governments until the 1950s, at the earliest. The rate of expansion into foreign markets 
thus becomes a defining issue in the competition among international firms. Theories 
regarding the determinants of a firm’s growth focus on the influential work of E.T. 
Penrose and O.A. Williamson. Penrose argued in 1959 against costly expansion, 
contending that there was a limit to the rate at which any firm can grow, a limit provided 
by the capacities of its existing management.26
Williamson’s more recent interpretation in 1975 also emphasized efficient 
managerial control over costs and profits: when a firm’s growth became too expensive, 
either because of organizational dysfunctions or lack of capital, then management would 
seek to contract operations.27 Williamson argued for a high degree of restraint and 
foresight by management, which in reality was an overly optimistic view of managerial 
behavior in light of the highly leveraged corporate expansions undertaken after the mid- 
1970s. The thesis will explore the degree of inefficiency in multiregional expansion, and 
the competitive advantage gained or lost, by examining the relationship between
25 M. Casson, Global Research Strategy and International Competitiveness (London: Basil Blackwell,
1991), pp. 77-79.
26 E.T. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1959),
p. 261.
27 O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York and 
London: The Free Press, 1975).
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ownership, financial control, and the rate of growth of specific firms from each focal
country, guided by the analytical framework of Coase, Chandler, Penrose and Casson.
‘Failure’ in foreign markets is an important dimension to this evaluation of
‘successful’ expansion and diversification of real estate advisory services. In an
%
enterprise where people and organizational management are believed to be central to the 
allocation of capital and professional resources, the definition of failure and the causes 
of firm failure provide valuable references for evaluating successful competitive 
advantage in international growth and diversification.
Chandler’s and Casson’s analyses, for example, linked entrepreneurial direction 
and organizational philosophy to the evolution of coordinated management across 
multiple divisions and regions. The failure to develop an effective local-to-global 
organizational framework could theoretically result in ineffective international expansion. 
Furthermore, if the innovation process was disconnected from the organizational 
structure—across multiple divisions or regions—intrafirm communication that distributed 
information about clients and service innovations conceivably would be hindered, as 
would the firm’s competitive advantage.
1.3 D eter m in an ts  of  In ter n a tio n a l  E x pa n sio n  and  In n o v a tio n
Real estate markets in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan experienced a 
dramatic restructuring between I960 and 1990, shifting from a predominantly local focus 
to a national and international orientation. This thesis suggested that the globalization 
of the real estate industry, which first emerged in the early 1960s and catapulted to 
international prominence in the 1980s, was driven by the rise in cross-border direct
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investment in real estate.28 Certain professional services that internationalized 
concurrently with growing cross-border investment supported foreign investment activity 
by following capital and investors across international borders. A growing body of 
recent research indicated that market expansion, in turn, aided allied services to establish
4
independent channels of global trade-in banking, accounting, law, construction, 
securities, insurance, and real estate advisory services. A recent study, in fact, 
sponsored by the Corporation of London with the London Business School, focused on 
the interesting issue of a firm’s home-base location and the important contribution a 
headquarters base such as London—an international financial and corporate center—played 
in supporting international growth of the City’s professional services, specifically law and 
accountancy. The study reinforced the findings of this thesis, which revealed that value- 
added reputation stemmed most of all from local market knowledge and a firm’s 
technical capabilities; international growth was supported by quality relationships with 
multinational clients who were strategically based in such international market centers 
as New York City or Los Angeles in the U.S., London in the U.K., Tokyo in Japan, and 
Frankfurt and Munich in Germany.29 The case studies presented in Chapter 4 and 6 
give direct and compelling evidence which would suggest that the firms that enjoyed the 
greatest international growth were headquartered in the world’s principal international 
market centers—alongside many of their major multinational clients who were also 
investing in foreign property markets.
28 S.E. Roulac, ‘The Globalization of Real Estate Finance’, Real Estate Finance Journal- v. 4 no. 2 
(1987), p. 39.
29 R. Cohen, J. Kay, C. Murroni, A. Pototsching, S. Trussler, ‘The Competitive Advantage of Law 
and Accountancy in the City of London’, The City Research Project (London, London Business 
School, 1994).
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Real estate advisory services expanded into new service products and foreign 
markets to capture the clients, the expertise, and the market positioning created by the 
tremendous growth in cross-border investment. The thesis examined whether the factors 
that supported the internationalization of real estate services in the four focal countries
4
were associated directly with those factors also influencing the expansion of cross-border 
real estate investment; these factors included the strength and size of domestic property 
markets, government regulations, national foreign trade policies, multinational trade by 
domestic corporations, and regulation of international financial markets and investment 
vehicles. Each of these elements were subject to long-term and abrupt economic shifts, 
which apparently affected the direction and rate that domestic firms expanded into 
foreign markets. The ability of individual firms to coordinate innovations across 
multinational and multifunctional divisions was suggested to be an equally important 
factor.
Innovations in services and technical skills, and their diffusion within and between 
firms, provided the key to an examination of the efficiency of real estate advisory 
services, and of particular firms, in expanding into foreign markets. While innovations 
eventually were adopted by real estate advisors worldwide, considerable time-lags 
occurred between the introduction of innovations and their diffusion to advisory firms 
in other nations. Introduction is defined as the first successful, systematic and profitable 
application of a new service product that promoted international expansion, rather than 
an isolated effort to implement an idea that failed to gain market acceptance. Diffusion 
is defined as the liberal circulation or dissemination of information and knowledge 
between and among firms and countries. A considerable time-lag between the successful 
introduction of an innovation and its widespread use among property advisors in other
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countries would suggest substantial disparities in cross-border investment activity by 
certain types of investors in these other countries, and perhaps even a weak link in the 
innovation and diffusion process. Pension fund portfolio management services, for 
example, followed such a course, as discussed in Chapter 5. Namely, portfolio services
4
were introduced in the U.K. in the early 1920s and were freely observable by others, yet 
did not come into widespread market use in the other countries until the beginning of 
1965. The earliest observance in Germany, simply because property investment by 
insurance companies did not create demand for portfolio management services, did not 
occur until this time.
The prime mover of innovation in real estate advisory services appeared to be 
capital investment flows across borders: significant changes in inward and outward real 
estate investment stock and flows, as well as the degree of volatility in the national 
economy, indicated shifts in the direction of capital markets and opportunity for 
innovation. The introduction of major innovations were examined relative to changes 
and/or events in direct real estate investment stock and flows, to annual GDP growth, 
and to annual property investment yields in the focal countries. Over time and through 
different investment cycles, innovation became an essential factor in retaining domestic 
capital and attracting foreign investors.30 Significant shifts in the growth/decline of the 
stocks of inward and outward direct real estate investment appeared to indicate periods 
of innovation, such as with public capital and securitized investment services discussed 
in Chapter 5.6.
A. Baum and A. Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’, Working Papers in European Property, 
Centre for European Property Research, University of Reading, March 1991, p. 67.
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Real estate service firms excelled through local market knowledge and expertise,
while* gaining a multinational or global reputation and organizational structure. This
international recognition broadened a firm’s client base and service capabilities, and
further equipped personnel to penetrate widely dispersed local markets. By contrast, the
*
firm profiles and case studies presented in Chapters 4 and 6, respectively, provided 
evidence that local and regional firms lacked a national and international reputation and 
were thus constrained in their ability to expand abroad. Such firms chose to cultivate 
a regional client base rather than invest in a multiregional and international network.
In all focal countries, regional and national real estate service firms by the 1980s 
were challenged by competitors to move into international investment markets—foreign 
regions or foreign clients. Some firms, lacking capital to expand or the managerial 
resources to grow, affiliated with established foreign firms or joined global cooperative 
networks. Firms sought to gain competitive advantage by achieving both local market 
knowledge and multinational access and prominence. The profession concurrently 
diversified through combination and integration into specialized functions: pension fund 
management services, accounting services, financial management consulting, legal 
services, and construction management services. Through diversification, real estate 
service firms broadened their professional skills (also an important source of innovation), 
and their client base.
1.4 Sc o p e , S ou r ces , and  M eth o d o lo g y
The scope of this study focused on real estate advisory firms that internationalized 
their business practice and their client services; the thesis did not encompass overall 
cross-border financial investment services. This explicit focus enabled the most directly
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relevant economic and organizational factors to be identified as advancing international 
trade-in this one important sector of these four national economies.
Real estate advisory services represented a highly unregulated profession that 
encompassed a number of professional disciplines—brokerage and agency, property 
management, development and construction management, -appraisal and portfolio 
valuation, real estate investment banking, and market research. As examined in the 
collective profile of leading firms in Chapter 4, different firms combined various 
disciplines. Whether the fully diversified firm of Jones Lang Wootton of the U.K., or 
the single-purpose core business of an individual firm, such as Goldman Sachs and Co., 
as well as other globalized brokerage houses and estate managers, appraisers and cost 
consultants, investment banks and securities houses, accountants and attorneys, mortgage 
lenders and financial counselors.31
The growing cross-border real estate investment market attracted allied 
professions, which were previously inexperienced in domestic and international real 
estate transactions. Financial intermediaries, especially those with a long history in real 
estate debt and equity instruments, represented the most formidable competition- 
merchant and commercial banks and investment banks and brokers. In addition, allied 
firms in management consulting, accounting, law, and construction also diversified into 
property services as a defensive move to protect and increase client revenues. Each 
brought specialized expertise to the field, thus further intensifying competition and 
prompting service innovations in the industry.
The thesis examined the impact of these related, and competitive, service sectors, 
primarily investment banks and accounting firms, by way of evaluating international
^  M.A. Hines, Marketing Real Estate Internationally, pp. 16-17, 77, 81, 142.
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expansion strategies and pioneering innovations that were subsequently adopted by real 
estate advisory firms. However, the thesis omitted detailed analyses of the organizational 
structures and expansion strategies of particular investment banking and accounting 
firms, in contrast to the detailed case histories of leading real estate service firms in each
4
of the four focal countries. The thesis also omitted detailed analyses of advisory services 
related to residential property, agricultural land, natural resources, and manufacturing 
and retailing facilities. The economic and market factors that impacted these other 
property markets were quite different from those that shaped commercial real estate 
investment markets. Moreover, residential property historically constituted only a small 
portion of cross-border investment, and the stock of direct invest in the latter three 
categories was combined (not itemized) in general industry statistics on international 
trade.
Finally, each sector of the real estate industry was not independently examined. 
Real estate development and construction services, for example, encompassed a number 
of economic and governmental processes which differed from those involved in cross- 
border direct investment, and these alone constituted a thesis. However, as they related 
to competition and innovation in international investment-grade property services, 
specific facets of real estate development, portfolio management, and financial services 
were discussed throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapters 3 through 5.
The modest amount of secondary source material available on the ‘history’ of real 
estate advisory services in each of the focal countries, and their relationship to the 
growth and rising influence of cross-border property investment, required consulting 
various sources to document emerging trends. Only in recent years, due to the visible 
impact of foreign real estate investment on national financial markets, have scholars,
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business analysts, and journalists begun to examine the industry’s dynamics and 
organization, yet these provided little analyses of its economic motivations and 
competitive strengths and weaknesses.
Secondary sources chronicling international real estate advisory services included 
national publications from each of the four focal countries. These represented three 
types: anecdotal books and articles written by financial journalists, such as Oliver 
Marriott’s The Property Boom (1967), The Economist (U.K.), Pensions & Investments 
(U.S.), Immobilien Manager (Germany), National Real Estate Investor (U.S.), and Site 
Selection (U.K.); published company biographies, such as Robert Sobel’s Trammell 
Crow. Master Builder: The Storv of America’s Largest Real Estate Empire (1989), and 
those of Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Mitsubishi, which presented largely 
undocumented insight into commercial real estate enterprises; and an extensive array of 
academic books encompassing various aspects of real estate investment services, such as 
S. Hayes and P.M. Hubbell’s Investment Banking: A Tale of Three Cities (1990), M.A. 
Hines’s Guide to International Real Estate Investment (1988), and D.J. Kostin’s German 
Real Estate Market: An Introduction for Non-German Investors (1991). In addition, the 
working paper series published by the Centre for Business Strategy at the London 
Business School, the Centre for European Property Research at the University of 
Reading, and the Center for Real Estate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
provided findings of recent research on specific sectors of real estate investment, 
property markets, and professional services.
Because so little comprehensive secondary source material was previously 
published, the thesis required compilation of two types of published and unpublished 
‘primary’ source material: direct investment stock data recorded (and sometimes
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published) by official government agencies, which remained the single-most consistent 
source of time-series statistics on cross-border direct investment among the four 
countries; and, detailed historical case studies of 40 real estate advisory service firms that 
moved into foreign markets and diversified services. The latter drew on annual reports, 
trade reports, internal corporate documents, press reports, industry publications, and 
interviews with executive managers.
An historical analysis of cross-border direct real estate investment is presented 
in Chapter 2, focusing on trends in inward and outward investment for the U.S., U.K., 
Germany, and Japan.32 However, data limitations must be mentioned: national
statistics were compiled for only the sectoral business enterprise (i.e., real estate), and 
not for each type of investment (property) by each type of business establishment (i.e., 
the real estate division of a multinational corporation). Real estate activities were 
therefore not identified separately from the major non-real estate activities of 
multinational enterprises. Cross-border direct investment in real estate was defined in 
national government statistics as the purchase or sale in a host country of land or 
structures for commercial use, or changes in existing investments in land or structures. 
In terms of economic motivation or global market strategy, investment in land or 
structures was more akin to the purchase of natural resources than to the acquisition of 
manufacturing or services facilities. However, the real estate industry included activities 
typically found in the construction and services industries, such as designing and building
°2 Stock data represent the cumulative historical book value of direct investors’s equity, including 
reinvested earnings in and net outstanding loans to their foreign affiliates. However, data on Japan 
represented the cumulative value of planned projects, not actual stock value. By contrast, flow data 
represent the total of annual direct investment capital flows of equity, reinvested earnings, and 
intercompany debt.
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commercial or residential projects, providing leasing services, or giving advice about, 
or performing services related to, real estate markets and investments.
Chapter 3 examines the principal factors that influenced the internationalization 
of real estate advisory services in the focal countries. To further focus the discussion, 
Chapter 4 then traces the historical evolution of ten leading firms in each focal country 
that internationalized at some point during the 1960-1990 period. This chapter evaluated 
service diversification, expansion strategies, management structures, and forms of 
ownership, and also documented marketplace and/or organizational (strategy and 
structure) determinants of ‘failed’ firms, defined as enterprises that failed as multinational 
operations or lost significant capital due to foreign expansion.33 This collective profile 
provided the general foundation and analytical framework for the indepth case studies 
presented in the chapter following.
Chapter 5 argues that real estate advisory service firms in the focal countries 
acquired and deepened competitive advantage in the international marketplace by 
continually developing new skills and moving into new markets. This chapter examined 
major service innovations and market-oriented technical innovations that advanced the 
internationalization of real estate advisory services throughout the 30-year period.
Chapter 6 presents the case studies of the international expansion strategies of 
four leading real estate advisory service firms in each of the four countries: Cushman 
& Wakefield of the U.S., Jones Lang Wootton of the U.K., Mueller of Germany, and 
Orix of Japan. By selecting four firms based in four different nations with diverse 
traditions, cultures, and economic circumstances, this comparative analysis attempted to
The ‘universe’ of firms that were evaluated was limited only to domestic firms that internationalized 
some point between 1960 and 1990. A full recitation of domestic firms in 1960 which subsequently 
failed in the domestic market was omitted, as such an analysis would constitute a separate 
dissertation.
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isolate determinants influencing successful international expansion in real estate advisory 
services, as distinct from the idiosyncratic ones. Among the four companies, several 
distinctions were analyzed: service diversification, response to and promotion of
periodic innovations, expansion strategy, ownership structure, and domestic and
4
international organizational structures.
Cushman & Wakefield, founded in 1917, was selected because it diversified its 
practice throughout domestic and international markets more rapidly than any other U.S. 
firm, establishing a presence in the European market through a joint initiative with a 
U.K. firm. Jones Lang Wootton, founded in 1783, was the most successful U.K. 
advisory firm, known as a chartered surveyor, to expand under its own name and 
ownership throughout the global marketplace. Mueller, established in 1958, was the first 
German firm to move beyond the domestic market, entering an alliance with a global real 
estate services network to broaden its international presence. Orix of Japan was among 
the first and most successful independent, non-trading companies involved in 
international real estate advisory services, expanding from its core business in financial 
services to acquire a controlling interest in a major U.S. development and investment 
advisory firm.
Each firm invested substantial capital to diversify its core advisory services in 
response to the rise of cross-border direct investments in the domestic market and 
abroad. Moreover, each enterprise developed specific strategies for domestic and global 
expansion to deepen the firm’s penetration of rapidly growing international corporate, 
development, and investment markets. In summary, the case studies set forth factual 
evidence for the prevailing thesis that international real estate advisory service firms 
initially cultivated and achieved a solid reputation in their home nations prior to
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international expansion. Moreover, service diversification and geographic expansion 
were^not necessarily mutually inclusive strategies. In fact, privately owned service 
enterprises that were governed by conservative financial management gained competitive 
advantage through an ability to capitalize service diversification and geographic 
expansion from retained earnings, as well as infusions of domestic and foreign capital 
from equity partners or shareholders. Simultaneously they formulated an integrated, 
multidepartmental structure that centralized corporate entrepreneurial control and 
decentralized localized operational management.
The conclusions presented in Chapter 7 summarize the major findings from each 
preceding chapter, and overall conclusions on the hypotheses examined in the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2 CROSS-BORDER DIRECT INVESTMENT OF THE FOCAL 
COUNTRIES
2 .1  In tr o d u c t io n  and D e fin itio n s
Cross-border direct investment involves the international transfer of capital for 
the purpose of purchasing and controlling foreign assets, going beyond the international 
sale of products or services generated from the use of domestic assets. It is defined as 
"an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, who is resident 
in another economy, owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power 
(for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise)."34 
A direct investment enterprise (affiliate) is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise 
in which a single person (an individual, company, government, or group of related 
individuals) owns a significant share of the voting securities (usually considered to be 
10 percent or more), or an equivalent interest, either directly or indirectly through 
another affiliate. Ownership and/or control of land or structures in a foreign country is 
also considered to be cross-border direct investment. Any other type of cross-border 
private investment that is made to not achieve some degree of control over the 
investment is referred to as portfolio investment.
The broad definition of portfolio investment encompasses many other different 
types of international investment, including the purchase and sale of equity securities 
(usually less than 10 percent of total outstanding voting securities), long-term debt 
securities (bonds, debentures, etc.), short-term (money market) debt instruments, trade
34 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Manual. 5th Edition. (Washington, DC, 1993),
p. 86.
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financing, bank lending or borrowing, and financial derivatives (options, futures, etc.)
whertrthey generate financial claims on or liabilities to nonresidents.35 Some of these
types of portfolio investment can ultimately be used to finance the purchase of land or
structures. However, balance of payments data record only the type of cross-border
♦
portfolio investment that has occurred, not its ultimate use or the industry or occupation 
of the owner of the capital. (The banking industry is the only exception, but even with 
investment reported by that industry there is still no distinction made as to the ultimate 
use of the funds.) Accordingly, portfolio investment that flows into real estate is not 
identified separately in the data and, thus, is not available for use in this thesis.
A few countries, including Germany, have collected data on cross-border private 
real estate investment intended for non-commercial use, such as vacation homes. But 
none of the other focal countries collected non-commercial real estate investment data. 
Real estate investment made through open-end property funds or by means of limited 
partnerships are also not identified separately in portfolio data. Direct purchases of land 
or structures by pension funds or property companies are reported directly to the national 
governments by those companies, or reported by the managing general partner of the 
enterprise, and are included in cross-border direct investment data.
Cross-border direct investment is categorized in government data by industry. 
The real estate industry also includes activities typically found in the construction and 
service industries, such as designing structures and building commercial or residential 
projects, providing leasing services, or performing advisory services related to real estate 
markets. Data are collected only for the total business enterprise, and not for each 
business establishment and/or division—for the legal entity rather than for each physical
35 Ibid., p. 91.
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location. Real estate activities are not identified separately from non-real-estate activities 
of the overall enterprise.36
In this chapter, direct investment stock37 data from official sources are used for 
purposes of analysis because they are the single-most consistent and comprehensive 
source of data available on cross-border direct investment of the focal countries. Stock 
data measure the cumulative outstanding value of direct investment made up until any 
given point in time, including valuation adjustments for changes in market value, foreign 
exchange rate gains or losses, and valuation of intangible assets. By comparison, direct 
investment flow data record only the annual flow of foreign investors’ capital invested 
in a foreign enterprise. However, since there is no universally applied system or method 
for the collection of data on cross-border direct investment, the specific definitions of the 
four focal countries are generally, but not strictly, comparable. Additional detail on the 
definitions and methodologies employed in cross-border data collection by the focal 
countries can be found in Appendix A, Data Limitations.
Other indicators of the global expansion of commercial real estate, not explored 
in this chapter because of data inadequacies, include the total asset value of commercial 
real estate held by foreign-owned affiliates (which, by accounting definition, is much 
higher than the value of foreign investors’ equity ownership in real estate); real estate 
investment included indistinguishably with the investment made by non-real-estate 
companies; property held by non-real-estate companies used for non-commercial 
purposes; or cross-border real estate activities that either are not defined as direct
36 See Appendix A for more discussion of this industry classification issue.
37 See footnote 32.
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investment, are not identified separately by statistics on portfolio investment, or are not 
identified separately in statistics measuring cross-border trade in services.
2 .2  R e v ie w  o f  R ecen t  Tr en d s  in  C r o ss-B or d er  D ir ect  In v estm en t  
Cross-Border Direct Investment in the Focal Countries, c. 1850 to 1950
The movement of capital across national borders as a measured phenomenon dates 
back to the late 19th century. Available data on international capital flows indicated that 
there were three major capital exporters—the U.K., France and Germany. The major 
capital importers were the U.S., Canada, Australia, Sweden, Italy, South Africa, 
Argentina and India.38 Although the data are tenuous and subject to a significant degree 
of error, scholars have pieced together information that enabled limited estimates of 
outward direct investment stocks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One such 
estimate indicated the world stock of direct investment abroad totalled $14 billion in 
1914, mostly from the U.K. ($6.5 billion), U.S. ($2.4 billion), France ($1.7 billion), and 
Germany ($1.5 billion).39 Most of this investment was in railways, utilities, land, 
public works, and manufacturing operations. Historical research also indicated that most 
foreign investment in real estate prior to the 1850s was in land used for crops and cattle 
ranching, and during the Second Industrial Revolution (c. 1865-1920) in sites for 
factories. After World War II cross-border direct investment in manufacturing and 
associated service industries began to expand on a larger scale.
j8 A. Bloomfield, Patterns of Fluctuation in International Investment Before 1914. International Finance
Section); Department of Economics Princeton Studies in International France, number 20, (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1968), pp. 42-44.
j9 J.H. Dunning, "Changes in the Level and Structure of International Production: The Last One
Hundred Years," in The Growth of International Business. M. Casson, editor, (London: George 
Allen & Unicom, 1983).
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Cross-Border Direct Investment in the Focal Countries, 1950 to 1980
^  Although cross-border direct investment in land and other natural resources, and 
in infrastructure development, continued to be important after World War II, by the late 
1950s and 1960s a new phenomenon emerged. The modern multinational corporation 
gained in economic power as manufacturing companies expanded into new markets and 
new products. U.S. multinationals achieved the largest gains during this period, 
primarily due to their advanced technology and management and marketing, and lower 
cost of capital.40
Government restrictions on cross-border direct investment in services,41 
including real estate, were a major factor limiting such investment, particularly 
throughout Europe and in Japan. In addition to regulatory and cultural barriers in the 
focal countries, the fragmented nature of real estate markets raised the economic cost of 
information about overseas markets compared with those costs for domestic markets. 
Another factor limiting cross-border direct investment in real estate was that financial 
markets in western Europe and Japan were more heavily regulated in the 1950s, and 
financial institutions focused primarily on meeting domestic needs and supporting 
international trade in goods, not financing foreign investment.42
Cross-border direct investment stock data shown in Tables 3 through 5 represent 
the cumulative historical book value of direct investment, unadjusted for inflation or for
40 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, International Direct Investment: 
Global Trends and the U.S. Role. (Washington, DC, 1988), pp. 2-3.
41 Government restrictions in the focal countries on cross-border direct investment in services, including 
real estate, are difficult to document through primary research records. Even the secondary sources 
available provide only descriptive information, not systematically official records.
42 These regulations included foreign exchange approval requirements, and outright restrictions of 
domestic residents for offshore finance and banking facilities to prevent international intermediation 
of funds.
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changes in market value. These stock data were collected by direct survey of foreign 
direct investors, and were provided by the focal countries in aggregate country and 
industry format. Because these stocks were valued at historical cost, they were usually 
understated, except for years when market values of commercial real estate fell 
substantially, such as 1974-1975. Despite this understatement, compared with either 
current cost or market value, historical book value data approximated the market value 
for recent years because the majority of cross-border real estate investment by the focal 
countries was made in the 1980s. To date, only the U.Sr provided current cost and 
market value estimates of total outward and total inward direct investment. The U.S. 
did not, however, provide current cost or market value estimates of direct investment in 
real estate specifically.
Trends in Outward and Inward Real Estate Investment, 1950-1980
Cross-border direct investment in real estate was relatively small well into the 
1970s (Table 3). The stock of outward direct investment in real estate in 1966 from 
Germany, Japan and the U.S. collectively totalled $575 million, or only 0.5 percent of 
the world stock of outward direct investment at that time.43 This is a low proportion, 
considering that total outward direct investment from these three focal countries 
accounted for over 54 percent of the world stock of outward direct investment at that 
time. By 1975, parallel real estate data were available for all four focal countries; the 
U.K. and Germany were the largest investing countries. Outward real estate investment 
from both countries had increased to over $2 billion, while from Japan and the U.S. it
4:5 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, International Direct Investment: 
Global Trends and the U.S. Role. (Washington, DC, 1988), p. 87. The world outward stock of 
direct investment was $112 billion in 1967.
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lagged behind at around $250 million each. By 1980, when Germany, Japan and the 
U .S .^egan to provide annual time series data, outward real ostate investment from 
Germany had jumped to over $6 billion, but had increased only minimally for Japan and 
the U.S. The U.K. reported industry-specific outward direct investment data on a
4
triennial basis since 1978; in 1981 outward direct investment in real estate totalled 
$3.3 billion, representing a modest 17 percent increase since 1975.
Before 1970, none of the focal countries, except Germany, identified inward 
direct investment in real estate separately. In 1970, only Germany and Japan recorded 
inward direct investment in real estate: $274 million and $3 million, respectively (Table 
4). By 1975, the combined stocks of inward direct investment in real estate for all four 
focal countries rose to $1.6 billion, or about 0.8 percent of the world stock of inward 
direct investment.44
Except for the U.S., the monetary value of inward real estate investment in the 
focal countries was relatively small before 1980. In 1980, the U.S. hosted the largest 
amount of inward direct investment in real estate at $6.1 billion, followed by the U.K. 
with $2.1 billion, and Germany with $1.7 billion. Most U.S. inward investment in real 
estate was from Germany, the U.K., and other European countries. Japan hosted only 
$23 million, reflecting long-standing government restrictions on foreign direct investment 
in general.
Liberalization of International Capital Controls
After World War II, all of the focal countries except the U.S. placed restrictions 
on capital outflows in order to relieve domestic shortages of capital and to promote a
44 Ibid., p. 91. The world stock of inward direct investment is estimated at $211.1 billion in 1973.
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faster recovery from the disruptions of the war. The U.S. first initiated voluntary 
controls in the 1960s, and then instituted mandatory controls on capital outflows in 
response to balance of payments and excess dollar liquidity problems.
During the 1970s, many countries, including the focal countries, began to loosen 
capital controls on outward direct investment. In part, the major industrial countries 
reduced their restrictions on international capital markets with the abolition of the Bretton 
Woods standard and the advent of the floating exchange rate system beginning in 1973, 
as well as the need to facilitate the recycling of dollar surpluses generated from OPEC 
oil price increases beginning in the early 1970s. Japan liberalized outward investment 
regulations for Japanese banks in the early 1970s, and later, in 1980, amended the 
Foreign Exchange Control Law to reduce government restraints on capital outflows. The 
U.K. gradually loosened controls on outward investment during the 1970s, culminating 
in the removal of foreign exchange controls in 1979. Shortly after abolishing its fixed 
exchange rate system and initiating a floating exchange rate system in the early 1970s, 
the U.S. officially ended its controls on outward investment in 1974.
This gradual liberalization of general capital controls by each of the focal 
countries in the 1970s and early 1980s removed major impediments to the international 
flow of capital, and set the stage for the further expansion of cross-border direct 
investment, including investment in real estate.
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TABLE 3
S t o c k  o f  T o t a l  a n d  R e a l  E s t a t e  O u t w a r d  D ir e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  by
t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s  
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
1950
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Germany
Total Real Estate 
67
203 0
306 0
408 23
483 48
618 72
820 125
1,103 175
1,361 226
1,654 288
1,961 325
2,315 388
2,581 400
3,041 450
3,716 596
4,511 813
5,689 948
7,034 1,218
9,200 1,739
11,723 2,158
12,528 2,136
23,315 3,109
28,111 3,781
37,071 4,704
45,181 5,761
47,823 6,149
49,901 6,029
50,971 6,624
Japan
Total Real Estate
348
447
546
671
790
949
1,176
1,451
2,008
2,673
3,577
4,435
6,773
10,267
12,663
15,943
19,405
22,211
26,809
31,804
36,497
45,428
53,131
2
3
4 
27
27
28 
35
35
36 
38 
44 
48
103
223
240
251
266
301
399
504
595
778
901
United Kingdom 
Total Real Estate
11,798 919 b
12,744 993 b
13,690 1,067 b
14,636 1,141 b
15.583 1,215 b
16,469 1,284 b
17,355 1,353 b
17,325 1,351 b
18,241 1,422 b
19,926 1,554 b
21,065 1,643 b
23,304 1,817 b
23,411 1,826 b
35,303 c 2,753 b
36,061 2,795 b
37.584 2,831 b
39,962 3,117 b
46,444 3,622 b
57,255 7,141 b
69,840 3,723
76,823 3,996
85,721 3,320
84,017 3,280
United States 
Total Real Estate
11,788 38
22,505 81
25,394 
27,409 
29,827
31,865 123
34,717 138
37,276 149
40,736 162
44.480 177
49,474 197
51,792 209
56,560 210
61,907 211
68,093 213
75.480 215
82,760 218
89,878 218
101,313 220
110,078 221 ,
124,050 221 •
136,000 224
145,990 227
162,727 243
187,858 235
215,375 251
228,348 249
207,752 550
(Table continues)
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Stock  o f  T otal  and Rea l  Estate Outward  D ir ec t  Investment by
t h e  F o c a l  C o u n tr ie s  > f
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Germany a Janan United Kingdom United States
Total Real Estate Total Real Estate Total Real Estate Total Real Estate
1983 50,186 6,606 61,276 1,144 83,878 3,274 207,203 558
1984 50,764 6,594 71,431 1,326 86,874 3,870 211,480 445
1985 66,085 8,547 83,649 2,533 101,270 4,557 230,250 384
1986 86,431 11,112 105,969 6,531 121,465 5,465 259,800 348
1987 110,020 13,942 139,333 11,958 158,958 5,811 314,307 1,868
1988 114,465 13,186 186,355 20,599 190,028 6,080 335,893 1,857
1989 133,328 14,555 253,896 34,742 198,650 6,356 372,419 2,025
1990 169,055 17,382 310,808 46,444 226,794 4,560 424,086 .1,860
— Not available.
Note: The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, performed and confirmed the interpolation of data for the following
years the focal countries did publish data: Japan, 1960, total and real estate investment; U.K., 1960-1973, 1975-1979, and 1980-1981, total 
and real estate investment, and for 1982-1983, 1986-1987, and 1988-1989, real estate investment only; U.S., 1960-1976, total and real 
estate investment.
a German outward direct investment in real estate before 1976 represents real estate held for personal use; for 1976 forward also represents 
commercial property. Break in time series in 1975 for all outward direct investment due to revised data collection methodology.
b Includes insurance.
c Break in time series in 1973 for both inward and outward U.K. direct investment due to revised data methodology.
Sources: For Germany, total outward direct investment from Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistical Supplements to the Monthly Report of the
Deutsche Bundesbank. Series 3, Balance of Payments Statistics, March and April issues; real estate data for 1957-75 from unpublished 
estimates by the Balance of Payments Division of the Statistics Department of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and for 1976-90 from the 
Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. April issues. For Japan, for 1963-75, Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual. 1976; 
for 1976-90, Japanese Ministry of Finance, Reported Outward and Inward Direct Investment. May/June issues. For the United 
Kingdom, total outward direct investment from levels of assets and liabilities data, Central Statistical Office, United Kingdom Balance of 
Payments. CSO Pink Book, various issues; real estate data from Central Statistical Office, Census of Overseas Assets. 1974, 1981, 1984 
and 1987. For the United States, for 1950-76, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Selected Data on U.S. 
Direct Investment Abroad. 1950-76, February 1982; for 1977, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S- 
Direct Investment Abroad. 1977. April 1981; for 1978-81, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Estimates. 1977-81, November 1986; for 1981-90, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. August issues.
TABLE 4
Stock  o f  Total  and R eal  Estate Inward D irect  Investment in
the  Focal  C ountries
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Germanya/ Japan_____  United Kingdom United States
Total Real Estate Total Real Estate Total Real Estate Total Real Estate
1950 879 476 — — — — 3,391 101
1951 916 476 — — — — 3,658 109
1952 938 476 — — — — 3,945 118
1953 1,010 476 — — — — 4,251 127
1954 1,076 452 — — — — 4,633 138
1955 1,117 427 — — — — 5,076 152
1956 1,239 405 — — — — 5,459 163
1957 1,412 381 — — — — 5,710 171
1958 1,496 383 — — — — 6,115 183
1959 1,620 360 — — — — 6,604 198
1960 1,794 336 510 0 4,879 48 6,910 207
1961 2,200 325 520 0 5,424 55 7,392 221
1962 2,566 325 550 0 5,968 61 7,612 228
1963 2,868 327 590 0 6,514 65 7,944 238
1964 3,257 302 650 0 7,059 70 8,363 250
1965 3,973 300 680 0 7,812 78 8,797 263
1966 4,410 277 750 0 8,566 85 9,054 271
1967 4,823 275 810 0 8,266 99 9,923 297
1968 5,392 250 840 2 9,251 93 10,815 324
1969 6,219 271 900 2 10,191 102 11,818 354 ,
1970 6,779 274 950 3 11,693 116 13,270 398 •
1971 8,816 275 1,020 3 14,217 143 13,914 417
1972 9,887 281 1,195 4 14,667 147 14,868 446
1973 13,972 407 1,220 5 17,621 176 20,556 600
1974 16,865 540 1,245 5 24,220 329 25,144 806
1975 15,042 496 1,470 6 24,490 338 27,662 777
1976 33,946 1,033 1,695 6 23,316 373 30,770 799
1977 38,245 1,209 1,920 13 29,955 625 34,595 853
(Table continues)
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Stock  o f  T o tal  and Real  Estate Inw ard Dir ec t  Investment in
the  Focal C ountries
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Germany * Japan_____ United Kingdom United States
Total Real Estate Total Real Estate Total Real Estate Total Real Estate
1978 ' 47,619 1,637 2,155 17 36,383 846 42,471 1,161
1979 53,399 1,875 2,679 23 48,953 1,388 54,462 1,820
1980 48,662 1,664 2,979 23 63,014 2,068 83,046 6,120
1981 44,586 1,568 3,411 27 57,263 1,883 . 108,714 8,964
1982 43,197 1,636 4,418 31 52,150 1,829 124,677 11,520
1983 40,018 1,387 5,571 31 54,009 1,954 137,061 14,636
1984 36,521 1,191 6,064 34 46,376 1,869 164,583 17,761
1985 50,943 1,533 6,844 41 62,561 2,730 184,615 19,402
1986 66,216 2,058 7,604 58 72,752 3,785 220,414 22,512
1987 87,742 2,690 9,551 77 116,256 6,904 263,394 22,025
1988 84,253 2,782 12,794 147 139,294 9,639 314,754 26,867
1989 102,336 3,393 15,654 794 160,282 10,081 368,924 30,386
1990 133,731 4,125 18,432 818 224,834 13,874 396,702 34,552
Not available.
Note: The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, performed and confirmed the interpolation of data for the following 
years the focal countries did not publish data: Japan, 1960-1975, total and real estate investment; U.K., 1960-1973, total and real estate 
investment; U.S., 1950-1972, total and real estate investment.
a German inward direct investment in real estate represents real estate held for personal use; for 1976 forward also represents commercial property.
Break in time series in 1975 for all inward direct investment due to revised data collection methodology.
Sources: For Germany, total inward direct investment from Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistical Supplements to the Monthly Report of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. Series 3, Balance of Payments Statistics, March and April issues; real estate data for 1957-75 from unpublished estimates 
by the Balance of Payments Division of the Statistics Department of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and for 1976-90 from the Monthly Report 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank. April issues. For Japan, for 1963-75, Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual. 1976; for 1976-90, 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, Reported Outward and Inward Direct Investment. May/June issues. For the United Kingdom, levels of 
assets and liabilities data from Central Statistical Office, United Kingdom Balance of Payments. CSO Pink Book, various issues. For the 
United States, for 1950-79, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Selected Data on U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad. 1950-79. December 1984; for 1980-86, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States; Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Estimates. 1980-86. December 1990; for 1987-90, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. August issues.
TABLE 5
R e a l  E s t a t e  a s  a  S h a r e  o f  T o t a l  O u t w a r d  a n d  In w a r d  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t
in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
Germany * Japan______ United Kingdom United States
Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward
1960 11.6% 18.7% — — — — — —
1961 15.2% 14.8% 0.7% — — — — —
1962 15.9% 12.7% 0.7% — — — — —
1963 16.6% 11.4% 4.0% — — — — —
1964 16.7% 9.3% 3.4% — — — — —
1965 16.6% 7.5% 2.9% — — — — . . .
1966 16.3% 6.3% 3.0% — — — 0.3% —
1967 15.5% 5.7% 2.4% — — — — —
1968 14.8% 4.6% 1.8% — — — — —
1969 16.0% 4.4% 1.4% — — — — —
1970 15.8% 4.0% 1.2% ♦ — — — —
1971 16.7% 3.4% 1.1% * — — — —
1972 17.3% 2.8% 1.5% * — — — —
1973 18.9% 2.9% 2.2% * — — — 2.9%
1974 18.4% 3.2% 1.9% * 7.8% 1.4% 3.2%
1975 17.0% 3.1% 1.6% 0.3% — 1.4% .0.2% 2.8%
(Table continues)
TABLE 5 (Continued)
R e a l  E s t a t e  a s  a  S h a r e  o f  T o t a l  O u t w a r d  a n d  I n w a r d  D ir e c t  I n v e s t m e n t
in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
Germanya Japan_____  United Kingdom United States
Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward
1976 13.3% 3.0% 1.4% 0.4% — 1.6% — 2.6%
1977 13.5% 3.2% 1.4% 0.7% — 2.1% 0.2% 2.5%
1978 12.7% 3.4% 1.5% 0.8% 12.5% 2.3% 0.2% 2.7%
1979 12.7% 3.5% 1.6% 0.9% — 2.8% 0.1% 3.3%
1980 12.9% 3.4% 1.6% 0.8% — 3.3% 0.1% 7.4%
1981 12.1% 3.5% 1.7% 0.8% 3.9% 3.3% .0.1% 8.3%
1982 13.0% 3.8% 1.7% 0.7% — 3.5% 0.3% 9.2%
1983 13.2% 3.5% 1.9% 0.6% — 3.6% .0.3% 10.7%
1984 13.0% 3.3% 1.9% 0.6% 4.5% 4.0% .0.2% 10.8%
1985 12.9% 3.0% 3.0% 0.6% — 4.4% .0.2% 10.5%
1986 12.9% 3.1% 6.2% 0.8% — 5.2% 0.1% 10.2%
1987 12.7% 3.1% 8.6% 0.8% 3.2% 5.9% 0.6% 8.4%
1988 11.5% 3.3% 11.0% 1.2% — 6.9% 0.5% 8.2%
1989 10.9% 3.3% 13.7% 5.1% — 6.3% 0.5% 8.2%
1990 10.3% 3.1% 14.9% 4.4% 2.0% 6.2% 0.4% 8.7%
Not available.
* Less than one-tenth of one percent.
a German outward direct investment in real estate includes real estate held for personal use in addition to commercial real estate
holdings.
Source: Tables 3 and 4.
Note: Real estate as a percent of total inward and outward direct investment was not calculated for those years in which the data
Tables 3 and 4 were interpolated.
Cross-Border Direct Investment in the 1980s
The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented volume of cross-border direct investment. 
Divergent monetary and fiscal policies among the major industrial countries, especially 
among the focal countries, encouraged the flow of portfolio and direct investment capital 
to the U.S. to help finance the country’s large trade and current account deficits. Other 
macroeconomic factors, including divergent economic growth rates, savings-investment 
imbalances, and large dollar depreciation, also fostered the rapid growth of cross-border 
investment. The growing competitiveness of non-U.S. multinationals was another major 
factor in the rapid growth of foreign direct investment in the United States. Germany, 
Japan and the U.K. were three major sources of this increased investment until the late 
1980s, when macroeconomic conditions shifted and the flow of foreign investment to the 
U.S. declined.
Real U.S. economic growth was only about one percent each year during 1988- 
1992.45 The U.S. balance of payments deficit also began to ease after its peak in 1987 
at $160 billion, falling to $92 billion in 1990 and to $9 billion in 1991.46 Thus, the 
need for foreign capital subsided and, in response, both foreign direct and portfolio 
investment flows to the U.S. declined. Intra-European Community (EC) foreign direct 
investment (both outward and inward) also grew in the latter half of the 1980s in
45 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. 
(Washington, DC, March 1992), p. 25.
46 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. 
(Washington, DC, June 1991), p. 45, and March 1992, p. 75.
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response to faster EC economic growth, as well as to increased investment opportunities 
in anticipation of a more unified market with EC92.47
Japanese direct investment abroad surged during the 1980s, especially after 1985, 
with most of this investment flowing to the U.S. A number of factors, some specific to 
Japan, spurred an unprecedented wave of Japanese direct investment abroad. These 
included: (1) a liberal monetary policy in Japan which kept interest rates low and 
facilitated the recycling of dollar surpluses arising out of the U.S.-Japan trade 
imbalances, (2) rapid yen appreciation, (3) a relatively low cost of capital arising from 
a soaring Japanese stock market and low interest rates, (4) a massive balance-of-payment 
surplus, (5) the unleashing of abundant Japanese savings to world financial markets with 
the removal of capital controls and a restructuring of Japanese financial regulations and 
financial markets, (6) the relative shortage of, and high prices for, real estate in Japan, 
(7) improved competitiveness of Japanese multinationals in certain industries arising from 
superior technology and management skills, and (8) an increasingly global outlook in the 
strategic planning of Japanese companies, including finance, insurance, and real estate 
companies.
The 1985 Plaza Accord on the dollar exchange rate was a major factor supporting 
yen appreciation during the late 1980s, inflating the net wealth of Japanese investors in 
dollar terms in a very short period of time. The yen nearly doubled in value against the 
dollar, appreciating from 239 yen per dollar in 1985, to 128 yen per dollar in 1988. 
Japanese investors were able to outbid U.S. and other foreign investors for companies 
and properties for sale in the U.S.
47 Anticipated market potentials and investment opportunities associated with EC92 may well have 
exceeded the benefits of combined European markets.
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Trends in Outward Real Estate Investment in the 1980s
Japanese outward investment dominated the international real estate industry in
the second half of the 1980s. Japanese outward investment in real estate increased the
fastest and by the largest amount of any focal country, and it grew to the highest*
proportion (15 percent) of any source country’s outward direct investment (Table 5). 
Japanese outward investment in real estate grew from $595 million in 1980 to 
$2.5 billion in 1985, and then rocketed to $46.4 billion by 1990. This phenomenal surge 
in Japanese investment inflated U.S. commercial real estate prices, and became 
extraordinarily lucrative for sellers of U.S. real estate.48
European markets also attracted Japanese investment in real estate, though to a 
much lesser extent, heavily concentrated in London, Paris, and Frankfurt. German 
outward direct investment in real estate advanced, primarily in 1986, 1987 and 1989, 
paralleling increases in total German outward direct investment. Growth in foreign real 
estate investment, however, did not keep pace with other industries. The majority of 
property investment through the 1970s flowed to European countries, and a growing 
portion went to U.S. markets in the 1980s. Outward investment data suggested that 
German real estate companies concentrated on domestic markets and, in 1989-1990, 
immediate investment opportunities in East Germany; German manufacturing and service 
companies, by contrast, implemented global strategies.
U.K. outward investment in real estate increased much less than that of either 
Germany or Japan, rising to $5.1 billion by 1987 and $6.4 billion in 1989, before 
declining to $4.6 billion in 1990. Although the official data showed that U.K. outward
48 Japanese inflationary purchases of U.S. property acquired the colloquial name, the "Tokyo takeout". 
D. G. Shulman, "Will Rising Japanese Interest Rates Limit the ‘Tokyo Takeout,’ a report by Salomon 
Brothers (January 16, 1990), p. 1.
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real estate investment grew modestly during the 1980s, data through 1986 might be
misleading. For example, U.S. data on inward direct investment in the U.S. real estate
industry showed that U.K. real estate investment in the U.S. alone grew from
$0.6 billion in 1980 to $4.8 billion in 1985, and then declined to $4.1 billion by 1990.49
♦
It therefore appeared that U.K. outward real estate investment data were understated.
U.S. outward investment in real estate remained modest at less than one-half of 
one percent of total U.S. direct investment abroad until 1987, when it increased 546 
percent in one year, from $348 million to $1.9 billion, and remained at that level through 
1990. Major acquisitions by U.S. companies in the EC, mostly in the U.K., were the 
primary basis for this rise. However, as discussed extensively in Chapter 3, many local 
regulations on foreign real estate investment in Europe and Japan, in contrast to the 
U.S., reinforced a less international outlook among U.S. commercial real estate 
companies and financial institutions and limited the growth of U.S. outward investment 
in real estate.
Trends in Inward Real Estate Investment in the 1980s
The U.S. attracted the largest amount of foreign real estate investment during the 
1980s, primarily due to the country’s open investment policy. In 1980, the stock of 
foreign direct investment in U.S. real estate totalled to $6.1 billion, the largest of any 
focal country. The stock increased steadily in the 1980s, and jumped after 1987 with the 
surge in Japanese investment in U.S. real estate. By 1990, the U.S. hosted $34.6 billion 
of stock in real estate, two-and-one-half times as large as the U.K., which had the second
49 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business.
(Washington, DC, August 1991), and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Balance of 
Payments and Direct Investment Position Estimates. 1980-86. (Washington, DC, December 1990).
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largest stock of any focal country. However, relative to the respective size of their 
ecoiiomies—the U.S. gross domestic product was about five-and-a-half times as large as 
the U .K .’s in 1990--inward investment in U.K. real estate was quite large. The U.K. 
also hosted a significant increase in Japanese property investment in the late 1980s, and
4
the overall stock inward direct investment in U.K. real estate increased from $2.7 billion 
in 1985 to $13.9 billion in 1990.
Despite these surges of inward direct investment in the U.K. and the U.S., real 
estate was not the major focus of cross-border direct investment. In 1990, the U.S. 
proportion of inward direct investment in real estate was only 8.7 percent, and in the 
U.K. it was only 6.2 percent (Table 5). Cross-border direct investment in 
manufacturing, trade, petroleum, and in banking, finance and insurance collectively 
prevailed in foreign markets.
2.3 I n te r n a t io n a l R e a l E s ta te  In v estm en t in  t h e  F o c a l C o u n tr ie s  
Germany: Outward Real Estate Investment
Significant increases in Germany’s outward direct investment in real estate 
occurred in the late 1970s and late 1980s, mostly in other European countries, the U.S. 
and South Africa.50 The stock of German outward direct investment in real estate 
increased from $813 million in 1970 to $2.1 billion in 1975, and jumped to $6.1 billion 
by 1980 (Table 3). By 1985, it had grown to $8.5 billion, and more than doubled to 
$17.4 billion by 1990. In both periods, Germany’s lower cost of capital and appreciating 
currency favored outward investment. German finance and commercial real estate 
companies, as well as individual investors, capitalized on lower cost interest rates and
50 M.A. Hines, Guide to International Real Estate Investment (New York: Quorum Books, 1988), p. 9.
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deutschemark appreciation in the 1980s, with overseas property values comparing
favorably to domestic property values during this time.
In the 1970s, superior technology, as well as the management and marketing
skills of German companies in chemicals, electronics, and transportation equipment%
manufacturing spearheaded an outward surge in direct investment. This success led other 
German industries—including professional services and real estate—to expand into new 
markets to service German multinational clients. In the late 1980s, German outward 
direct investment slowed in the U.S., but expanded in Europe, particularly in the EC and 
in some countries that joined the EC during this decade (e.g., Spain and Portugal).51 
Two major reasons for this shift in German outward investment were rapid economic 
growth in Europe following recession in the early 1980s, and anticipation of more unified 
markets of EC92, which sparked cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The fall of 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland in 1989, also opened 
previously closed markets to Western investors. A relatively small amount of German 
investment also occurred in East Germany (before unification), Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia, including real estate acquisitions.
Germany’s outward direct investment was characterized by a greater 
representation of personal investment in overseas real estate than found in the other 
countries, facilitated by large open-end property funds.52 Other German outward 
investment was facilitated by real estate advisory service companies, rental and housing 
agencies, and asset and fund management companies. Also, some foreign investment
51 Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Statistical Supplement, Series 3, 
(April 1991), pp. 4, 6.
52 Personal property investment typically is either classified as portfolio rather than direct investment 
or is not measured at all, but it is included in German direct investment data.
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was channeled through holding companies and pooled international funds, which were 
classified in the finance industry rather than in real estate; this investment would 
consequently not be counted in real estate investment stock data. Finally, the relocation 
to the U.S. of major divisions of German institutional fund management firms, such as 
Lehndorff, might have lowered reported outward direct ■* investment in German 
statistics.53 Taken together, these factors likely resulted in the understatement of the 
stock of German outward real estate investment.
Germany: Inward Real Estate Investment
Inward direct investment in German real estate also surged during the late 1970s 
and again in the late 1980s. The amounts of inward investment were much smaller than 
outward direct investment, however.54 Rapid economic growth in Germany during 
those two periods attracted more foreign investment, both overall and in real estate. The 
prospering economy increased profits and reinvested earnings of existing foreign-owned 
real estate companies. (In addition to new equity investment and intercompany debt, 
reinvested earnings of foreign-owned companies also increased foreign direct investment 
stock.) The expansion of the operations of large multinationals located in the EC 
countries was also a major factor. Increased private investment and government
5j When companies transfer their ownership to a foreign country they cease to be foreign direct 
investors. Since these companies are not defined as foreign direct investors, any funds borrowed 
abroad to finance real estate acquisitions or new developments are also not defined as direct 
investment. The transfer of Lehndorff operations to the United States is described in the case studies, 
Chapter 6.
54 As shown in Table 4, the stock of inward investment in real estate doubled from only $274 million 
in 1970 to $496 million in 1975, and increased to $1.7 billion in 1980. By 1985, it had declined 
slightly to $1.5 billion, but grew to $4.1 billion by 1990.
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spending associated with the unification of east and west Germany created additional 
opportunities for foreign investment in German real estate, mostly in the west.
A limited amount of buildable land for commercial structures supported relatively 
high prices and low investment returns for German property, which, when combined 
with a strong currency, hindered foreign investment relative to other European countries 
and the U.S. Relatively low inflation in Germany also limited the attractiveness of 
German real estate as an inflation hedge or for price speculation. Thus, despite German 
tax incentives for offshore companies investing long-term in property, inward investment 
in German real estate remained low relative to U.K. and U.S. markets.55
Germany’s real estate market was further characterized by distinct demographic 
features. A large proportion of the population live in urban centers—86 percent versus 
an average of 78 percent for Europe, 77 percent for Japan and 74 percent for the U.S.56 
Fifty percent of the population live on only 7 percent of the land, which has created a 
high demand for property in cities. Thus, real estate investment in Germany has been 
concentrated in urban office buildings, and high-density commercial and residential 
developments.
Most property investments have been managed and owned by large German 
institutions, and, to a lesser extent, by private investment groups and major construction 
contractors in partnership with investors. Open-end property funds also attracted foreign 
capital to German real estate.57 Foreign investors were particularly attracted to
55 Weatherall, Green & Smith, German Property Report 1990 (London, May 1990), p. 7.
56 D.J. Kostin, ‘German Real Estate Market: An Introduction for Non-German Investors,’ a report 
prepared for Salomon Brothers (New York, April 1991), p. 23, and personal interview, D.J. Kostin, 
May 1991.
57 If the ownership level falls below the reporting threshold for German statistics, investment in these 
funds is defined as portfolio rather than direct investment.
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Frankfurt and Hamburg, where offshore investments accounted for more than one-third
of 1989 acquisitions. Foreign investors also began to invest in Berlin in 1990 and 1991,
which prompted such major real estate advisory firms as Mueller of Germany and Jones
Lang Wootton of the U.K. to open Berlin offices in 1991.58 U.K. investment in%
Germany historically was through U.K.-based property companies, such as Hammersons, 
Slough Estates, MEPC, and London & Edinburgh Trust. Japanese investors began to 
invest in German property markets in the late 1980s, once having established ownership 
stakes in the U.K. and the U.S. This strategy preceded the recession in 1990, at which 
time only 6 percent of Japanese property investments in Europe were located in 
Germany.59
Japan: Outward Real Estate Investment
The economic and demographic factors which supported Germany’s outward real 
estate investment were similar to those in Japan. The country’s small land mass, vast 
mountainous regions, high-density urban development, and rising per-capita income 
supported high real estate prices and created a pent-up demand for real estate. This, 
together with a loosening of controls on international capital flows, an easy monetary 
policy and lower interest rates, soaring stock prices, and the availability of vast sums of 
dollars recycled from the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance, boosted Japanese outward real 
estate investment in the late 1980s to unprecedented levels. Between 1985 and 1990, 
Japanese stock of outward real estate investment soared from $2.5 billion to 
$46.4 billion, the largest stock of any focal country.
58 See Chapter 6, Case Studies.
59 J. Plender, ‘The Bankers’ House of Cards’, Financial Times (12 November 1991), p. 14.
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Many Japanese companies and institutional funds were relatively new to foreign
real estate investment and tended to concentrate acquisitions in established U.S. urban
center and well-known commercial properties, some of which were highly visible, high-
quality properties. Mitsubishi Estate purchased an interest in Rockefeller Plaza, for
♦
example, an investment of $1.46 billion in 1989.60 Japanese investors also acquired 
major U.S. real estate holdings outside urban areas, particularly shopping centers, golf 
courses, hotels, and undeveloped land in the states of Hawaii and California.
To broaden their understanding of foreign markets, Japanese investors typically 
engaged U.S. investment banks and real estate advisory firms, discussed in Chapters 3 
and 6. In Europe, in addition to Paris and Frankfurt, Japanese investors focused on 
London property between 1985 and 1989, in which they invested approximately 
$2.8 billion over four years.61 Among the largest transactions were EIE International’s 
purchase of Britannic House, Moor Lane; 38 Bishopsgate by Kumagai Gumi; Old Bailey 
by Mitsui Real Estate; Bush House, Aldwych by Kato Kagaku.62 Through the early 
1980s Japanese investors were dominated by construction, development and trading 
companies (notably Kumagai Gumi, Itoh, Shimizu and Kajima), which typically 
participated in joint ventures and debt financings, rather than acquire sole ownership 
positions.63 By the late 1980s Japanese life assurance companies became the most
60 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United States. 1989 Transactions. (Washington, DC, June 1991), p. 109.
61 This represented 3.7 percent of total outward direct investment over the same period. ‘Asian 
Property Market: Investment in the 1990s,’ a report issued by Richard Ellis (1990), p. 78.
62 Ibid.
6j H. Mitani, ‘Capital from Japan, Part II: Gaining Access to Japanese Investors’, The Real Estate 
Finance Journal v. 4, no. 4 (1988), p. 19.
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active Japanese investors, investing company capital instead of borrowing funds for 
property investments.
Japanese banks also entered the London market, reportedly to expand international 
name recognition, to gain direct experience in the global securities business, and to 
accommodate clients demanding multinational services.64 Within the 1983-87 period, 
Japanese banks increased their share of the construction loan market to U.K. residents, 
from one percent of the overall market to 6 percent, a total of $400 million. Japanese 
bank loans for property acquisitions also grew, from zero to 4 percent of the entire 
market, a total of $500 million.65
The decline of the Japanese stock market beginning in 1990, coupled with a rapid 
increase in Japanese interest rates and a fall in property values, forced Japanese investors 
to decrease real estate investments in 1990 and 1991, which severely depleted global 
capital lending and acquisition sources. This was true particularly in the U.S., where 
a high proportion of Japanese investments were focused and where the commercial real 
estate market had come to depend on rising flows of Japanese capital. During the 1990- 
1991 U.S. recession, industry publications and professional journals reported multiple 
examples of under-performing Japanese holdings in U.S. markets, investments acquired 
between 1985 and 1989. Concurrently, however, the U.K. was also experiencing a 
recessionary real estate market. Japanese investors subsequently emphasized diversified 
acquisition strategies, by national markets as well as types of real estate investments.
64 J.T. Dueser, International Strategies of Japanese Banks (London and New York: Macmillan, 1990), 
p. 115.
65 Ibid., p. 122.
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Japan: Inward Real Estate Investment
-'r Similar economic and demographic factors that underlay the expansion of 
Japanese outward real estate investment strictly limited the amount of inward direct 
investment in Japanese real estate. Exceptionally high real estate prices, low returns, an 
appreciating currency, and few property sales (in part due to- a relatively high capital 
gains tax of 62.4 percent) acted as major deterrents to foreign investors. By 1990, the 
stock of inward direct investment in Japan totalled only $818 million. As points of 
reference, this volume was the equivalent of only 2 percent of inward direct investment 
in U.S. real estate and just one percent of Japanese outward direct investment in real 
estate.
Japanese government restrictions on foreign direct investment in Japan before 
1980 suppressed inward real estate investment. The restrictions dated back to the 
reconstruction period following World War II and were designed to limit foreign 
competition while Japanese companies rebuilt factories and reestablished domestic 
markets. Prior to the 1980 amendment to the Foreign Exchange Control Law, direct 
investors obtained approval from the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) to make 
inward or outward investments. The amendment, formulated in response to pressure 
from foreign governments to ease restrictions on foreign direct investment, changed the 
requirement to notification to the MOF only for a proposed investment, with automatic 
approval after 30 days if no objection was raised by the MOF. Prior to 1980, the 
Japanese government was accused of exploiting this law to force foreign investors to 
accept minority ownership positions with Japanese partners. In March 1991, the Foreign 
Exchange Control Law was amended again, allowing foreign investors to initiate 
transactions before notifying the MOF.
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Japanese securities laws and restrictive practices of domestic stock exchanges also 
discouraged foreign investors from issuing or trading foreign securities on the exchanges. 
By limiting the amount of stock available for public purchase, interlocking directorates 
and keiretsu arrangements between Japanese companies prevented acquisitions of 
Japanese companies by foreign investors.
United Kingdom: Outward Real Estate Investment
There is a long history of U.K. outward real estate investment that dates back to 
at least the 17th century. Unfortunately, systematic records began only in the early 
1970s. In 1974, the U.K. sponsored the largest amount of outward direct investment in 
real estate of any focal country, at $2.8 billion. Although U.K. statistics did not provide 
specifics on geographic focus, most foreign property investment reportedly occurred in 
such developed national markets as Europe and the U.S., aligning with total U.K. 
outward direct investment. The pattern of international expansion undertaken by the 
U.K. real estate advisory service firm of Jones Lang Wootton during the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s (which typically aligned with clients’ foreign investment targets discussed in 
Chapter 6), provided selective evidence of the focus of foreign real estate investment by 
U.K. investors.
British institutional funds, such as the National Coal Board Pension Fund, 
remained major investors abroad through the mid-1980s, with substantial real estate 
investments in the U.S. British corporations were also active in foreign property 
markets, including golf course and resort developments in the U.S. For example, 
Guinness Enterprise Holdings, Inc., an affiliate of the London-based multinational, 
purchased a historic hotel and golf course in Vermont, in 1991. Also in 1991, the U.S.
6 6
office of Chesterton International, a U.K. chartered surveyor, arranged its first golf
course community investment with a $5 million participating mortgage. Far Eastern and
European investors, including the Church of England’s Deansbank pension investment
subsidiary, acquired a 50 percent interest in the same project.66
♦
United Kingdom: Inward Real Estate Investment
The inward stock of real estate investment in the U.K. was relatively small until 
the late 1970s. It increased from $338 million in 1975 to $2.1 billion in 1980. It then 
stagnated until 1985, when it began to rise over the next five years due to Japanese, 
Canadian, U.S., and other European investments. Most of the increase was believed to 
be directed to U.K. property companies active in the London office market, based on 
several reports during this period about Japanese companies buying highly valued 
properties in central London. It is estimated that between 1987 and 1990, foreign 
investors have accounted for one-third of all U.K. property investment, 10 billion 
pounds.67
Foreign investors also made significant indirect (portfolio) property investments 
in the U.K. by purchasing significant blocks of domestic public property companies. For 
example, in 1990 Market Chief, backed by U.S.-based Prudential-Bache and British- 
based Eagle Star, bought Imry Merchant Developers, U.S.-based JMB purchased 
Randsworth and acquired 25 percent ownership in Priest Marians, and Canadian-based 
Olympia & York purchased Stanhope Properties PLC. Indirect investment was also 
made through bank financings. Between 1984 and 1989, total commercial bank loans
66 ‘Pension Fund Advisor Funds Golf Resort’, Golf Business & Real Estate News (July 8, 1991), p. 3.
67 P. Hugill, ‘The International Investor Moves In’, Comment ‘90. (London: Knight Frank & Rutley 
1990), p. 24.
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to U.K. property companies increased 600 percent, to 30 billion pounds. Foreign banks
accounted for 12 billion pounds in 1989, or 40 percent, up from 20 percent in 1984.68
In 1990 and 1991, U.K. inward direct real estate investment declined. Japanese
reduced U.K. direct real estate investments along with all foreign property investments,
*
and Canadian and U.S. direct investment also subsided. For example, Canadian and 
U.S. direct investment in the huge Canary Wharf development project resulted in 
significant losses and severe refinancing problems for its major sponsor, Olympia & 
York Developments, Ltd.
United States: Outward Real Estate Investment
The U.S. sponsored the smallest stock of outward direct investment in real estate 
among the focal countries. Until 1987, when U.S. foreign direct investment soared to 
$1.9 billion, the previous high point had been was recorded in 1983 at $558 million, 
which then declined to only $348 million in 1986.69 U.S. investment in European 
property markets in the late 1980s stemmed from a rise in perceived market opportunities 
among U.S. real estate construction and development companies, major institutional 
investors diversifying abroad, and acquisition of office buildings and industrial facilities 
by U.S. multinationals.
United States: Inward Real Estate Investment
Rising outward direct investment by the other focal countries was reflected in a 
rapid increase in inward direct investment in U.S. real estate. Economic and political
68 Ibid., p. 24.
69 The U.S. investment data methodology may result in some understatement of U. S. outward real estate 
investment. See Appendix A: Data Limitations.
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stability, a favorable investment climate, a relatively low capital gains tax, and the size
of thercountry’s financial and real estate markets created the world’s most attractive and
diverse real estate market. Among the four focal countries and worldwide, the U.S.
remained the most active market for real estate investment after the early 1970s. In
%
1973, when the U.S. Department of Commerce started tracking real estate investment 
separately from investment in other industries, the inward stock of direct investment in 
real estate was $600 million. By 1990, the inward stock of direct investment in U.S. 
real estate had grown to $34.6 billion. As one gauge of the U.S. market’s overall 
magnitude, this peak level represented less than one percent of the value of U.S. land 
at 1990 prices.70
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Canadian investors led foreign investment in 
U.S. real estate markets, followed by U.K. and German firms, respectively, as measured 
by capital invested. In the mid- to late 1980s, Canadian investment began to slow, while 
Japanese investment accelerated. German and U.K. firms remained active in the U.S. 
into the late 1980s, yet their investments were insignificant by comparison with Japanese 
capital invested. According to U.S. data, the stock of Japanese inward direct investment 
rose from $1.5 billion in 1985 to $15.2 billion in 1990. By comparison, the stock of 
U.K. direct investment in the U.S. real estate industry declined from $4.8 billion to 
$3.6 billion, while the stock of German direct investment rise slightly from $1.1 billion 
to $1.3 billion over the same period.71 Despite the greater significance of Canadian, 
U.K., and German investment in U.S. real estate during the 1970s and early 1980s,
70 Proportion calculated based on total value of U.S. land at current cost as reported by Federal Reserve 
Board of U.S., Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy. 1949-90. (Washington, DC, September 1991).
71 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. 
(Washington, DC, August 1987), p. 90, and July 1993, p. 65.
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highly visible Japanese investments prevailed in the second half of the 1980s. On 
occasion, his led to property rights advocates to seek government intervention, albeit, 
unsuccessfully.
Inward direct investment in U.S. real estate was largely in land, offices, shopping 
centers, industrial complexes, and residential buildings, and also included smaller, 
specialized projects such as private golf courses. U.K. investors tended to focus along 
the Mid-Atlantic coast and Japanese firms around the Pacific coast, Texas and Hawaii.72
2 .4  C y cles  o f  Cr o ss-B o r d er  D irect  In ve st m en t  by  t h e  F o c a l  C ountries
Cross-border direct investment in real estate declined after 1990, marking a shift 
in rising global property investment73 in the 1980s. In addition to macroeconomic 
factors, there were several specific reasons the real estate market expanded dramatically: 
real rents increased substantially; major urban markets worldwide experienced low 
vacancy levels (below 5 percent); and an insufficient supply of contemporary, high- 
quality office space, especially in Europe. Demand for real estate advisory services also 
expanded in association with the worldwide growth in services industries in the focal 
countries during this period.
The result of overbuilding during 1984-1990, however, followed by slow 
economic growth in the focal countries in 1990-1991, led to an overabundance of vacant 
and underutilized commercial real estate in most major cities in the U.K. and U.S. The
72 For example, construction financing for a $100 million resort development in San Antonio, Texas was 
provided by the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. The Japanese bank was joined in its 
financing by U.S.-based Hyatt Hotels Corporation, and two Japanese firms-Shimizu and Kawasaki 
Steel, in Golf Business & Real Estate News. (July 15, 1991), p. 2.
7j D.G. Shulman, ‘The End of the Global Property Boom’, a report for Salomon Brothers, (New York, 
December 11, 1990).
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market value of real estate in all of the focal countries, except perhaps in Germany, 
subsequently fell, in some instances by as much as 40 percent in one year. For example, 
in late 1990 Minoru Isutani, a major Japanese developer, bought the Pebble Beach Gulf 
Links golf course for $841 million. In February 1992, Mr. Isutani sold the property for
4
$500 million, a loss of over 40 percent.74 Such a loss was typical of this period, based 
on current reports in the press and industry publications.
Many foreign investors also incurred operating losses on their investments. In 
the U.S., foreign real estate investors incurred negative income of $1.3 billion in 1990, 
and $1.6 billion in 1991.75 In 1990, Canadian direct investors in the U.S. real estate 
reported total negative cash and capital income of $732 million, German direct investors 
negative $56 million, British investors negative $131 million, and Japanese direct 
investors negative $87 million. Other factors which contributed to reduced earnings 
among real estate entities centered around reduced operating income among commercial 
properties; decreased real estate values; and, reduced demand for new homes and 
housing construction.76 The global banking system also significantly decreased new 
activity in debt and equity issues through 1993, as a means to build reserves and increase 
profits in order to offset losses on nonperforming loans, especially real estate loans. 
Lending for investment in real estate diminished to very conservative terms.
74 "Japanese Purchases of U.S. Real Estate Fall on Hard Times," The Wall Street Journal. 
(February 21, 1992); p. A-l.
75 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. 
(Washington, DC, July 1993).
76 Y. Shima, ‘Real Estate Industry Update: After the Land Boom’, a report by Goldman Sachs (New 
York, August 7, 1990), p. 1. It is interesting to note that the Goldman Sachs report, in their 
prediction of a decrease in global land prices, ties the decline in commercial real estate values to a 
decline in the private housing market. Yet, there is not always a direct correlation.
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Real Estate Investment Cycles in the Focal Countries
^ Cross-border direct investment in Europe accelerated after the early 1980s, and 
further growth can be expected in the 1990s once economic expansion resumes 
worldwide. Why this relatively positive outlook? The 1980s witnessed the growth of 
multinational corporations and the globalization of bond and equity portfolios, including 
real estate. The 1990s have witnessed to date a confirmation of the merits of 
multinational operations and global property portfolios have provided economic 
diversification and the prospect of diminished overall risk.77 After 1988, Japanese 
investors focused principally on continental Europe, shifting away from U.S. markets. 
The central London market, by comparison, continued to sustain the interest of Japanese 
investors, particularly life insurance companies.
Slower economic growth and the virtual collapse of commercial and residential 
real estate markets in Japan and the U.S. in 1991 and 1992, fostered expectations among 
real estate investors that Europe would offer an alternative market, with growth in 
inward and outward investment aided by deregulation and improved transportation 
systems within and between countries across the Continent.78 Continental Europe, with 
its low property-vacancy rates and the consensus among business analysts and economists 
that combined national markets offer enhanced investment opportunities, noting 
360 million customers, generated activity among foreign property investors.79 U.K.
77 B. White, chief executive officer of Richard Ellis, a major international U.K.-based chartered 
surveyor, untitled speech given at the Melbourne Investment Group breakfast meeting (8 November 
1990).
78 F. Dijkstra, ‘International Property Research: The New Dimension’, Comment ‘90. (London: Knight 
Frank & Rutley 1990), p. 74. However, of the 279 EC directives aimed at harmonizing pan- 
European services not one directly mentions property. Arthur Andersen and Nabarro Nathanson, 
Building a Stake in Europe: Guidelines for Investors in Real Estate. (Chicago, June 1991), p. 5.
79 B. White, op . cit.. (8 November 1990).
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developers and investors led property investment in continental Europe in the early 
1970s*, which slowed in the second half of the 1980s. While economists and business 
analysts widely agree that the high-growth real estate market of the 1980s is past and the 
internationalization of real estate markets will experienced more modest growth over the 
next decade, there is widespread disagreement as to the long-term consequences for 
property values and cross-border real estate investment.80
More recently, Waterglade, Heron, and Sibec have acquired and participated in 
German developments. U.K. institutional investors have participated with U.K.-based 
developer Pan European in its portfolio expansion.81 Hammersons purchased a 
277,000-square-foot shopping center in Essen for about 60 million pounds 
(DM 167 million) in January 1990. One year later, the Dutch civil service pension fund 
Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP) bought a 70 percent stake in the shopping 
center, for an estimated total value of 74.8 million pounds (DM 218 million).82
80 Y. Shima, op.cit.. p. 2.
81 Weatherall Green & Smith, German Property Report 1990 (London, May 1990), p. 6.
82 D.J. Kostin, ‘German Real Estate Market: An Introduction for Non-German Investors’, report 
prepared for Salomon Brothers (New York, April 1991), p. 21.
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CHAPTER 3 THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF REAL ESTATE 
ADVISORY SERVICES
3 .1  In tr o d u c t io n
Real estate markets throughout the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan experienced 
a dramatic restructuring between 1960 and 1990, shifting from a predominantly local 
orientation to a national and international focus. As documented in Chapter 2, the 
globalization of the real estate industry during this 30-year period was driven by the 
expansion of cross-border direct investment in real estate.83 Certain professional 
services—finance, accounting, law, construction, insurance, and real estate advisory 
services—internationalized concurrently with growing cross-border investment activity, 
supporting foreign investment by following capital and investors across international 
borders. Market expansion, in turn, enabled these allied services to establish 
independent channels in global trade.
This chapter reviews the principal factors that supported the internationalization 
of real estate advisory services in the four countries, focusing particularly on those 
factors associated with the predominance of certain nations and firms. Through a review 
of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, organizational structures, and industry 
structures during the 1960-1990 period, the discussion further refines the primary thesis— 
that the internationalization of real estate advisory services was successfully pursued by 
firms that achieved a solid reputation in their home nations by capitalizing on the 
domestic economy’s maturing capital and real estate markets, then built a diversified,
Also see, S.E. Roulac, ‘The Globalization of Real Estate Finance’, The Real Estate Finance 
Journal, v. 4 no. 2 (1987), p. 39.
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multiregional organization targeted to the cross-border investment activities of 
multinational clients.
International real estate advisory services cover the full spectrum of the real estate
industry: the sale and leasing of property; real estate finance; institutional investment;
♦
property and asset management; and, project management and construction. Clients, 
who commissioned real estate advisors for outside, "objective" counsel and for 
specialized expertise about property and financial markets, were the source of capital. 
The client market was unstructured and included entities involved in some facet of real 
estate, as well as those who lacked both the experience and knowledge of buildings and 
markets. They ranged from individual investors to multinational corporations, from 
commercial and merchant banks to building societies in the U.K. and savings and loan 
associations in the U.S., insurance and pension funds, universities and local 
governments, securitized investment and unit trusts, and international developers and 
construction firms. The advisors, or providers, also encompassed a broad array of 
specialized disciplines in this unregulated profession. A full-service, diversified firm, 
such as Jones Lang Wootton of the U.K., would offer all disciplines, while a "niche" 
firm would focus its core business exclusively on a limited number of specializations- 
brokerage, estate management, appraisal, cost consulting, investment banking, 
securitization, or project management. Such other professional service firms as 
accountants, attorneys, mortgage lenders and financial counselors, seeking to expand 
their services, began to diversify into real estate advisory services in the late 1960s.84
84 M.A. Hines, Marketing Real Estate Internationally (New York: Quorum Books, 1988), pp. 
16-17, 77, 81, 142.
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Davis and Smales argued that international trade in professional services differed 
fronrrmanufacturing, in that knowledge and reputation constituted the imports and 
exports, rather than manufactured products. Labor, moreover, which was culturally 
specific to each nation, played a central role in successful cross-border services trade.85
4
Real estate was ultimately a localized industry that required expert knowledge and 
understanding of local property and investment markets. A real estate advisory firm, 
whether a regional, national, or international practice, succeeded or failed on its 
collective local expertise and reputation.
The inquiry centers around this question: how have the dual, and often
competing, requirements for responsiveness to local markets and strategic demands for 
a multifunctional, multinational structure affected the international expansion by real 
estate advisory service firms in the focal countries? What benefits were gained, and 
challenges confronted, by real estate advisory firms from the focal countries expanding 
into foreign markets? The question also arises of why such firms simultaneously 
diversified into new service products.
3 .2  In te r n a tio n a l  Services  Tr ade  T heory
International trade in services only recently became a subject of systematic 
analyses, and the theoretical literature remains limited compared to that for 
manufacturing trades.86 The real estate industry overall, and real estate services in
E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, Working Paper 
Series no. 66, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, (April 1989).
Comparative statistical models that analyze dependent factors of international trade in services 
have only recently been developed, notably by Louis Wells and Mark Casson. The author has 
drawn from this work in analyzing factor advantages in international real estate advisory 
services.
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particular, have received only cursory attention by scholars, typically addressed as a 
subset of generic professional services, and of business and financial services. Yet even 
this body of literature, as Weiss argued in the ‘Real Estate History: An Overview and 
Research Agenda’, focused overwhelmingly on residential development and residential
4
finance in domestic markets in the U.S., U.K., and Germany, areas which have 
concerned national public policy since the 1930s.87 In Japan, real estate investment and 
real estate advisory services have been evaluated as just one element of the larger 
corporate history of the keiretsus and zaibatsus, or large business groups, and this only 
since 1985. All of these discussions presented either historical studies of the domestic 
industry and its overseas activities or "how-to" reference manuals for conducting business 
in real estate markets abroad.
Weiss provided compelling evidence of the need for further indepth research and 
analyses of the flow of capital funds and the complex relationship among various investor 
groups, builders, owners, national and international regulatory policies, and the 
professional services that facilitated real estate investment, both at home and abroad. 
Especially needed, Weiss contended, was systematic analyses of the changing historical 
role of institutions in the financing of commercial and industrial development.88 This 
thesis argued that real estate advisors have played a central role in capitalizing on and 
directing the international flow of real estate investment funds—and therefore shaping 
national real estate markets, generally—and in influencing particular investor groups in 
the location and volume of their investment activities.
M.A. Weiss, ‘Real Estate History: An Overview and Research Agenda’, Business History
Review, v. 63 no. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 241-82.
Ibid. p. 257.
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What factors have sustained the growth of international real estate advisory
services? What factors specific to particular national markets and particular firms
sustained this incremental growth over the thirty years between 1960 and 1990?
Sampson and Snape added to Well’s thinking in arguing that international trade
♦
could also occur without the movement of either the provider or the receiver, simply the 
transfer of the service--be it oral advice or a written product—thanks to advances in 
electronic technology over the past three decades.89 For purposes of prescribing 
effective national trade policies, Sampson and Snape claimed, services should be 
classified by those involving movement of factors of production (the service provider or 
capital), movement of the receiver (the investor, or client), and those requiring no 
movement by either provider or receiver.90 Real estate advisory services encompassed 
all three categories, thus ideally requiring free movement of trade at all levels.91
3 .3  F a c t o r  Ad v a n t a g e s  o f  In ter na tio n al  R e a l  E state  Ad v iso r y  Services  
The international role of real estate services was inextricably linked with domestic 
economies and national real estate markets after 1960, as reviewed in section 3.4. 
Indeed, Dufey argued in his work on Japanese financial services that "there are few 
uniquely international institutions."92 Real estate advisory practices depended on long­
G.P. Sampson and R.H. Snape, ‘Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services’, pp. 172-73.
Ibid., p. 173.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, and discussed further in this chapter, such liberal, completely open 
trade has not historically existed in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan.
G. Dufey, ‘The Role of Japanese Financial Institutions Abroad’, in Japanese Financial Growth. 
edited by C.A.E. Goodhart and G. Sutija (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional 
Press, 1990), pp. 132-66.
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term growth of the domestic economy and domestic property markets to build established
domestic practices and domestic clientele and survive in the international marketplace.
An important limitation of standard theories of international business as applied
to real estate advisory services was their inadequate attention to the role of specialization,
%
technical competence, innovation, and the exchange of information within and between 
firms. Successful differentiation of roles and the management of these functions across 
broad geographic regions, as Chandler and Casson pointed out, could only be 
accomplished by people.93 Casson refined Chandler’s theory of the multinational 
manufacturing enterprise to account for labor’s central role in international services trade 
and the concomitant factor of "innovation through experience.1,94 Thus labor, which 
was conditioned over a long period of time via the national culture and educational 
values, became an essential factor in international trade, discussed in section 3.5.
The third factor focused on the role of government as it influenced the evolution 
of a nation’s competitive environment in a given industry. Because international trade, 
generally, and real estate advisory services, particularly, encompassed the transfer of 
capital, services, and personnel across national borders, domestic border regulations and 
a country’s international policy toward foreign service providers and inward and outward 
direct investment played a major role, as reviewed in section 3.6.95 Was one nation 
more protectionist, and another more expansionist? Did domestic regulations raise
93 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scone: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge,
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990); M. Casson, ed., The Growth of
International Business (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983); and M. Casson, Enterprise 
and Competitiveness (1990).
94 M. Casson, Ibid. (1990), p. 5.
95 See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of government regulations, taxation policies, and fee
requirements affecting real estate direct investment and professional services in each of the 
focal countries.
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barriers or open markets to free movement of cross-border transactions? These questions 
center around such issues as foreign investment, the ‘right of establishment’, and 
immigration, and can be answered by profiling policies of the focal countries over the 
1960-1990 period, and, most important, by evaluating the growth of cross-border direct 
real estate investment over five-year increments and its contribution to each nation’s total 
international direct investment.
A fourth factor was the extent to which supporting industries reinforced the 
growth of each nation’s international real estate advisory service industry. The 
emergence of multinational corporations and the internationalization of financial markets 
and investment vehicles appeared to be most influential, reviewed in sections 3.7 and 
3.8, respectively. For all four countries, the rise of heavy industry determined the shape 
of current urban and economic systems to a large extent. And, as Hayes and Hubbard 
documented in their work on global investment banking services and the growth of the 
Eurobond market, the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan became generators of surplus 
investment capital.96
Finally, the organizational structure and management of firms competing within 
the international arena of real estate advisory services represented an important factor, 
as discussed in section 3.9. Over the long term a firm’s business philosophy and 
organizational infrastructure were the defining elements that determined the firm’s ability 
to capitalize on economic growth and defend an international practice in the face of 
periodic economic decline, to respond to market upturns and downturns, to function 
across diversified services and multiple cultures, as well as various government policies
S.L. Hayes HI and P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking: A Tale of Three Cities (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1990), p. 319.
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and local markets, to develop innovative service products and develop the skills to 
maintain and grow competitive position, and to sustain the loyalty and commitment of 
experienced people to overcome both internal and external challenges.
*
3.4 T h e D o m estic  E con om y and R e a l E s ta te  M a r k e t
The growth and prosperity of international real estate advisory services principally 
depended on consistent, long-term growth in the domestic economy. By extension, the 
relative demand for real estate services in home markets determined the competitive 
strength (or weakness) that each firm experienced in the global market—either providing 
or limiting opportunities to develop superior capabilities in diversified and innovative 
services, and to gain exposure to a broad range of clients. The two most reliable 
measures of economic conditions that affected real estate advisory services were gross 
domestic product (the size, rate of growth, and annual volatility of a nation’s economy) 
and commercial construction investment.
The growth of the economy indicated the relative availability of investment 
capital, and the size of the economy indicated the relative wealth and diversity of the 
domestic market. Annual GDP for the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan increased at 
respective 3.0 percent, 2.5 percent, 3.0 percent, and 6 to 7 percent annually, as each 
country’s domestic financial markets matured concurrently with international financial 
markets and international trade. In addition, cross-border direct investment in real estate 
multiplied by substantial multiples of GDP over the 30-year period, except for the U.K. 
between 1970 and 1980. This alone would suggest increased demand for foreign real 
estate advisory services and the internationalization of property service firms. Moreover, 
as international financial capital markets matured and investors and multinationals sought
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to diversify assets and portfolios across global markets, the liberalization of government 
regulations and changes in tax regulations expanded the competitive environment to 
include foreign firms and foreign markets increased the demand for real estate advisors.
As shown in Table 6, the U.S. economy remained the largest among the four 
focal countries over the 1960-1990 period. GDP growth also rose at a fairly consistent 
rate during these 30 years, and the volume of commercial construction positioned the 
U.S. as the premier real estate market in the world, as shown in Table 7. The U.S. 
provided attractive and diverse real estate investment opportunities for both domestic and 
foreign sources, and U.S. real estate advisors enjoyed wide-ranging opportunities in 
home markets to service the diverse needs of both U.S.-based and foreign clients. 
Rather than dedicating financial and professional resources to expand operations in 
smaller foreign markets, the majority of national firms invested corporate capital in 
introducing new services and entering new U.S. markets, clearly evident in the ten firms 
profiled in Chapter 4.
In fact, not until 1989-1990, when the domestic economy and capital markets 
began to contract due to overbuilt property markets and overextended financial 
institutions, U.S. real estate service firms limited their overseas activities to specific 
client engagements during the previous decades, when U.S.-based multinational clients 
were increasing international acquisitions. This contrasted with the experience of allied 
professional service firms, such as banking, accounting, architectural design, and law,
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which internationalized extensively in the 1970s.97 Perhaps U.S. real estate service 
firms^were hindered by European competitors, which had a virtual lock on Continental 
markets and financing sources, as well as by explicit and tacit Japanese regulatory 
controls on foreign investment and business development.
The European property market, in contrast to the U.S., developed along two, 
mutually inclusive tiers: at the local level, in which domestic and foreign clients engaged 
chartered surveyors for estate management (the heart of the business through the 1960s), 
and increasingly for knowledge about market conditions, government regulations, and 
potential financial partners; and, at the international level, in which domestic clients 
required advisory services in foreign markets. While the U.K. economy produced 
surplus investment funds during the 1961-1975 period, and again in the late 1980s, the 
modest size of British commercial and financial markets and stiff government 
intervention in the national economy led investors to supplement domestic investment by 
going abroad—most in the British Commonwealth and on the Continent.98
Ibid., p. 323, for discussion of U.S. investment bankers and international experience. For the 
accounting profession, see C.P. DeMond, Price. Waterhouse & Co. in America (New York: 
Arno Press, 1980). And for international architectural services, see A.O. Dean, ‘European 
Forecast’ and N.R. Greer, ‘Americans Abroad: Some Coming Attractions’; ‘Foreign 
Exchange’, Architecture. September 1990, pp. 101-05; M. Casson, Enterprise & 
Competitiveness, pp. 2-3.
C.G. Powell, An Economic History of the British Building Industry. 1815-1979 (London: 
Methuen, 1982), pp. 152-53.
83
TABLE 6
G r o s s  D o m e s t ic  P r o d u c t  a
B il l io n s o f  N o m i n a l  U.S. D o l l a r s
Year Germanv Jaoan United Kingdom United States
1960 72.6 43.1 72.3 * ' 513.4
1961 82.5 53.3 77.0 531.8
1962 90.2 60.6 80.9 571.6
1963 95.9 69.2 85.8 603.1
1964 105.7 81.4 93.3 648.0
1965 115.0 90.7 100.4 702.7
1966 122.1 105.2 107.0 769.8
1967 124.0 123.2 111.3 814.3
1968 133.6 146.6 105.3 889.3 •
1969 152.1 173.1 112.3 959.5
1970 185.2 204.3 123.8 1,010.7
1971 215.3 231.5 142.0 1,097.2
1972 258.1 303.8 161.0 1,207.0
1973 343.2 412.1 182.0 1,349.6
1974 380.2 457.5 197.6 1,458.6
1975 417.3 498.8 237.1 1,585.9
1976 445.0 561.0 229.9 1,768.4
1977 514.7 690.6 255.8 1,974.1
1978 639.1 970.7 324.5 2,232.7
1979 757.5 1,009.2 419.9 2,488.6
1980 809.8 1,057.5 539.8 2,708.0
1981 679.2 1,168.4 518.4 3,030.6
1982 654.4 1,226.6 488.0 3,149.6
1983 653.5 1,186.1 461.7 3,405.0
1984 615.2 1,264.5 433.2 3,777.2
1985 618.9 1,343.3 461.4 4,038.7
1986 886.6 1,985.6 562.1 4,268.6
1987 1,107.4 2,408.9 689.7 4,539.9
1988 1,193.5 2,898.4 832.3 4,900.4
1989 1,181.3 2,871.8 838.7 5,250.8
1990 1,487.3 2,940.4 980.7 5,522.2
1991 1,566.3 3,362.2 1,018.0 5,677.5
3 Gross domestic product ("GDP") is defined as the market value of output of goods and services 
produced by labor and property located in each focal country. GDP excludes net output produced 
or consumed in foreign countries and is conceptually equivalent in definition among the focal 
countries. For Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the national currency is converted to 
U.S. dollars at current exchange rates.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
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TABLE 7
To ta l  Nonresidential  F ixed Investm ent - Stru ctu res O nly a
M illion s  o f  Nom inal  U.S. D ollars
Year Germany Japan United Kingdom United Stat
1960 5,951 N.A. 3,260 '  ■ 19,600
1961 7,020 N.A. 3,806* 19,700
1962 7,949 N.A. 4,184 20,800
1963 8,687 N.A. 4,203 21,200
1964 10,207 N.A. 5,001 23,700
1965 10,526 N.A. 5,402 28,300
1966 10,827 N.A. 5,693 31,300
1967 9,247 N.A. 6,194 31,500
1968 9,855 N.A. 5,934 33,600
1969 11,798 N.A. ' 6,277 37,700
1970 16,654 11,785 7,049 40,300
1971 19,561 13,080 8,046 42,700
1972 22,028 16,994 8,916 47,200
1973 27,093 24,277 11,030 55,000
1974 29,164 25,897 13,400 61,200
1975 29,366 20,253 15,597 61,400
1976 29,702 26,960 13,940 65,900
1977 33,081 30,695 13,348 74,600
1978 41,218 41,950 15,705 93,900
1979 51,372 49,042 20,447 118,400
1980 58,156 60,117 27,455 137,500
1981 46,248 64,582 25,290 169,100
1982 42,042 57,156 23,432 178,800
1983 39,200 59,421 20,185 153,100
1984 36,017 61,397 19,571 175,600
1985 34,623 63,595 19,727 193,400
1986 51,015 89,740 24,266 174,000
1987 63,297 105,158 32,571 171,300
1988 67,663 128,865 43,416 182,000
1989 68,420 144,643 50,685 193,300
1990 86,866 155,342 63,592 201,100
a Nonresidential fixed investment in structures represents current expenditures on farm and nonfarm 
buildings and structures, public utilities, and on mining shafts and wells. More detailed 
breakdowns of nonresidential fixed investment in nonfarm building are not available in a time 
series for all focal countries. For Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the national currency 
is converted to U.S. dollars at current exchange rates prevailing in the year recorded and 
published.
Sources: For Germany (1960-1990), Japan (1961-1990) and the United Kingdom (1960-1990), 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), National Accounts, 
Detailed Tables, Volume 11 1992, 1990, 1987, 1985, 1984, 1982, 1981, 1980 and 1979 
editions. For Japan for 1950, Government of Japan, Economic Planning Agency, Annual 
Report on National Income Statistics, 1978. For Germany for 1991, OECD, Quarterly 
National Accounts, Number 1, 1992 edition. For the United States (1960-88), U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product 
Accounts of the United States, Volume 2, 1959-1988, September 1992; (1989-1991) Survey 
of Current Business, July 1992.
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Moreover, the U .K .’s modest land area--94,214 square miles-led the government 
to restrict the amount of new office development throughout Britain in 1964, and again 
during 1971-1976, which limited investment opportunities and prompted cross-border 
mobility by developers, investors, and real estate advisors." Withal, direct investment 
in domestic and foreign commercial property had a significant influence on the British 
economy, accounting for approximately one-third of total investment in the U.K. 
economy during the 1970-1990 period.100
Since about 1955, U.K. investors and advisors began to transport capital and 
professional resources to markets worldwide where diverse investment opportunities 
existed. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, developers and investors were 
principally focused in the London market, retaining quantity and chartered surveyors for 
estate and development management.101 Yet by 1964, when Parliament passed the 
Brown Ban act to restrict new building by specifying the amount of new office 
development in central London and later throughout all of England, several of the U.K.’s 
leading estate agents, such as Jones Lang Wootton and Weatherall Green & Smith, had 
already opened overseas offices to assist British clients that were investing abroad.102 
Investors benefited from the tight property market through inflated asset values in the
99 The Economist. November 5, 1966, p. 610; November 11, 1967, p. 639; March 18, 1972, p. 8; 
June 10, 1978, pp. 3-11.
100 S. Currie and A. Scott, ‘The Place of Commercial Property in the U.K. Economy’, paper 
presented to The London Business School, Jan. 1991, p. 1.
101 ‘Development, The Economy and the Chartered Quantity Surveyor’, Chartered Surveyor. 
November 5, 1965, pp. 243-46; and, May 1966, pp. 595-97; A.T. Brett-Jones, ‘The Future Role 
of the Quantity Surveyor’, Chartered Surveyor. July 1969, pp. 13-15; A. Bailey, ‘Property 
People’, The Estates Gazette, v. 219 (July 31, 1971), pp. 597-601.
102 E.L. Erdman, People & Property (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1982), p. 181; O. Marriott, The 
Property Boom (London: Abingdon Publishing, 1967, 1989 reprint), pp. 120, 138-39, 150-60; 
and The Economist. November 11, 1967, p. 639.
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1970-1972 period, but they were limited in investment opportunities by the restricted 
amount of developable land. The majority of domestic capital investment occurred 
through institutional pensions funds, insurance companies, banks, and a growing volume 
of publicly-issued property bonds.103 The 1974-75 recession and property crash, as 
well as the government’s rent control edict, further constrained the U .K .’s commercial 
market.104 Domestic estate agents thus gained competitive advantage early on by their 
international perspective and local expertise in foreign markets, as well as through long­
standing client relationships with institutional funds, bond funds, and domestic 
banks.105
Germany, by comparison after 1990, was the second largest advanced industrial 
economy in the world until 1968 (when Japan surpassed it). Yet the republic was 
characterized by small, fragmented commercial property markets and highly urbanized 
development. Eighty-six percent of the German population in 1990 lived in urban areas 
(similar to Japan), and commercial land remained scarce across the 30-year period.106 
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s commercial property was viewed as stones built 
for one tenant, rather than as a speculative investment, and major institutional 
landowners and regional corporations dominated commercial property markets until 
1985.107 Because individual owner-occupants defined the market’s size and structure,
103 The Economist. March 18, 1972, p. 8; July 1, 1972, p. 22.
104 P. Scott, ‘MEPC PLC’, International Directory of Company Histories IV, edited by A. Hast 
(London: St. James Press, 1991), pp. 710, 711.
105 The Economist. June 10, 1978, pp. 3-11; August 2, 1980, p. 67; S. Cowan, The Guide to 
European Property Investment v. 1, (London: Waterlow Publishers, 1989), pp. 3-7.
106 D.J. Kostin, ‘German Real Estate Market: An Introduction for Non-German Investors’, (New 
York: Salomon Brothers, April 1991), p. 3.
107 The Economist. November 25, 1972, p. 124; July 13, 1985, p. 480.
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independent estate management and quantity surveying was not widely practiced.108
Overall knowledge of major markets and property cycles was unnecessary and therefore
undocumented.109 The absence of competitive advisory services was exacerbated by
the diversity of geographically separate regional economies, markets which were centered
♦
around the three largest metropolitan areas of Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, and Stuttgart, and 
the secondary markets of Munich and Hamburg, and Berlin and Leipzig after 1989. 
German investors remained largely localized in their perspective, and real estate advisory 
firms that were not affiliated with one of the major bank funds focused on one 
metropolitan market, such as Frankfurt, with secondary expertise in other metropolitan 
areas.110 Unlike the U.S. and U.K., no one firm dominated the national market until 
1990.
Such a localized industry, together with volatile GDP gains throughout the 1970s 
and into the early 1980s, hindered the growth and service capabilities of commercial real 
estate advisory firms. Fragmentation within the industry, and the absence of significant 
competition for major firms in any of the major markets, was believed to diffuse the 
economic pressure for a national or an international outlook. While Germany led the 
other three focal countries in outward direct investment during the 1980-87 period, most
108 R. Marshall, ‘The QS in Europe’, Building. (September 24, 1976), p. 61.
109 R. Gop, ‘The League Table of Estate Agents: The Leaders Stay Ahead of the Field’, Immobilien 
Manager. February 1992, pp. 17, 18.
110 Germany’s largest banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Dresdner, created real 
estate advisory service divisions in the 1970s in response to the foreign investment activities of 
major banking clients. Because of their diversified European operations and leading involvement 
in the international Eurobond market in London, these banks were well-positioned in major local 
markets abroad in the 1970s and 1980s to advise on foreign direct real estate investment. See, 
Deutsche Bank, ‘Deutsche Bank - A Brief History’, press release, Frankfurt am Main, Dec. 1989; 
and, J.A. Gosling and A.J. Thomley, ‘The Role of the European Property Professional: France, 
Spain, The United Kingdom and Germany’, Working Papers in European Property, Centre for 
European Property Research, University of Reading, March 1991.
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German real estate advisory firms lacked an international practice. Instead, only a few
firms^stablished operations in major European financial centers, such as London, Paris,
Madrid, and Rome, where local clients were investing, and usually worked in tandem
with one of Germany’s large commercial or investment banks. German financial
♦
institutions, which sponsored the largest volume of foreign direct investment, maintained 
the customary practice of retaining local advisors in local markets, and typical hired 
domestic real estate firms in each foreign nation.111
Japan’s tremendous economic growth over the 30-year period exceeded gains by 
the U.S., U.K., and Germany, and produced large reserves of excess capital. Yet only 
a dozen trading conglomerates invested substantial capital reserves to diversify into 
commercial real estate and establish real estate advisory service divisions. Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, as well as the recently privatized Japan National Railways, held 
title to the country’s scarce inventory of developable urban land. Excessive land prices 
and high capital gains taxes restricted commercial construction and domestic real estate 
investment throughout the 30-year period.112 Office space in downtown Tokyo, for 
example, the largest urban market in the country, remained severely undersupplied for 
two decades, with vacancy rates peaking at two percent in 1975 and declining to below 
one percent by 1990.113
The major trading companies sponsored the majority of Japan’s real estate 
advisory firms, subsidiaries created to serve the leading domestic construction and
111 J. van den Bos, ‘JLW Signs Up to Manage Germany Buying Spree’, Chartered Surveyor Weekly. 
January 31, 1991, p. 7.
112 The Economist. July 13, 1985, p. 480.
113 L.S. Bacow, ‘The Tokyo Land Market: An Essay’, Working Paper Series No. 26, Center for 
Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (October 1990), pp. 5-8.
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development firms and to advise sister companies on domestic real estate investments, 
most'pf which involved office, hotel, and residential development for the corporation and 
its employees. After 1983, however, when the Ministry of Finance lifted capital export 
controls and the foreign exchange value of the yen soared, Japanese investors shifted a 
disproportionate volume of their real estate activities to foreign markets. Japan’s largest 
construction, development and trading companies (such as Kumagai Gumi, Itoh, and 
Kajima) led foreign property investment, followed by the major institutional funds and 
real estate companies (such as Sumitomo Life, Yasuda Life, Asahi Mutual Life, and 
Mitsui Real Estate). Whether an investment was for the company’s own account or in 
joint venture with a foreign partner, Japanese real estate advisors were brought in to 
counsel Japanese investors, often times coordinating with foreign real estate service firms 
in the U.S., continental Europe, and the Pan-Asian region.114
3 .5  S k i l le d  L abo r
Specialized expertise in local markets laid the foundation for a real estate advisory 
firm’s relative value in the national and international marketplace. Market knowledge 
and reputation in this business stemmed directly from people—specifically from recruiting 
and retaining experienced professionals in each local market. This prerequisite for 
gaining a competitive advantage became more challenging and expensive as a firm 
expanded into new markets, especially foreign markets, where cultural differences among 
employees and dispersed operations intensified organizational diseconomies. Because 
real estate advisory firms gained a reputation through long-term experience in local and
114 A. Froggat and T. Oliver, ‘Japanese Investment in European Property’, World Property. (May 
1990), pp. 25-27; S. Hayes and P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking (1990), p. 278; M.A. Hines, 
Guide to International Real Estate Investment (1988), p. 89.
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national markets, some firms were more successful in minimizing market and
geographical disparities and distances than others.115
Over the 30-year period, each of the focal countries cultivated an abundant supply
of real estate and financial services professionals who were trained in the business
%
traditions of the country and adaptable to changing market conditions. Historical labor- 
force and employment data for each of the focal countries indicated that employment in 
real estate and related services rose relatively slowly but steadily during the 1960s and 
early 1970s (Table 8). Concurrent with the rise of total cross-border direct investment, 
employment increased at a faster rate in the late 1970s and 1980s, with the largest 
number of job gains occurring in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan. Employment in the 
commercial real estate sector was believed to be influenced by GDP, relative wages, 
domestic commercial property investment, and total cross-border real estate investment, 
as it was the willingness and capability of advisory firms to expand overseas and into 
different markets, and the interests of investors that came to bear on employment data. 
For example, German investors relied on domestic advisors in foreign markets while 
U.S. property investors were most likely to reduce their reliance on domestic real estate 
consultants and use local experts in foreign markets. The thesis will argue that the 
domestic business culture bore a direct relationship between cross-border property 
investment and real estate employment. National cultures which tended to be more 
closed to foreign advisors or property services tended to retain domestic real estate 
consultants to manage property investments in both domestic and foreign markets. 
Investors from these countries preferred to retain advisors with whom they enjoyed a
115 J. Kay argued that the reputation of products is revealed by one of three processes: (1) research; 
(2) immediately on consumption; and, (3) through long-term experience, in Foundations of 
Corporate Success (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 89-90.
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cultural affinity and were readily familiar (by reputation or experience). Moreover,
multinational corporations with extensive overseas activities often had direct and/or
indirect long-standing business associations with a particular home-based real estate
advisory firm, and thus were inclined to retain that firm in foreign markets. In cultures
*
historically more open and fluid, such as the U.S., domestic investors tended to (or were 
willing to) retain foreign advisory firms when investing abroad.
In the U.S., real estate employment began growing at a faster pace in the late 
1970s, a trend which slowed throughout the 1980s. Even so, the real estate sector added
358.000 jobs during the 1980-1990 period. The U.K., with the highest annual growth 
of 4.4 percent in real estate employment during the 1980s, created 83,000 jobs during 
this decade. In both the U.S. and U.K., "other business services" employment, which 
included a small (but unquantifiable) number of real estate jobs, nearly doubled between 
1980 and 1990, and finance and insurance employment increased by approximately one- 
third over the same period. Real estate employment in Japan rose by 46,000 jobs 
between 1980 and 1990, with the majority of job gains occurring concurrently with the 
boom in Japanese foreign investment and land prices in Japan after 1985. Germany, 
which reported real estate and business services employment together, added 539,000 
jobs during the 1980s, compared to 436,000 new jobs between 1960 and 1970, and
282.000 new jobs during the 1970-1980 period.
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TABLE 8
Lo n g -Term  E m ploym ent  Trends in Real  E state  and
R e la t e d  In d u str ie s  in  t h e  F o c a l  c o u n t r ie s  . ■ • f
(Th ousands o f  Em ployees)
Germany 1960 a 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 450 945 1,100 1,336 1,540 1,880 2,217
Finance and Insurance 383 485 597 703 755 793 893
Real Estate and Business Services 67 460 503 633 785 1,087 1,324
Japan
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services*1
1960 b 1965 1970 e 1975 1980 1985 1990
2,291 2,844 3,076 4,155 5,004 5,746 6,955
Finance and Insurance 568 612 744 965 1,036 1,033 1,085
Real Estate and Business Services 36 37 57 76 71 84 117
Other Business Services d 1,687 2,195 2,275 3,114 3,897 4,629 5,753
United Kingdom 1960 1965 1970* 1975 1980 1985 1990
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 538 623 893 1,078 1,237 1,989 2,685
Finance and Insurance 546 645 544 603 674 784 879
Real Estate and Business Services 67 110 122 153 193 236
Other Business Services 319 363 571 648 744 914 1,436
United States 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 3,313 4,007 5,087 5,921 7,868 9,958 11,893
Finance and Insurance 2,155 2,452 2,813 3,438 4,247 4,929 5,481
Real Estate and Business Services 491 547 664 756 972 1,165 1,330
Other Business Services 667 1,008 1,410 1,746 2,650 3,865 5,082
* Data are for 1961.
b Data are for 1963. \
c Data are for 1969.
d Other business services include personal services employment.
* Data are for 1971. Definition of employment by sector and data collection methodology were changes in 1971. Thus, data for 1971 forward are not comparable with earlier years.
f Included indistinguishably in other business services; data series change in 1970, to specify Real Estate and Business Services.
Note: Employment is classified according to the major activity of each business establishment. Real estate includes the sale and management of commercial and residential real estate; real estate
consulting is included in business services; portfolio investment and related management operations would be included in finance. In addition, there may be ancillary real estate investment
with associated employment by business establishments classified in non-real estate sectors. Data collection methodologies are not uniform among the focal countries.
Sources: For Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden. Facherie 18, Reihe 1.2; OECD, Department of Economics and Statistics. Labor Force Statistics; OECD, Statistics Directorate. National
Accounts. Volume II. For Japan: Ministry of Labor. Yearbook of Labor Statistics. For the United Kingdom: Department of Employment. Employment Gazette: Department of Employment 
and Productivity, British Labor Statistics. Historical Abstract. 1886-1968. For the United States: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment. Hours and Earnings, United States, 1909-90, 
Volume II.
The rise in cross-border direct real estate investment between 1980 and 1990 is 
believed to have been an important factor in unprecedented job gains in each of the focal 
countries. U.S. employment growth was likely supported by the rise of inward 
investment, while U.K. job gains were supported by U.K. investors and real estate 
advisors expanding in foreign markets. Japan’s employment growth was partially 
supported by domestic real estate service firms expanding abroad, following the 
extraordinary rise of Japanese investment in the U.S. and U.K. Gains in Germany’s real 
estate employment during the 1980-1990 period is believed to stem from both the 
maturation of the domestic market, as well as the increase of outward investment.
The accelerated expansion of real estate service firms into multiple markets, 
concurrently with a refinement and multiplicity of service products, focused attention on 
the importance of intrafirm communication and cooperation among people.116 The 
experience of internationalizing real estate advisory firms reinforced Casson’s argument 
in Enterprise and Competitiveness that "a culture which encourages a high degree of 
moral commitment among the members of an organization" would reduce internal 
transaction costs by making personnel more trustworthy and cooperation more fluid.117 
A personalized corporate spirit was essential to maintain standards of quality while 
diversifying across national borders and multiple cultures.118 How was such
116 S.L. Hayes III and P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking (1990), p. 320; M. Casson, Enterprise 
and Competitiveness (1990), p. 13.
117 M. Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness. (1990) pp. 87-88. In a history of U.K. chartered 
surveyors Drivers Jonas, H. Barty-King argued that a firm must maintain a personalized corporate 
spirit throughout growth and diversification, in Scratch a Surveyor . . . .  (London: William 
Heinemann Ltd, 1975), p. 253.
118 S.B. Sagari argued that skilled labor was also a comparative national advantage for international 
financial services, in contrast to large endowments of arable land and surplus capital, which have 
a negative impact on international trade; her findings are statistically documented in ‘The 
Financial Services Industry: An International Perspective’, (Ph.D. diss., Graduate School of 
Business Administration, New York University, 1986).
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commitment cultivated, by both nations and firms? Which nations and firms excelled in 
professional competence at the local level and cross-border coordination in the 
international arena?
The U.K. achieved preeminence among the four countries for its high educational
%
standards in real estate services, particularly in the training o f professionals and the 
regulation of professional competence through the Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors, founded in 1868.119 U.K. real estate advisors provided estate and project 
management services, then land use and country planning services by the late 1960s, 
having expanded into Europe, Australia, Canada, and Africa as early as the 1950s. Such 
leading chartered surveyor firms as Weatherall, Green & Smith, Jones Lang Wootton, 
and Hillier, Parker, May & Rowden began to build multinational networks throughout 
Europe and the Commonwealth in the late 1950s, integrating an international structure 
into the operating business long before the rise in cross-border investment activity in the 
late 1970s and 1980s. Established international networks and expertise in foreign 
markets contrasted with the regional and national orientations of competitors in the U.S. 
and Germany. Only when cross-border real estate activity accelerated in the 1970s did 
firms in these nations begin to establish international offices and bring foreign personnel 
into the company.
Firm allegiance by senior managers, particularly, played an influential role in 
international expansion. While U.K., U.S., and German real estate advisors identified 
less with specific firms than with specialized professions—such as brokerage, agency, 
estate and property management, planning, appraisal, finance, design, and construction—
119 The Economist. August 10, 1968, pp. 12-13; J.A. Gosling and A.J. Thomley, ‘The Role of the 
European Property Professional: France, Spain, The United Kingdom and Germany’, Working 
Papers in European Property, Centre for European Property Research, University of Reading, 
March 1991.
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most leading real estate advisory firms transferred senior staff abroad to sustain corporate
loyalty and internal coordination across widely dispersed regions.120 U.K.
professionals were most adaptable to foreign practices, likely a result of the country’s
long history in international expansion. U.K. firms also demonstrated superior
%
capabilities to U.S. and German counterparts in balancing competing demands for 
internal corporate commitment and local professional talent in foreign offices.121 U.S. 
real estate advisory firms only began to move abroad in the late 1980s, and were less 
adept at shaping a multinational structure and adapting to foreign practices, even in light 
of their experience with diverse domestic markets and foreign clients investing in U.S. 
markets.
Multinational Japanese advisory firms faced their greatest challenges in integrating 
U.S. and European personnel into Japan’s strict corporate culture. Japan’s educational 
system cultivated "society oriented" professionals and an unmatched focus on thorough 
analysis and innovation. Domestic Japanese businesses excelled in retaining personnel 
for decades, people who placed the company’s interests above their own and who 
facilitated fluid intrafirm communication across multiple divisions.122 Yet Japanese
120 Professional allegiance originated in the U.S. and U.K. in the late 19th century with specialized 
training and technical schools, then was sustained through licensing requirements and professional 
organizations. J. Bennett, R. Flanagan and G. Norman, ‘Capital & Counties Report: Japanese 
Construction Industry’, Centre for Strategic Studies in Construction, University of Reading, May 
1987. R. Volhard, D. Weber, and W. Usinger, eds., Real Property In Germany: Legal and Tax 
Impacts of Development and Investment (Frankfurt: Fritz Knapp Verlag, 1975, 1991), pp. v, 23. 
S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance (London: Butterworth, 1988), pp. 30-32.
121 Throughout the 1960s, many leading chartered surveyor firms and senior professionals accepted 
equity positions in foreign projects, while also providing "objective" counsel to clients. 
Challenged by RICS and the Estate Agents Council on the basis of conflicts of interest, this 
practice had diminished considerably by the mid 1970s. The Economist. August 10, 1968,
pp. 12-13; R. Sobel, Trammell Crow. Master Builder: The Story of America’s Largest Real 
Estate Empire (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989), p. 109.
122 G. Dufey, o p . cit.. pp. 151-52.
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firms were less effective in engendering commitment among locally hired professionals
in foreign markets. Japanese executives also insisted on retaining centralized control at
home, rather than conceding authority to U.S. and European branches or affiliates. In
foreign markets, this strategy clashed with long-standing U.S. and European practices
♦
of independence and local responsiveness.123
During the 1980s, two new phenomena rose to the forefront to weaken company- 
wide coordination among firms then expanding on an international scale. One was the 
real estate industry’s emphasis on financial expertise, which rewarded individual 
entrepreneurship, through commission pay structures, at the expense of fee-based 
teamwork. The second factor was the exponential growth between 1985 and 1990 in 
personnel employed in real estate and financial services. To varying degrees, internal 
diseconomies affected Japanese, U.S., German, and U.K. firms alike. Overall, U.K. 
firms fared better in diversifying into new services and foreign markets, principally 
because they had cultivated an infrastructure of professional talent and local expertise in 
multiple markets more than 20 years in advance of direct competitors. U.S. firms, by 
contrast, were handicapped by the entry of foreign real estate advisory firms capitalizing 
on the dramatic growth in inward real estate investment in the U.S. Foreign firms that 
established operations in the U.S. during the 1980s exploited weaker corporate loyalties 
within U.S. real estate advisory firms by hiring experienced, local professionals away 
from the best American firms and business schools.124
123 J. Bennett, R. Flanagan and G. Norman, op. cit.. pp. 11-15; and, S. Hayes and P.M. Hubbard, 
Investment Banking (1990), p. 290.
124 Interviews with and primary observations by author, CB Commercial; Cushman & Wakefield; 
Goldman Sachs & Co.; Arthur Andersen & Co.; Harvard Business School; Wharton Business 
School, University of Pennsylvania.
97
3.6 International  P olicy and Investment Perspective
^  National foreign trade policies and domestic investors’ orientation to foreign 
markets influenced the international expansion of domestic real estate advisors. Until 
1990 professional service firms depended largely on the core activities of customers, and 
real estate advisors diversified their operations to encompass the foreign markets of 
domestic and foreign clients.
Two measures provided evidence of this phenomenon: the expansion and
contraction of the home nation’s inward and outward direct investment, and the target 
markets of real estate investors and real estate advisors.125 Barriers and incentives to 
international trade took the form of both implicit business practices and policies, and 
explicit government regulations. Each effectively hindered or encouraged the expansion 
of foreign service firms in certain domestic markets. Moreover, in such nations as Japan 
and Germany, where restrictive investment and financial services laws of the 1960s and 
1970s were liberalized after 1985, domestic demand for services still adhered to long- 
held provincial attitudes about foreign real estate advisors. The economic system could 
not be easily redirected.
Applied to the flow of services moving in and out of the country, national trade 
regulations and international fiscal policies governed direct capital investment by 
foreigners in a nation’s property assets. Official policies also defined the nature of 
professional services for investors in domestic and foreign markets, and the transfer of 
personnel to and establishment of satellite operations in foreign nations. For example, 
preferential treatment of domestic investors and domestic real estate advisors (in Japan)
125 The source of data on the target markets of investors included author interviews with real estate 
investors, as well as direct surveys of the 10 largest real estate advisory firms in each of the focal 
countries, detailed in Chapter 4.
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strengthened the international competitive standing of domestic firms at the potential (and
intended) expense of foreign firms. Real estate advisory firms,-particularly, were able
to broaden corporate reputations and increase fee revenues through unhindered access to
particular geographic regions.126 To represent foreign investors in local markets, real
♦
estate advisory firms required more than tolerance, but an open business climate. US. 
foreign trade policies and business practices remained the most liberal among the focal 
countries throughout the 1960-1990 period, reinforcing international services trade by 
both foreign and domestic real estate advisors.127 The 1962 U.S. Trade Expansion 
Act lowered import-export duties and made America the most open market in the world. 
This established the tradition of foreign investment. In the early 1970s, the U.S. 
government further eased administrative and registration guidelines, thereby liberalizing 
foreign access to the U.S. financial system and the world’s largest real estate market as 
measured by annual output, total inventory and the number of geographic markets.128 
Foreign investment in U.S. real estate was unparalleled worldwide, accounting for 2.8 
percent of overall inward investment in U.S. assets in 1975, and growing to 7.4 percent 
in 1980, 10.5 percent in 1985, and dropping back to 8.6 percent by 1990129 Since the 
mid-1970s foreign advisors representing foreign investors were unhindered in the openly
126 Domestically focused service firms have had the most difficulty in managing cross-border 
regulations and cultures, "and thus have had most way to go [sic] in developing internationally", 
according to E. Davis, G. Hanlon, and J. Kay, in ‘Internationalization in Accounting and Other 
Professional Services’, Working Paper Series No. 78, Centre for Business Strategy, London 
Business School, Apr. 1990, p. 3. See Appendix B, ‘A Brief History of Restrictions on 
International Investment by the Focal Countries’.
127 The caveat to this statement, discussed in the preceding section, is that foreign real estate advisory 
firms active in the U.S. partially diminished the competitive advantage of U.S. firms in their 
home market by hiring skilled real estate professionals away from many domestic firms.
128 M. Wilkins, ‘Japanese Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 1879-1990’, 
Business History Review 64 (Winter 1990), p. 608.
129 Chapter 2, Table 4.
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competitive U.S. environment. U.S. real estate advisors, therefore, "internationalized" 
principally by targeting foreign investors active in U.S. markets, according to casual 
observations of industry professionals. Overseas markets, where U.S. real estate 
advisors were far less knowledgeable and experienced, were distant secondary targets.
S.E. Roulac argued in ‘The "Globalization" of Real Estate Finance’, that foreign 
investors approached the U.S. market ’with somewhat more discernment than some of 
their U.S. competitors’. The author contended this practice resulted from the foreign 
custom of retaining professional advisors for objective counsel in overseas 
investments.130 The leading U.S. and German real estate advisors profiled in 
Chapter 4 gained an unmatched reputation among foreign investors active in domestic 
markets. Yet their domestic dominance rarely carried over into foreign markets, where 
U.S. and German real estate service firms struggled to achieve a competitive standing. 
In fact, only those U.S. accounting and financial services firms that incorporated real 
estate advisory services into the mainline international business as a complement or a 
subsidiary—such as the investment bank of Goldman Sachs & Co. or the accounting firm 
of Arthur Andersen & Co.—succeeded in establishing credible reputations across various 
foreign markets.
Precisely because U.S. real estate investors, developers, and corporations 
historically imported more foreign capital and services than they exported to major 
trading partners, U.S. property advisors faced lower risk and higher profitability by 
targeting foreign investors active in domestic markets rather than enter markets
lj0 S.E. Roulac, ‘The "Globalization" of Real Estate Finance’, The Real Estate Finance Journal vol. 
4 no. 2 (Spring 1987).
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abroad.131 Even so, during the 1960s, U.S. investors and advisors shifted their 
primary focus from the U.K. and other EC countries to Canada. One reason for this was 
Canada’s proximity and the increasing volume of cross-border real estate investment 
between the two nations. Another reason: U.K. real estate advisors virtually
monopolized U.K. and Continental markets, having decades before set the standards and 
informal rules by which all advisors operated. The breadth and quality of property 
education created strict professional standards and business practices among licensed 
chartered surveyors, which were more limiting to direct investment by foreign 
competitors and cross-company exchanges in real estate advisory services than official 
U.K. regulations—which actually levied the lowest taxes and VAT fees on foreign entities 
of all EC nations until the early 1980s.132
As early as the 1850s, British civil engineers pioneered the export of advisory 
services in design, construction, project and portfolio management, and direct 
investment, mostly in European countries. Founded on a century of experience, by the 
mid-1950s, U.K. advisors excelled in their access to capital sources in the U.K., Spain, 
France, Belgium, and other European nations. And in 1965 the Board of Trade 
established the British Consultants Bureau to promote the interests of U.K. property and
131 Real estate constituted less than one percent of all outward direct investment throughout the 1950- 
1990 period. In addition, 85 percent of U.S. entities that did participate in overseas investment 
focused their activities in one foreign country, most in the culturally compatible European 
Economic Community. M. Wilkins, The Maturing Multinational Enterprise: American Business 
Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 341, 350; L.S. 
Bacow, ‘Foreign Investment, Vertical Integration, and the Structure of the U.S. Real Estate 
Industry’, Working Paper No. 25, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Real Estate 
Development, (Cambridge, MA, January 1990); also P.A. Geroski and S. Toker, ‘Picking 
Profitable Markets’, Working Paper Series No. 59, Centre for Business Strategy, (London 
Business School, November 1988).
132 S. Cowan, The Guide to European Property Investment I (London: Waterlow Publishers, 1989), 
pp. 7-12, 7-16; Arthur Andersen & Co. and Nabarro Nathanson, Building a Stake in Europe - 
Guidelines for Investors in Real Estate (Chicago, June 1991), p. 140.
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engineering consultants abroad, the only representative body in the U.K. concerned with 
advising on overseas property and engineering capital investments.133
Yet practical experience in the British Commonwealth was more beneficial than 
any official promotional initiatives. Through private company initiative, chartered
4
surveyors Jones Lang Wootton and Weatherall Green & Smith, among others, gained 
knowledge of foreign real estate and learned to transport service innovations to other 
markets and to overcome onerous local barriers.134 This became particularly valuable 
during 1964 and the 1971-1976 period, when the government and Bank of England, 
respectively, imposed development and financial restrictions on the U.K. market, 
prompting such major development companies as MEPC and Slough Estates to expand 
overseas, primarily to Canada, Australia, Belgium, France, and the U.S.135 With few 
exceptions they were guided into new markets by domestic property and financial 
advisors. Through most of the 1970s, however, U.K. real estate advisors and investors 
diminished their activities in foreign markets.136 The government lifted foreign 
exchange controls in 1979, prompting U.K. real estate investors to expand their 
acquisitions abroad by $2.1 billion in the 1980-1985 period, more than double the
133 Ibid., p. 198-99.
134 E. Davis and C. Smales argued that international expansion by service firms, and gaining 
competitive advantage, involved the importation of "creative services" into new markets, in ‘The 
Internationalization of Professional Services’, Working Paper Series No. 66, London Business 
School, April 1989, p. 10.
135 P. Scott, ‘Slough Estates PLC’, International Directory of Companies Histories IV, edited by A. 
Hast (London: St. James Press, 1991), p. 722; P. Scott, ‘MEPC PLC’, International Director of 
Company Histories IV, (London: St. James Press, 1991), pp. 711-12; The Economist. April 3, 
1976, pp. 117-18; September 11, 1976, pp. 99-100; Leslie Hannah, Barclays Bank, ms., January 
1994, pp. 277-87.
136 P. Scott, op.cit.. p. 711.
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increase of the previous five-year period.137 As a result, the major real estate advisory 
firms^ expanded their reach into new overseas markets in the early 1980s, such as 
Washington, D.C., Tokyo, and Geneva, providing U.K. advisors with a firmly 
established clientele and market base for the late 1980s investment boom.
4
An important advantage enjoyed by U.K. property advisors was their central 
geographic position, as well as their conventional cultural and moderate political 
orientation-unmatched by U.S., Japanese, and even German advisors. The European 
market was neither uniform in tax and fiscal policies, nor national trade regulations. Yet 
even before the 1987 Single European Act, which provided a schedule for eliminating 
non-tariff barriers, U.K. advisors were particularly well-equipped to enter foreign 
European markets by virtue of their continental base and heritage.138 Cross-border 
mobility, and an increasing volume of European property acquisitions by multinational 
investors in the late 1970s and early 1980s, laid the foundation for collaborative 
opportunities among real estate advisors—such as the European Economic Interest Group 
created by London-based Goddard & Smith, Paris-based Arthur Lloyd, and Hamburg- 
based Angermann.139
German property advisors were less expansive than their U.K. counterparts in 
counseling multinational investors. Beginning in the early 1970s independent property 
advisors and the real estate advisory departments of German banks entered foreign 
markets in London, Paris, New York, Rome, and Madrid, to serve the outward
lj7 Chapter 2, Table 3.
lj8 M. Hsia, ‘Corporate Location in Europe: The Implications of a Single Market’, Working Papers 
in European Property, Centre for European Property Research, University of Reading, March 
1991, p. 1-2, 13.
lj9 Chartered Surveyor Weekly. Mar. 12, 1992, p. 6.
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investment activities of Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Dresdner Bank. Only since 
1990** when the government lifted regulatory restrictions on foreign investment by 
German open-end funds, have international property and financial advisors begun to gain 
prominence with German investors in foreign markets.140
*
If investment in German real estate carried a high level of risk for German 
nationals, market and regulatory barriers were even higher for foreign investors and 
developers. Limited commercial land and complicated, multi-tiered public approvals 
added to the risk of speculative investment by foreign investors, particularly for those 
represented by foreign real estate advisors. Foreign investors active in one of Germany’s 
metropolitan areas were virtually required to retain a local advisor, even if in 
collaboration with a foreign real estate service firm.141 In addition, variable and 
discriminatory taxes and fees on revenues of foreign advisors and investors created 
regulatory barriers as formidable as market barriers: the government ostensibly
"welcomed" foreign investment but did not encourage it at the expense of domestic 
entities. The boom in cross-border investment activity and globalization of financial 
markets after 1985 helped to liberalize German markets, and prompted U.K. and French 
real estate advisors to enter Germany-Richard Ellis and Healey & Baker in 1988, and 
August-Thourard in 1990.142
140 Jones Lang Wootton, JLWorld. privately published corporate brochure, May 1991, p. 19; and, 
‘News Briefs’, National Real Estate Investors. July 1991, p. 16.
141 For example, U.K. property developer MEPC, assisted by Jones Lang Wootton, spent 6 years 
seeking development permission for a Munich site it controlled; it finally sold the property to the 
largest Munich real estate developer and planning permission was promptly granted. D.J. Kostin, 
o p . cit.. p. 19; R. Volhard, D. Weber, and W. Usinger, o p . cit. (1975, 1991), pp. vii, 36, 114- 
16.
142 R. Volhard, D. Weber, and W. Usinger, o p . cit.. pp. 82-121; R. Gop, ‘Player + Profile’, 
Immohilien Manager. February 1992, p. 11; S. Cowan, o p . cit.. pp. 8-9; Arthur Andersen &
Co. and Nabarro Nathanson, Building a Stake in Europe (1991), pp. 51-52, 56.
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Japanese real estate advisors expanded into foreign markets in the 1960s to 
support the foreign trade initiatives of Japan’s large trading companies, their corporate 
sponsors. Because only corporate-affiliated advisors were privy to the needs of Japanese 
trading and construction companies, domestic real estate advisors in the U.S. and U.K. 
were retained on a limited basis, if at all, to provide only market information (and 
intelligence) and to assist Japanese corporate real estate advisors, who acquired property 
to support the nation’s financial, manufacturing, and tourist trades.143 Most foreign 
direct investment was governed by the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law of 1949 and centered around market access to facilitate cross-border trade, 
particularly with the U.S. Japanese foreign property investments increased only 
moderately after 1974, when floating exchange rates strengthened the yen relative to the 
U.S. dollar and other major world currencies. The Foreign Exchange Control Law of 
1980 sharply reduced restraints on capital outflows from Japan and outward direct 
investment in total and in real estate rose further.
It took the Bank of Japan to lower the discount rate to 2.5 percent in 1986—the 
lowest worldwide—for Japanese financial institutions and corporations to accelerate real 
estate acquisitions and lending in foreign markets. As the volume of direct property 
investments grew in proportion to total outward investment, from 3 percent in 1985 to 
15 percent by 1990, Japanese investors increasingly retained international real estate 
advisors to provide objective counsel on speculative commercial investments. Having 
established extensive financial and trading outposts in the U.S. since the early 1950s,
14^  On Japanese foreign direct investment in Europe, notably the U.K., see R. Strange, Japanese 
Manufacturing Investment in Europe: Its Impact op the UK Economy (Routledge: London and 
New York, 1993) and M. Mason and D. Encamation, eds., Does Ownership Matter? Japanese 
Multinationals in Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); M. Wilkins, ‘Japanese Multinationals 
in the U.S.: Continuity and Change; Business History Review 64, (Winter 1990), pp. 601-08, 
617.
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Japanese nationals were most familiar with major U.S. markets, and U.S. real estate 
investments soared from $1.9 billion in 1985 to $16.5 billion by 1988.144 Domestic 
real estate advisory firms with established operations in multiple U.S. markets, such as 
Cushman & Wakefield and CB Commercial, secured premier acquisition contracts with 
Japanese investors.145 Similarly, chartered surveyors with multiple European offices, 
such as JLW and Weatherall Green & Smith, secured major Japanese contracts.
Restrictive monetary and lending policies implemented by the Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance in late 1989 halted Japanese acquisitions and credit worldwide.146 
Several real estate advisory firms in the U.S. and Europe expanded operations and 
personnel during 1985-1988, led by the extraordinary surplus of Japanese investment 
capital~as well as heady real estate conditions created by Japan’s dominance in foreign 
markets. Beginning in late 1989 and continuing through 1993, these same firms were 
forced to contract operations. While the Ministry of Finance facilitated the global 
expansion of real estate and financial advisory services after 1985, it continued to hinder 
foreign trade in Japan. Highly restrictive policies and long-standing business practices 
dating from the post-World War II years restrained foreign professional service firms as
144 Direct investment in foreign corporations that owned property assets were included in the total 
asset value of the particular industry in national stock statistics; real estate was not identified 
separately. In the U.S., real estate investments included manufacturing plants for SONY and 
hotels in Hawaii for affluent Japanese tourists.
145 Kenneth Leventhal & Co., ‘Japanese Capital Flows: Availability and Constraints’, unpublished 
report, Los Angeles, 1992; Kenneth Leventhal & Co., ‘1991 Japanese Investment in United States 
Real Estate’, unpublished report, Los Angeles, 1992.
146 In addition, in 1988 the Bank of International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland, introduced 
minimum capital standards for international banks to strengthen stability of international banking 
system, requiring that capital must equal at least 8 percent of risk-adjusted assets. This action, 
plus restrictive monetary policy, the declining Japanese stock market, the banking industry’s low 
profit margins, declining land prices in the principal Japanese markets reduced the flow of 
Japanese investment capital. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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well as inward real estate investment.147 Capital liberalization between 1967 and 1971 
excluded real estate investment and real estate services, which required screening by 
government officials and virtual restriction. Even while real estate was one of 17 
industries finally designated by the Japanese government for inclusion in foreign 
ownership during 1973-76, the business environment’s strong aversion to foreign firms 
remained high.148
In addition, the Ministries of Finance and International Trade & Industry 
maintained onerous requirements for selling services in Japan to domestic trading 
companies; prohibited foreign services from advising Japan’s international banks, pension 
funds, and insurance companies; and, selected joint ventures on the basis of obtaining 
innovative technologies, which effectively eliminated real estate services. Extraordinarily 
high land prices and a negative investment tax structure were further deterrents.149 Up 
until 1985, both government regulations and informal government-corporate relationships 
created a hostile environment for foreign real estate advisors seeking to establish
147 H. Yoshihara and S. Khan, Strategy and Performance of Foreign Companies in Japan (Westport, 
CT: Quorum Books, 1994); M. Mason, American Multinationals and Japan: The Political 
Economy of Japanese Capital Controls. 1899-1980 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University, 1992).
148 M.Y. Yoshino, ‘Japan as Host to the International Corporation’, The International Corporation 
(Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1970), pp. 350, 368-69; M.Y. Yoshino, ‘Japan as 
Host to the International Corporation’, The Japanese Economy in International Perspective, edited 
by I. Frank (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975),
pp. 276-89.
149 J.C. Baker and T. Kondo, ‘Joint Ventures in Japan and How to Obtain Managerial Control’,
MSU Business Topics, v. 19 no. 1 (Winter 1971), p. 49; R.M. March, ‘Foreign Firms in Japan’, 
California Management Review, v. 22 no. 3 (Spring 1980), pp. 42-46; W.E. Brock, ‘A Simple 
Plan for Negotiating on Trade in Services’, The World Economy, v. 5 no. 3, p. 235;
M.A. Hines, Investing in Japanese Real Estate (New York: Quorum Books, 1987), pp. 8, 121.
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operations in Japan. Even then, the Japanese economy tolerated but did not encourage 
open competition from foreign services firms.150
Each focal country’s tax structures and international trade regulations influenced 
access to particular markets. Such legal structures are believed to have reflected the 
nation’s real receptiveness to inward and outward cross-border trade. By extension, 
national business practices and market standards were very influential in defining the 
competitive environment for international real estate advisory services. The U.S. 
established a foundation of a favorable tax and market system, as well as a liberal trade 
and investment climate, and provided the greatest openness to foreign service firms. 
Japan’s and Germany’s restrictive domestic regulations, by contrast, reflected tightly 
linked investor-advisor relationships and closed service networks. The U.K. established 
liberal regulatory standards, yet the small and restricted domestic market ultimately 
limited competition from foreign real estate advisory firms.
3.7 International Trade and M ultinational C orporations
The unprecedented growth of capital-intensive multinational corporations was the 
most important impetus behind the globalization of accounting, law, and financial 
services in the post-World War II era.151 Real estate advisory services also expanded 
into international markets during this period, often as subsidiary operations of
150 S.L. Hayes III and P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking: A Tale of Three Cities (1990), p. 158- 
74, 278.
151 A.D. Chandler, Jr. documented in Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism 
(1990), pp. 140-41, that such capital-intensive industries as oil, rubber, paper, glass, aluminum, 
and other metal manufacturers enjoyed significant economies of scale and cost advantages by 
diversifying over widely dispersed geographic regions. E. Davis and C. Smales further argued 
that the demands of multinational corporations were the principal force behind the globalization of 
service industries, in ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, April 1989.
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multinationals, particularly in Japan and later the U.S. However, because property
services remained regionalized in character through the early 1980s, scholarly research
in international services trade devoted scant attention to the influence of corporate
property investment on the global expansion of real estate services. Even so, investment-
♦
grade real estate historically constituted 25 percent to 40 percent of the total assets of 
corporations, and approximately 20 percent of the assets of financial institutions.152
Given this level of investment in commercial property—office buildings, 
manufacturing plants, warehouses, retail stores, land, and hotels—it is interesting that 
many U.S. and European multinational corporations began to retain international real 
estate advisors only in the 1980s. Throughout the U.S. and much of Europe, the IBM 
model of independent subsidiaries based in several nations prevailed, and each foreign 
operation managed its facilities and real estate requirements separately.153 Until the 
last decade, it was more the exception than the rule for a U.S. corporation and many 
European multinationals to retain an independent real estate advisor when expanding into 
foreign markets.154
Japan’s group trading companies pioneered multinational real estate advisory 
services during the onset of global expansion in the late 1920s.155 With the rising
152 S. Currie and A. Scott, ‘The Place of Commercial Property in the U.K. Economy’, (London, 
January 1991), p. 1.
153 A. Baum and A. Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’, (Center for European Property 
Research, University of Reading, May 1987), p. 63.
154 Western European corporations had a longer history than U.S. firms in retaining real estate 
specialists for leasing and building facilities. The tradition was first established in the post-World 
War II years, when national and multinational businesses were involved in real estate development 
and financing. See M.A. Hines, Marketing Real Estate Internationally (1988), pp. 14-15.
155 Japanese trading companies became well-established in several foreign nations by the post-World 
War I era, then opened branch banks to arrange financing for Japanese trade. See Wilkins, 
‘Japanese Multinationals in the United States’, pp. 586-90; and, M.A. Hines, Guide to 
International Real Estate Investment (New York: Quorum Books, 1988), p. 89.
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importance of finance in international trade, the largest group companies-Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo-created subsidiary real estate divisions to manage substantial 
corporate property assets and other direct investments in both domestic and foreign 
markets. The activities of the groups’ multiple subsidiaries supported the real estate 
divisions, and, simultaneously, the real estate professionals provided market intelligence 
and project management services in new markets. In the U.S., for example, Japan’s 
largest trading market, the major trading companies and their group banks-Mitsui Bank, 
Mitsubishi Bank, Sumitomo Bank—established headquarters in New York City and on the 
west coast in San Francisco and later Los Angeles. Through the trading companies, 
Japanese investors gained access to distribution and information networks for the 
acquisition of U.S. assets.156
During the 1960s and early 1970s, Japanese foreign direct investment continued 
to support trade and focused on raw materials, land, sales networks, and banking 
services, primarily in the U.S., Hong Kong, Brazil, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia. By 
1970 and 1972, Sumitomo Realty and Tokyo Land Corporation, respectively, established 
residential brokerage and land development operations in California, and hotel 
management and development in Hawaii.157 In 1972, Mitsui Real Estate Development 
Co., Japan’s leading real estate concern and a pivotal member of the Mitsui group,
156 M. Wilkins, Ibid., pp. 586-96; M.A. Hines, Ibid., p. 11.
157 Tokyu Land Corporation was established in 1953 as a subsidiary of Tokyo Electric Express 
Railway Company to manage the urban development, gravel transportation, and recreational 
property businesses of its parent. In T.H. Tucker, ‘Tokyu Land Corporation’, International 
Directory of Company Histories IV, edited by A. Hast (London: St. James Press, 1991), p. 728. 
During its first decade, Sumitomo Realty, established in 1949, primarily served the real estate 
management and investment needs of the Sumitomo group. L.M. Kalanik, ‘Sumitomo Realty & 
Development Co., LTD’, International Directory of Company Histories IV, edited by A. Hast 
(London: St. James Press, 1991), p. 726.
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expanded abroad as advisor, investor, and developer. By 1990, it had 201 foreign 
subsidiaries and affiliates.158
Because of Japan’s increased economic dependency on foreign trade and export 
markets, the real estate services firms developed broad-based expertise during the 1970s 
in research, appraisal, property management, brokerage, finance, accounting, and 
construction management.159 By the early 1980s, just prior to the surge in Japanese 
real estate direct investment, real estate subsidiaries of trading companies were intimately 
familiar with U.S. and European markets, as well as local business practices and the 
relative value of property.160 Japanese real estate advisors accelerated their overseas 
expansions, particularly in U.S. and U.K. markets, acquiring global-local reputations in 
the late 1980s by counseling Japanese investors and corporations in landmark acquisitions 
and joint developments overseas, such as Rockefeller Center in New York City and 
Paternoster Square in London.161
Japanese trading companies also played a vital role in promoting the international 
reputations of Japanese construction specialists. The largest contractors developed full-
158 J. Harpham, ‘Mitsui Real Estate Development Co., LTD’, International Directory of Company 
Histories IV, edited by A. Hast (London: St. James Press, 1991), p. 715.
159 M.A. Hines, Investing in Japanese Real Estate (New York: Quorum Books, 1987), pp. 97-100, 
155-59, 242-3, 253.
160 The largest international real estate services firms in Japan included Mitsui Real Estate, Mitsubishi 
Real Estate, Sumitomo Realty and Development, Nippon Steel Real Estate Corporations, and 
Seibu Railway Company. M. Wilkins, o p . cit.. pp. 607-13; M.A. Hines, o p . cit.. pp. 242-43.
161 L.M. Kalanik, ‘Mitsubishi Estate Company’, International Directory of Company Histories, v. 4, 
(London: St. James Press, 1991), pp. 713-14; J.T. Dueser, International Strategies of Japanese 
Banks: The European Perspective (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990), 
pp. 51, 62-66, 116. Also, Nikkei Annual Corporation Reports (Kaisha nenkan) (Tokyo: Nihon 
Keizai Shinbunsha, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990), which publishes financial statistics and annual stock 
and flow financial data, and a synopsis of investment activity in Japan by foreign companies; and, 
Gaikoku Shihon no Tainichi Toshi: Gaikukuhen (Tokyo: Kaizai Chosa Kyoka, 1969, 1970, 1980, 
1990), which publishes an annual synopsis of each foreign firm investing in and doing business in 
Japan.
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service advisory practices, stemming directly from paternalistic relationships within their 
business groupings—Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Toshiba, and Hitachi. These contractors gained 
financial strength through group banks, the principal financiers of major international 
projects. They maintained a distinct competitive edge in overseas development projects 
sponsored by Japanese manufacturing and commercial companies, which tended to sole- 
source to the group’s Japanese construction manager.162
Such Japanese real estate advisory firms as Orix, however, which operated semi- 
independently from one of the trading groups, tended to expand into foreign markets 
after 1985 through finance-driven investors and institutions focused on real estate 
investments, rather than through corporate initiatives and projects. These independent 
firms, then, lacked the business backing and international foundation of the 1960s and 
1970s that group-owned and group-affiliated firms enjoyed. They entered fully mature 
foreign real estate markets beginning in 1985.
Throughout the 1960-1990 period Japanese advisors deliberately limited business 
services to foreign U.S. and European clients. Due to the country’s restrictive 
investment policies, Japan’s real estate advisors oriented their services only to those non­
domestic clients seeking Japanese financial partners. U.S. and European corporations 
retained a Japanese real estate service company associated with one of the major trading 
groups, as an introductory vehicle to Japan’s domestic economic system or to other 
affiliates in the group. Such was the case of the Disney Corporation, which was advised 
by joint venture partner Mitsui Real Estate during 1980-85.
162 J. Bennett, R. Flanagan, and G. Norman, ‘Capital & Counties Report’, (1987) pp. 19, 26, 36-7, 
73.
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Similar to Japan’s limited resources, the U.K.’s modest land area prompted
domestic trading and service enterprises to accelerate overseas expansions in the post-
World War II years.163 U.K. estate managers first assisted Commonwealth companies
with plant and facility investments worldwide in the late 19th century. This activity
♦
accelerated during the 1950s as regional differences diminished-arid a nationalized market 
emerged. U.K. ‘chartered surveyors, with unmatched knowledge and experience of 
Western European markets, advised a broad range of European corporate clients 
expanding or relocating throughout the EC region.164
U.K. advisors were thus well-positioned to compete favorably for the business of 
U.S. multinationals entering European markets. The greatest share of U.S. direct 
investment in real estate during the 1950s was concentrated in the U.K., which took 
second place to Canada in the 1960s. During the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the 
U.K. continued as an important expansion market for U.S. multinationals because of its 
cultural familiarity, and in spite of its moderate economic size.165 For example, in 
1984 the entry of U.S. corporations Intel, National Semiconductor, and Union Carbide 
along the M4 motorway between London and Bristol inflated commercial property values 
and became a major focus of U.K. property agents and advisors.166 The prospect of
16-5 Thirty percent of the U.K.’s gross domestic product in 1989 was generated by exports of goods
and services; cited in S. Cowan, The Guide to European Property Investment I (1989), p. 7-1. 
Also see A.D. Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 250.
164 Corporations involved in trade or service emphasized rail and air transport, the cost and suitability 
of office/plant space, when evaluating sites for European relocations. C.G. Powell, An Economic 
History of the British Building Industry. 1815-1979 (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 179-83; M. 
Hsia, o p . cit.. pp. 27, 46-47; also see J.H. Dunning and G. Norman, ’The Theory of the 
Multinational Enterprise: An Application to Multinational Office Location, Environment and 
Planning, v. 15 (1983), pp. 675-92.
165 M. Wilkins, The Maturing Multinational Enterprise (1974), pp. 341-42.
166 The Economist. Nov. 3, 1984, p. 334.
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EC market integration in late 1992 heightened European property investment by Japanese 
and U.S. manufacturers after 1987—principally electronics, chemicals, machinery, and 
automotive concerns--which concentrated operations in London, Paris, and 
Frankfurt.167 Market access was the first priority of Japanese companies entering 
Europe, while U.S. companies placed political stability first and market access 
second.168
U.K. property advisors enjoyed only moderate success in securing the business 
of multinational corporations expanding into Germany. Following the passage of the 
constitutional property rights Basic Law (Grundgesetz) in 1949, which authorized 
German enterprises and banks to take precedence in property development and property 
ownership,169 non-domestic property advisors enjoyed limited opportunities to penetrate 
German markets. Instead, German advisory firms in each metropolitan area held sway 
over the majority of German and foreign investors.170
Corporate consultancy, or outsourcing to property advisors, was common practice 
among many European and Japanese corporations by the 1950s. U.S. multinationals, by 
contrast, while recording a long history of overseas expansions, possessed a short 
outlook on the value of real estate advisory services in domestic and foreign markets.
167 During the 1986-1990 period, 185 Japanese companies opened plants and offices in European 
nations, including the UK, Germany, France, and Spain; 230 U.S. plants opened over the same 
period in the U.K., France, Ireland, Netherlands, and Germany. R. Buck, ‘New Japanese and 
U.S. Investments in Europe’, Site Selection Europe. Nov./Dec. 1990, p. 14 and March 1992, 
pp. 12-13.
168 Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., ‘The Cushman & Wakefield/Healey & Baker European 
Business Real Estate Monitor: American and European Businesses Rate Europe’, unpublished 
survey, July-Aug. 1990.
169 J.A. Gosling and A.J. Thomley, ‘The Role of the European Property Professional: France, Spain, 
The United Kingdom and Germany’, Working Papers in European Property, Centre for European 
Property Research, University of Reading, March 1991, pp. 41-44, 73.
170 R. Gop, ‘Player + Profile’, Tmmohilien Manager. February 1992, p. 11.
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U.S. corporations sponsored the greatest share of international real estate transactions
dowrr to the early 1980s, with U.S. foreign direct investment in manufacturing,
petroleum production, trade, and mining growing at a faster rate than the U.S. economy
between 1955 and 1970. Yet until 1983-84, American businesses typically viewed real
♦
estate investment as incidental to the mainline business and approached each market and 
each asset independently of others in the company’s portfolio.171 McDonald’s 
Corporation, for example, one of the world’s largest fast-food enterprises, operated in 
44 countries by 1988 and internally managed real estate projects within separate regional 
offices. The Gillette Company, as well, which opened its first overseas plant in 1904 
and had 20 factories abroad by 1970 and 30 by 1990, undertook foreign real estate 
investments under the auspices of the company’s finance personnel or regional 
managers.172 Through the early 1980s these and most other U.S. corporations relied 
on finance personnel for real estate development and investment, and retained a local 
property advisor only for large and/or major projects.173 By extension, U.S. real 
estate advisory firms lacked an international perspective until the mid-1980s, when 
foreign clientele brought U.S. advisors into the international marketplace.
Another factor that prompted the internationalization of U.S. real estate advisory 
firms after 1985 was intensified competition from major investment banks active in
171 M. Wilkins, The Maturing Multinational Enterprise (1974), pp. 329, 375; M.A. Hines, Guide to 
International Real Estate Investment, p. 12.
172 Xerox Corporation was among the few largest U.S. multinationals to manage its property as an 
investment portfolio, forming a separate real estate subsidiary akin to the Japanese model. By the 
time Xerox Real Estate Company was organized in 1975 the parent had been established in 
foreign markets for two decades and received 40 percent of corporate revenues from overseas 
operations, having established its first joint venture abroad in 1956 in the U.K. M.A. Hines,
Ibid., p. 12.
17j S. Goldenberg, Hands Across the Ocean: Managing Joint Ventures (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1988), pp. 3-4, 74.
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international markets. Mellon Bank, Salomon Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan
Stanley began to diversify into real estate financial services in the early 1970s to meet
the demands of corporate clients. With the emphasis on financial services and financing
innovations after the mid-1970s, together with an unprecedented, $200 billion rise in the
%
total U.S. stock of outward direct investment 1985 and 1990,- U.S. real estate advisors 
strengthened their foreign market expertise and their financial services capabilities, in 
concert with the needs of U.S. multinationals.
3.8 Inter na tio n alizatio n  o f  F inancial  M a rk ets and  In ve st m en t  Veh ic les  
Real estate advisory service firms accelerated the pace of global expansion and 
financial services innovations in the early 1980s principally to capitalize on the growth 
of unregulated international money sources. Prior to this time, debt and equity financial 
services were largely the domain of domestic banks and life insurance companies, also 
the primary sources of real estate capital in local markets. The mid-1980s, however, 
brought new forms of finance, an increasingly dynamic international investment market 
(particularly in the U.S.) and intense competition from investment banks and the Big Six 
accounting firms.174 In this context, real estate service firms competed directly with 
leading investment and merchant banks active in Eurobonds, international securities, and 
now real estate services. Firms competed on the basis of access to capital sources and 
global financial markets, as well as knowledge of property markets.175
The creation of the Eurobond market in 1963 prompted innovations in funding 
vehicles and distribution methods, and drew new business into the international
174 S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance (London: Butterworth, 1988), pp. 31-2.
175 Author’s interviews with industry executives and casual observations from multiple professional 
articles.
marketplace. Real estate finance, though not a primary sector of the Eurobond market, 
was certainly integral to most corporate debt and equity issues. During the late 1970s 
and early 1980s several lead managers in the focal countries, most of which were 
investment and merchant banks, established real estate advisory divisions to provide both 
advisory services and equity capital for real estate transactions. With the tremendous 
growth of the new-issues market during 1967-1987 and the globalization of capital and 
real estate markets, the number and breadth of real estate financing sources increased in 
the 1970s and further in the 1980s.176
Real estate advisory firms in the focal countries diversified into innovative 
financial services and expanded office operations and/or correspondent relationships into 
the primary financial capitals of New York, London, Tokyo, and Frankfurt, in an effort 
to build a financial services practice linked to international investors and capital markets, 
as well as compete directly with investment and merchant banks in counseling corporate 
clients on real estate matters. U.S. real estate firms gained the leading position in 
international finance, stemming from New York’s predominance in the Eurobond market 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, plus the international strength of the real estate 
divisions of New York investment banks Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, 
Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Salomon Brothers.177 As foreign real estate 
loans grew to a $2 billion to $8 billion market during 1981-1989~a volume 150 percent
176 The U.S. new-issues market grew 25 percent annually, 1967-1987, cited in S.L. Hayes III and 
P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking (1990), pp. 63, 51-53. The globalization of real estate 
finance particularly emphasized mortgage-related securities rather than equity investments. See 
discussion in S.E. Roulac, ‘The "Globalization" of Real Estate Finance’, The Real Estate Finance 
Journal, v. 4 no. 2 (1987), p. 40.
177 See annual listings of lead managers in Eurobonds, 1963-1987, in S.L. Hayes III and 
P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking (1990), pp. 37-9, 44, 51, 55, 59, 350-51.
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to 200 percent greater than foreign direct investment--the U.S. prevailed as the largest 
international mortgage market in the world.178
By the early 1980s, corporate mergers and acquisitions and leveraged buyouts 
constituted a growing sector in real estate financial services.179 Development finance 
was another major focus of international finance. U.S. advisory firms and investment 
banks that prevailed in this segment, whether acting as an advisor or as an equity 
partner, distinguished themselves from competitors by access to international capital 
sources and by offering superior financial expertise. For precisely this reason, Japan’s 
Nomura Securities in 1986 acquired a 50 percent interest in Eastdil, the leading U.S. real 
estate finance firm during the 1970s.180
U.S. investment banks sustained their lead through the mid-1980s by shifting 
significant capital and personnel resources to the London market, then the center of 
Euromarket activities. This, in turn, intensified competition for U.S. real estate advisory 
firms, which to date had pursued a domestic-oriented range of services. To remain 
competitive, such national firms as Cushman & Wakefield and CB Commercial 
broadened their practices to encompass new forms of international finance and expanded 
operations into foreign markets, notably London.181
U.K. chartered surveyors, too, faced new competition from investment banks and 
the Big Six accounting firms. In the early 1970s, U.K. merchant banks and European
178 M.A. Louargand, ‘Foreign Bank Participation in United States Mortgage Markets’, Working 
Paper No. 24, Center for Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
December 1989.
179 Ibid., pp. 62, 132.
180 S.L. Hayes III and P.M. Hubbard, on. cit.. p. 278.
181 See Chapter 4, Table 9.
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credit banks established real estate advisory divisions to review short- and medium-term
property loans.182 While insurance companies were the primary sources of long-term
debt and equity investment through the early 1980s, such leading merchant banks as
Morgan Grenfell, N.M. Rothschild, and S.G. Warburg remained an important source of
%
long-term debt for the largest developers and corporate investors, and concentrated 
financial advisory services on full-service corporate finance, including property.183 
Domestic currency restrictions issued by the Bank of England in 1976 constrained U.K. 
real estate credit markets, especially for foreign investments.184 The banks, guided by 
their inhouse advisors, went in two directions: direct development financings, and/or 
international loan syndicates, such as the Canary Wharf development. A few U.K. 
investors in foreign projects secured "back to back" loans with foreign banks, guaranteed 
by local merchant banks.185
U.K. property advisors gained prominence among financial institutions in the face 
of the 1973-75 property crash and the Bank of England’s 1976 edict.186 Independent, 
third-party advisors rose in importance, and value, and were called on to prepare
182 The Economist. March 18, 1972, p. 8.
18;> Clearing banks and merchants banks occasionally provided longer-term finance during 1969-1975 
period. After the 1973-75 property crash and until the early 1980s, many secondary clearing 
banks were unwilling to provide construction loans; the merchant banks continued to lend to 
developers with healthy capital base. The Economist. April 3, 1976, pp. 117-18; S.L. Hayes III
and P.M. Hubbard, op. cit.. p. 211; Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, Finance in
Property (London: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, Oct. 1977), p. 24.
184 The Economist. September 11, 1976, pp. 99-100.
185 R.J. Wolfe, ‘Debt Finance’, in Real Estate Finance, edited by S.L. Barter (London: Butterworth,
1988), pp. 83, 96; and, E.L. Erdman. People & Property (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1982),
pp. 181-82.
186 The 1975-1976 period was a significant turning point for the U.K. property market and U.K. 
property advisors. Yet the 1976 edict was ineffective after October 1979, when the dollar 
premium was abolished, together with previous barriers between wholesale capital markets and 
international capital markets in London and domestic credit markets. Since 1980, the Bank had 
no effective authority over sterling investments and credit markets.
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independent valuations and financial pro formas for new developments.187 Yet during
the 1980s clients increased pressure to provide access to international capital sources and
to operate as both an advisor and a principal. The increasing importance of foreign
capital in the face of contracting domestic sources heightened the competition with
%
investment banks, merchant banks, and accounting firms—which took principal positions 
in international capital markets.188 The 1986 Financial Services Act had the effect of 
expanding the service market for the U.K. property advisors by regulating the conditions 
under which such professional firms as lawyers, accountants and chartered surveyors 
engaged in investment matters and competed with the financial advisory arms of 
merchant and investment banks. This more restrictive financial services environment 
enhanced the marketability and stature of quality property advisors.
U.K. and German-based chartered surveyors redefined financial services to 
encompass transactional representation. German firms, such as Mueller and Dr. Lubke 
GmbH Immobilien merged with Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank, respectively; U.K. 
firms, such as Richard Ellis and Jones Lang Wootton, established affiliations with global 
investment funds and created multi-disciplined financial services divisions that drew on 
the firms’ core brokerage, development consulting, and fund management services.189
Germany’s financial institutions enabled domestic real estate advisors to compete 
on the basis of capital access after 1980, while the real estate affiliates expanded the 
financial services capabilities of the leading merchant and investment banks. Yet real 
estate advisory firms did not attempt to compete with German banks as principal agents,
187 H. Barty-King, Scratch a Surveyor (London: William Heinemann, 1975), p. 255.
188 S. Currie and A. Scott, ‘The Place of Commercial Property in the UK Economy’, (paper 
presented to the London Business School, January 1991), pp. 15-19.
189 S.L. Barter, ed., op. cit.. pp. 4, 30-34.
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nor did they expand operations to the global financial capitals of London, Tokyo, and 
New^York to participate in international financial markets.190 Germany was the 
world’s largest sponsor of foreign property investment for over two decades, 1966-1987 
(accounting for 12 percent to 16 percent of the nation’s total foreign direct investment), 
and international financial consultancy constituted one of many divisions of the largest 
investment and merchant banks. Deutsche Bank, for example, was among the top 
participants in the Eurobond market since 1963. With the assistance of both inhouse and 
third-party advisors, such as JLW of the U.K., Deutsche Bank aggressively pursued 
international real estate clients from its earliest years in the late 19th century, building 
up a centralized real estate department in Frankfurt and a foreign network of 300 full- 
service offices by 1990.191
Japanese real estate advisory firms capitalized on the heightened importance of 
financial services by exploiting their affiliations with domestic financial institutions 
(typically members of the same group), and followed domestic banking clients overseas. 
After 1986, Japanese corporations were even more motivated by cumulating stock 
surpluses to issue convertible Eurobonds and to transfer domestic investments abroad, 
notably in U.S. real estate.192
190 R. Volhard, D. Weber, and W. Usinger, eds., Real Property in Germany (1975, 1991), pp. vii, 
81, 119-21.
191 Deutsche Bank, ‘Deutsche Bank - A Brief History’, press release, Frankfurt am Main, December 
1989.
192 R.S. Dohner, ‘Japanese Financial Deregulation and the Growth of Japanese International Bank 
Activity’, USJP Occasional Paper 89-05, The Center for International Affairs and the Reischauere 
Institute of Japanese Studies, Cambridge, Harvard University, 1989; J.T. Dueser, International 
Strategies of Japanese Banks: The European Perspective (London: Macmillan Academic and 
Professional Ltd., 1990), p. 58; Kenneth Leventhal & Co., ‘Japanese Capital Flows: Availability 
and Constraints’, unpublished report, 1992, pp. 11-12.
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Japanese real estate advisory firms, in tandem with Japanese banks, extended
U.S.*rand other offshore services to U.S. and European corporations, institutional
investors, and property companies.193 By 1988, the same long-term credit banks which
built the largest U.S. presence were also among those that built a significant position in
«
international Euromarket securities and debt sectors--Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, 
Industrial Bank of Japan, and Daiichi Kangyo.194 Over the 1977-1987 period, the 
growth of foreign direct investment, was highly correlated with the growth of 
commercial and long-term credit banks. For example, as real estate investment rose to 
15 percent of total international trade during the 1986-1990 period, Japan’s largest real 
estate investor, Mitsubishi, was also the largest Japanese bank in the U.S. during the late 
1980s.195 Moreover, the leading Japanese banking centers in the U.S. were also the 
leading real estate investment markets—Los Angeles, New York City, Honolulu, and San 
Diego.196
The real estate advisory firms affiliated with long-term credit banks were 
distinguished in U.S. and European real estate markets during the 1985-1989 period by 
their ability to provide financial services and investment capital in both an advisory and 
agency capacity, as a source of counsel and capital. These dual roles diminished sharply 
after December 1989. When the Bank of Japan enforced restrictive monetary standards
19j M. Wilkins, ‘Japanese Multinationals in the U.S.’, p. 620.
194 Ibid.; S. L. Hayes III and P.M. Hubbard, o p . cit.. (1990), pp. 170, 183.
195 Loans collateralized by property accounted for over half of the loan growth of Japanese city banks 
during 1987-88. See discussion in Kenneth Leventhal & Co., ‘Japanese Capital Rows:
Availability and Constraints’, unpublished report, 1992, p. 4. M.A. Louargand, ‘Foreign Bank 
Participation in United States Mortgage Markets’, pp. 30-31.
196 Kenneth Leventhal & Co., ‘1991 Japanese Investment in United States Real Estate’, unpublished 
report, Los Angeles, 1992.
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and Japanese worldwide credit expansion ended, Japanese advisors were no longer sought 
for their access to real estate funds, or for their counsel of real estate investments and 
financing vehicles.197
3 .9  In du str y  and  O r g a n iza tio n a l  S tructure
The unregulated worldwide industry and minimal differences in real estate service 
practices across national borders facilitated a liberal flow of market and competitor 
information after 1960. In this environment, an increasingly internationalized and more 
capable industry emerged.198 Japan was the exception, where national regulations and 
business customs hindered foreign competition and the cross-border flow of knowledge 
and market intelligence.
What did real estate advisory firms expect to gain by engaging in cross-border 
services trade between the focal countries? And, what market vehicles did firms rely on 
to establish a competitive advantage in foreign nations? Measurable differences in 
national markets, real estate investment yields, and specifically a broad range among 
major urban centers (London, New York, Los Angeles, Frankfurt, Tokyo, for example) 
prompted firms with strong domestic reputations to respond to the demands of
197 See discussion of rise and fall international credit flows of Japanese real estate banks, 1986-1991, 
in Kenneth Leventhal & Co., ‘Japanese Capital Flows: Availability and Constraints’, unpublished 
report, 1992.
198 G.B. Richardson argued that a fluid industry structure enabled information to flow freely, thus 
allowing entrepreneurs to make adjustments in investments based on market intelligence about 
competitors, in Information and Investment: A Study in the Working of the Competitive Economy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. xxii, 51-2. Internalization by the "big 8" accounting firms 
after 1920 was facilitated by similar professional standards among nations, in E. Davis and C. 
Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, p. 7.
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multinational clients and the rising volume of foreign direct investment.199 For those 
firms-that established new offices in foreign markets, international expansion was 
structured to accomplish perceived profitability maxims—either by consolidating with 
domestic firms, by cooperative agreements with potential competitors, and/or by 
establishing subsidiary operations.200 Each firm’s established reputation in a related 
market played a key role in internationalization.
J. Kay argued in Foundations of Corporate Success that a firm’s "reputation was 
the market’s method of dealing with attributes of product quality which customers cannot 
easily monitor for themselves."201 Reputation was such a powerful source of 
competitive advantage, Kay contended, that it directly affected the billing rates and price 
premiums a firm commanded as well as market dominance.202 For real estate advisory 
services, industry accounts and (public and private) corporate reports provided evidence 
that real estate advisory firms with solid international reputations began to command rate 
premiums above national and local firms in the U.K. and Japan as early as 1960, 
reflecting the greater emphasis in these markets on cross-border investment and value- 
added of internationalized property services.
For example, internationalized Mitsui Real Estate’s hourly billing rates average 
10 percent to 15 percent higher than those of the domestic firm of Tokyu Land in 1960,
199 See Appendix D. Documentation of real estate yields and volatility in U.S. and U.K., 1983- 
1988, in Salomon Brothers, ‘Real Estate versus Financial Assets - An Updated Comparison of 
Returns in the United States and the United Kingdom’, unpublished report, Feb. 16, 1989.
200 G.B. Richardson discussed the competitive benefits of different organizational structures, in 
Information and Investment (1990), pp. 227-33.
201 J. Kay, Foundations of Corporate Success. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 87.
202 Ibid., pp. 88-9.
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growing to a premium of 50 percent to 100 percent by 1975. Similarly, the U.K.’s 
largest international firm, Jones Long Wootton, commanded rate premiums of 10 percent 
over the domestic practice of King Sturge & Co. in 1960, rising to almost a 100 percent 
premium by 1975.203 It could be argued that international breadth was one among 
several attributes reflected in such rate premiums. Indeed, industry accounts at the time 
indicated that the value of personnel, of service capabilities, and of reputation in major 
markets were as critical to the two internationalized firms’ market value as were their 
cross-border knowledge and international investment services, a value edge each 
sustained through the early 1980s.
Only in the late 1980s (by 1990) did U.S. international firms quote rate premiums 
relative to domestic competitors. Arthur Andersen’s international real estate services 
group, for example, commanded hourly rates 20 percent to 25 percent above domestic 
practices in 1990, such as James Felt Realty of New York City. By contrast, 
internationalized firms in Germany, the most localized of the focal countries, consistently 
reported lower billing rates than exclusively domestic firms.204 The Mueller Group, 
Germany’s largest property consultants with offices in western and eastern Europe, 
reported average hourly fees consistently on a par with or below domestic competitors, 
suggesting that there was no particular value-added for international scope in this most 
localized and fragmented of national markets. However, the world’s largest and by
2(b Company reports and direct surveys: King Sturge, senior partner of Office Consulting; Jones 
Lang Wootton information was affirmed by a partner and third party clients; Tokyu Land, 
affirmed by senior vice president; Mitsui Real Estate information confirmed by executive vice 
president, New York City.
204 Company reports and direct surveys: James Felt Realty information confirmed by senior partner, 
New York City. Senior partner of Arthur Andersen (formerly Gladstone Associates) provided 
information; Dr. Seebauer founded in 1985, but was a local consulting firm in 1975. Information 
was confirmed by senior partner (Financial Office); Mueller information was confirmed by senior 
partner (in early years, Mueller was providing very little consulting).
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reputation leading real estate advisory firm, Jones Lang Wootton, consistently 
commanded the highest billing rates among all firms analyzed across the 1960-1990 
period. This would suggest that reputation stemmed from market exposure and market 
knowledge, and had a direct impact on a firm’s real estate service fees.
4
Firmwide staff growth and billing fees commanded by leading advisory firms in 
the four countries served as quantifiable measure of reputation. Additional measures, 
if available to the researcher, could include a firm’s historical gross revenue, net 
revenues per employee, active client roster, and revenue by client and service division. 
These latter measures, however, remained largely confidential and unattainable for a 
collective analysis of the 40 firms in the real estate services profession. The work of 
Davis and Smales (1989) also highlighted how "the crucial feature of expert services" 
was "very difficult for buyers to monitor," thus making "reputation an important factor 
in attracting customers to service firms."205 Again, the core issue of measuring 
reputation was addressed but not resolved. Indeed, reputation was such a crucial feature 
of valuing the merits of professional services generally and real estate advisory services 
particularly that further, full-scale research would be warranted.
What we have determined was that since the 1960s, property advisory firms 
competed on the basis of access to markets, capital and clients; reputation stemmed from 
securing these domestic and international sources to the maximum and earliest extent; 
internationalization of the profession was driven by the globalization of financial markets 
and multinational investors. In the nature of the business of property investment and 
advisory services, competitive advantage implied that real and perceived conflicts of
205 E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, Working Paper 
Series No. 66, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, April 1989, p. 4.
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interest were balanced against a firm’s knowledge and representation of other major 
investor clients. For example, Kraft General Foods selected Cushman & Wakefield real 
estate adviosrs to manage the multinational’s real estate functions because of the firm’s 
national and internationl network of professionals and indepth knowledge of other 
corporate competitors’ business and property portfilos (which-were also clients). In a 
business which placed equal value on information and technical capablity, potential 
conflicts of interest between clients were cautiously avoided and deliberately overlooked 
by investors in the interest of access to expertise and markets.206
While Ricardo’s price theory of international trade in goods is largely inapplicable 
to an analysis of international real estate services trade, the essence of Ricardo’s free 
trade argument remained valid: capital investment in domestic trade tended to be
diverted to other markets where profits and yields were expected to be higher.207 
Unrestricted trade yielded the greatest economic efficiencies and benefits to both export 
and import markets. As in real estate investment, Japanese firms exported real estate 
advisory services to the U.S. and Europe in the hope of increasing returns on 
investments in personnel and service innovations. U.K. chartered surveyors, too, were 
principally export-oriented, focusing foreign services trade in the country’s primary real 
estate investment markets—other EC nations, the U.S., and the British Commonwealth. 
Conversely, where such "invisible" imports were restricted, or wholly prohibited—as in 
Germany and Japan—market participants incurred higher costs from limited competition,
206 C. Harlan, ‘Firms Use Outside Real-Estate Managers’, Wall Street Journal, June 4, 1992, p. Bl.
207 M. Morishima provided a critical assessment of David Ricardo’s theory in Ricardo’s Economics:
A General Equilibrium Theory of Distribution and Growth (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 5, 126-34. The discussion in this chapter also revealed the 
limitations of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model in determining the prime movers of trade 
flows; international trade in real estate advisory services depended on additional factors of 
production beyond just capital and labor endowments in the different national markets.
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limited access to professional expertise and market knowledge, and delays in
technological transfer and service innovations.208 Such formal and informal restraints
on real estate services trade hindered long-term national gains, as Hindley and Smith
argued for international services trade generally.209 Indeed, international investors in
*
the U.S. stood to gain the most from the country’s most liberal import policy for services 
and real estate expertise: information and innovations flowed freely across borders and 
through the national market.
By the mid-1980s, real estate services firms based in free-trade national markets 
were able to exploit the benefits of intensified international competition and an increased 
dependency on cross-border transfer of information—access to innovations, clients, and 
capital—at the expense of advisory firms headquartered in more restricted markets. An 
indigenous trait among real estate advisory firms was that when information and 
expertise were harbored, colleagues and competitors closed off channels of mutually- 
beneficial communication. Two extremes exemplified this observed practice: U.K. 
chartered surveyors responded promptly to market shifts, service innovations, and 
national inward-outward investment cycles; Japanese advisors, in contrast, innovated and 
expanded in response to macro trade forces (such as capital credit markets), rather than 
to shifting real estate markets and advancing service innovations.
208 The latter consequence emerged in 1989-90, when limited market perspective and finance-driven
investments in the U.S. and Europe resulted in disproportionately high losses for Japanese
investors. For a history of "invisible" U.K. imports and exports, see D. Liston and N. Reeves,
The Invisible Economy: A Profile of Britain’s Invisible Exports (London: Pitman Publishing, 
1988).
209 B. Hindley and A. Smith contended that "a country gains from importing services or allowing 
immigration of labor or receiving foreign direct investment if the terms on which these 
transactions take place are more favorable than the terms available on domestic transactions." In 
‘Comparative Advantage and Trade in Services’, The World Economy, v. 7 no. 4 (Dec. 1984), 
p. 375.
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Real estate advisory subsidiaries in larger, diversified financial and professional 
services organizations--U.K. merchant banks, German investment banks, and U.S. 
accounting firms-also appeared to be less responsive to property market shifts and 
industry innovations. By contrast, independent real estate advisory firms, such as those 
presented in the case studies in Chapter 6, tended to be most pliable to market shifts and 
more innovative than their competitors in banking, accounting, and product trade.210
The optimum organizational structure accommodated the pressures of both an 
integrated global strategy and local responsiveness: a centralized multiregional and 
multinational network of offices and subsidiaries; an autonomous but cooperative 
multidisciplined departmental system; an international perspective toward markets and 
clients; and an adequate capital reserve to fund incremental expansion and new 
businesses.211 U.K. real estate advisory firms were most successful in developing a 
complex structure that integrated a multimarket, global presence with locally autonomous 
offices and diversified service divisions. Over several decades beginning in the early 
20th century, such firms as Jones Lang Wootton and Weatherall, Green & Smith retained 
central control over expansion into multiple national markets by enabling the most 
profitable local offices to subsidize the firmwide strategy of expanding services beyond 
a provincial business environment and broadening the scope of international trade.212
210 S.L. Hayes III and P.M. Hubbard found the same tendency in international investment banking 
services, discussed in Investment Banking (1990), p. 321.
211 Comparative advantage is gained by integrating an international strategy with local market 
responsiveness, discussed in C.K. Prahalad and Yves L. Doz, The Multinational Mission: 
Balancing Local Demands and Global Vision. (New York and London: The Free Press, 1987), 
pp. 37-47. E.T. Penrose argued that a firm’s growth is restrained by managerial diseconomies 
and increasing costs, in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1959, reprinted 1991).
212 C.G. Powell, An Economic History of the British Building Industry (1982), p. 154; Healey & 
Baker’s European expansion strategy chronicled in J. Ozanne, ‘Teaming Up to Trade on the 
Continent’, Estate Times European Supplement. March 2, 1990, p. 8; K. Holmes and R. Butler,
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At the other end of the spectrum were global, multi-firm networks. One notable 
chartered U.K. chartered surveyor, Ronald Collier, who practiced in the U.K. and 
Australia, in the 1960s established the earliest known multinational, multi-firm network- 
throughout the British Commonwealth in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Canada.213 By the late 1980s, Colliers had built a network of 34 firms in twelve 
countries. Over time, however, eroding commitments by member firms weakened the 
reputation and market acceptance of Colliers and other multinational networks.214 Most 
networks were founded in the 1970s and early 1980s and prided themselves on 
meritocratical organizational structures and no nation-state allegiances—though the 
majority originated in the U.K. and U.S. Only one multinational network, International 
Commercial Property Association (ICPA) of Europe, which was founded and managed 
since 1972 by UK-based Hillier Parker, retained centralized control through a 
hierarchical organizational structure and succeeded in balancing competing demands for 
multiregional vs. local expertise.215
‘1992: Joint Ventures in the EC’, Single Market Monitor, v. 2 no. 7 (April 1990), p. 56.
Richard Ellis, which opposed joint ventures in foreign markets, embarked on a rapid, and flawed, 
and expansion strategy in the late 1980s, depleting reserves and ultimately resulting in the 
worldwide firm’s demise; in A. Reinbach, ‘Ellis Principals Do Buy-Out’, Pensions & Investment 
Age. June 12, 1989, p. 37.
21j J. Gladstone and N. Nohria, compilers, Colliers International Property Consultants Case Study. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1990).
214 Ibid., p. 3. Another international network, which has a strong U.S. presence, is Oncor, formerly 
The Office Network, chronicled by S. Brown, ‘Real Estate Networks’, National Real Estate 
Investor. July 1989, p. 94. Also see, P. Kavanaugh, ‘Levy, Younce, Roth Ease U.S. Firms’ 
Entree Into Europe’, Commercial Property News. April 16, 1991, p. 14.
215 J. Ozanne, ‘Teaming Up to Trade on the Continent’, Estate Times European Supplement.
March 2, 1990, p. 7; B.W. Selvin, ‘Networks Help Firms Branch Out’, Real Estate. July 17, 
1990; Hillier Parker Ltd., The Hillier Parker Magazine, published corporate brochure, 1989, 
p. 12-13; W. Taylor, ‘The Logic of Global Business: An Interview with ABB’s [Asea Brown 
Bovery] Percy Bamevik’, Harvard Business Review. Mar.-Apr. 1991, p. 92.
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U.S. firms, by comparison, tended toward decentralized management of services 
and regional markets, and simply lacked the international experience to institute a unified 
global network. Regional expansion in U.S. markets after 1960 was principally driven 
by local-national clients and the potential profitability of adapting existing services to 
local conditions. Even as late as 1990 and faced with the-formidable presence of 
international competitors, many established U.S. firms~as well as the U.S. subsidiaries 
of international accounting and insurance organizations—lacked the leadership and 
centralized control to coordinate multinational operations and capitalize on the global 
reputation of diversified services organization.216
3.10 C o n c lu s io n s
What determined competitive advantage for real estate advisory services in the 
international marketplace? Different national markets cultivated different skills in 
response to real estate cycles, inward and outward investment flows, and investor 
demands. Variations in real estate markets and capital investment flows defined the 
historic evolution and relative strength of firms in each nation. U.S. and U.K. advisory 
services were built on brokerage, agency, investment sales, corporate real estate, and 
pension fund management. Japanese firms focused on financial services, and German 
advisors oriented their practices to agency services, and institutional and bank 
investments.
216 C.P. DeMond, Price. Waterhouse & Co. in America (New York: Amo Press, 1980), pp. 307-08, 
332-37. E. Davis, G. Hanlon, and J. Kay argued that a service firm’s reputation is the key factor 
in internationalization, rather than production economies; in ‘Internationalization in Accounting 
and Other Professional Services’ Working Papers Series No. 78, Centre for Business Strategy, 
London Business School, April 1990, pp. 9-10.
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Throughout the 1960-1990 period, even in the face of an internationalizing 
marketplace, domestic firms held a prima facia advantage over foreign competitors in 
domestic markets.217 While the U.S. encouraged a free flow of information and 
professional expertise, and U.S. and foreign firms alike were afforded equal access to 
investors—in contrast to more limited market environments in the U.K., Germany, and 
Japan, where domestic advisors enjoyed a clear advantage over foreign advisory firms- 
U.S. firms still enjoyed unmatched expertise in widely dispersed local markets.
The size and stability of inward and outward investment flows also influenced the 
long-term competitive standing and reputation of real estate advisory firms. U.K. firms 
gained dominance early on in the 1950s and 1960s, because of the nation’s long history 
in outward investment. U.S. firms, as well as foreign firms active in the U.S. 
marketplace, acquired international prominence across the 1980s due to the sustained 
growth of foreign real estate investment—from the U.K., Japan, Germany, The 
Netherlands, and Canada. Japanese and German property advisors lacked consistent 
exposure to international investor demand throughout the 1960-1990 period, and 
therefore lacked a solid investment climate for sustained innovation.
217 For international real estate advisory services, the author endorses the argument set forth by G.P. 
Sampson and R.H. Snape, that "the broader the front across which the liberalization of trade 
operates, the more likely that the allocation of resources will be improved", in ‘Identifying the 
Issues in Trade in Services’, The World Economy, v. 8 no. 2 (June 1985), p. 178.
132
CHAPTER 4 HISTORICAL PROFILE OF 40 REAL ESTATE ADVISORY 
SERVICE FIRMS IN THE FOCAL COUNTRIES
4 .1  In tr o d u c t io n
This chapter presents a historical profile of leading real estate advisory service 
firms in each focal country. An evaluation of the internationalization of 40 prominent 
firms provided a comparative reference for the detailed analysis of the growth and 
internationalization of four major real estate advisory service firms in Chapter 6. The 
case study approach departed from pure narrative analysis, in that business history can 
be documented through the chronology of particular firms and major events in the 
profession, an approach which Chandler pioneered in the early 1960s.218
Why would such a collective profile be necessary in conjunction with the 
preceding historical survey of the growth of real estate advisory services and the 
following detailed case-study biographies? The real estate services sector, as with most 
professional services, was not previously documented by economic analysts and 
historians, and the quantitative evidence for this thesis largely depended on national 
economic and cross-border direct investment statistics.219 In fact, all the property 
service firms profiled in this chapter moved into new services or foreign markets without 
the benefit of national and international benchmark performance data on markets, firms,
218 A.D. Chandler Jr., Strategy and Structure. 1962.
219 In the U.S. and the U.K., the real estate sector and foreign investment have been largely 
unregulated and unevenly documented; in Germany, through 1990, property and financial market 
data was unpublished and restricted; in Japan, even though real estate service firms were publicly- 
traded enterprises, the real estate division’s activities and profitability indicators were not itemized 
in published reports. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance maintained tight controls on government 
data, effectively closing off access to detailed statistics on property, investment, and the real estate 
sector.
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and products. Such an uninformed perspective contrasted with the experience of most 
otherrmajor industries. Only real estate firms which moved into foreign markets or into 
international services were included in this analysis. This evaluation, together with the 
comprehensive analysis of the four case study firms, constituted otherwise unobtainable 
data essential to an understanding of the history of real estate-advisory services in four 
countries.
An important finding of this survey was that 37 of the 40 firms, or 92.5 percent 
of those surveyed, increased in size (measured by the number of personnel employed) 
over the thirty-year period, and 34 of the 40 firms, or 85.0 percent, expanded the 
operating business into foreign countries. These findings suggested that a high incidence 
of multidivisional growth into dispersed and foreign markets defined the evolution of 
firms within this professional services sector over the 1960-1990 period. A key 
question, then, was what were the conditions prompting change (or growth), and what 
methods did firms use to implement change most effectively and efficiently? These 
profiles will begin to illustrate how a firm’s organizational structure hindered or helped 
growth, geographic expansion, and service diversification, and the degree to which 
changes in organizational structure were intimately related to the way in which the 
enterprise did, and was able to, expand. This discussion will be further expanded in the 
Chapter 6 case studies. If, as argued by Coase, Chandler, and Williamson, the primary 
goal of administrative structure was to economize a firm’s transaction costs, internally 
and externally, then the profiles would likely reveal which form of coordinated super­
134
structure was most effective in administering an international enterprise in the real estate 
services sector.220
The intent of the present evaluation was to isolate the essential factors influencing 
international growth in property services by evaluating uniform facts about 40 firms 
relative to broader historical developments impacting professional services, property 
markets, cross-border real estate investment, and real estate advisory service firms.221 
It also provided the framework for further refining the discussion presented in Chapters 
2 and 3, and for establishing the context of the discussion on innovations in Chapter 5, 
and the case studies in Chapter 6.
The profile of each firm was based on direct surveys, published corporate reports 
and unpublished company documents, and interviews with senior personnel, present and 
past.222 The firms were selected based on three criteria: staff size in 1990, with each 
firm ranking among the largest in each national market; the existence of an international 
practice (with or without establishment of personnel or an affiliate in a foreign country);
220 A.D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 6.
221 It should be noted that the author did not include Orix, the Japanese firm examined in the Chapter 
6 case studies, among the 10 Japanese real estate services firms analyzed in this chapter. The 10 
firms that are evaluated all originated as subsidiaries of group trading companies, while Orix was 
created out of an equipment leasing company. The firms are therefore believed to be uniformly 
comparable for the purposes of collective analyses.
222 See Appendix C for the "Company History & Profile" form the author used for direct surveys of 
each of the 40 firms in the focal countries; also, C. R. Christensen and A. Hansen, Teaching and 
the Case Method (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1987), p. 26.
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and the recommendations of recognized professional authorities in each focal 
country.223
4 .2  G r o w in g  M a r k e t s , C h a n g in g  C lient  D e m a n d s , Ser v ic e  In n o v a tio n  
Foreign expansion and service diversification took shape differently and at various 
times in each focal country, as well as among the different firms. As illustrated in 
Tables 9 and 10, foreign expansion among Japanese firms occurred between the mid- 
1920s and mid-1950s and typically within a decade of the firm’s founding. Yet for these 
firms, which were vertically integrated within multinational group companies, 
international expansion did not necessarily require a foreign presence. Five of the ten 
firms did not establish a foreign office and instead served a Japanese clientele of 
international investors from a domestic base. Because Japanese multinationals (in 
alliance with the Ministry of Finance) virtually dominated the country’s economy, as the 
discussion in Chapter 3 made clear, Japanese advisors sought to reach a larger pool of 
clients by investing resources to expand in domestic markets.224
22j In the United States, the author consulted with the Association of Real Estate Counselors and the 
research division the National Realtors Association, as well as the International Federation of Real 
Estate Consultants for all countries. For Japan, the author consulted with the Real Estate 
Companies Association in Japan, ALL Japan Real Estate Association, the Association of Real 
Estate Agents, Shuwa Investments Corporation, The Nomura Group of Japan, Nippon Life, C. 
ITOH Real Estate, the International Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo and the Japan Company 
Handbook for the largest publicly-listed real estate service companies, which all Japanese real 
estate advisory firms are. For Germany, the author consulted with the editor of the annual 
Immobilien Manager’s Player + Profile survey of real estate consultants, the Association of 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHT), Ring Deutscher Makler (RDM), the 
research division of Gesellschaft fur Informationsverarbeitung mbH, Deutsche Immobilien 
Anlagegesellschaft mbH (Deutsche Bank), and Commerz Grundbositz Investmentgesollschaft mbh 
(Commerzbank), and for the United Kingdom the author consulted Ernst & Young (chartered 
accountants), the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors research division, and the annual edition 
of The Chartered Surveyors Survey. 1979-1993.
224 Refer to Chapter 3.
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Nine of the ten U.K. firms, by contrast, internationalized to a greater number of 
foreign markets than did firms in any other focal country. U.K. advisors established 
offices abroad several decades after the firms’ founding, between 1958 and 1968, 
concurrent with a significant rise in outward direct real estate investment by U.K. 
sponsors. During the 1960-1990 period, foreign expansion exceeded domestic growth, 
with U.K. firms entering 12 new foreign nations and growing by 40 offices firmwide 
over the 30-year period, on average.
German property advisors internationalized beginning in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Two recently established firms, Apollo (1988) and Eureal (1990), only entered 
foreign markets in the 1990s, and two of the firms surveyed, Comfort and Brockhoff & 
Partner, had not established offices outside Germany at the time the manuscript was 
completed. German advisors approached international expansion in a provincial manner, 
just as they approached regionalization in domestic markets. On average, they opened 
five new offices and entered two foreign markets. Rather than investing the firm’s 
capital resources in opening an office abroad, most (except Mueller) affiliated with a 
foreign firm, or firms, or joined a global network association.
U.S. firms, the last among the focal countries to expand abroad, internationalized 
between 1975 and 1990 in response to increased multinational activity by domestic clients 
and the liberalization of globalized financial markets.225 Relative to U.K. firms, 
however, U.S. advisors invested more corporate capital and personnel resources in 
geographic diversification in domestic markets, where foreign investors were most active, 
than in foreign markets. On average, U.S. real estate advisors increased the number of 
offices by 34, yet entered only four to five foreign nations over the 1960-1990 period.
225 M.A. Hines, ‘Global Real Estate Services’, The Appraisal Journal (April 1992), pp. 206-13.
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Davis et al’s hallmark studies on internationalizing professional services argued 
that the key asset of an internationalizing service firm was reputation, at home and 
abroad. This was because customers typically bought and priced services (or products) 
based on a firm’s reputation in a specific market or a specific practice area.226 In 
cross-border real estate investment, when clients and/or investment capital entered 
foreign markets to build, acquire, and finance real estate assets, investors sought to retain 
property advisors with strong credentials and known expertise in a particular market or 
a particular technical service. This study found that reputation was clearly among the 
key factors, but the research concluded that local market knowledge was precedent to a 
firm establishing market reputation and pricing value with clients.
Perceived and real ‘value creation’ was crucial to each firm’s growth and 
profitability. Because of this, shifts in client needs, and patterns of where and how 
clients invested during certain periods, directly influenced the strategies of these 40 real 
estate advisory firms, both in terms of the services offered and the geographic 
location/concentration of established personnel.
The business expansion experienced by the 40 firms during the 30-year period, 
complemented by rising cross-border direct investment, clearly appeared to provide an 
important national factor advantage in the growth and international expansion of real 
estate advisory services. It can be concluded that the availability of skilled labor also 
constituted a primary factor in the growth of real estate services. Even though national 
markets temporarily competed on the basis of low-cost investment capital during the 
finance-driven 1980s (which was true of financial services generally), for real estate
226 E. Davis, G. Hanlon and J. Kay, ‘Internationalization in Accounting and Other Professional 
Services’, Working Paper No. 78, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, 1990, 
p. 3; and, E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, Working 
Paper No. 66, Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, 1989.
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TABLE 9
S u m m a r y  P r o f il e  o f  T e n  L e a d in g  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v is o r y  Se r v ic e  F ir m s  
.  I n  E a c h  o f  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
Year Foreign Staff Size,
Established Expansion 1990
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  F i r m s
1. Cushman & Wakefield 1917 1990, 1,270
2. CB Commercial 1969 1980 3,860
3. Grubb & Ellis 1958 1984 2,200
4. Arthur Andersen 1963 1990 195
5. LaSalle Partners 1966 1978 1,820
6. Colliers International 1967 1967 1,500
7. Landauer Associates 1946 1979 78
8. Morgan Stanley Realty 1935 1975 100
9. Eastdil Realty 1967 1975 a 125
10. Goldman Sachs & Co. 1974 1979 95
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  F i r m s
1. Jones Lang Wootton 1783 1958 3,500
2. Knight, Frank & Rutley 1896 1963 2,280
3. Healey & Baker 1820 1963 600
4. Hillier Parker 1896 1963 2,000
5. Richard Ellis 1773 1963 1,500
6. Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks 1853 1972 1,700
7. Weatherall Green & Smith 1860 1963 550
8. Savills 1855 1982 525
9. Chesterton 1805 1985 1,500
10. Edward Erdman 1934 1959 910
G e r m a n  F i r m s
1. Mueller International 1958 1977 250
2. Aengevelt Immobilien 1910 1975 84
3. Zadelhoff Deutschland 1979 1983 180
4. Angermann Internationale 1951 1982 110
5. Volckers, King & Co. 1853 1980 276
6. Brockhoff & Partner 1986 — 27
7. Deuteron Holding 1976 1978 42
8. Eureal Gesellschaft 1990 1992 8
9. Comfort Gesellschaft 1978 — 24
10. Apollo Gesellschaft 1988 1991 14
J a p a n e s e  F i r m s
1. Mitsui Real Estate 1941 1946 1,303
2. Mitsubishi Real Estate 1937 1937 1,832
3. Sumitomo Realty and Development 1949 1956 715
4. Heiwa Real Estate 1947 — 93
5. Tokyo Tatemono 1896 1926 356
6. Osaka Real Estate 1923 — 127
7. Tokyu Land 1939 1946 1,004
8. Hankyu Realty 1947 - 313
9. Daiwa Danchi 1948 — 617
10. Towa Real Estate Development 1957 -- 556
* International division established, but personnel not transferred or employed.
Source: Direct surveys of companies, conducted 1993-March 1994; public corporate reports; private company 
reports and memoranda.
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TABLE 10
S i z e  o f  F ir m s  B e f o r e  (1960) a n d  A f t e r  (1990) 
I n t e r n a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v is o r y  S e r v ic e s
Offices________  National M arkets
1960 1990 Change 1960 1990 Change
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  F i r m s
1. Cushman & Wakefield 2 65 +63 1 10 +9
2. CB Commercial 30 a 90 +60 1 a 4 +3
3. Grubb & Ellis 5 86 +81 * . 1 7 +6
4. Arthur Andersen 1 b 23 +22 1 b 7 +6
5. LaSalle Partners 3 c 36 +33 1 c 3 + 2
6. Colliers International 13 c 76 +63 c 16 + 11
7. Landauer Associates 1 6 +5 1 2 + 1
8. Morgan Stanley Realty 4 7 +3 1 4 +3
9. Eastdil Realty 1 c 3 + 2 1 1 0
10. Goldman Sachs & Co. 5 d 8 +3 2 d 4 +2
Average 6 40 +34 1.5 6 +4.5
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  F i r m s
1, Jones Lang Wootton 4 61 +57 2 20 +  18
2. Knight, Frank & Rutley 2 71 +69 1 15 + 14
3. Healey & Baker 1 16 + 15 1 13 +  12
4. Hillier Parker 1 56 +55 1 22 +21
5. Richard Ellis 1 39 +38 1 14 + 13
6. Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks 1 e 26 +25 1 8 +7
7. Weatherall Green & Smith 1 19 + 18 1 7 +6
8. Savills 9 28 +  19 1 4 +3
9. Chesterton 3 28 +25 1 10 +9
10. Edward Erdman 2 38 +36 8 +6
Average 3 38 +35 1 12 + 11
G e r m a n  F i r m s
1. Mueller International 1 12 + 11 1 5 + 4
2. Aengevelt Immobilien 1 2 + 1 1 2 +  1
3. Zadelhoff Deutschland 1 f 7 + 6 1 5 + 4
4. Angermann Internationale 1 7 + 6 1 3 + 2
5. Volckers, King & Co. 1 18 + 17 1 5 + 4
6. Brockhoff & Partner — 1 0 1 0
7. Deuteron Holding 1 g 3 + 2 1 2 + 1
8. Eureal Gesellschaft — 1 0 7  h +6
9. Comfort Gesellschaft 1 i 7 + 6 1 i 1 0
10. Apollo Gesellschaft — 1 0 1 0
Average 1 6 +5 1 3 + 2
J a p a n e s e  F i r m s
1. Mitsui Real Estate 1 27 +26 1 5 +4
2. Mitsubishi Real Estate 5 9 + 4 1 3 + 2
3. Sumitomo Realty and Development 6 9 +3 1 4 +3
4. Heiwa Real Estate 2 4 + 2 1 1 0
5. Tokyo Tatemono 3 7 + 4 1 2 + 1
6. Osaka Real Estate 2 2 0 1 1 0
7. Tokyu Land 1 3 + 2 1 2 +1
8. Hankyu Realty 4 8 + 4 1 1 0
9. Daiwa Danchi 3 9 + 6 1 1 0
10. Towa Real Estate Development 5 8 +3 1 1 0
Average 3 9 + 6 1 2 +1
* 1969 figures.
b 1963 figures.
c 1967 figures.
d 1974 figures.
* Renamed DTZ Debenham Thorpe in 1990. 
f Established in 1979.
8 1976 figures.
b Established 1990; 1992 figures.
' 1978 figures.
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advisory services an educated workforce appeared to be a more important long-term 
factor advantage.227 In fact, while low-cost capital was a definite advantage for 
Japanese firms during the late 1980s, across the entire 30-year period Japanese firms 
gained competitive strength due to their investment in financial expertise and skilled 
professionals.
This was particularly evident among U.K. firms: the British system was 
unmatched in its consistent commitment to superior property education, as well as the 
internal advancement of chartered surveyors. The ten U.S. firms, as well, consistently 
invested corporate capital in recruiting and retaining well-educated professionals. All the 
senior managers believed that a trained, credentialed staff provided a sound foundation 
for technical innovations and adaptability to market changes, and had longer term value 
in national and international competition than low-cost investment capital.
In addition, structural changes in financial and economic markets over the 1960- 
1990 period brought new types of clients and new service demands into international real 
estate investment. Tables 11 and 12 illustrate the degree to which shifting client 
demands and competitive pressures prompted real estate advisory firms in all focal 
countries to introduce innovative services and diversify into new practice areas. Most 
firms pursued diversification to broaden their reach across overlapping markets, different 
client types, and periodic weaknesses in specific market sectors (such as development, 
leasing, finance, or corporate expansions/relocations).228 Real estate advisory firms 
diversified into new services through different means: by recruiting or increasing staff 
in multiple functions, by developing innovative services and technical capabilities,
7 7 7  • •S. B. Sagan, ‘The Financial Services Industry: An International Perspective’, (Ph.D. diss., New 
York University, 1986), pp. 67-8.
228 See H. Barty-King, Scratch a Surveyor (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1975 pp. 250-52.
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through merger and acquisition with potential competitors, and through affiliation with 
an established business (and also a potential competitor).229
Each country’s property advisors emphasized their expertise in different services
during different times, typically in response to the prevailing demands of domestic
*
clients, which, on average, remained the dominant source of revenues in all countries 
throughout the 1960-1990 period. For example, U.S. advisors focused on feasibility 
studies and development services for insurance companies and retail/residential 
developers in the 1960s, emphasizing in the 1970s appraisal and portfolio management 
for pension and mutual funds and insurance companies, then corporate real estate and 
financial services for major corporations, mixed-use commercial developers, and large- 
scale investors and investment funds in the 1980s.230 U.K. advisors, which faced 
fierce competition from inhouse corporate property managers as well as accountants, 
attorneys, planners, management consultants and environmental experts, focused their 
practices on such basic services as acquisitions and dispositions, rent reviews and ratings, 
valuation, investment services, portfolio management, development services, and 
research by the late 1980s.231 Internationalized German advisors sustained their focus 
on portfolio management and advisory services for pension funds and other institutional 
investors throughout the 30-year period, and in the late 1980s supplemented weakening
229 Innovation will be evaluated in detail in Chapter 5; organizational structures are reviewed in 
section 4.4, and again in Chapter 6.
230 The Wall Street Journal. Jan. 19, 1970, pp 1, 19; March 6, 1970, p. 3; July 30, 1970, p. 10; 
March 20, 1980, p. 1; Oct. 8, 1984, p. 37; Oct. 15, 1980, p. 31; April 3, 1990, p. 46; Sept. 13, 
1990, pp. C l, C9. R. Derven, ‘Goldman Sachs Credits Innovative Financing for Success in a 
Changing Mortgage Market’, National Real Estate Investor. June 1986, p. 131.
2;>1 Chartered Surveyors Survey (London: Tann vom Hove, 1987-1991); A. Bailey, ‘Putting the
Professional Under One Roof, Director. April 1988, pp. 37-38; The Wall Street Journal.
January 25, 1990, p. C6.
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client demand for leasing and development services with asset management services for
newly-privatized agencies and investors in former East Bloc regions.232
The degree to which cross-border real estate investment influenced this process
can only be inferred from the rate of growth of foreign (versus domestic) personnel and
%
fee revenues, for each firm individually and for each country overall. Few firms, 
however, could operate on a large enough scale to support a fully integrated operation 
in every market, finding as Williamson argued, that it was more efficient to affiliate, 
contract, or merge with a third party for certain services in certain regions, at home and 
abroad.233
As the profession evolved during the 1960s and early 1970s, real estate advisors 
in all countries could be categorized by one of two operating philosophies: those that 
were entirely independent of their clients’ investment activities, and those that were 
linked in a participating (partnership) position.234 Among the 40 firms, U.K. and 
German advisors tended to be most independent from clients, and presumably the most 
objective, with only one of the ten in each country (Edward Erdman and Apollo,
232 Dr. Seebauer, ‘From East and West to unified Germany: Real Estate Market and Real Estate 
Financing Market’, July 1991; "The French are Coming-- International Investors in Germany’, 
European Real Estate Insider, vol. 2 no. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 3-5, 12; R. Gop, ‘Player + Profile: 
New Game Rules’, Immobilien Manager, no. 6 (Dec. 1993), pp. 9-20. Interview with author, 
Caspar Frhr. von Weichs, Dr. Seebauer & Partner, GmbH, Munich, December 15, 1993 and 
January 26, 1994.
2jj O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, pp. 56, 82ff; also see, L.S. Bacow, ‘Foreign
Investment, Vertical Integration, and the Structure of the U.S. Real Estate Industry’, Working 
Paper No. 25, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Real Estate Development, 
January 1990, pp. 16-17.
234 The Economist. March 18, 1972, p. 8. A real estate advisory firm could have a participating or 
partnership stake in a client’s project without an investment of equity by the professional service 
firm; rather, incentive fees and percentage-based commission pay structures were common in the 
U.K., Germany, and the U.S.
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TABLE 11
C l i e n t  P r o f i l e  o f  F e e  R e v e n u e s  
P e r c e n t a g e s  f o r  F e e  R e v e n u e  b y  C a t e g o r y  
f o r  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v i s o r y  S e r v i c e  F i r m s  a 
1960/1990
Pension
and
Manufacturing Insurance
and Trade Corps. Funds
United States
1960 30% 10%
1970 30% 10%
1980 30% 15%
1990 30% 20%
Development Government 
and and Other
Financial Construction Professional 
Institutions Companies Service Firms
20% 20% 20%
15% 30% 15%
15% 30% 10%
15% 20% 15%
United Kingdom
1960
1970
1980
1990
15%
15%
25%
40%
20%
20%
15%
10%
15%
15%
15%
15%
30%
35%
35%
25%
20%
15%
10%
10%
Germany
1960 40% 10% 40% 5% 5%
1970 40% 15% 30% 5% 10%
1980 30% 15% 30% 10% 15%
1990 25% 15% 25% 10% 25%
Japan
1965
1975
1980
1990
23%
33%
38%
36%
7%
7%
9%
9%
50%
18%
16%
21%
20%
33%
34%
25%
9%
3%
a Average of 10 leading firms in each focal country.
Sources: Public corporate reports and private company documents; direct surveys of 40 firms, 1993-94.
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TABLE 12
Se r v ic e  D iv e r s if ic a t io n  o f  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v is o r y  F ir m s
1960 -1990
United Kingdom 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990
Brokerage/
Agency
x
x
x
x
Property
Management
Development
Consulting
Appraisal
Portfolio
Valuation
Market
Research
Asset
Management
Corporate
Services
United States 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990
Germany
1960
1970
1980
1990
Japan
1960
1970
1980
1990
/
Financial/
Investment
Banking
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Sources: Public corporate reports and private company documents; direct surveys of 40 firms, 1993-94.
respectively) having an equity interest in either development companies or building 
projeets. In the U.S., the investment and merchant banks of Goldman Sachs, Eastdil 
(originally Eastman Dillon), Morgan Stanley, Landauer, LaSalle Partners, and Coldwell 
Banker (mortgage banking) often acted as both an advisor and an entrepreneurial agent 
in client investments. Japanese advisors without exception were integrally tied with an 
industrial or trading group company: Mitsubishi was a pivotal member of the Mitsubishi 
group; Sumitomo originated as the real estate administrator to the Sumitomo family; 
Osaka was closely related to the Sumitomo Group; Tokyu Land was a subsidiary of the 
major electric railway Tokyo Comp Excels; Hankyu was a subsidiary of an industrial 
group; and Towa Real Estate was affiliated with the major general contractor Fujita 
Corporation.
The role of the real estate advisory firm either as an independent or a 
participating agent appeared to have only a marginal affect on a firm’s international 
expansion: U.S. investment and merchant banks capitalized on established European and 
Asian financial services and securities operations to expand real estate advisory services 
in foreign markets; and, Japanese advisors capitalized on the established reputations and 
business networks of the group company to subsidize foreign expansion. However, U.K. 
advisors, which experienced the greatest international growth over the 30-year period 
rarely advanced in foreign markets by way of an equity or participatory relationship with 
a client or a client’s operations.
4 .3  P a tter n s  o f  Ge o g r a ph ic  E x pa n sio n  and  In ter na tio n al  Gr o w t h
The 40 companies indicated that personnel and office growth tended to stem more 
from geographic expansion than from service diversification (Table 13). Geographical •
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dispersion responded to increasing levels of domestic and foreign real estate investment,
growing commercial property markets domestically and abroad, and the investment
activities of existing and prospective clients. Sheer staff size and gross revenue levels
proved to be less significant to the reputation and organizational structure of the market’s
*
top leaders, than did geographic breadth and service diversification. For example, the 
failed international expansion of CB Commercial of the U.S. (the nation’s largest real 
estate advisory firm in 1990) and Richard Ellis of the U.K. (the nation’s fifth largest 
chartered surveyor firm in 1990) will be discussed in section 4.5; the relative success of 
the case-study firms in Chapter 6 highlighted the significance of geographic and service 
diversity.
During the 1960s and until 1977, U.K. investors sponsored the greatest amount 
of direct outward real estate investment. This cross-border activity would suggest the 
existence of a lucrative platform to support overseas expansion of U.K. advisors. 
Indeed, eight of the ten U.K. property advisors entered foreign markets through 
"organic" expansion (Table 14). Such vertical integration was matched only by a 
minority of firms in the other focal countries, which chose instead to affiliate or merge 
with potential competitors in foreign markets. Perhaps because a global perspective was 
part of the national culture, U.K. firms were most adaptable to foreign customs and drew 
on well-established capabilities to exploit economies of scale. In addition, U.K. firms 
initially moved across continental Europe and into British Commonwealth regions when 
they first internationalized, thus ameliorating the most challenging aspect of foreign 
expansion by entering markets with familiar customs.235 The complexity and cost of
2j5 The Economist. Jan. 20, 1973, pp. 90-92; R. Marshall, ‘The QS in Europe’, Building. Sept. 24, 
1976, pp. 60-61.
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managing several offices across different regions and cultures became the highest barrier 
for internationalizing real estate advisory service firms.236
U.K. ’s DTZ Debenham Thorpe aggressively responded to rising management and 
acquisition costs of international expansion by incorporating the partnership of Debenham 
Tewson & Chinnocks and taking it public on the London Stock Exchange in 1987. The 
company chose to float a public offering at the market’s and economy’s peak, 
deleveraging to acquire new capital for domestic and international expansions and 
acquisitions across the 1988-1992 period.237 The prospectus provided only moderately 
more enlightenment about the company, its clients, professional staff, and service 
revenue than private research obtained, rather laying out a detailed and systematic 
chronology since 1922 of the company’s history and domestic office openings and 
subsequent international expansion—France (1972), Australia (1973), Turkey (1975), The 
Netherlands (1977) and the U.S. (1980).238 Documented in company reports were the 
functions of the umbrella holding company, which centrally managed the international 
operations of DTZ Debenham Chinnocks, including 23.5 percent ownership in DTZ BV 
European operations (the balance owned by partners in Belgium, France, Germany and 
The Netherlands) and financial interests in private real estate service companies in Spain, 
Greece, Turkey, Russia, Hungary and Ukraine. Partial equity ownership in different 
operating business maximized DTZ’s international expansion in multiple markets and
236 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ in The Firm, the Market, and the Law, edited by R.H. 
Coase, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 333-34, 338.
'2S1 This statement is implied rather than explicitly stated in the data and information contained in 
public offering documents and reports.
238 DTZ Debenham Thorpe, ‘Background to DTZ Debenham Thorpe’, DTZ Debenham Thorpe - A 
Brief history (1984-1994)’, DTZ Debenham Thorpe - International Statement’, public company 
reports and prospectus documents, 1987-1994. The flotation was valued at £41.6 million and, by 
1990, it was valued at £39.2 million.
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with multiple partners, made possible by an infusion of public capital for operations and 
future expansion.
Among U.S., German, and Japanese firms, nonequity affiliations, as well as 
equity mergers and acquisitions were adopted in roughly an equal number of international 
expansions. When a firm independently entered a foreign market, it gained direct market 
knowledge and a singular reputation among clients. Equity and nonequity combinations, 
by comparison, typically achieved two objectives: a limited degree of market coverage 
and an expansion of the firm’s scope of services or expertise. When choosing the 
location and the form of geographic expansion, each firm assessed the cost and risk 
relative to the potential gain, recognizing, as Coase and Chandler argued, that local 
relationships and local market knowledge were ultimately most effective and 
economical.239 Because real estate investment remained highly sensitized to local 
markets, local effectiveness was a critical element in each firm’s decisions about how to 
organize international expansion.
For example, Japanese firms acquired ownership interests in U.S. firms in the 
1980s to gain access to pools of investors (or, sources of supply) and to participate 
directly in higher yielding property assets—Nomura Securities acquired 50 percent of 
Eastdil, Dai-Ichi bought 40 percent of LaSalle Partners, Sumitomo acquired 12.5 percent 
of Goldman Sachs, Orix acquired 70 percent of Rubloff, Mitsubishi acquired 51 percent 
of The Rockefeller Group (which had acquired Cushman & Wakefield in 1975), and 
Tobishima bought 18 percent of William Zeckendorf.240 The U.S. partners anticipated
2;>9 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope, pp. 38-39; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, pp. 55- 
58; L.S. Bacow, ‘Foreign Investment, Vertical Integration, and the Structure of the U.S. Real 
Estate Industry’, p. 7.
240 The Wall Street Journal. Feb. 9, 1990, p. B11C; Sept. 13, 1990, p. Cl; Bacow, ‘Foreign 
Investment, Vertical Integration’, pp. 5-7.
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reciprocity in Japanese markets and among Japanese investors, yet rarely received such
benefits. Indeed, in markets where the ‘right of establishment proved onerous or too
expensive relative to expected fee revenues—such as in Japan for all foreign real estate
service firms, and Germany for U.S. and Japanese firms—foreign property advisors chose
*
to operate through an affiliate or limited partner rather than invest corporate capital in 
a satellite office. However, those property service firms which made an upfront 
investment of corporate capital (public or private) to expand abroad—either through 
diversification or by a merger/acquisition with a foreign partner—typically received a 
greater proportion of fee revenues from foreign sources than did firms that 
internationalized through a nonequity affiliation or a global network (Table 14).
Higher investment costs tended to accrue higher long-term benefits. This would 
suggest that, at a minimum, an equity investment in geographic expansion was typically 
required—either to diversify the firm or to merge with another—to build an international 
practice that exceeded at least 15 percent of the firm’s gross revenue. Yet even some 
equity-based mergers or diversifications failed to achieve this level of return, such as 
Germany’s Aengevelt and Volckers, King, and Japan’s Mitsubishi, Tokyo Tatemono, 
Osaka, and Tokyu Land, perhaps stemming from certain diseconomies that one or more 
partner brought to a merger.241
241 As G.J. Stigler explained, sufficiently large diseconomies of scale deplete a merger of profits and 
ultimate success, including commitment of financial resources, personnel, efficient management 
and coordination, in The Organization of Industry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 
p. 99.
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TABLE 13 D o m e s t ic  and F o r e ig n  P e r s o n n e l  
T e n  L e a d in g  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v iso r y  Se r v ic e  F ir m s  in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
1960
1960 - 1990
1970
United States Firms
Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total
1. Cushman & Wakefield 75 0 75 175 0 175
2. CB Commercial — — — 600 0 600
3. Grubb & Ellis 1,050 0 1,050 2,200 0 2,200
4. Arthur Andersen 5 0 5 50 0 50
5. LaSalle Partners — — — 40 10 50
6. Colliers International — — — 28 0 28
7. Landauer Associates 10 0 10 110 0 110
8. Morgan Stanley Realty ~ " — 200 0 200
9. Goldman Sachs & Co. — — — 3 0 3
10. Eastdil Realty - “ - 5 0 5
United Kingdom Firms
1. Jones Lang Wootton 60 20 80 170 60 230
2. Knight, Frank & Rutley 65 0 65 130 25 155
3. Healey & Baker 300 0 300 300 100 400
4. Hillier Parker 60 0 60 200 50 250
5. Richard Ellis 60 0 60 170 50 220
6. Debenham Tewson & Chimiocks 40 0 40 200 20 220
7. Weatherall Green & Smith 55 0 55 180 40 220
8. Savills 200 0 200 300 0 300
9. Chesterton 120 0 120 160 0 160
10. Edward Erdman 50 5 55 65 15 80
German Firms
1. Mueller International 6 0 6 25 0 25
2. Aengevelt Immobilien 30 0 30 36 2 38
3. Zadelhoff Deutschland — — — — — —
4. Angermann Internationale 6 0 6 30 0 30
5. Volckers, King & Co. 7 0 7 10 0 10
6. Brockhoff & Partner — — — — — - -
7. Deuteron Holding - - - - - - - - - -
1980 1990
Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total
410 0 410 630 640 1,270
4,500 2 4,502 3,800 60 3,860
3,450 0 3,450 2,200 0 2,200
75 5 80 145 50 195
240 200 440 850 650 1,500
34 4 38 75 15 90
150 0 150 73 5 78
1,200 50 1,250 1,700 120 1,820
45 5 50 75 20 95
75 0 75 125 0 d 125
700 300 1,000 1,000 2,500 3,500
300 150 450 680 1,600 2,280
350 150 500 425 175 600
450 180 630 670 1,330 2,000
350 150 500 500 1,000 1,500
525 75 600 1,300 400 1,700
275 85 360 380 170 550
350 5 355 500 25 525
180 0 180 1,200 300 1,500
160 60 220 230 680 910
75 5 80 245 5 250
64 3 67 80 4 84
10 0 10 180 0 180
52 0 52 95 15 110
20 0 20 265 11 276
10 0 10 c 27 0 27
6 7 13 35 7 42
(Table continues)
TABLE 13 (Continued)
D o m e s t ic  an d  F o r e ig n  P e r s o n n e l  
T e n  L e a d in g  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v is o r y  Se r v ic e  F ir m s  in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
1960 - 1990
1960 1970 1980 1990
Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total
8. Eureal Gesellschaft — — — — — — — — — 8 0 b 8
9. Comfort Gesellschaft — — — — — — 3 0 3 24 0 24
10. Apollo Gesellschaft - - - -- - - 5 0 5 8 14 0 14
J a p a n e s e  F i n n s  
1. Mitsui Real Estate 487 0 487 690 0 690 808 10 818 1,284 19 1,303
2. Mitsubishi Real Estate 1,630 0 1,630 1,759 0 1,759 1,852 0 1,852 1,709 123 1,832
3. Sumitomo Realty and Development 959 0 959 776 0 776 518 0 518 397 318 715
4. Heiwa Real Estate 75 0 75 79 0 79 97 0 97 93 0 93
5. Tokyo Tatemono 204 0 204 230 0 230 258 0 258 350 6 356
6. Osaka Real Estate 207 0 207 180 0 180 153 0 153 127 0 127
7. Tokyu Land 1,050 0 1,050 1,027 0 1,027 1,356 0 1,356 980 24 1,004
8. Hankyu Realty 194 0 194 216 0 216 240 0 240 313 0 313
9. Daiwa Danchi 170 0 170 226 0 226 312 0 312 671 0 617
10. Towa Real Estate 240 0 240 307 0 307 412 0 412 556 0 556
Indicates the firm or the firm’s real estate practice/personnel not formally established.
8 Established in 1988; 1988 figures.
b Affiliated with Savils of U.K.
c Established in 1987; 1987 figures
d Nomura Securities merged with Eastdil Realty in 1987.
* 1993 figures; in 1990, the real estate advisory service firm of GA/Partners (est. 1961-1963) was acquired by Arthur Andersen.
Source: Direct surveys of each firm, 1993-1994.
TABLE 14
A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  S t a f f  G r o w t h  o f  
R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v is o r y  Se r v ic e  F ir m s  in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
1960 - 1990
Foreign
Staff Size  Annual Expansion
1960_____ 1990 Growth Structure
United States Firms
1. Cushman & Wakefield 75 1,270 40 A, M
2. CB Commercial 2,200 a 3,860 79 D, A
3. Grubb & Ellis 1,050 2,200 38 A
4. Arthur Andersen 5 195 6 M, D
5. LaSalle Partners 200 b 1,820 68 D
6. Colliers International 50 c 1,500 63 A
7. Landauer Associates 10 78 2 M
8. Morgan Stanley Realty 25 100 2 M
9. Eastdil Realty 5 c 125 5 M
10. Goldman Sachs & Co. 3 d 95 6 M
Average 195 1,125 31
United Kingdom Firms
1. Jones Lang Wootton 80 3,500 114 D, M
2. Knight, Frank & Rutley 65 2,280 74 D, M, A
3. Healey & Baker 300 600 10 A, D
4. Hillier Parker 60 2,000 65 D, M, A
5. Richard Ellis 60 1,500 48 D, A
6. Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks 40 1,700 55 M
7. Weatherall Green & Smith 55 550 16 D, A
8. Savills 200 525 11 D
9. Chesterton 120 1,500 46 D, M
10. Edward Erdman 55 910 29 M
Average 104 1,530 48
German Firms
1. Mueller International 25 250 7 D, A
2. Aengevelt Immobilien 30 84 2 A, D
3. Zadelhoff Deutschland 10 e 180 15 A, M
4. Angermann Internationale 6 110 3 D
5. Volckers, King & Co. 7 276 9 M
6. Brockhoff & Partner — 27 6 f —
7. Deuteron Holding 13 8 42 3 —
8. Eureal Gesellschaft — 8 — —
9. Comfort Gesellschaft 3 h 24 1 —
10. Apollo Gesellschaft — 14 5 ! —
Average 13 102 3
(Table continues)
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TABLE 14 (Continued)
A v e r a g e  A n n u a l  S t a f f  G r o w t h  o f  
R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v is o r y  Se r v ic e  F ir m s  in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
1960 - 1990
Foreign
Staff Size Annual Expansion
1960_____ 1990 Growth Structure
Japanese Firms 
1. Mitsui Real Estate 487 1,303 27 M
2. Mitsubishi Real Estate 1,630 1,832 7 M
3. Sumitomo Realty and Development 959 715 ( 8 ) M
4. Heiwa Real Estate 75 93 1 —
5. Tokyo Tatemono 204 356 5 D
6. Osaka Real Estate 207 127 ( 3 ) M
7. Tokyu Land 1,050 1,004 ( 2 ) D
8. Hankyu Realty 194 313 4 -
9. Daiwa Danchi 170 617 15 —
10. Towa Real Estate Development 240 556 11 —
Average 512 692 6
Indicates the firm or the firm’s real estate practice/personnel not formally established.
Note: D= Internal Expansion; A= Alliance or Affiliation; M= Merger or Acquisition. 
a 1969 figures.
b 1966 figures.
c 1967 figures.
d 1974 figures.
e 1979 figures.
f Established in 1987.
8 Established in 1978; 1980 figures.
h Established in 1978.
' Established in 1988.
Source: Direct surveys of each firm, 1993-1994; public corporate reports; private company documents.
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TABLE 15
United States Firms
1. Cushman & Wakefield
2. CB Commercial
3. Grubb & Ellis
4. Arthur Andersen
5. LaSalle Partners
6. Colliers International
7. Landauer Associates
8. Morgan Stanley Realty
9. Eastdil Realty
10. Goldman Sachs & Co.
Average
United Kingdom Firms
1. Jones Lang Wootton
2. Knight, Frank & Rutley
3. Healey & Baker
4. Hillier Parker
5. Richard Ellis
6. Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks
7. Weatherall Green & Smith
8. Savills
9. Chesterton
10. Edward Erdman 
Average
D o m e s t ic  v s . F o r e ig n  S o u r c e s  o f  F e e  R e v e n u e  
T e n  L e a d in g  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v iso r y  Se r v ic e  F ir m s  in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
1960 - 1990
1960
Domestic Foreign
100% 0 %
100% 0% 
100% 0%
95% 5%
1970 1980
Domestic Foreign
100% 0 %
100% 0 %
100% 0 %
100% 0 %
95% 5%
90% 10%
90% 10%
95% 5%
75% 25%
100% 0 %
95% 5%
Domestic Foreign
1990
90%
95%
95%
95%
90%
55%
90%
90%
25%
85%
81%
10%
5%
5%
5%
10%
45%
10%
10%
75%
15%
19%
Domestic Foreign
85%
85%
95%
80%
80%
55%
85%
/o
25%
73%
15% 
15% 
5% 
20 %a 
20% 
45% 
15% 
20% 
75% 
40% 
27%
90% 10%
100% 0 % 
100% 0 % 
100% 0 % 
100% 0 % 
100% 0 % 
100% 0 % 
100% 0 % 
98% 2%
95% 5%
98% 2%
75% 25%
90% 10%
95% 5%
85% 15%
95% 5%
95% 5%
85% 15%
95% 5%
95% 5%
85% 15%
90% 10%
70% 30%
67% 33%
90% 10%
75% 25%
65% 35%
90% 10%
75% 25%
90% 10%
92% 8%
75% 25%
79% 21%
30% 70%
30% 70%
80% 20%
50% 50%
33% 67%
75% 25%
70% 30%
80% 20%
83% 17%
25% 75%
56% 44%
(Tabic continues)
TABLE 15 (Continued) D o m e s t ic  v s . F o r e ig n  So u r c e s  o f  F e e  R e v e n u e  
T e n  L e a d in g  R e a l  E s t a t e  A d v is o r y  Se r v ic e  F ir m s  in  t h e  F o c a l  C o u n t r ie s
I960 - 1990
German Firms
1. Mueller International
2. Aengevelt Immobilien
3. Zadelhoff Deutschland
4. Angermann Internationale
5. Volckers, King & Co.
6. Brockhoff & Partner
7. Deuteron Holding
8. Eureal Gesellschaft
9. Comfort Gesellschaft
10. Apollo Gesellschaft 
Average
1960 
Domestic Foreign
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1970
Domestic Foreign
90%
97%
90%
100%
10%
3%
10%
0%
1980
Domestic Foreign
100% 0 % 94%
85%
96%
90%
80%
95%
90%
90%
100%
90%
. 91%
15%
4%
10%
20%
5%
10%
10%
0%
10%
9%
1990
Domestic Foreign
85%
94%
70%
65%
92%
85%
75%
90%
79%
83%
15%
6 %
30%
35%
8 %
15%
25%
10%
21 %
10%
17%
Japanese Firms
1. Mitsui Real Estate
2. Mitsubishi Real Estate
3. Sumitomo Realty and Development
4. Heiwa Real Estate
5. Tokyo Tatemono
6. Osaka Real Estate
7. Tokyu Land
8. Hankyu Realty
9. Daiwa Danchi
10. Towa Real Estate Development 
Average
100%
100%
99%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
92%
95%
93%
98%
100%
97%
100%
95%
100%
98%
97%
8%
5%
7%
2 %
0%
3%
0%
5%
0%
2%
3%
80%
92%
85%
97%
/o
97%
97%
96%
94%
20%
8%
15%
3%
2%
2%
3%
3%
4%
2%
6%
75%
93%
90%
95%
96%
98%
98%
96%
94%
95%
25%
7%
10%
5%
4%
2%
2 %
2 %
4%
6 %
5%
Indicates the firm or the firm’s real estate practice/personnel not formally established.
* Weighted average of 1990-1993 period.
b 1987 figures, when firm was established.
Source: Direct surveys of each firm, 1993-1994; public corporate reports; private company reports and documents.
The most important finding from Table 16 is that while cross-border real estate 
investment and real estate advisory services increasingly moved toward an international 
business throughout the 1960 to 1990 period, by 1990 only five of the firms surveyed 
received more than one-half of their fee revenues from foreign sources. U.K. firms, the 
most internationalized of the firms studied, produced an average 1990 revenue mix of 
56 percent domestic sources and 44 percent foreign. Thus, while sizeable gains were 
achieved in establishing international reputations and diversifying into widely dispersed 
foreign markets, the dominant value and core business of most leading real estate 
advisory firms remained centered in domestic markets.
4 .4  Organizational  Structure and M anagem ent  o f  Gr o w th
The collective profiles illustrated the extent to which a firm’s organizational 
structure hindered or helped growth, geographic expansion, and service diversification. 
Each firm’s early (1960s) or previous organizational structure tended to influence the 
manner and pace in which the firm grew. For example, Japanese advisory firms 
remained highly centralized and integrated within the publicly-held, family/group 
company. Geographic diversification followed the expansion patterns of other company 
divisions, and all divisions and subsidiaries were ultimately administered by the central 
headquarters office in Japan and major shareholders. Thus, Japanese advisors indicated 
a propensity to pursue service diversification and geographic diversification only to 
respond to the immediate needs of clients. The firms’ organizational structures were 
nominally (if at all) altered by international expansion. When real estate markets 
worldwide contracted in the post-1989 period, Japanese firms had the least structural 
flexibility to respond to changing markets and client needs, affirming Chandler’s basic
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argument that ‘growth without structural adjustment can lead only to economic 
inefficiency’.242
European and U.S. firms which sought only access to and information from major 
foreign markets, rather than an established presence or a globalized network, tended to 
prefer to affiliate with a reputable firm, to capitalize on a foreign partner’s reputation and 
practice. The intent, or strategy, ideally dictated the most efficient structure. For 
example, Cushman & Wakefield of the U.S. and Healey & Baker of the U.K. entered 
into a nonequity affiliation to acquire access and knowledge about their respective 
domestic markets. Globalized networks made up of several firms represented a broader 
version of two-way affiliations and were favored among European and U.S. real estate 
advisors in the mid-1970s. Networks enabled a federation of local firms to pool 
resources in the international marketplace without a substantial equity investment.243
Property advisors which chose to internationalize by entering a foreign market 
independently, or by merging with a foreign firm, faced the greatest challenges in 
shaping a fluid structure among multiple service divisions and geographic regions. The 
ideal result was a complex administrative structure with a coordinated managerial 
hierarchy that facilitated management and growth of various departments across widely 
dispersed regions.244 The firms that effectively created a semi-decentralized, 
multidivisional structure remained among the most successful international real estate
242 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope, p. 16.
24si Networks established corporate guidelines among member firms, which outlined territorial 
boundaries and exclusive market coverage. Each firm retained local autonomy, and paid 
membership fees to the network corporation or partnership. In a few cases, network affiliation 
fostered a merger of two firms, such as the U.K.-France merger of Erdman Thouard.
244 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial 
Enterprise (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962), p. 33; and, A.D. Chandler, Ibid., pp. 31, 41; O.E. 
Williamson, Market and Hierarchies, p. xi, 52-56.
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advisory firms--LaSalle Partners and Arthur Andersen of the U.S., Jones Lang Wootton, 
Knight Frank & Rutley, Hillier Parker, Savills, and Weatherall Green & Smith of the 
U.K., and Mueller of Germany. Why were they successful in local and foreign markets? 
Because the organization, generally, encouraged initiative and innovation at the divisional 
and local levels. Also, because each firm was privately and directly owned by 
partners/principals and/or employees, corporate managers enjoyed a greater degree of 
control and freedom to implement long-term structural changes than did, for example, 
public companies answerable to shareholders.245
One important challenge that property service firms faced in managing growth and 
geographic expansion was balancing the nuances of real estate markets and investments, 
which were highly localized and highly entrepreneurial, with administrative needs to have 
uniform coordination across domestic and foreign markets.246 Perhaps one reason that 
German firms limited their foreign expansion to only a few major financial capitals was 
due to the atomistic structure of the domestic industry, which produced organizational 
inefficiencies by its very nature: 15 of the country’s largest population regions constituted 
only 38 percent of the national market in 1990.247 U.K. firms, by comparison, were 
forced in the 1960s to consolidate into multidisciplinary firms to respond to growing 
demands by domestic clients, which were increasingly critical of the multiplicity of
245 Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., General Motors chairman in the 1920s, effectively introduced the 
‘decentralized’ multidivisional corporate structure, believing that divisional independence focused 
‘line’ staff on operations and freed central managers to deal with planning, in A.D. Chandler, Jr., 
Scale and Scope, pp. 133, 284.
246 L.S. Bacow argued that vertical integration as applied to the real estate industry and foreign 
expansion was inappropriate, in ‘Foreign Investment, Vertical Integration,’ p. 8.
247 J.L. Blysh, ‘Baukostenplanung (Quantity Surveying in Germany)’, The Quantity Surveyor. 
July/Aug. 1972, pp. 3-5; Statistisches Bundesamt, Dr. Seebauer & Partner, 1991.
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professionals they had to employ and coordinate. Mergers and acquisitions thus became 
prevalent among British property advisors in the mid- to late-1960s.248
4 .5  F a il u r e : M a r k e t s  and  M a n a g em en t
Firms that failed to internationalize effectively typically experienced one of two 
problems: an inability to remain knowledgeable about local markets and cultivate client 
relationships at the local level, and/or an inability of senior managers to create an 
efficient yet flexible administrative structure that acknowledged the complexity of a 
growing enterprise across diverse regions and multiple service functions. Two notable 
failures, Richard Ellis of the U.K. and CB Commercial of the U.S., are discussed below. 
A third firm, Gladstone Associates (later Arthur Andersen’s Real Estate Services Group 
in the U.S.) was a domestic firm that failed in internationalization, until it was acquired 
by Arthur Andersen S.A., which subsequently globalized the real estate service group. 
A fourth failure in the international marketplace was Orix of Japan, reviewed in 
Chapter 6.
Richard Ellis, which was founded in 1773 and first moved abroad in 1963, faced 
a major management crisis during the 1983-1989 period. The firm’s international 
structure remained highly centralized in the London office and among the 16 London- 
based partners. The U.S. operation, which began in 1976 with two professionals had 
grown to 280 employees in five offices in New York, Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles and 
San Francisco by 1989 and principally served a client base of corporate and institutional 
pension funds, 60 percent domestic and 40 percent foreign (Dutch, Japanese, and
248 I.A. Leslie, ‘Service to the Industry’, and J.B. Sermon, ‘In the Contracting Camp’, Building.
May 2, 1969, p. 91; J. Nisbet, ‘The Future Private Practice’, Chartered Surveyor. July 1969, pp.
33-36.
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British). In 1983 several U.S. managers and partial owners resigned due to a 
disagreement with the U.K. owners over the relative lack of authority of the U.S. 
partners, generally, and New York headquarters, specifically. The London partners 
maintained that control should be centralized and coordinated in London (first) and New 
York (second), rather than decentralized through the regional offices. The resigning 
U.S. board members and owners argued that to cultivate a strong regional network for 
marketing real estate services, the firm should distribute ownership among local and 
regional partners, not centralize authority.
In 1989, the conflict between London and the U.S. operation climaxed when the 
London partners decided that all offices worldwide would provide a full menu of 
property services to international clients, deemphasizing the U.S. group’s business in 
fiduciary investment management for foreign and domestic institutions. London failed 
in this decision to consult or acknowledge the U.S. partners, who consequently 
implemented a 49-percent buyout of the New York-based company. The London 
partners acquired the remaining 51 percent. The former U.S. principals created The 
Yarmouth Group, retaining eleven tax-exempt clients and $5 billion of managed property 
assets.249
CB Commercial’s failed international expansion illustrated the critical importance 
of indepth local market knowledge and an entrepreneurial perspective in managing the 
organization. In 1968 Sears Roebuck & Co., the publicly held retail conglomerate, 
acquired Coldwell Banker, a residential brokerage and mortgage banking house
249 K. Blanton, ‘Dispute Over Control Leads to Richard Ellis Departures’, Pensions & Investment 
Age. October 17, 1983, pp. 2, 44; ‘Richard Ellis and County Bank Join Forces’, Accountancy. 
July 1986, p. 34; A. Reinbach, ‘Ellis Principals Do Buy-Out’, Pensions & Investment Age. 
June 12, 1989, pp. 37, 39; ‘Richard Ellis Inc. Sold to Executives in All-Cash Deal’, National 
Real Estate Investor. July 1989, pp. 28-30.
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predominantly located in the Far West and Southwestern regions.250 The next year 
Sears established the commercial division of Coldwell Banker, which became CB 
Commercial in 1980. Sears incorporated CB Commercial into the diversified 
organizational structure, centralizing management in Chicago corporate headquarters and 
altering the incentive-based compensation (or reward) structure to align with other retail 
divisions. Both of these actions limited cross-communication between regional offices 
and different service divisions among the real estate advisory professionals, and worked 
as a disincentive against entrepreneurial innovation.
Then in 1979-80, Sears transferred two real estate service professionals to the 
London satellite office to establish a European base for Commercial Banker Commercial. 
Both lacked experience and direct knowledge of U.K. and Continental markets, as well 
as of international investment practices. By 1988, just as cross-border real estate 
investment was peaking, the London real estate advisory group ceased operations and the 
larger U.S. firm was experiencing negative revenue growth as well as internal staff 
turmoil. Sears, moreover, lacked the ability and initiative (and perhaps the 
understanding) to dedicate management and financial capital to restructuring Commercial 
Banker Commercial, forced as it was to dedicate corporate resources to a weakening 
retail business, especially after 1989. In 1990 The Carlyle Group, a U.S.-based 
multinational investment holding company and venture capitalist, acquired the real estate 
services firm and continued to invest surplus capital and professional resources in
250 Sears’ diversification into some financial services, such as residential mortgage and retail credit 
cards, was successful because closer allied with the mainline retail market, while commercial 
property services were oriented to a very different client market.
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rebuilding the company’s management structure, compensation structure, and revenue 
base.251
Perhaps those domestic firms that built successful real estate advisory practices 
in international markets in the late 1980s (rather than earlier in the 1960s and 1970s) 
were those which were acquired by or merged with large, multi-service international 
holding companies—such as Coldwell Banker and The Carlyle Group. Another was 
GA/Partners of the U.S. and Arthur Andersen & Co. S.A. GA/Partners, founded in 
1961 as Gladstone Associates, a sole proprietorship in Washington, D.C., developed a 
highly successful and technically specialized domestic practice during the 1970s and early 
1980s. Clients included Fortune 50 corporations in leading U.S. industries, major 
national developers, financial institutions, and Federal government agencies. In the mid- 
1970s, the firm had opened three small satellite offices in Los Angeles, Boston and 
Miami, which were consolidated back into the central headquarters office in 1979 in a 
move to centralize management and ownership in Washington. In 1981 the firm’s 
founder, Robert Gladstone, sold the practice to six active partners who created an 
egalitarian partnership of equal shares and responsibilities.
As in the 1960s and 1970s, GA/Partners continued to be respected by clients and 
in major and secondary domestic markets as a leader in real estate consulting in the 
U.S.—indepth market knowledge, relationships with premier clients, premium 
professional fees, a highly educated professional staff, and an ability to innovate to 
respond to changing service and technical needs. And while the firm had a token few 
international assignments each year—in Canada, Singapore, Mexico, British Columbia—
251 ‘Head Start’, Forbes. October 1, 1970, p. 46; Coldwell Banker annual reports, 1970-1979; 
Coldwell Banker and CB Commercial annual reports, 1980-1993.
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the partners lacked the capacity to establish profitable, ongoing relationships with foreign 
investors in U.S. markets or to retain work abroad. GA/Partners was firmly entrenched 
in domestic markets and respected for its domestic reputation and practice.
Enter Arthur Andersen in 1985, one of the six largest, globalized, full-service 
accounting firms. Seeking to expand into real estate services in the U.S. and 
subsequently abroad, Arthur Andersen viewed a merger and acquisition of GA/Partners 
as a foothold into an under-developed and complementary practice area for the 
accounting firm. For GA/Partners, the acquisition meant loss of autonomy, control and 
ownership by the six partners, yet offered the ability to expand the practice nationally 
and internationally by capitalizing on Arthur Andersen’s domestic clientele and global 
office network. The acquisition was completed in early 1986. By late 1990, the real 
estate services group of GA/Partners-Arthur Andersen had grown more than two-fold in 
professionals, and foreign personnel and fees and increased ten-fold. In addition, access 
to international investors active in U.S. markets expanded an indeterminant, exponential 
amount—global financial institutions, foreign pension and insurance funds, and high-net- 
worth individual investors. Prior to Arthur Andersen’s acquisition, GA/Partners’ 
partners and 50-75 professionals lacked the financial and personal resources to gain and 
sustain indepth knowledge of local foreign markets and clients. Arthur Andersen’s 
global office network and existing clientele worldwide expanded the firm’s international 
capacity and was the essential vehicle to facilitate an ongoing profitable business and 
international reputation.252
252 The sacrifice to GA/Partners in the Arthur Andersen acquisition was the phased-out use of the 
Gladstone name and loss of the identity-based reputation. Within a decade of the acquisition, the 
Gladstone and GA/Partners identities were virtually unrecognized by most except long-time 
professionals and clients in the U.S.
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4 .6  C o n c lu sio n s
This collective profile of 40 firms provided a reliable account of the 
representative universe of firms in the four countries between 1960-1980-portraying 
firms that internationalized quite successfully, firms that developed a modest foreign 
practice and firms that failed in internationalization.253 Leading firms, both domestic 
and international, consistently invested corporate capital in recruiting and retaining well- 
educated professionals. The quality of a firm’s professional staff directly affected 
reputation, and reputation was key to a firm establishing its value with clients. Perceived 
and real ‘value creation’ was crucial to each firm’s growth and profitability. Because 
of this, shifts in client needs—patterns of where and how clients invested during certain 
periods—directly influenced the strategies of these 40 real estate advisory firms, both in 
terms of the services offered and the geographic concentration of a firm’s personnel.
Service diversification was prompted by client demand and by competitive 
pressures from other real estate advisory firms and other allied professional service 
firms, such as the major investment banking houses and accounting firms. Only by 
diversifying into new service areas and new markets could firms broaden their range of 
exposure among different types of clients, and thus broaden sources of potential 
revenues. In addition, innovations were motivated by the prospect of attracting and 
retaining clients and by maintaining and growing profitability margins.
Diversification and expansion tended to occur concurrently with the growth of the 
domestic economy and with rising cross-border investment in real estate. As such, firms 
in each focal country undertook foreign expansion during different periods. Increasingly
25,3 It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to document domestic real estate advisory firms in 
each country that failed in domestic markets.
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more complex organizations characterized real estate advisory firms across the 30-year 
period, stemming from the maturation of real estate markets worldwide, the increase in 
more sophisticated techniques and the types of services, and growth in the number of 
multiregional operations. The challenge for each firm how to manage standards of 
quality, efficiencies, and effective service delivery across these multiple layers. Firms 
that centralized authority and decentralized decision-making and innovation to regional 
markets and functional divisions tended to be most responsive to shifts in markets, client 
demands and economic circumstances. Moreover, privately-owned and privately- 
operated firms had the greatest capital and reputation at risk, yet also enjoyed the 
greatest flexibility to grow, contract, and/or expand offices incrementally relative to 
shifting property and investment markets.
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CHAPTERS INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE 
ADVISORY SERVICES
5.1  In t r o d u c t io n
Real estate advisory service firms in the focal countries acquired competitive 
advantage in the international marketplace by continually developing new skills and 
entering new markets. Innovations in services and market-oriented techniques, together, 
advanced the internationalization of real estate advisory services throughout the 30-year 
period. While such international trade theorists as Wells, Casson, and Sampson and 
Snape defined trade in services as the cross-border transfer of just service factors, real 
estate services trade involved the mobility of both service factors (investors and 
professional advisors) and/or local service products (real estate investment and 
investment advisory services). To promote internationalization, real estate advisory firms 
innovated by moving into new products (services) and new functions (foreign markets 
and foreign investor clients).254
5 .2  In d ic a to r s  o f  In n o v a tio n  in  R e a l  E sta te  Ad viso ry  Se r v ic e s
What macroeconomic conditions, if any, enabled firms and nations to achieve 
competitive advantage in innovative products to sustain internationalization? The prime 
mover of innovation in international real estate advisory services appeared to be total 
capital flows across borders. Significant changes in inward and outward real estate
254 A.D. Chandler, Jr., defined the move into new functions as vertical integration and the
development of new products as diversification, in Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History 
of American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962), p. 14. Also see R.W. 
Jones and F. Ruane, ‘Appraising the Options for International Trade in Services’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, v. 42 no. 4 (Oct. 1990), pp. 672-87, which argued that "opening up trade in 
either the service factor or the service product will improve economic welfare" (p. 686).
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investment stock and flows, as well as the degree of volatility in the national 
economy,255 indicated shifts in the direction of capital markets and opportunities for 
innovation. In addition, other conditions of innovation in international real estate 
advisory services included the national industry’s structure and competitive environment, 
and the organizational structure of leading national firms. The following sections review 
the introduction of major service innovations and technical innovations discussed relative 
to changes and/or events in direct real estate investment stock and flows to annual GDP 
growth, and to annual property investment yields in the focal countries.
Economic Cycles and Innovation
Changing economic environments necessitated new approaches to real estate 
acquisitions, dispositions, financings, management, and development. During 
recessionary cycles corporations, investors, and real estate developers demanded new 
mechanisms to strengthen or salvage yields on property investments. Yet rising stocks 
of real estate investment also tended to prompt service and technical innovations: to 
reinforce international investment activity in property and improve investment yields 
relative to real estate costs.256 Investors became uncertain in unusually strong or weak 
market environments, and tended to intensify demand for more and new types of real 
estate investment. Exceptionally active cross-border markets, such as the U.K. in the 
1960s (outward investment), Germany in the 1970s (outward investment), and the U.S.
255 Chapter 2, Table 3.
256 Chapter 2, Table 5. J.S. Metcalfe and M. Gibbons, ‘Technology, Variety and Organization: A 
Systematic Perspective on the Competitive Process’, in Research on Technological Innovation. 
Management and Policy, edited by R.S. Rosenbloom (London: JAI Press, 1989), pp. 154-58, 
190.
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and Japan in the 1980s (inward and outward investment, respectively), stimulated a 
higher degree of innovation.257
Significant shifts in GDP growth or decline was a second indicator of turbulence 
in the national economy and usually, in down cycles, created new forces in the real 
estate marketplace that transformed standard practices to daunting challenges.258 The 
dynamics of the market thus attracted prominent investors and qualified professionals, 
and enlarged the national market’s opportunities for investors, professional skills, and 
ongoing innovation.259
Innovation became an essential factor in attracting and retaining domestic and 
global investors throughout periodic, up-and-down investment cycles.260 For example, 
when foreign investment capital increased globally after 1978, U.S investment banks 
introduced innovative debt and equity instruments to finance real estate investment 
worldwide, and thereby attracted an abundance of real estate capital to diverse and 
profitable U.S. markets.261
257 P. A. Geroski argued that active markets generated more innovations and investment activity with 
higher total returns than less active ones, and that high import levels strengthened competition and 
productivity, in ‘Entry, Innovation and Productivity Growth’, Working Paper Series No. 53, 
Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School, August 1988, pp. 20-21.
258 R. McLean III, Director of corporate real estate for Cushman & Wakefield, U.S., discussed the 
manner in which economic and market shifts gave rise to demand for innovative real estate 
advisory services in the 1970s and 1980s, in Focus, no. 952, June 24, 1987.
259 M. Casson argued that a nation’s comparative advantage in innovation attracted the best 
professionals, whether in finance or the sciences, in Global Research Strategy and International 
Competitiveness (London: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 77-79.
260 A. Baum and A. Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’, Working Papers in European Property, 
Centre for European Property Research, University of Reading, March 1991, p. 67.
261 Because national statistics for inward and outward direct real estate investment did not specify 
types of investors, this analysis relied on anecdotal assertions by market analysts and participants 
and historical accounts about real estate markets in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan, as well 
as assertions by market analysts and industry participants, to determine each sector’s relative 
contribution to cross-border investment activity and specific innovations at particular points in 
time.
169
Based on a review of primary and secondary historical and contemporary sources, 
equity investors appeared to be the most prevalent entrants into international markets at 
the bottom of a cycle. Economic growth generated excess capital, which gave way to 
higher leveraged investment vehicles and strategies. Innovations that emerged from such 
rapid local economic realignments moved efficiently into national and international 
markets, especially during advanced globalization of the late 1970s and 1980s.
Industry Structure and Competitive Environment
Taking a locally developed service product or technical product into the 
international marketplace required an open industry structure that enabled innovations 
introduced in one particular sector or local market to flow by competitive supply/demand 
forces throughout the national system. In essence, this industry’s and the profession’s 
broadly defined and relatively flexible structure encouraged innovation and 
diversification.
Real estate advisory firms, unlike other professional services such as law or 
medicine, defied classification into distinct groups. As the real estate industry and 
property professions worldwide matured nationally and internationalized, real estate 
advisors in the focal countries called on different professional services to complement 
and expand existing practices. Many sectoral firms—including pension funds, insurance 
companies, commercial and merchant banks, investment banks, developers and 
contractors, equity funds, and investment trusts—diversified vertically to integrate some 
form of property consulting into the mainline business. Firms that gained competitive 
advantage nationally and globally extended services and technical skills through existing 
expertise, rather than to create or acquire a wholly new products; furthermore, they
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possessed the administrative, financial, tactical, and political capabilities to export 
innovations to new, foreign markets and among foreign investors.262
Restraints and barriers on trade in international markets most of all limited the 
effective and efficient transfer of skills, services technologies, and specialization to 
foreign markets.263 Persistent protectionism through strict immigration and labor laws 
in Japan, and local ownership rules in Europe and Japan hindered the progress of 
internationalizing real estate service firms, as well as other professional services.264 
Since the 1950s, for example, most European nations required foreign investors to secure 
offshore funding, rather than to rely only on domestic sources for real estate acquisitions. 
Provincial investment practices encouraged both domestic and foreign real estate advisors 
to expand operations across multiple countries on the Continent to diversify risk and gain 
an adequate return on investment in Europe. In this environment, domestic U.K. and 
German firms enjoyed a competitive advantage over U.S. and Japanese real estate 
advisory firms. Even German real estate service firms, being highly localized in their 
operations, were at risk in challenging international competitors on a purely local 
approach.265 As discussed in Chapter 3, inegalitarian market access in the U.K.,
262 A.D. Chandler. Jr.. Scale and Scope, p. 41. The structure and diseconomies of multimarket,
multidiscipline investment banking firms were similar to real estate service firms, in I. Walter and 
R.C. Smith, Investment Banking in Europe: Restructuring for the 1990s (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), p. 136; also, G.J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), p. 99.
26j I have found no evidence of this cited in the literature on real estate advisory services, yet the
research on the 40 firms and the four case studies indicated a strong relationship between trade
barriers and the international transfer of skills and knowledge.
264 Since 1986 the Group of Negotiations on Services at GATT in Geneva has begun to address 
cross-border trade interests of consultancy and construction services, principally focusing on 
developing countries. See D. Liston and N. Reeves, The Invisible Economy: A Profile of 
Britain’s Invisible Exports (London: Pitman Publishing, 1988), p. 216.
265 C.K. Prahalad and Y.L. Doz, The Multinational Mission: Balancing Local Demands and Global
Vision (New York and London: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 57-58.
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Germany, and Japan, particularly, hindered the cross-border transfer of innovative 
services among foreign competitors.266 Instead, most innovations throughout the 1960- 
1990 period depended largely on fluid communications among professionals and firms 
in each country.
Organizational Structure and Innovation
The international marketplace represented the ultimate arena of service and 
technical innovations originally conceived in local and national markets. Yet how did 
locally developed innovations emerge into international markets; and, more importantly, 
how did such locally cultivated techniques and services assist internationalization?
In the best circumstances, several of a firm’s geographic and functional divisions 
contributed to developing innovative responses to local market opportunities, then 
transported these new skills into foreign markets and/or with foreign clients. Firms that 
achieved a competitive advantage among foreign clients developed an effective network 
to bring locally cultivated services into the international marketplace. This research 
suggested that the strongest competitors were companies sensitive to market and 
technical/analytical trends and were able to exploit new services globally in a prompt and 
efficient manner (Table 16). The development and distribution of local-to-global 
innovations demanded that senior managers centralize standards of quality and 
decentralize authority to divisions and regions to permit flexible communication channels. 
Japanese real estate service firms were the exception in this regard. They typically 
pursued centralized research and development, and advised clients in different markets
266 Specific issues that a constitution for international trade in services might address were outlined by 
J.H. Jackson, ‘Constructing a Constitution for Trade in Services’, The World Economy, v. 11 
no. 2 (June 1988), pp. 187-202.
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during the 1985-1988 period on the basis of fairly uniform though innovative financing 
criteria and techniques. This lack of market-based responsiveness resulted in huge losses 
during 1989-90 in U.S., U.K., and German markets, among others, and by Japanese and 
foreign clients.
Any one firm’s foundation for service innovation rested on the breadth of 
experience in diversified markets and with a diverse range of clients.267 Not dissimilar 
to product manufacturers, real estate services firms moved into overseas markets to gain 
access to new market knowledge and to sustain the competitive position gained in home 
markets, usually with existing customers. Firms that incrementally diversified or 
expanded operations in the early 1960s or before—Jones Lang Wootton, Richard Ellis, 
Cushman & Wakefield, Mitsubishi—tended to be structurally organized to disperse more 
efficiently into multiple domestic and foreign markets in the 1970s and 1980s and 
incorporate new functions into the core business.268 In this way, Jones Lang Wootton 
of the U.K. was the exemplary model, as reviewed in Chapter 6.
The results of case studies of 40 firms in Chapter 4 indicated that the motivation 
for entering a new business or a new market, either through integration, consolidation, 
or cooperation, was to exploit access to existing and distinctive resources—skills,
267 Based on research results of 40 firms and the four case studies. H.G. Grubel affirmed that 
certain service innovations derived from specific demand conditions, contending that services were 
consumed as they were produced, in ‘All Traded Services are Embodied in Materials or People’, 
The World Economy, v. 10 no.3 (Sept. 1987), p. 319.
268 The experience of real estate advisory service firms reinforced G.B. Richardson’s argument that 
"a firm has to settle down and ‘digest’ large expansions before it can successfully carry out 
others, otherwise "managerial diseconomies" would result from rapid expansion in widely 
dispersed markets; Information and Investment: A Study in the Working of the Competitive 
Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 59.
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experience, markets, clients—which were more expensive for competitors to acquire.269 
As U.S. and U.K. investment and merchant banks became involved in real estate 
advisory services in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they applied expertise in securities, 
mergers and acquisitions, and international investment management to real estate 
advisory services. For example, the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Japan dominated global 
financial markets during the 1980s, accounting for up to 80 percent of all Euromarket 
issues. Such wide-ranging influence enabled a distinct coterie of lead investment banks 
to be easily accepted by clients and competitors in affiliated functions, and to introduce 
innovative financial structures to property investment.270
Since 1960 the competitive marketplace demanded new combinations of services 
through vertical integration or well-conceived coordination between specialized 
disciplines.271 Innovations typically emerged when firms had perceived intensified 
competition from new entrants or lower profitability from existing businesses. 
Investment in people and advanced skills and technologies were the essential ingredients 
of innovation in real estate advisory services.
While vertical integration of functions enhanced innovation through cross- 
cultivation of information about investor needs, markets, and technological approaches
269 M. Casson argued that firms gained competitive advantage by capitalizing on proprietary 
technology or a superior business strategy, in Enterprise and Competitiveness: A Systems View of 
International Business (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 86-87.
270 Leading international investment banks, whose principal focus was stock brokerage and securities, 
intermittently subsidized real estate departments to provide full-service support to corporate 
clients, including Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse First Boston, Nomura Securities, Morgan 
Guaranty, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, S.G. Warburg, and Paribas. S.L. Hayes III and 
P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking: A Tale of Three Cities (Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1990), pp. 85-88. For an account of the international accounting profession’s real estate- 
related services, see C. Rassam and D. Oates, Management Consultancy: The Inside Story 
(London: Mercury Business Books, 1991).
271 As A.D. Chandler, Jr. documented for manufacturing, innovations through joint production 
transformed existing industries and created many new ones, in Scale and Scope, p. 21.
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and solutions, the evidence was mixed as to whether returns from innovation in a 
vertically integrated enterprise were higher than in a so-called "niche" service firm.272 
The niche firms evaluated in Chapter 4, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, 
did not necessarily incur higher transaction costs when real estate services were vertically 
integrated into the mainline business. Conversely, quite often when a real estate 
advisory firm and an investment bank—or another sectoral enterprise—joined in a 
cooperative engagement, the cost of innovation was typically higher (by bringing two 
firms together) but the results, or profits, to the firms and the investor client were also 
greater. U.S., U.K., and German investment banks were more profitable in real estate 
financial services in the late 1980s than most of the full-service real estate advisory firms 
in these countries, because of their ability to act as both advisor and principal.273
The ultimate issue was sustaining profitability growth. Competing theories argued 
by Williamson, and by Porter and Millar, addressed the benefits of diversification versus 
specialization: diversified firms enjoyed greater opportunities to deepen market 
penetration and increase market share by broadening competitive scope, contended 
Williamson; specialized firms enjoyed lower cost margins and therefore higher 
profitability margins by targeting particular market segments, argued Porter and
272 This finding conflicts with the conclusions presented by H.O. Armour and D.J. Teece, ‘Vertical 
Integration and Technological Innovation’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, v. 62 no. 3 
(Aug. 1980), p. 470.
27j Virtually no published research on the profitability and sources of revenues exists for investment 
banks and real estate advisory services, yet the author’s direct experience over the 1982-1993 
period (with Arthur Andersen, Goldman Sachs & Co., Jones Lang Wootton, and Morgan Stanley) 
suggested that Goldman’s and Morgan Stanley’s ability to take an equity position in collaborative 
projects and with Arthur Andersen and Jones Lang Wootton ability to not participate, 
respectively, produced higher profits for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.
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Millar.274 Because local market knowledge lay at the heart of real estate advisory 
services, most real estate service firms tended to diversify into allied functions (rather 
than specialize in one or a few distinct services) to create a foundation for nurturing 
innovative capabilities and complement existing services.275
The following sections discuss specific turning points in national and international 
markets, and innovations in services and technical skills that emerged during particular 
economic environments. As reviewed in section 5.3, U.K. chartered surveyors 
developed new portfolio management skills in the mid-1920s and led the industry in 
counseling insurance and pension funds investing in foreign markets. Japanese advisors 
were the first to engage in corporate real estate services beginning in the late 1930s, as 
a means to acquire access to foreign resources and strengthen financial gains in overseas 
markets, discussed in section 5.4. International investment banks diversified into real 
estate advisory services in the early 1960s to protect existing relationships with corporate 
and institutional clients by integrating property finance into personal and corporate 
services; this prompted property advisors to incorporate financial or real estate 
investment banking services into the business. And, in the global real estate recession 
of the late 1980s, securitized real estate portfolio services were introduced by U.S. firms 
to attract equity investors worldwide and thereby increase fund management fee 
revenues, as discussed in section 5.5.
274 O.E. Williamson argued for diversification until managerial diseconomies set in, in Markets and 
Hierarchies, p. 82; M.E. Porter and V.E. Millar argued the benefits of specialization, in ‘How 
Information Gives You Competitive Advantage’, Harvard Business Review. July-Aug. 1985, p. 
151.
275 On this general point, see G.B. Richardson, Information and Investment, p. viii.
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TABLE 16
Innovations in Real  Estate  A dvisory Services 
U nited States, United  King do m , Germ any , and  J apan
Innovation
Country and Date 
of Innovation
International Time 
Diffusion Las
Widespread 
Market Use
Pension & Insurance Fund 
Portfolio Management Services -
U.K. - 1924 1965 41 Germany
U.S.
Japan
1965
1975
1985
Corporate Real Estate 
Services -
Japan - 1937 NA NA U.K. 
U.S. c. 
Germany
c. 1965 
1978-79 
c. 1981
Financial and Investment 
Banking Services -
Germany - 1963 1981 18 U.S.
U.K.
Japan
1981
1981
1985
Public Capital and Securitized 
Investment Services -
U.K. - 1953 1960 7 U.S.
Germany
1960
1970
Japan 1959
1 "Pension and Insurance Fund Portfolio Management Services" include systematic analysis and strategic
planning and management of real estate investments (assets, mortgages, and equity interests) held by 
institutional pension and insurance funds; these services may be outsourced or retained internally, often 
depending on the proportionate size of the institution’s real estate portfolio relative to total investment 
assets.
b "Corporate Real Estate Services" include advisory services undertaken on behalf of a non-real estate
private corporate entity to maximize the value of owned/leased assets and minimize financial exposure 
relative to the mainline business; such services can include tenant representation, project management, 
sale/leaseback arrangement, take-over defense strategy (to utilize the residual value of real estate assets 
to bolster overall corporate value). 
c "Financial and Investment Banking Services" include real estate advisory services that involve
investment banking techniques and vehicles that were originally designed to expand the universe of 
corporate investment capital, such as equity financing, participating mortgages, commercial paper, 
mezzanine financing, and SWAPs. 
d "Public Capital and Securitized Investment Services" include real estate investment services that utilize
public capital markets and securitized investment vehicles, such as Real Estate Investment Trusts, 
Property Unit Trusts, Eurodollar bond financing, and publicly-traded corporate equity shares.
Source: S.E. Roulac, ‘The Globalization of Real Estate Finance, The Real Estate Finance Journal 4, 
No.2, Spring 1987, 40; S. Tolliday, ed.,‘Business History of Real Estate’, Business History 
Review, summer 1989 issue; L.S. Bacow, ‘The Internationalization of the U.S. Real Estate 
Industry’, working Paper No. 16, MIT, Center for Real Estate Development, Nov. 1988; A. 
Baum and A. Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’, Working Papers in European Property, 
Centre for European Property, University of Reading, March 1991; Peter Scott’s PhD 
dissertation; D. Neidich and T.M. Steinberg, ‘Corporate Real Estate: Source of New Equity’, 
Harvard Business Review 4, July-Aug. 1984, pg. 76-83; S.L. Hayes and P.M. Hubbard, 
Investment Banking (1990); privately published industry and company reports (see Bibliography); 
Arthur interview, cited in thesis, with several leading property professionals and property 
economic analysts during the conduct of dissertation research and 20-year professional career.
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5.3 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P e n s i o n  a n d  In s u r a n c e  F u n d  M a n a g e m e n t
Institutional funds invested in foreign real estate to diversify investment 
portfolios, rather than as a means of seeking higher investment yields than were available 
in domestic markets.276 Because national regulations prohibited the creation of 
international co-mingled funds, except in the U.K., international funds retained real 
estate advisors in the host country for advice on acquisitions and asset management. 
Investment and merchant banks, securities firms, international accounting firms, and 
independent investment advisors competed directly with real estate advisory service firms 
for institutional fund management business.277
Pension and insurance funds became the single largest source of funds for 
domestic real estate investment in the U.K. in the 1930s, then in Germany and the U.S. 
in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, respectively, and finally in Japan in 1985-1986. U.K. 
real estate advisors introduced portfolio management services around 1924 and led the 
industry in counseling insurance and pension portfolio funds investing in foreign markets. 
Insurance company property investment emerged in the early 1920s, around 1922-23 
rising precipitously in the inter-war years to become the principal source of domestic real 
estate equity in the 1950s and 1960s.278 Investments in land property and ground rents 
constituted 20 percent of total insurance investments in 1964. When in 1965 the capital 
gains tax prompted institutional investors to hold property for their own account (rather
276 L. Hannah, ‘International Perspectives on Competition and Regulatory Change in Pension Fund 
Asset Management’, in Pension Asset Management: An International Perspective, edited by L. 
Hannah (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1988), pp. 1-13, 10.
277 Ibid., p. 6.
278 P. Scott, ‘Financial Institutions and the British Property Investment Market, 1850-1980’. 
Unpublished D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 1992, p. 97-8.
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than through developers and be taxed on profits),279 insurance companies with their 
property advisors introduced property bond funds in 1966 to invest directly in real estate. 
Pension funds then invested 25 percent of portfolios in property-linked life policies, or 
property bonds.280
During this same period, in 1958, institutional portfolios had begun to invest in 
foreign real estate; foreign purchases accelerated after the 1964 Brown Ban and the high 
inflationary period of the early 1970s.281 Major insurance companies, for example, 
funded the foreign expansion of The Hammerson Property Investment & Development 
Corp. in the late 1950s and 1960s, in Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S., advised by 
Jones Lang Wootton.282 MEPC, too, expanded into continental Europe, Australia, 
Honolulu, Munich, and Frankfurt, during 1961-1973, backed by Equitable, London Life, 
and National Provident Institution.283 And the Imperial Tobacco pension fund formed 
a joint development company with a City Centre Properties in 1961 to pursue domestic
279 The Economist. March 30, 1963, p. 1291; Jan. 28, 1967, p. 356; March 18, 1972, p. 8; N. 
Morris, ‘Competition, Regulation, and Deregulation in Pension Fund Portfolio Management: The 
Case of the United Kingdom’, in Pension Asset Management: An International Perspective, edited 
by L. Hannah (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1988), pp. 71, 75.
280 The Economist. Nov. 5, 1966, p. 610; March 2, 1968, p. 61; July 6, 1968, p. 69; July 25, 1970, 
p. 81; Sept. 11, 1971, p. 93; Mar. 18, 1972, p. 8; Sept. 23, 1972, pp. 100-01; Sept. 8, 1973, 
pp. 70-71. Property bond fund investments increased more than three-fold from Dec. 1970 to 
Sept. 1972, from 80 million to 300 million pounds.
281 S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance (London: Butterworth, 1988), pp. 10-11.
282 P. Scott, ‘The Hammerson Investment & Development Corp., PLC’, in International Directory of
Company Histories, v. IV, edited by A. Hast (London: St. James Press, 1991), pp. 696-97.
28-5 P. Scott, ‘MEPC PLC’, in International Directory of Company Histories, v. IV, edited by
A. Hast (1991), pp. 710-12.
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and U.S. projects.284 The first offshore bond fund, Tyndall Property Fund of 1970, 
was structured by U.K. estate managers Allsop & Co.285
Because domestic and foreign real estate investments accounted for a 
disproportionate share of the growth of insurance and pension fund investments, portfolio 
advisory services played an important role in the evolution of chartered surveryors’ 
property services throughout the 30-year period. Insurance funds increased property 
investments from 8.6 percent of total assets in 1958 to 9.0 percent in 1960, 16 percent 
in 1976, and 18.3 percent by 1980; commercial and residential property mortgage assets 
grew by approximately 15 percent annually over the same period.286 Pension funds, 
as well, increased real estate assets from 5 percent in 1965 to 17 percent of total assets 
by 1976; by the early 1980s, large public sector funds, which were advised by chartered 
surveyors and others, invested 30 percent of funds in real estate.287 Prior to 1979, 
pension funds collectively invested 5 percent of portfolios abroad, which increased to 
approximately 16 percent after 1979 with the liberalization of capital export tax 
controls.288
284 The Economist. June 10, 1961, p. 152.
285 The Economist. Sept. 12, 1970, p. 91; Sept. 19, 1970, p. 104.
286 ‘Are Investment Policies Changing?’, The Economist. July 22, 1961, p. 381; A. Baum and A.
Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’, Working Papers in European Property, Centre for 
European Property Research, University of Reading, March 1991, pp. 37-8; Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors, Finance in Property (London, Oct. 1977), p. 23.
287 J.N. Gordon, ‘Property Performance Indexes in the United Kingdom and the United States’, Real 
Estate Review. Summer 1991, p. 34; pension funds with major real estate investment included 
British National Coal, British Telecom, Electricity Supply, Post Office, and British Railways 
Board, in S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance, p. 3.
288 L. Hannah, ‘International Perspectives on Competition and Regulatory Change in Pension Fund
Asset Management’, p. 10; RICS, Finance in Property, p. 23.
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The prevalence of inflated property bond values and portfolio funds during the 
1971-1974 period led institutional investors to establish stricter and more conservative 
investment strategies.289 Chartered surveyors developed systematic criteria in creating 
research, appraisal, and asset management programs for evaluating foreign property 
purchases. These programs encompassed a broad array of disciplines—estate 
management, appraisal, asset management, investment sales and purchases, and financial 
services.290 Firms appeared to achieve competitive advantage by establishing 
systematic investment guidelines for different markets and different types of real estate 
products.291 Regular market valuation for property valuations first became common 
in the U.K. in the mid-1940s for retail assets, such as Mark & Spencer’s properties -- 
appraised by Hillier, Parker, May & Rowden.292 Major institutional portfolio 
valuations were not performed consistently on an annualized basis until the late 1960s, 
such as in 1969 by U.K. chartered surveyor Debenham, Tewson & Chinnocks for the 
Royal Exchange Assurance-Guardian Assurance merger.293 This marked the origins 
of modern real estate benchmarking and real estate financial services. Not until the late 
1970s, however, did most leading chartered surveyors develop systematic performance 
measurements for institutional portfolios.
289 The Economist. Sept. 25, 1971, pp. 106-07; Sept. 23, 1972, pp. 100-01.
290 M. Mallinson, ‘Equity Finance’, in Real Estate Finance, pp. 66-69, 78-9. Also see R. Sobel, 
Trammell Crow. Master Builder: The Story of America’s Largest Real Estate Empire (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1989), pp. 133-34, on a Paris project guaranteed by two British pension 
funds; and, E.L. Erdman, People & Property (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1982), p. 73, on a 
Knightsbridge project sold to the BP Pension Fund.
291 U.K. chartered surveyors active in foreign markets also took on foreign institutional clients 
investing in the U.K., thus becoming an international channel for cross-border investment.
292 See P. Scott, ‘Learning to Multiply: The Property Market and the Growth of Multiple Retailing 
in Britain, 1919-39’, Business History 36, No. 3 (1994), p. 23, n. 51, n. 63.
293 H. Barty-King, Scratch a Surveyor. (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1975), p. 249.
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Performance measurements introduced during the mid-1970s and early 1980s 
enabled fund managers and institutions to evaluate real estate yields relative to other 
investment vehicles, notably equities. In the high-inflationary, slow-growth climate of 
1974-75 institutional funds abandoned joint venture development projects and equity 
property investments in both domestic and foreign markets. And in the early 1980s, 
growing usage of benchmark evaluations prompted U.K. pension funds to implement 
more rigorous asset allocation strategies and reduce fixed income and equity real estate 
investments from 18.3 percent of portfolios in 1980, to 12.1 percent in 1988.294 In 
1990 British National Coal Board’s pension fund entirely liquidated its $1 billion 
portfolio after eight years in the U.S. market.
The diffusion of portfolio fund management skills from the U.K. to Germany and 
the U.S. occurred over a period of several decades, as widespread market use appeared 
in the major urban markets around Frankfurt and Munich, and New York, Chicago and 
Washington, D.C., only when insurance funds were interested in or legally able to invest 
in property. By the mid-1960s, German insurance and pension funds were the primary 
sources of equity and long-term debt of commercial properties in domestic markets.295 
Over time, German advisors informally observed U.K. chartered surveryors who were 
advising U.K. insurance funds investing in Munich and Frankfurt (such as JLW, 
Weatherall, Green & Smith, and Hillier, Parker, May & Rowden), and casually acquired
294 A. Baum and A. Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’, Working Papers in European Property, 
Centre for European Property Research, University of Reading, March 1991, pp. 36-39; M. 
Mallinson, ‘Equity Finance’, in Real Estate Finance, p. 40; ‘U.K. Funds Still Shunning Real 
Estate, Fixed Income’, Pensions & Investments. Oct. 1, 1990. Two U.K. performance 
measurement services are World Markets Co. and Combined Actuarial Performance Services 
(CAPS).
295 Property investment stemmed from the Insurance investment law no. 54. See S. Cowan, The 
Guide to European Property Investment I (London: Waterlow Publishers, 1989), pp. 8-9, 8-14 
through 8-19; The Economist. Dec. 22, 1984, p. 24-63.
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knowledge about other firms’ portfolio management services—services that German 
advisors subsequently used to manage the domestic portfolios of German open-end funds, 
as well as potential investments in major European capitals of Paris, London, and 
Madrid.296 U.K. advisors and the largest private German property companies (such 
as DIVAG and Fuender), by contrast, managed the majority of closed-end foreign and 
real estate funds. 297
A similar diffusion process occurred in U.S. markets where U.K. advisors and 
insurance funds were active—New York, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. Institutional 
portfolio management services were virtually nonexistent in the U.S. until 1975, once 
the 1974 Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) came into effect. 
ERISA included asset allocation guidelines for U.S. pension fund investments, including 
real estate. While insurance funds had been investing in real estate and property-backed 
mortgages since the mid-1930s—constituting about 3 percent and 8 percent of total assets, 
respectively—ERISA and the maturation of U.S. real estate markets after the recession 
and high-inflationary period of the early 1970s elevated portfolio management services 
to the core business.298 Professional techniques combined asset management and 
financial services, which had been introduced to the U.S. real estate market by chartered 
surveyors and U.S. banks and accounting firms.
296 Private company reports and public corporate statements, Jones Lang Wootton; Weatherall, Green 
& Smith; Hillier, Parker, May & Rowden; and, the Zadelhoff Group (DTZ Debenham Thorpe).
297 Up until 1990, German government prohibited open-end institutional funds from investing capital 
in foreign properties. Moreover, Germany’s tax structure limited the growth of large, externally 
invested funds. See New Briefs, National Real Estate Investor. July 1991, p. 16; Jones Lang 
Wootton, JLWorld. unpublished corporate brochure, May 1991, p. 19; and, L. Hannah, 
‘International Perspectives on Competition and Regulatory Change in Pension Fund Asset 
Management’, p. 1.
298 Assets and earnings rate of U.S. life insurance companies, 1955-1990, American Council of Life 
Insurance files, Washington, D.C.
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The size and depth of U.S. markets enabled pension and insurance funds to 
achieve adequate diversification by investing exclusively in domestic assets through the 
early 1980s.299 Because pension funds tended to view ‘value creation’ in the context 
of selected, long-term contractual relationships, the cultural compatibility of fund and 
advisor was an important criteria.300 Only the very largest pension funds invested a 
small portion of their portfolios in overseas fixed-income investments, about 2 percent, 
and even less in foreign real estate. U.S. real estate advisory firms competed directly 
with the major commercial banks that managed large pension funds and advised banking 
clients (such as BankAmerica) on real estate investment, orienting their practices to 
appraising and managing domestic real estate assets, as well as targeting investment 
properties for U.S. and foreign funds active in home markets.301
Eastern Air Lines Variable Benefit Retirement Plan for Pilots was one of the 
pioneer U.S. funds to invest in foreign real estate when it began acquiring residential 
properties in London in 1984, assisted by U.K. estate managers.302 By the late 1980s, 
prompted by weaker performance of U.S. equities and armed with international portfolio 
investment index surveys, U.S. pension funds began to invest increasing amounts of
299 D.A. Love, ‘U.S. Pension Fund Asset Management’, in Pension Asset Management: An 
International Perspective, edited by L. Hannah, (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1988), 
pp. 65-66.
000 See Chapter 3, pp. 124-5, Chapter 4, pp. 138 and 141, and Appendix D, p. 331 for definition of 
the concept of ‘value creation’.
j01 BankAmerica, for example, advised CALPERS, California’s largest state pension fund, on 
mortgage lending and real estate investments through the U.S. and U.K. The pension funds of 
General Motors Corporation and AT&T (prior to the breakup) were advised by major investment 
banks in structuring a $685 million participating loan to Taubman Realty Group, in Washington 
Post. June 21, 1991, p. HI. LaSalle Partners, Chicago real estate advisors typically managed 
property investments for pension fund clients, in ‘LaSalle Partners’ Mike Bell: Sharp-Eyed 
Insights from the Service Provider Side’, Site Selection. December 1990, p. 1357.
j02 H. Rosenberg, ‘Will U.S. Pension Funds Go Global?’, Institutional Investor. March 1989, 
p. 123.
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capital in European markets as a means of simply diversifying and hedging the ups and 
downs of the U.S. economy and domestic markets.303 By 1987-1988 overseas fixed- 
income assets, which included property, accounted for approximately 4 percent to 
5 percent of pension fund portfolios.304
U.S. and U.K. real estate advisors sought to introduce an international portfolio 
fund benchmarking system that encompassed key markets and property classes for 
assisting global clients. By 1990, however, the effort had failed because of logistical 
obstacles to uniform indexing of individual portfolios and funds: U.S. investors 
questioned the technical accuracy and uniformity of U.K. indices, and German and 
Japanese financial institutions prohibited publication of proprietary financial performance 
data on managed insurance and pension funds.305
Japanese advisors came to establish portfolio investment guidelines in 1985-1986, 
simultaneously with the surge in the country’s cross-border real estate investment
3(b ‘Pension Funds Off Target’, World Property. March 1990, p. 42; G.F. Blundell and C.W.R.
Ward, ‘Property Portfolio Allocation: A Multi-Factor Model’, Land Development Studies. May 
1987, pp. 145-56; J. Lewis, ‘MPT Comes to Real Estate’, Institutional Investor. Feb. 1990, pp. 
153-60.
304 See Pension Funds and Their Advisors 1990/91: The Blue Book of the Global Pension Fund
Industry (Tiburon, CA:Global Info-Net Inc., 1990), which publishes statistical data on how and 
where the major funds from ten countries, including the four focal countries, invest their assets. 
Also, discussion of pension fund real estate investment and future outlook in ‘Future Opportunities 
for Pension Fund Investment in Real Estate’, proceeds of a Seminar at the Center for Real Estate 
Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dec. 3, 1984; and Hannah, ‘International 
Perspectives on Competition and Regulatory Change in Pension Fund Asset Management’, p. 2,
9.
j05 In the U.S., the Frank J. Russell Company/MCREIF Property Index is the most widely used
valuation benchmark. In addition, Jones Lang Wootton, Cushman & Wakefield/Healey & Baker, 
Landauer, and Morgan Stanley International publish international real estate market reports. D.J. 
Kostin, ‘An Initial Benchmark Portfolio for Global Office Building Investments’, Bond Market 
Research pamphlet, Salomon Brothers, Oct. 4, 1989, p. 2; J.N. Gordon, ‘Property Performance 
Indexes in the United Kingdom and the United States’, Real Estate Review. Summer 1991, p. 40; 
M. Hay and P. Williamson, The Strategy Handbook (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 16-18.
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activities.306 Because corporate pensions were managed by trust and insurance 
companies, which were linked with the keiretsus, real estate subsidiaries simply 
incorporated portfolio services in the scope of corporate services, domestic and abroad. 
And Japanese life companies, which were prohibited from entering non-life insurance 
businesses, aggressively entered foreign real estate by acquiring interests in foreign firms 
involved in financial and real estate advisory services. In 1987 Nippon Life bought 
13 percent of Shearson Lehman Brothers of the U.S., and Yasuda Mutual Life acquired 
18 percent of the Paine Webber Group.307 Foreign advisors counseled Japanese funds 
on property purchases in home markets, while domestic advisors managed the overall 
portfolio of international assets.
Since the creation of real estate portfolio fund management services by U.K. 
chartered surveyors in the mid-1920s, real estate advisory firms which gained 
competitive advantage among international pension and insurance funds were 
distinguished by a solid national practice—or Continental practice, in the case of U.K. 
firms—as well as indepth knowledge of multiple markets, systematic appraisal and asset 
management skills, and, ideally, a coordinated worldwide network of offices.
j06 This also coincided with the Ministry of Finance’s initiative to increase the amount of assets 
allocated to foreign investments. Prior to 1986 MOF limited foreign assets to 10 percent of 
pension trust funds; after 1986, the limit was raised to 25 percent. The maximum limit for real 
estate investments was set at 20 percent of total assets, in N. Terada, ‘Pension Fund Portfolio 
Management in Japan’, in Pension Asset Management: An International Perspective (1988), 
p. 167.
307 D. Ostrom, ‘Japanese Insurance Companies’, Japan Economic Institute Report. August 12, 1988, 
no. 31A.
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5.4 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t e  R e a l  E s t a t e  S e r v ic e s
The ultimate objective of international corporate real estate services since its 
origins in Japan around 1937 was for property advisors to achieve the lowest systemwide 
costs for corporate clients across widely dispersed regions, cultures, and varying price 
and tax structures.308 As discussed in Chapter 2, Japanese holding companies were 
the first multinational investors to capitalize on the advantages of real estate advisors in 
the interest of pursuing cross-border trade and managing corporate real estate assets, 
domestically and abroad. Multinational, corporate-wide systems became especially 
widespread in the post-World War II decades of the 1940s and 1950s, and advanced in 
the 1966-1970 period when total outward direct investment rose 200 percent, from $1.2 
billion to $3.6 billion, most focused in U.S. markets.309
Even while the largest Japanese group companies, and leading European and U.S. 
multinationals, created internal property functions, or retained corporate real estate 
services for owned and leased assets, the function still remained incidental to foreign 
expansions down to the early 1980s. Affiliated professional services that managed 
corporate cross-border transactions dominated international corporate real estate services 
and technical innovations. Multinational investment banks and securities firms in the 
U.S. and U.K. and European merchant banks (such as Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch 
International, Salomon Brothers, S.G. Warburg, and Nomura Securities) and
j08 The cost efficiencies sought by multinationals in foreign facility transactions and property
investments, attempted to alleviate what Coase described in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937), that 
"the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the 
spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the 
probability of changes in the relevant prices", p. 25. Also, C.K. Prahalad and Y.L. Doz, The 
Multinational Mission: Balancing Local Demands and Global Vision (New York and London: The 
Free Press, 1987), p. 41.
j09 The leading Japanese international corporate real estate services firms were subsidiaries of the 
large holding companies, including Mitsubishi Estate Company Ltd. (est. 1937), Mitsui Real 
Estate Development Co., Ltd. (est. 1941), and Tokyu Land Corporation (est. 1953).
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international accounting firms (such as Arthur Andersen, Price Waterhouse) developed 
internal real estate divisions, recognizing that property services could be an important 
source of fee-based revenue in cross-border mergers, acquisitions, and operational 
investments.310 The banks and accounting firms, by cross-selling multiple services 
linked with international public securities and capital markets and foreign tax 
management and investment strategies, constituted formidable competition with standard 
real estate advisory firms.
Japanese corporations achieved worldwide leadership in corporate real estate 
services because they recognized the critical role that corporate facilities and resources 
played in establishing new overseas operations or joint ventures with foreign 
partners.311 Japanese holding companies recognized the inherent balance-sheet ‘value’ 
of corporate property assets decades before U.S. and European multinationals, primarily 
because property was a key element in Japan’s interlocking economic structure. 
Corporations owned one-quarter of the land in the domestic market, while resident 
households owned 68 percent. Because Japan’s public companies were priced for stock 
purposes based on the market value and cash yield of real estate assets, corporate 
property advisors appraised and adjusted the value of both operating and undeveloped 
properties, on an annual and semi-annual basis. Escalating property valuations were used
jl° S.L. Hayes III and P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking, pp. 278, 333-34; M. Stevens, The Big 
Six: The Selling Out of America's Top Accounting Firms (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
jU Even though Japanese corporations frequently retained foreign financial advisors to negotiate
financial transactions, in real estate-related matters they ultimately relied on real estate subsidiaries 
for counsel on corporate assets. One example is the Toshiba-Westinghouse joint venture, in 
which each partner divided ownership of corporate assets, 50.1/49.9, respectively, including the 
Westinghouse facility in the U.S. where the new joint corporation is housed. For a discussion of 
corporate real estate’s role in foreign expansion, S. Goldenberg, Hands Across the Ocean: 
Managing Joint Ventures with a Spotlight on China and Japan (Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1988), pp. 80, 139.
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to finance additional investments in public markets, a practice which became widespread 
in U.S. leveraged buyouts in the second half of the 1980s.312
In addition, another important factor in serving multinationals, Japan’s Mitsubishi 
Estate Company was the first property service firm among the focal countries in 1937 
to introduce an international structure. By heritage rather than innovation, Japanese 
advisors operated within the group company’s hierarchical structure that centered around 
efficient, intercompany coordination across several nations. The real estate subsidiaries 
of Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo shared in the pooled resources of the interlocking 
families of companies throughout the world, including market intelligence, technical 
skills, labor, and capital. During the 1960-1984 period, when Japanese outward direct 
real estate investment remained at low levels of approximately one percent to two percent 
of total outward direct investment, Japanese advisors served domestic clients in foreign 
markets at minimal risk, efficiently entering and exiting other countries because of the 
keiretsu’s established operations and reputation. After 1985, when Japanese groups 
increased capitalization levels in affiliated real estate service firms, which were chosen 
to expand operations in foreign markets, property firms moved expeditiously through 
global intercompany mechanisms.313
While development and corporate asset management services were a core product 
of Japanese real estate firms since their founding in 1937—Mitsubishi Estate Company 
was the first-strict limitations on communication between Japanese and western
012 L.S. Bacow, ‘The Tokyo Land Market: An Essay’, Working Paper Series No. 26, Center for 
Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Oct. 1990, pp. 10-11; and,
M.A. Hines, Investing in Japanese Real Estate, p. 19.
jlj Xerox, Disney Corporation, and IBM were the largest U.S. multinationals that established 
corporate real estate service affiliates, and Smith Kline Beecham in the U.K., and Siemans in 
Germany. Japanese firms never entered a global network affiliation: these were sponsored by 
U.S. and European corporations.
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European enterprises until the 1980s blocked diffusion and the cross-border transfer of 
property skills. Instead, corporate services in the U.K. beginning in the mid-1960s, in 
the U.S. in the late 1970s, and in Germany in the early 1980s, emerged out of home 
market conditions, in response to corporate demand in foreign trade.
In the U.K., corporate real estate services emerged concurrently with the post- 
World War II redevelopment of Europe. The high-inflationary 1973-75 period marked 
a turning point for property-intensive corporations and created the demand to seek 
alternative, low-cost funding vehicles to raise cash for operations. Chartered surveyors 
responded by developing innovative funding structures, primarily promoting the 
widespread use of sale-leasebacks, as well as the income-producing value of owned 
land.314 To liquidate the residual value of corporate-owned buildings and factories, 
corporations sold property portfolios to insurance and pension funds (predominantly) and 
leased back the facilities for their own use. U.K. investors tended to take an equity 
interest in property during inflationary periods, rather than high, fixed-term interest loans 
or debentures, and corporations removed real estate assets from operating statements and 
added sales proceeds to income.315 The first modern sale-leaseback in the U.S. 
occurred in 1984, when investment banker Goldman Sachs arranged a sale-leaseback for
514 British Rail’s created a separate property company, advised by chartered surveyors in planning 
joint development projects on large land parcels, in The Economist. July 14, 1973, p. 77. C.G. 
Powell, An Economic History of the British Building Industry. 1815-1979 (London: Methuen, 
1982), pp. 176-183.
Jl5 S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance, pp. 119-20; The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 
Finance in Property. (London, Oct. 1977), pp. 3, 16. For recent practices, see V. Houlder, 
‘How Under-Used Assets Can Be Exploited’, Financial Times. May 17, 1991.
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Security Pacific National Bank on its $300 million headquarters, having adopted the 
technique from its London office.316
Until the late 1970s, most U.S. real estate advisory firms committed resources 
to domestic markets, despite a market environment in which expanding multinationals 
were among the largest clients. With few exceptions, U.S. advisors were slow to 
recognize opportunities to develop international asset and investment management 
services—notably because about one-third of U.S. multinationals actively managed foreign 
real estate investment from central headquarters and the majority retained real estate 
brokers in foreign markets to execute individual transactions. This research indicated 
that until about 1978-79 and into the early 1980s most U.S. corporations also remained 
equally ignorant about the value, operating performance and strategic management of 
owned and leased property.317 A clear shift in perspective occurred during the 1982-83 
recession when poor balance-sheet performance increased corporate demand for proactive 
management of real estate assets and transactions. Rising foreign merger and acquisition 
activity in the 1983-88 period, as well as an increase in hostile takeovers, also motivated 
corporations to tap into the value of owned real estate in corporate transactions.318
Jl6 C.A. Manning, ‘Getting Things Done: The Economics of Real Estate Decisions’, Harvard
Business Review, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1986), p. 12. Union Carbide structured a sale-leaseback of 
its Connecticut headquarters as an antitakeover defense, and Amoco Corp. established a real estate 
fund of its prime property assets for the same reason; cited in M.A. Hines, Global Corporate Real 
Estate Management, pp. 3, 15-18, 30; A.M. Berman, R.J. Jinnett, R.A.N. Cudd, ‘Strategic Use 
of Real Estate Against the Hostile Takeover Bid’, The Real Estate Finance Journal. Winter 1989,
pp. 1-2.
017 S. Zeckhauser and R. Silverman, ‘Rediscover Your Company’s Real Estate’, Harvard Business
Review. Jan.-Feb. 1983, pp. 111-17.
318 For a chronicle of growing recognition by U.S. corporations that real estate assets were important
financial resource, see C.A. Manning, ‘Getting Things Done: The Economics of Real Estate 
Decisions’, Harvard Business Review, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1986), p. 12. For analysis of U.S. and 
European mergers & acquisitions, 1983-88, see I. Walter and R.C. Smith, ‘European Investment 
Banking: Structure, Transactions Flow and Regulation’, in European Banking in the 1990s. edited 
by J. Dermine (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 115-125.
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Domestic investment banks, having long-standing relationships with corporate 
clients as well as international practices and direct knowledge of foreign property 
markets, were well-positioned to advise corporations on real estate matters. This 
competitive advantage prompted U.S. real estate advisers to acquire advanced capabilities 
in corporate advisory services and introduce systematic valuation techniques and 
multiregional asset management programs to enable corporate clients to capitalize on real 
estate by reducing occupancy costs and leveraging the value of owned assets.319 U.S. 
real estate advisory firms figured prominently during the 1983-1988 period in devising 
corporate capitalization strategies to fend off hostile takeovers, as well as cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, which encompassed over $110 billion of real estate assets.320
After 1983, U.S. investment banks and real estate advisors were the primary 
sources of innovative corporate finance techniques: cross-border sale-leasebacks, 
participating corporate facilities leases, and wraparound "operating" leases.321 With 
the rise in foreign investment in U.S. markets during the 1983-1990 period, which
j19 U.S. corporations appraise real estate assets at book value (original cost less depreciation), rather
market value; this valuation technique increases corporations’ vulnerability to takeovers in strong 
real estate markets by understating the value of owned assets. See R.K. Brown,
‘Competitiveness, the CEO and Real Estate Decisions’, National Real Estate Investor. Oct. 1987, 
p. 54; H. Nourse, IDREC report, p. 6.
j20 Between 1983 and 1988, total cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose from 16 percent to 43
percent of all transactions worldwide, most hosted by U.S. and European buyers and sellers.
Real estate assets represented approximately 25 percent of corporate value, a conservative 
estimate; in the U.S. $172.6 billion of international mergers and acquisitions occurred, most of 
which were sponsored by European buyers and sellers; outside of the U.S., transactions valued 
$294 billion were executed. In I. Walter and R.C. Smith, Investment Banking in Europe (1990), 
pp. 45-8.
s2x M.G. Star, ‘Financing Arranged for Office’, Pensions & Investments. Sept. 17, 1990; K.C.
Knutsen, ‘The Impact of Real Estate on Operations and Financial Statements: Sale-Leaseback 
Transactions’, Site Selection. Nov. 1990, p. 27 (1409); W.T. McGrath, ‘Unwrapping Leasehold 
Equity: An Introduction to the "Wraparound Lease"’, Real Estate Review, v. 19 no. 4 (Winter 
1990), pp. 23, 26-27; R. Waters, ‘Goldman Sachs Heads Towards a Half-Way House’, Financial 
Times. June 12, 1991; A.M. DiSciullo and J.B. Wood, ‘Financing Real Estate Development 
Through Participation Leases’, Real Estate Review, v. 20 no. 4 (Winter 1991), p. 30.
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accounted for 8.4 percent to 10.7 percent of total inward direct investment, U.S. 
advisors enjoyed a prosperous investment climate to introduce innovative services. U.K. 
chartered surveyors, too, acquired the technical expertise and marketing skills for 
valuations and asset management in corporate mergers and acquisitions, responding to 
growing competition from U.S. advisors and international investment banks. In 
Germany, public and private German corporations controlled the majority of commercial 
land and buildings, and corporate real estate services encompassed building management 
and project finance, as well as agency and estate management.322 Since the late 1950s, 
developers and builders had advised corporations and invested equity in corporate 
development. By the early 1980s, growing competition among real estate advisors forced 
firms to distinguish themselves with development services, and to acquire project and 
asset management capabilities to gain competitive advantage with corporations against 
specialized builders.323
The 1989 downturn in real estate markets worldwide, and the resulting 
devaluation of corporate assets prompted corporate managers in each of the focal 
countries to seek new strategies to reduce long-term facilities costs and to establish more 
efficient management standards for owned and leased property. In all four nations, 
managers and advisors developed performance benchmarks to achieve uniform operating
Only the largest German corporations recognized the value and practice of corporate real estate 
services, including VEBA, Volkswagen, VIAB, BASF, and some of the largest transport 
companies.
j2j D J. Kostin, ‘German Real Estate Market: An Introduction for Non-German Investors’, Salomon 
Brothers, New York, April 1991, p. 23; S.E. Roulac, ‘The Globalization of Real Estate Finance’, 
The Real Estate Finance Journal, v. 4 no. 2 (1987), p. 44. German corporations also preceded 
major U.K. and U.S. companies in developing internal real estate functions, established to 
manage corporate property assets at home and abroad. See, L. Liston, ‘Peter Ball of Philips: 
Advocate for Asset Management’, Site Selection Europe. March 1992, p. 6.
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standards and efficiencies throughout multiregional and multinational companies.324 
In the U.S. and Europe, several corporations were able to improve operating results by 
downsizing inhouse real estate departments and outsourcing to property advisors and 
asset managers.325
5 .5  International  Financial  and Investment B anking  Services
U.S. and Japanese government regulations during the early 1960s separated 
property finance from commercial and industrial financial activities. This division of 
complementary functions fueled the growth of investment banking services to provide a 
bridge between real estate capital sources (both domestic and foreign), and property and 
non-property companies seeking debt and equity funds for property investments.326 
Leading European and U.S. investment banks, merchant banks, and commercial banks, 
which dominated world capital markets, were mostly responsible for introducing 
innovative financial structures and funding mechanisms in foreign markets down to the 
early 1980s. Financing innovations for property acquisitions, refinancings, and new 
development created the service technology and cross-border networks ultimately adopted 
by real estate advisory firms after 1981.
324 R.K. Brown, ‘Competitiveness, the CEO and Real Estate Decisions’, National Real Estate
Investor. Oct. 1987, p. 54; M.J. Joroff, ‘Corporate Real Estate 2000: Management Strategies for 
the Next Decade’, Industrial Development Research Foundation, (Washington, DC, 1992).
j25 G. Schuck, ‘Outsourcing in the 1990s: Managing Corporate Real Estate Consultants’, Working 
Paper No. 33, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Real Estate Development, June 
1991; J. Lyne, ‘The Out-Sourcing of Real Estate: Entrenched, Growing and Controversial’, Site 
Selection. Feb. 1991, pp. 50-58; L. Kimbler, ‘Corporate Real Estate Outside Services Survey’, 
unpublished presentation at Industrial Development Research Council Conference, Fall 1991; L. 
Liston, ‘Peter Ball of Philips: Advocate for Asset Management’, Site Selection Europe. March 
1992, pp. 6, 8; Wall Street Journal. June 4, 1992, p. Bl.
j26 D. Liston and N. Reeves, The Invisible Economy, pp. 48-49, for national regulations governing 
financial institutions in the focal countries.
Europe was the site of the earliest innovations. Following the unprecedented rise 
of German foreign direct real estate investment in 1959-61, German banks, notably 
Deutsche Bank, pioneered the use of long-term equity financing and participating debt 
finance for real estate in 1963 and 1965, respectively. Participating debt and equity 
loans were most appealing to pension and insurance funds in domestic and foreign 
investments because yields on capital investment tended to be higher. These popular 
funding structures subsequently spread across Europe and into U.S. markets, becoming 
a central feature in cross-border property investment throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.327
Since the early 1960s, such full-line banks as Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and 
Dresdner Bank of Germany, and the investment bank of S.G. Warburg in the U.K., were 
among the leading agents in each nation’s foreign real estate investment activities, and 
also among the largest lead managers in the international Eurobond market.328 
Germany’s largest banks, notably Deutsche Bank, pioneered the prevailing mechanisms 
in cross-border property finance and investment banking services during the 1965-1975 
period, funding structures designed for acquiring assets for corporate and institutional 
investors. The largest German bank funds investing in major U.S. and European 
market—Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and London-tended to retain 
domestic advisors most familiar with these local markets, such as CB Commercial, 
Cushman & Wakefield, LaSalle Partners, Goldman Sachs, Jones Lang Wootton, and 
Richard Ellis, and thereby unintentionally promoted the cross-boarder transfer of
s21 In the U.K., British investment banks were among the principal managers of institutional funds, 
the primary sources of long-term real estate credit.
°28 For a ranking of lead managers in Eurobond markets, 1969-1987, see G. Dufey, ‘The Role of 
Japanese Financial Institutions Abroad’, in Japanese Financial Growth, edited by C.A.E.
Goodhart and G. Sutija (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 149.
investment banking criteria and property investment services.329 Even though U.K. 
banks never came to dominate international real estate finance—either in the volume of 
international real estate finance—either in the volume of outward investment or in service 
innovations—such British institutions as S.G. Warburg, Lloyds Merchant Bank, and 
Baring Brothers were important contributors to the innovation process due to their close 
associations with leading chartered surveyors.
More than a decade passed before significant advances in international financial 
services occurred in the early 1980s, subsequent to financial market deregulation in New 
York City and Tokyo, and to a lesser extent in Frankfurt and Paris. Intensified 
competition among the world’s major investment banks catapulted real estate financial 
services and particular firms such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon 
Brothers, from a cross-border business between individual nations to a global industry. 
Between 1981 and early 1987, the center of innovation in real estate financial services 
shifted from surprisingly Germany to the U.S., specifically from Deutsche Bank to the 
leading investment banks headquartered in New York City. Concurrently, foreign direct 
real estate investment in U.S. markets rose to unprecedented levels, increasing from 
8.2 percent of total direct investment in 1981 to 10.7 percent in 1985, and 8.6 percent 
in 1987. U.S. investment banks also occupied four of the top six positions in the league 
of Eurobond lead managers in 1981, and all of the top five positions in 1985, evidence 
of dominance in multinational capital investment services.330
029 Public corporate reports and private company files; confirmed by author via direct interviews.
During the 1981-1987 period, Deutsche Bank dominated international real estate finance, ranking 
fourth among Eurobond lead managers in 1981, sixth in 1985, and third in 1987. See, G. Dufey, 
‘The Role of Japanese Financial Institutions Abroad’, in Japanese Financial Growth, p. 149.
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The same five leading banks in 1985 were also among the top advisors of the 
largest cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 1988, transactions which typically 
involved real estate valuations that encompassed a significant number of diverse 
properties.331 Deutsche Bank, for example, which had built an international property 
client base since it earliest years in corporate finance in the 19th century, discussed in 
Chapter 3, (page 121) commenced systematic property valuations of U.S. and European 
commercial portfolios in 1989, retaining multiple international real estate advisory firms 
(including Arthur Andersen, Coldwell Banker and Jones Lang Wootton) to perform 
overlapping, checks-and-balance advisory and valuation functions.332 Standard 
appraisals for individual properties were periodically evaluated in the context of 
comprehensive corporate and multinational strategies to determine corporate asset book 
values and debt and equity exposures through different economic cycles in major 
national-metropolitan markets, such as New York, London and Mexico.
This thesis argued that the prominence of globalized financial services in domestic 
and foreign real estate investment after 1981, as well as the competitive advantage held 
by international investment banking houses in major real estate markets, prompted real 
estate advisory firms in the U.S., U.K., and Germany to diversify into financial services. 
The most immediate challenge came from major investment banks, which competed 
favorably for the advisory business of real estate services firms’s existing clientele.333
Ibid., Table 9.3 (reprint from Euromonev. March 1989).
Deutsche Bank, ‘Deutsche Bank - A Brief History’, Frankfurt am Main, December 1989; Arthur 
Andersen Real Estate Services Group, USA, confidential corporate reports.
JJ>3 M. Wilkins, The Maturing Multinational Enterprise (1974), pp. 393-95; S.L. Hayes III and 
P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking, pp. 251-63; R. Volhard, D. Weber, and W, Usinger, eds. 
Real Property in Germany, pp. vii, 74-81; and, P. Kavanaugh, ‘Levy, Younce, Roth Ease U.S. 
Firms’ Entree Into Europe’, p. 27.
197
Extensive research capabilities, financial and real estate expertise, august reputations 
among investors worldwide (particularly publicly-traded multinationals), and strategic 
links to capital sources, sustained investment banks’s competitive advantage in 
developing innovative financing techniques—multinational bank syndicates, corporate 
commercial paper, Eurobonds, LIBOR-rated bonds, and foreign equity and debt 
investment structures.334
National real estate advisory service firms relied on both formal and informal 
professional relationships with U.S. investment banks to acquire knowledge about 
financial structures and foreign capital sources. While most real estate service firms 
maintained an independent advisory role, two U.S. firms distinguished themselves as 
both financial advisors and property finance principals, or portfolio agents—Eastdil, 
founded in 1967, and JMB Realty Corporation, founded in 1969. Eastdil specialized in 
investment banking via offshore capital sources, notably in the Pacific Rim, while JMB 
focused on syndicated equity and debt packages, predominantly among major life and 
pensions funds—Aetna, CBS, Inland Steel, Xerox, and Chrysler, for example.335 The 
success of Eastdil and JMB during the high-inflationary period of the mid-1970s was 
instrumental in increasing the demand from domestic and foreign investors for technical 
(fee-based) and agency (commissioned-based) real estate services. They also helped to
j34 P.D. Kazilionis, ‘Real Estate Finance’, in The Investment Banking Handbook, edited by
J.P. Williamson (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988), pp. 176-78; ‘Bankers Trust Co., On the 
Move in Tokyo’, Euromonev. Feb. 1988, pp. 40-43; S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance, 
pp. 14-16; Ian Flanagan, Chairman, Landauer Associates, interview with author, London,
July 30, 1991.
P. Kavanaugh, ‘Levy, Younce, Roth Ease U.S. Firms’ Entree into Europe’, p. 26; J. Martin, 
‘JMB Realty Corporation’, in International Directory of Company Histories IV, edited by A. Hast 
(London: St. James Press, 1991), pp. 702-03.
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expand real estate investment banking and financial services beyond the exclusive realm 
of international investment banks.336
The real estate advisory firms researched for this thesis indicated that following 
the turbulent economy of the late 1970s, then the worldwide recession during 1979-81, 
public and private investors, domestic and foreign, looked to invest long-term ("patient") 
equity into appreciating U.S. real estate assets, income-producing property that yielded 
fixed and preferred returns. Investors sought flexible financing mechanisms that 
minimized risk through fixed rates of return and captured long-term capital appreciation 
by preferred partnership positions. Cushman & Wakefield of the U.S. and Jones Lang 
Wootton of the U.K., for example, assisted investment and commercial bankers at 
Goldman Sachs, Salomon Brothers, Citicorp, and others, tailored debt and equity 
structures for individual transactions, and executed cross-border capital alliances to fund 
land acquisition, real estate development, and long-term ownership. In the U.S. and 
U.K., the national insurance companies and pension funds remained the primary source 
of long-term debt and equity finance through the early 1980s when such leading banks 
as Morgan Grenfell and S.G. Warburg in the U.K. and First Boston and Goldman Sachs 
in the U.S. emerged as important sources of long-term debt for developers, 
multinationals and foreign investors.337 The investment banks and insurance companies 
competed for funding deals on the basis of property services, finance fees and equity 
participation. A qualitative factor for the investor/developer seeking a venture partner
Eastdil’s partnership with The Nomura Group of Japan, 1986, broadened the geographic scope 
and active participation of real estate advisory service firms in foreign capital markets.
3y7 The Economist, April 3, 1976; Royal institution of Chartered Surveyors, Finance in Property 
(London: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, October 1997), pp. 23-25; The Economist, 
September 11, 1976; R. J. Wolfe, ‘Debt Finance’, in Real Estate Finance, ed. by S.L. Barter 
(London: Butterworth, 1988), pp. 83, 96.
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was the quality of the business relationship. Quantitative factors included the quality of 
the advisors’ property and financial services, the amount of equity participation offered, 
and the overall fee structure proposed to complete a debt-equity investment. In many 
instances, such as the 1987-88 development of Goldman Sachs International headquarters 
in the City of London, the equity principals also acted as the advisor for investment 
partnership.
In another transaction, Jones Lang Wootton assisted in formulating a mixed 
debt/equity structure in 1982 for the first phase of Broadgate, also in the City of London. 
The managing partners, Rosehaugh/Greycoat, secured debt financing for the real 
property, backed by the syndicate’s equity investment, in the joint venture development 
company. Jones Lang Wootton was instrumental in managing the newly created 
investment syndicate of insurance and pension funds and corporate investors designed to 
raise equity for the Rosehaugh/Greycoat project through subscription shares in the 
project-specific development company. The syndicate also secured through debenture 
guarantees short-term debt to fund construction costs. Within five years, the project was 
built, fully leased, and generating positive cash flow. In 1987, the development 
partnership sold its shares to a managing building owner, a sale which returned the 
partners’ original principal investment plus a profitable capital return.338
Participating debt represented another prevalent form of debt/equity financing by 
international pension and insurance funds after the early 1980s. Widely used and 
promoted by leading U.S. investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, 
Salomon Brothers and JMB Realty, participating financing combined traditional lending 
with equity participation—either in a portion of operating cash flow and/or a preferred
3j8 S.L. Barter, Real Estate Finance (London: Butterworth, 1988), pp. 21-23.
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return at the time of a capital event—sale or refinancing.339 Another creative 
debt/equity combination, bordering on securitization, was developed 1985-86 by 
Goldman Sachs of the U.S. for Billingsgate City Securities of the U.K., a scheme which 
involved a conventional company issuing two classes of share capital—ordinary shares 
and preferred share (the latter quoted on the Luxembourg Stock*Exchange) supplemented 
by a deep-discount first mortgage bond. U.S. and European shareholders participated 
in 30 percent of the Billingsgate development project’s operating income and capital 
appreciation while having no direct ownership in the property.340
International bank syndicates, as well, (which real estate advisory firms often 
assisted in organizing and which totalled $20 billion in U.S. assets in 1984 alone) 
encouraged cross-border innovation and provided a productive environment for the 
diffusion of concepts and services.341 Inhouse and retainer property advisors guided 
international banks (e.g., Citicorp and BankAmerica in the U.S. and Morgan Grenfell 
and N.M. Rothschild of the U.K.) with direct financings and international loan 
syndicates, such as the $5 billion Docklands’ Canary Wharf development funding led by 
Morgan Stanley International, Citibank, Chemical Bank, Canada’s four largest 
commercial banks, and J.P. Morgan.342
339 D. Bramson, ‘The Mechanics of Joint Ventures’, Real Estate Finance, edited by S.L. Barter 
(London: Butterworth, 1988), pp. 139-149.
340 D. Hughes, Necessity is the Mother of Invention’, Accountancy. April 1987, p. 118.
341 D. Lake, ‘Japan and Mortgage-Backed Securities’, World Property. March 1990, p. 34.
342 N. Barsky, Olympia & York, New York City Set Restructuring of Firm’s Property Taxes’, Wall
Street Journal. May 22, 1992, p. A3; L. Light, ‘Even the Reichmanns are Feeling the Pinch’, 
Business Week. October 8, 1990, pp. 128-29; W. Claiborne and K. Day, ‘A Dynasty of Control’, 
The Washington Post. April 26,1992, HI; W. Claiborne and K. Day, ‘Bank Experts Differ on 
Impact of Surprise Bankruptcy Filings’, The Washington Post. May 16, 1992, p. C l; G. Frankel, 
‘Futuristic London Project Threatened’, The Washington Post. May 24, 1992, p. A39.
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The New York City offices of U.K. and German investment banks active in U.S. 
real estate markets during the 1980s, as well as the London offices of New York 
investment houses in Europe, transported acquired skills and techniques to European 
markets.343 The U.K.’s oldest merchant bank, Barings, acquired the real estate 
investment fund division of Landauer in 1989, renaming it Barings Institutional Realty 
Advisors. Barings Asset Management group also entered Japan seeking to gain access 
to domestic capital for European and U.S. property investments. And its former national 
partner in Japan, U.K. real estate advisor Hillier Parker, formed a new alliance with 
Japan Pacific Partners Ltd., to advise U.S. and European enterprises seeking Japanese 
investments and Japanese investors entering U.S. markets.344 Because British banks 
were less willing to lend to and invest in property after 1988, Barings and other leading 
U.K. advisors and bankers further internationalized financial services and turned to 
foreign capital funding sources.345
Japanese commercial banks were the principal targets, which had originally 
introduced commercial paper financing to domestic markets in 1958-59. In their capacity 
as investors and established institutional fund managers, Japan’s commercial banks were 
the single largest source of real estate capital during the 1986-1988 property boom and 
effectively financed the nation’s foreign investment surge.346 Yet they did not
j4j For example, Natwest Bankcorp, the U.S. subsidiary of a U.K. clearing bank, was heavily 
committed to loan syndicates in U.S. property, which, in the 1990-1991 market downturn, 
produced $1.3 billion of losses; in ‘British Bank is Hit for $352 million Loss in America’, The
European. February 1-3, 1991.
344 Barings annual report, 1989; Ian Flanagan, Senior Partner of Hillier Parker, interview with 
author, London, July 30, 1991.
345 S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance, p. 18.
346 Japanese partners played a major role in foreign markets, facilitating the growth of real estate 
investment banking services worldwide.
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introduce new investment techniques and financial services, instead adopting those of 
U.S."hanks (on which they had extensive research). In 1987 the MOF and Bank of 
Japan curtailed real estate lending by commercial banks in the face of rising volumes of 
nonperforming loans, and Japan’s major investment banks stepped in.347 Japanese 
investment banks, entering the international marketplace at a relatively late date and in 
the face of declining foreign investment, competed for the real estate financial services 
business of U.S. and U.K. banks and property advisors. A few Japanese financial 
services firms, including Orix, Nomura Securities, and Sumitomo, entered cooperative 
agreements with or acquired equity interests in foreign real estate advisory firms, 
primarily in the U.S. and U.K. Nomura Securities, for example, which had a growing 
domestic real estate services practice, sought to capitalize on the two-fold rise in 
Japanese foreign direct real estate investment during 1985-1986. In 1989 the Japanese 
securities firm acquired a 50 percent interest in Eastdil, the premier U.S. real estate 
financial services firm of the 1970s. Nomura offered an entree to capital-rich Japanese 
investors, and reinforced Eastdil’s skills in innovative financial structures.348 Yet by 
the late 1980s, technical innovations that moved through international markets during 
1982-1987 were commonplace and appeared less critical to domestic and foreign property 
investment. Instead, international firms indicated that they now competed on the basis
j47 In 1987 Japanese investment banks represented five of the top ten lead managers in Eurobond 
placements. G. Dufey, ‘The Role of Japanese Financial Institutions Abroad’, in Japanese 
Financial Growth (1990), p. 149. The Economist. May 28, 1988, p. 609; G.A. Goodman,
‘Pacific Basin Investment in U.S. Real Estate: An Overview for the Professional Adviser’, Real 
Estate Finance Journal, v. 5 no. 3 (Fall 1988), p. 54; H. Mitani, ‘Capital from Japan, Part II: 
Gaining Access to Japanese Investors’, Real Estate Finance Journal, v. 4 no. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 
19-25; A.H. Levy, E.M. Marks, and J.B. Weller, ‘Convertible Mortgages Lure Creative 
Investors and Owners’, Real Estate Review, v. 18 no. 4 (Winter 1989), p. 30; T. Shale,
‘Clipping the Wings of Japan’s High Flyers’, Euromonev. June 1990, pp. 70-72.
348 S.L. Hayes III and P.M. Hubbard, Investment Banking: Eastdil Realty Corporate services 
brochure, New York, 1990-1991.
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of established investor-client relationships, and the ability to bring together compatible 
financial partners in cross-border investments. By 1990 financial services of real estate 
advisors and investment bankers focused on defining clients’ investment criteria and the 
terms of the relationship with a foreign partner or in a foreign market.349
5.6 P ublic  C a pita l  and Securitized  In vestm en t  Ser v ic es
The capital-intensive real estate investment surge of the 1980s ended abruptly in 
late 1989-early 1990: Japanese investors pulled back from real estate loans and 
acquisitions; German funds slowed foreign investments to capitalize on expanded 
domestic opportunities; and U.S. and U.K. investors restrained new investments in 
property assets in the face of a rising number of nonperforming assets. Real estate 
securities experienced marked growth and a capital expansion in the early 1960s in 
national markets in the U.K., U.S., and Germany, and became quite prevalent again 
after 1989.
Historical public-markets data suggested that securitized commercial property 
demand rose during periods when the availability of real estate investment capital 
diminished. In each of the focal countries public markets tended to prevail as sources 
of real estate funding during periods of: low/negative investment yields (i.e., U.K. in 
1967-71); a proportionate decline in inward investment flows (i.e., U.S. in 1987); 
turbulence in domestic real estate markets (i.e., Japan in 1965-1970); and, less 
willingness to lend or invest by traditional sources (i.e., U.K., 1963-67). Securitized 
investment carried higher upfront costs than direct debt and equity investments, yet
349 S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance, pp. 17-18; Chartered Surveyor Weekly. July 18, 1991,
p. 11.
appealed to investors during down-cycles in economic growth and property markets 
because of the liquidity and minimized risk (and return) of pooled assets.350 By 
converting assets into tradeable paper securities, unit shares provided greater liquidity, 
current cash flow potential, and, most important, risk-sharing portfolios—whether for a 
single property or for multiple assets and markets.
But commercial equity and debt issues historically were more difficult to package 
and sell in bulk on public markets, as they characteristically were structured with varying 
terms to reflect varying levels of risk—in contrast to the standardized structure of 
residential mortgage-backed securities, from which they originated. Anecdotal evidence 
suggested that investor demand for securitized real estate in the U.S., U.K., and Japan 
ebbed and flowed relative to the rise and fall, respectively, of private real estate capital 
markets as well as the availability of bank and insurance debt and equity funds.351
Real estate advisors tended to be reactive, rather than proactive, to investor (or 
client) demand for securitized investment services, responding to the strength/weakness 
of public securities markets and national capital availability. Public property companies 
listed on the London market experienced significant growth after 1958, as insurance 
companies and pension funds recorded losses and reduced property funding 
commitments.352 In 1970 the first insurance property bond fund merged with a 
publicly quoted property investment company, known as Fordham Life and General
j50 Higher costs of asset-backed securities were due to the need for prospectuses, advertising, 
appraisers, lawyers, accountants, brokers’s fees, and underwriters.
■>51 S.L. Barter, ed., Real Estate Finance, p. 23; R.J. Wolfe, ‘Debt Finance’, in Real Estate Finance, 
p. 38; T J . Jenkinson, ‘Initial Public Offerings in the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Japan’, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, v. 3 no. 4 (Dec. 1990), pp. 428-49.
j52 The Economist. January 16, 1963, p. 348; September 14, 1963, p. 946; November 11, 1967, p. 
638; September 28, 1968, pp. 77-78.
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Assurance Company, which raised concerns about conflicts of interest and financial risks 
of overlapping investment markets.353 Yet property unit trusts, or PUTs, established 
in 1966 and backed by real estate assets rather than the reputation of particular firms, 
generated only moderate interest from investors. PUTs constituted only about 5 percent 
of equity investment in domestic real estate during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and 
related advisory services were simply integrated into the mainline practice of real estate 
advisory firms—appraisal, estate management, investment sales, and research. The high- 
interest rate environment of the mid-1970s altogether reduced the attractiveness of equity 
securities as a source of real estate investment capital; they would not reemerge for more 
than a decade.354
The U.S. market was eminently familiar with residential securities, the primary 
source of government-insured mortgage funds since the 1940s. In 1960 U.S. investment 
banks and real estate advisors successfully lobbied for the creation of real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), tax-exempt investment vehicles designed to increase the 
supply of mortgage capital. REITs were structured similarly to tax-exempt business 
trusts, or property holding companies for corporate facilities, and inspired by the success 
of the domestic market in securitized residential mortgages—rather than by the 
commercial experience in the U.K. During the first decade, REITs sold only equity 
securities and shares of beneficial interests in other REITs.355
The recession and high-inflationary environment of 1976-77, however, prompted 
bankers and advisors to develop lower cost debt vehicles accessible to a broader
The Economist. August 1, 1970, p. 60.
354 RICS, Finance in Property, pp. 23-24.
j55 The Economist. March 18, 1972, p. 8; M.A. Hines, Marketing Real Estate Internationally, 
pp. 158, 163.
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spectrum of investors. In response, BankAmerica issued the first commercial mortgaged- 
backed security in 1977 in the U.S.356 REITs gained widespread favor among domestic 
investors and large institutional funds during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but attracted 
modest investment capital from abroad.357 When during 1981-82 inward direct real 
estate investment rose to over 10 percent of total foreign investment, U.S. real estate 
companies and property funds largely shifted away from REITs with offshore investment 
funds in abundance. In addition, critics argued that real estate advisors had overvalued 
the income potential and market value of assets. As domestic investors and property 
companies shifted to direct, private investment markets during the 1980s, publicly traded 
REIT yields declined, posting the worst performance during the decade in 1989-90.358
In Germany, rigorous property finance laws dating back to 1900 limited the 
number of institutions permitted to issue public mortgage bonds, principally public-sector 
commercial banks, and allowed only real estate advisory firms experienced in domestic 
lending laws to appraise property portfolios. The first, grundbesitz-invest, established 
in 1970, was controlled entirely by Deutsche Bank and included 73 properties across 
Germany by 1990.359 The largest among the twelve largest open-end property funds, 
DEGI, was 65 percent controlled by Dresdner Bank, which, through the offices of its
356 U.K. investors might have taken advantage of persistent differences between U.S. and U.K. 
markets, and invested in U.S. REITs, but this did not occur. In the U.S. and U.K. demand for 
real estate securities was uneven and highly localized in national markets until the late 1980s. See 
P.A. Geroski and S. Toker, ‘Picking Profitable Markets’, Centre for Business Strategy, London 
Business School, November 1988.
357 By 1987, the U.S. commercial securities market was valued at over $600 billion. W. Kay, 
‘Bringing Security to Hearth and Home’, Euromonev. Dec. 1987, pp. 159-60; T.S. Schubert, 
‘Publicly Traded Real Estate and the Myth of Inherent Appreciation’, The Real Estate Finance 
Journal, v. 7 no. 3 (Fall 1990), p. 58.
358 T.S. Schubert, ‘Publicly Traded Real Estate and the Myth of Inherent Appreciation’, pp. 53-57.
359 Grundbesitz-invest (Deutsche Grundbesitz-Investmentgesellsdraft mbH), Deutsche Bank, 
custodian, annual reports, 1970-1990.
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inhouse real estate advisory group, encompassed 110 geographically diversified 
commercial properties.360
High-quality German funds, which attracted up to 70,000 domestic and foreign 
investors by 1990, set the standards that financial institutions in the U.S., U.K., and 
Japan sought to achieve in the late 1980s. With falling property values worldwide, 
institutional and private investors required flexibility through liquid equity investments, 
at home and abroad, and holders of real estate debt and equities looked to convertible 
securities for nonperforming assets. In Japan, for example, the MOF encouraged 
commercial banks—Nomura, Saiwa, Nikko, Yamaichi—to convert mortgage portfolios 
into equity securities. Yet Japan’s mature secondary mortgage residential market had 
little appetite for commercial mortgage-backed securities.361 Even so, in 1990 
Goldman Sachs International and Daiwa Real Estate advisors established an alliance to 
sell large-scale commercial securities packages to Japanese and foreign investors.362
International portfolios of securitized rof securitized rs were the most recent 
innovation in cross-border investment in 1990, and real estate advisors and commercial 
and investment banks had only begun to test their acceptance in global capital and 
Eurobond markets. While such fundamental skills in research, valuation, asset 
management, and finance are required, competitive advantage depends on innovative
360 D.J. Kostin, German Real Estate Market (April 1991), pp. 22-23; J. van den Bos, ‘JLW sign up
to manage German buying spree’, Chartered Surveyor Weekly. Jan. 31, 1991, p. 7.
j61 The Economist. Sept. 24, 1988, p. 565; A.J. Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura (New York:
Arcade Publishing, 1990), p. xi. Assessments of 1990 Japanese securitization in Kenneth 
Leventhal & Co., ‘Japanese Capital Flows: Availability and Constraints’, unpublished report, 
1992; S.L. Barter, Real Estate Finance (1988), pp. 23-26.
j62 D. Lake, ‘Japan and Mortgage-Backed Securities’, World Property. March 1990, p. 34.
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transactional techniques and capabilities, as well as knowledge of multinational real estate 
and public securities markets.363
5.7 C om petitive  Ad v a n ta g e  in  In n o v a tio n
%
U.K. and Japanese real estate advisors enjoyed a distinct advantage in the 
international marketplace because of each nation’s economic culture, which emphasized 
a self-defined and long-standing multinational stature. And individual firms tended to 
cultivate business strategies that coordinated allied technical functions and different 
investor groups, especially over wide-ranging geographic areas. It is suggested that such 
multifunctional and multiregional practices were expensive to imitate in a relatively short 
period. A high degree of commitment to an organization, especially among Japanese 
firms, also encouraged trust among different (and sometimes competing) functions 
internally, and decreased the need for hierarchical supervision, thus increasing the flow 
of communication, cooperation, and innovation.
Throughout the 1960-1990 period, the comparatively open structure of the 
property services profession, and its multifunctional disciplines attracted competition 
from niche firms in investment banking, accounting, appraisal, corporate finance. Such 
firms as Eastdil, Goldman Sachs, Nomura Securities, Price Waterhouse, and Deutsche 
Bank were organized for constant research and innovation because of their specialized 
focus. The concentration of various types of investors in international markets also 
encouraged innovation to respond to their specialized demands.364 This increased
j6° Goldman Sachs & Co. reports, 1990; confirmed by author with Richard Moore, Vice President, 
April 1993.
364 The specialized demands of different investor groups in the four focal countries is assessed in the 
case studies in Chapter 6.
breadth, in turn, heightened the value of multiregional coordination as well as local 
market/investor responsiveness.
Yet, was a strategy of global integration anathema to local responsiveness? 
Japanese and German firms tended to emphasize centralized, product-oriented structures, 
which were ultimately less efficient for the innovation process.365 In U.S. and U.K. 
firms, which excelled in developing decentralized organizations that emphasized local-to- 
global production, local specialists were the primary sources of innovation.366 
International accounting, construction, and corporate relocation firms that incorporated 
real estate advisory services into their businesses after 1975 tended to promote a 
centralized, product-oriented management structure, and acquired innovative services and 
technical skills from the marketplace rather than developing them internally.
Historically, real estate advisory service firms reacted to changes in markets and 
competitors’s strategies rather than invest proactively in systematic research and the 
development of innovations. Strategic planning (based on market knowledge and 
analytical forecasts) remained a low priority, except among Japanese advisors who
365 These findings are based on the profiles of firms reviewed in Chapter 4 and the case studies 
analyzed in Chapter 6, and reinforce Chandler’s thesis that exploitation of economies of scope 
(product innovation and diversification) first required an administrative structure that exploited 
economies of scale (markets); as witnessed by Jones Lang Wootton’s organizational evolution, 
early investment in market coverage kept an enterprise more innovative. Also, A.D. Chandler, 
Jr., Scale and Scone, pp. 169, 218.
366 M. Wilkins contended that the most profitable U.S. multinational corporations gave equal weight 
to product divisions and regional operating subsidiaries, in The Maturing Multinational Enterprise, 
pp. 382-83. However, reinforcing the experience of real estate services, J.W. Lorsch and
P.R. Lawrence concluded that product innovation required an organizational environment in which 
market and technical specialists were able to coordinate their research with other geographic and 
product divisions, in ‘Organizing for Product Innovation’, Harvard Business Review. Jan.-Feb. 
1965, pp. 109-122.
210
benefitted from the umbrella support of parent holding companies.367 Even so, local 
market knowledge throughout the 30-year period was the core of developing new skills 
and the basis for counseling investors on market risks, tax impacts, cultural practices of 
nations and regions.
367 Japan’s four largest banks-Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yamaichi, and Daiwa—created separate research 
institutes to develop indepth analyses of economic trends, alternative financial forecasts, 
demographic studies, and theoretical models on equity and debt markets. See A. Baum and 
A. Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’ (1991), p. 56.
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CHAPTER 6 FOUR CASE STUDIES: REAL ESTATE ADVISORY SERVICE 
FIRMS FROM THE FOCAL COUNTRIES
6 .1  In tr o d u c t io n
This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the International expansion 
strategies and the resulting corporate structures of four real estate advisory service firms 
based in each of the four focal countries. These companies were among the leading 
domestic real estate advisory firms to capitalize on the growth of both national and 
foreign real estate markets between 1960 and 1990 (Table 17). Each firm invested 
substantial capital to diversify its core advisory services in response to the rise of cross- 
border direct investments in the domestic market and abroad. Moreover, each enterprise 
developed specific strategies for domestic and global expansion to deepen the firm’s 
penetration of rapidly growing international corporate, development, and investment 
markets, as outlined in the top-ten profiles in Chapter 4.
The case studies provided factual evidence for the primary thesis that international 
real estate advisory service firms initially cultivated and achieved a solid reputation in 
their home nations by diversifying services and operations to exploit the domestic 
economy’s growing financial and real estate markets. Each responded to foreign direct 
investment by existing and prospective multinational clients, through some form of 
combination or consolidation (Figure 1). This investigation revealed that privately-owned 
service enterprises governed by conservative financial stewardship gained competitive 
advantage by financing service diversification and geographic expansion with retained 
earnings, as well as infusions of domestic and foreign capital from equity partners or 
shareholders. Simultaneously they formulated an integrated and multidepartmental 
structure that centralized corporate entrepreneurial control and decentralized operational
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management at the local level. The collective historical profiles presented in Chapter 4 
indicated that growth in personnel and foreign operations and innovation in services 
occurred concurrently with the rise in real estate markets worldwide and cross-border 
investment activity. Yet was a strategy of service diversification a necessary 
precondition to successful geographic expansion and internationalization by these firms?
A.D. Chandler, Jr. and R. H. Coase368 concluded from their research of 
industrial enterprises that a diversified firm might choose alternative ways and vehicles 
to expand abroad. Did the evidence which follows indicate measurable economic or 
other administrative benefits for internalized expansion, collaboration, or acquisition? 
Each of the case studies represented one or more of these strategies, the respective 
choice a result of organizational perceptions based on different professional service skills, 
ambitions, and domestic performance.369 The choice of how much a firm grew in size 
and complexity, Coase argued, depended on the capabilities and risk tolerance of the 
"entrepreneur" or corporate management.370 There were the costs and marginal 
benefits of buying additional services (or products) in the market, versus the costs of 
administration and management. For these real estate advisory service firms, the 
complexity and costs of managing several offices over widely dispersed regions and 
different cultures, balanced against the coordination of disparate departmental services
j68 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chanters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise 
(1962), pp. 30-3; and R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Finn’, Economica new series IV (1937), pp. 
334-35, 337-38.
369 See P. A. Geroski, ‘The Interaction Between Domestic and Foreign-Based Entrants,’ Working Paper 
Series no. 44, Centre for Business Strategy, London School of Economics, 1987, for an analytical 
model of domestic-based and foreign entrants into new markets.
370 R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, pp. 333-34, 338.
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and clients, proved to be the greatest challenges. The case studies were designed to 
demonstrate how effectively and profitably each firm met these challenges.
TABLE 17
S i z e  o f  F ir m s  B e f o r e  a n d  A f t e r  
I m p l e m e n t a t io n  o f  I n t e r n a t io n a l  S t r a t e g y
"Before" -1960
National
Employees Offices Markets
Cushman & Wakefield 50 2 1
Jones Lang Wootton 80 4 2
Mueller 6 1 1
Orix 0 0 0
"Midpoint" - 1975
Emolovees Offices
National
Markets
Cushman & Wakefield 275 24 1
Jones Lang Wootton 2,000 20 9
Mueller 56 5 2
Orix 0 0 0
"After" - 1990
Employees Offices
National
Markets
Cushman & Wakefield 1,270 65 10
Jones Lang Wootton 3,500 61 20
Mueller 250 12 5
Orix 402 10 3
Source: Private company reports and documents; interviews with executives of Cushman 
& Wakefield, Jones Lang Wootton, Mueller, and Orix; company documents.
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Client:
National Corporation 
Institutional Investor 
Real Estate DeveloperI
r
 Client expands to
Multinational Enterprises
Client owns or invests in Client owns or invests in 
Foreign Real Estate Domestic Real Estate
Real Estate 
Advisory Services 
Firm
!
Affiliates or Foreign Subsidiaries
Figure 1. “Globalization of Real Estate Advisory 
Services”. Growing inward-outward direct investment.
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The analytical framework for evaluating the factors that promoted or hindered 
globalization by real estate advisory firms drew from the standard literature on economic 
and business history, principally Chandler’s systematic analyses of American industrial 
enterprises. The analysis highlighted relevant comparisons between accepted business 
theory and the actual experience of these four real estate advisory service firms. Based 
on Chandler’s thesis in Strategy and Structure that a "new strategy required a new or at 
least refashioned structure if the enlarged enterprise was to be operated efficiently,"371 
the analytical framework for each case study was designed to evaluate the most important 
factors in the internationalization of a professional services firm: (1) what was the firm’s 
corporate expansion philosophy and history? (2) how did each firm broaden the scope 
of its business through geographic expansion and service diversification? (3) did alliances 
and/or acquisitions play a central role in the firm’s geographic and service 
diversification? and (4) did the executives of these four firms develop an ownership and 
management structure independently of one another, and was this structure developed 
explicitly to support the firm’s service diversification and/or geographic expansion 
strategy?
Cushman & Wakefield of the United States was the nation’s largest real estate 
advisory firm by 1990372 and expanded domestically and abroad to a greater extent than 
any one of its American competitors. Jones Lang Wootton of the United Kingdom 
remained the largest real estate advisory service firm worldwide, and, more than any 
British competitor—domestically known as chartered surveyors—successfully expanded
j71 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise 
(1962), p. 15.
j72 The size of the firm was measured by the total number of employees working in commercial real 
estate services, rather than by gross revenues, which are available on a very irregular basis and 
difficult to substantiate.
216
throughout the global marketplace. Mueller of Germany became the largest and most 
prominent real estate advisory service firm in its home nation, yet due to the fragmented 
nature of the German economy and domestic real estate markets it lacked a uniform 
national reputation. However, Mueller was among the first and the most visible German 
real estate advisory firm to expand into the international marketplace. Finally, Orix of 
Japan was one of the first and most prominent independent, nontrading enterprises 
involved in international real estate advisory services.373
In the absence of published industry-wide data, an examination of the corporate 
growth strategies of these major players provided evidence that real estate advisory 
service firms most effectively expanded into foreign markets (1) in tandem with 
multinational clients expanding abroad, and (2) by implementing a multifunctional 
management structure that emphasized vertical integration, the corporate identity and 
central control.
6 .2  Cu sh m a n  & W a k e fie l d , In c . ,  U nited  States
Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., was founded in 1917 in New York City and became 
a national and international innovator in real estate advisory services over seven decades. 
It was the largest real estate advisory firm in the U.S. by 1990, providing services to all 
segments of the real estate industry. Established by J. Clydesdale Cushman and Bernard 
Wakefield as a small real estate management firm, Cushman & Wakefield initially 
focused on property management and leasing of office buildings in midtown 
Manhattan.374 The firm’s size, structure, and function changed little over the first
^  This assessment was based on critical evaluations published in trade journals and obtained by the 
author through interviews with corporate real estate executives.
y74 T. Sarowitz, ‘Evolution of a Real Estate Firm’, Real Estate Forum (April 1988), p. 116.
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40 years; after 1960, however, Cushman & Wakefield grew more than five-fold. In 
1990st stood at 2,800 employees worldwide, with 53 offices in 20 states across America 
and 12 affiliate offices in eight European countries. The firm’s clientele and services 
divisions expanded in response to more sophisticated needs of domestic, multinational, 
and foreign clients, and a more complex property market—both at home and abroad. 
Cushman & Wakefield expanded the scope of services to include new professional 
disciplines and new geographic markets (Table 18).
Historically, the firm maintained a conservative policy of controlled growth. 
Domestic expansion was led by flagship projects and targeted to perceived near- and 
long-term market opportunities. This corporate strategy paralleled the firm’s financial 
management: it had never borrowed to expand into new markets or to upgrade
innovative technology; it had never been in debt; and, its domestic growth throughout 
the continental U.S. was either in tandem with major clients or in response to accessible 
client opportunities in growing employment and real estate markets. Since the 
company’s founding in 1917 Cushman & Wakefield financed a majority of domestic and 
international expansions and service-line diversifications with retained earnings generated 
by ongoing client engagements.375
Geographic Expansion
Cushman & Wakefield expanded its geographic scope independently of the scope 
of its service divisions (Table 20). It opened the first office outside New York City in 
the late 1950s, when San Francisco-based Bank of America—also a New York client—
j75 Public and private company reports; confirmed in interview with author, R. Hollander, Regional 
Director and Senior Vice President, Cushman & Wakefield, Washington, D.C., July 24, 1991.
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retained the firm to advise it on building and leasing a new world headquarters. 
Because the City of San Francisco pressured Bank of America to retain a local firm, 
Cushman & Wakefield promptly decided to open a San Francisco office, staffed by 
experienced people from the New York office as well as local professionals.
Throughout the 1960s, the company opened offices m other U.S. cities as it 
secured new clients or new engagements for existing national clients. By 1970, Cushman 
& Wakefield operated 20 offices nationwide, thus gaining a national reputation with each 
successive move. In the late 1970s, for example, First International Bank of Dallas, 
Texas retained Cushman & Wakefield to represent the bank in leasing new headquarters 
offices. Cushman & Wakefield had no local presence at the time and employed a leasing 
representative from the Dallas office of Tishman Realty & Construction Co., thereby 
continuing a long-held strategy of creating competitive advantage through localized 
knowledge and perceived market opportunities.376 Then as today, this strategy proved 
to be a profitable means of establishing immediate credibility in a new market.377
Service Diversification
Throughout the 1980s, Cushman & Wakefield continued its national expansion 
by advising major clients on the development, leasing, and management of such premier 
projects as Sears Tower in Chicago, Arco Plaza in Los Angeles, the Tampa City Center 
in Florida, and the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. These flagship
216 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope, pp. 31-39.
2,71 T. Sarowitz, o p . cit.. p. 118.
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TABLE 18
C o r p o r a t e  P r o f il e  
C u s h m a n  &  W a k e f ie l d , U n it e d  S t a t e s  
1960-1990
1990
630
640 
1,270
________Factors___________  1960 1970 1980
Number of Employees
Domestic 50 175- 410
Foreign _0 __ 0 __0
Total 75 175 410
Domestic 2 20 28 53
Foreign _0 _0 _0 _12
Total 2 20 28 65
Alliances /Acquisitions
Alliances 0 0 0 2
Mergers/Acquisitions _0 _0 _0 _1
Total 0 0 0 3
Global Client Mix
Manufacturing 10% 30% 40% 35%
Services 85% 65% 50% 50%
Government 5% 5% 10% 15%
Sources of Revenue
Manufacturing 20% 20% 30% 30%
Services 75% 75% 60% 60%
Government 5% 5% 10% 10%
Source: Corporate documents and publications; author’s interviews with Cushman
& Wakefield executives.
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TABLE 19
C o m p e tit iv e  S co p e  
S e r v ic e  D iv e r s i f ic a t io n  and G e o g r a p h ic  E xp an sion  
C ushm an &  W a k e f ie ld ,  1960-1990
t
Competitive Scope  1960________  1970_______   1980__________   1990
Services Scope a Office brokerage 
Property management
Office brokerage 
Property management
Commercial brokerage 
Industrial brokerage 
Property management 
Appraisal 
Financial services 
Development consulting
Commercial brokerage
Industrial brokerage
Management
Appraisal
Financial services
Development consulting
Research
Geographic Scope United States United States United States United States
United Kingdom
Belgium
Channel Islands
France
Italy
The Netherlands 
Spain 
Sweden 
Germany
used for all four companies for purposes of consistency and comparative analysis;
‘Evolution of a Real Estate Firm’; author’s interviews with Cushman & Wakefield executives,
Common terminology to define real estate advisory services is 
specific terms may depart from the company’s terminology.
Includes commercial office and retail space.
Source: Unpublished private corporate documents; T. Sarowitz
H.C. Carey and Richard Hollander, 1991.
TABLE 20
S o u r c e s  o f  R e v e n u e , 1960-1990 
C ushm an & W a k e f ie ld
Services 1960 1970 * 1980 1990
Commercial Brokerage 95% 70% ■ 70% 60%
Industrial/Technology Brokerage -- 10% 10% 10%
Property Management 5% 15% 15% 15%
Development Consulting -- 5% 5% 5%
Appraisal -- -- -- 5%
Financial Services 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Unpublished corporate documents and industry publications; author’s interviews with 
Cushman & Wakefield executives, H.C. Carey and Richard Hollander, 1991; and T. 
Sarowitz, ‘Evolution of a Real Estate Firm’.
projects were complemented by other corporate headquarters buildings—for such 
multinationals as American Express, RCA, GTE Corporation, and CBS Records—as well 
as hundreds of development consulting engagements for hotels, renovations, and interior 
tenant improvements. Even though development consulting projects across the country 
triggered Cushman & Wakefield’s national expansion, brokerage services in office and 
commercial properties constituted the principal source of gross revenues and revenue 
growth throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Table 20).
During the 1980s, commercial brokerage spawned the new industrial/technology 
brokerage group, once economies of scope and the division’s profitability appeared to 
be assured. While industrial brokerage constituted a small share of the company’s gross 
revenues during the 1970s and 1980s, the division contributed to international expansion 
by enabling the firm to capitalize on work for multinational clients which had overseas 
manufacturing facilities.
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In 1980 the firm formally established the appraisal division, and in 1983 the 
financial services division. Both groups further diversified the firm’s core services and 
broadened its national and international presence among institutional investors. In just 
five years, 1975-1980, the stock of inward direct investment in U.S. real estate had 
grown from $0.8 billion to $6.1 billion.378 As a "first mover"379 among domestic 
competitors, Cushman & Wakefield secured long-term contracts from several domestic 
and foreign investment funds. Over the 1980-1990 period, the appraisal group and 
financial services, particularly, enabled the firm to capture a substantial share of the 
growing U.S. real estate market.380 The appraisal group, for example, advised such 
multinational corporations as International Business Machines and domestic and foreign 
pension funds investing a significant portion of their portfolios in real estate assets. 
Because the funds’ assets were located in numerous markets throughout the country, 
Cushman & Wakefield was able to advise institutional investors from both a local and 
national perspective, in contrast to competing firms which had only regional practices or 
less coverage in major markets.
The financial services group also represented corporations, investors, and 
institutional funds in a variety of capital funding and financing plans and transactions, 
domestically and abroad.381 Moving beyond these core services to introduce more
578 See Chapter 2, Table 4.
j79 A firm which preempted competitors in diversifying into a new market, in A.D. Chandler, Jr., 
Scale and Scope (1990), p. 34.
580 Cushman & Wakefield, ‘Focus on Appraisal Services’ and ‘Focus on Appraisal Services: 
Property Tax Consulting and Tax Management Services’, unpublished corporate services 
brochures, 1989; and interview with author, H.C. Carey, Senior Vice President, Cushman & 
Wakefield, 1991.
081 Cushman & Wakefield, ‘Focus on Industrial/Technology Services’, an unpublished corporate 
services brochure, 1989; and, interview with author, H. C. Carey, Cushman & Wakefield,
1991.
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sophisticated financial services and respond to the unprecedented increase in cross-border 
direof investment in the 1980s, Cushman & Wakefield executives invested substantial 
capital in developing the firm’s in-house expertise to assist foreign investors in targeting 
U.S. property purchases. Senior management believed that the firm’s competitive 
position would be enhanced by strengthening the skills of existing staff, rather than 
acquiring another firm and adjusting to the diseconomies of bringing two distinct 
organizations together. This strategy reinforced the theories of Coase and Williamson, 
notably that superior market performance is achieved by effective management of vertical 
relationships, especially internally within the firm.382
As a result, Cushman & Wakefield’s financial services group secured a superior 
position with foreign investors relative to its American competitors during the 1980s. 
The financial services group also diversified into complementary advisory services for 
corporate and institutional clients, such as monitoring institutional offshore funds and 
investor criteria on a systematic basis, and representing U.S. clients in securing debt and 
equity funds with financial institutions in Europe and the Pacific Rim. Thus by 
expanding its service capabilities, the firm tapped into international real estate and 
financial markets, and concurrently expanded its geographic scope together with its base 
of national and multinational clients. One example of how service diversification 
reinforced geographic expansion was an engagement for The Greyhound Corporation of 
Phoenix, Arizona. Cushman & Wakefield introduced Greyhound to Deutsche Bank, 
Germany’s largest bank and a client of long-standing, to finance the transit company’s
j82 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of The Firm’ (1937), pp. 21-5; O. E. Williamson, Markets and
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 82; M.E. 
M.E. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York: The Free Press, 1985), pp. 41-44.
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new headquarters. This transaction marked the largest foreign debt or equity financing 
in the* state of Arizona.383
Strategic Alliances and Service Diversification
By 1985, in spite of advances in the domestic market; Cushman & Wakefield 
executives believed that its competitive position in cross-border real estate investment 
activity would be limited absent an external alliance with a major player in international 
investment. With an eye to minimizing risk and opportunity costs,384 in 1985 the firm 
entered into a non-equity alliance with Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corporation, Japan’s 
largest trust bank (Figure 2). The vertical alliance was undertaken to better position the 
firm in expanding into international financial markets. Through the exclusive joint 
agreement, which resulted in 11 transactions within the first 18 months, Cushman & 
Wakefield advised Mitsubishi’s clientele—corporations, private investors, and pension 
funds—in seeking real estate investment opportunities throughout the U.S. In turn, 
Cushman & Wakefield had direct exposure to Mitsubishi’s foreign clients and gained 
first-hand knowledge of the rigorous investment guidelines of Japanese nationals.
Mitsubishi chose to enter into the vertical alliance with Cushman & Wakefield 
because of the real estate services firm’s national and growing international reputation, 
and, importantly, because of its long-established experience in local U.S. markets. One 
advantage stemmed from Cushman being the largest, third-party property manager of
3 J Cushman & Wakefield, ‘Focus on Financial Services’, unpublished corporate services brochure, 
1990, p. 10; interview with author, H. C. Carey, Cushman & Wakefield, 1991.
j84 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, pp. 21-25; A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure
(1962), pp. 30-36; A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope, pp. 37-41; M. E. Porter, op. cit.. pp. 57- 
66 .
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commercial real estate in America.385 The firm secured management contracts with 
an aa-ray of property owners—national and foreign life insurance companies, banks, 
pension funds, and institutional investors. Property contracts emphasized market 
research and computerized asset'management. And multinational clients that owned 
facilities in both the U.S. and Europe retained Cushman & Wakefield to provide uniform 
reporting and management standards via the firm’s international office network. Few 
competitive real estate advisory firms active in the U.S. and international markets could 
commit to a uniform level of service.
Cushman & Wakefield’s growing international reputation during the 1980s 
exemplified what Davis & Smales and Kay identified among companies worldwide: a 
national firm’s success in expanding into international markets capitalized on its domestic 
market stature to establish a competitive foothold in foreign nations.386 Cushman & 
Wakefield’s executives maintained that the firm’s ability to expand its client base 
domestically and abroad was ultimately tied to local expertise, because real estate was 
a local business.
Ownership and Management Structure
Private ownership and capital investment from retained earnings enabled Cushman 
& Wakefield to respond promptly and decisively to current client needs and perceived
In 1988, Cushman & Wakefield managed over 78 million square feet of commercial space valued 
at $10 billion. Cushman & Wakefield, ‘Focus on Management Services’, an unpublished corporate 
services brochure, 1989; interview with author, H.C. Carey, Cushman & Wakefield, 1991; and,
T. Sarowitz, ‘Evolution of a Real Estate Firm’.
E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, pp. 11-14; and,
E. Davis, G. Hanlon and J. Kay, ‘Internationalization in Accounting and Other Professional 
Services’, working paper series no. 73. Centre for Business Strategy, London Business School 
(April 1990), pp. 11-12.
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market opportunities. This flexibility also reduced the firm’s exposure and indebtedness, 
thereby enhancing its market position during downturns in the economy. Before 1970, 
Cushman & Wakefield’s corporate stock was owned by senior executives and major 
financial partners. In 1970, with annual revenues of nearly $19 million and 20 offices 
nationwide, Cushman & Wakefield sold the company’s privately-held stock to the 
communications conglomerate RCA. The real estate advisory firm initially welcomed 
the acquisition and capital infusion. For its part, RCA was one of several multinational 
conglomerates at the time that were diversifying into unrelated businesses, even though 
ownership of a real estate services firm provided no real advantages to the 
communications business. Within two years, diverging expansion strategies and 
management policies proved to be insurmountable obstacles between the two 
companies.387 Most important, RCA dictated a systematic national expansion, while 
Cushman & Wakefield believed that moving with clients and market opportunities was 
the most effective, and profitable, strategy. During 1970-1976, the firm’s revenue 
growth stagnated while the number of nationwide offices and personnel increased. The 
result was unprecedented deficits.
j87 T. Sarowitz, o p . cit.. p. 122.
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Alliances
^  •  The Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corporation, Japan, 1985
•  Healey & Baker, United Kingdom, 1990
Mergers/Acquisitions/Joint Ventures
•  RCA Corporation (acquired Cushman & Wakefield), 1970
•  The Rockefeller Group (acquired 80% of Cushman &
Wakefield private stock), 1976
•  The Mitsubishi Estate Company, Ltd (acquired 51 % of The 
Rockefeller Group), 1989
Source: Author’s interviews with Cushman & Wakefield executives; corporate 
documents and publications.
Figure 2 . Strategic alliances and acquisitions by Cushman & Wakefield in the 
United States.
The turning point in regaining profitable expansion came in 1976, when The 
Rockefeller Group, Inc. (RGI), then known as Rockefeller Center, Inc., acquired an 80 
percent ownership position. The remaining 20 percent was retained by the firm’s 
employees.388 The Rockefeller Group owned and managed properties throughout the 
U.S. and believed that Cushman & Wakefield still had a good reputation, despite six 
marginal years. RGI and Cushman & Wakefield executives reinforced the real estate 
advisory firm’s national reputation by infusing fresh capital to strengthen professional 
capabilities in a broader range of disciplines.
j88 T. Sarowitz, ‘Evolution of a Real Estate Firm’ (1988), pp. 122, 124; interviews with author, H.
C. Carey and R. McLean, Cushman & Wakefield, 1991; Cushman & Wakefield/Healey & Baker, 
‘A Global Real Estate Initiative’, unpublished corporate service brochure, 1990. In 1990, 
Mitsubishi Estate Co. Ltd. purchased 51 percent of The Rockefeller Group, which owned 
80 percent of the equity of Cushman & Wakefield. Cushman & Wakefield personnel owned 
20 percent.
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Toward this end, senior management restructured the compensation policy for 
regional directors and office managers, shifting from a commission basis to a salary-plus- 
bonus, based on operational performance and the office’s profitability. The intent was 
to trade off pure entrepreneurial competition internally for a more externally focused 
entrepreneurship that advanced Cushman & Wakefield’s larger corporate identity. As 
Williamson documented through studies of trading companies, Cushman & Wakefield’s 
executives decided that to economize transaction costs over the long term and provide 
greater opportunity to deepen market penetration they needed a hierarchical management 
structure in local offices, thus placing separate functional groups under common 
direction.389 It was an expensive restructuring,390 but since the late 1970s the rate 
of revenue growth for each of the 60 U.S. offices exceeded the company’s historical 
performance.391
RGI and Cushman & Wakefield executives also developed a new corporate 
management structure, which paralleled the changes in managers’ functions and 
compensation. It also reflected the firm’s national growth in both personnel and offices 
during the 1970s, and the diversification of the company’s core services (Figures 3 
and 4). The new structure essentially represented a mix of what Williamson termed the 
"peer group" and "simple hierarchy" forms of management.392 The firm’s executives 
recognized the need to implement a structure that emphasized both the team approach,
j89 O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (1975), p. 82.
390 Cushman & Wakefield executives recalled only that the restructuring was expensive, relative to gross 
revenues, but reportedly did not have records in private company documents of actual costs.
j91 T. Sarowitz, ‘Evolution of a Real Estate Firm’, p. 124; interview with author, H. C. Carey, 
Cushman & Wakefield, 1991.
i92 O.E. Williamson, o p . cit.. pp. xi, 55-56, 82. Also, A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure, pp. 
9-17, 30-33; and, A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope, p. 43.
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for each office and throughout the company, as well as distinct lines of authority—from 
the local office, to the regional office, to national headquarters. To ensure quality 
control for the firm’s multifunctional and multiregional services, the U.S.-based offices, 
which numbered 60 in 1990, were realigned to report to six regional directors. The 
regional directors, in turn, now reported to the chief operating officer, who reported to 
the chief executive officer and president, both of whom resided in corporate headquarters 
in New York City.393
Overall management of each of the functional service groups was integrated 
within the larger regional structure. The service line directors, also located in corporate 
headquarters, were given both entrepreneurial and operational authority to work directly 
with the regional directors and chief operating officer, and report to the chief executive 
officer. With this structural change, each director was responsible for the financial and 
competitive performance of a core business group and managed the relationships with 
national and multinational clients. Taken together, the service line directors and the 
corporate officers constituted Cushman & Wakefield’s board of directors. Together, they 
established corporate policy and the broader national and international competitive 
strategy.
39j T. Sarowitz, o p .  cit.. p .  117.
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International Expansion and Strategic Alliances
Cushman & Wakefield’s previous expansion strategy, which focused on service
capabilities and established client relationships of local offices, formally moved beyond
national boundaries in late 1989 to encompass an international scope. Senior
*
management recognized the growing demand for real estate advisory services in western 
Europe.394 The most compelling factor was that a majority of the firm’s tenants, many 
of whom were multinationals, were expanding their activities into Europe. A central 
management committee considered four European expansion strategies395 and chose to 
pursue a joint initiative, in consideration of the financial risks the U.S.-based firm faced 
in securing local clients in a foreign marketplace as well as access to foreign funds.396 
Cushman & Wakefield’s primary competitor, London-based Jones Lang Wootton, had 
established offices throughout Europe and the U.S., and another competitor, London- 
based Weatherall Green & Smith, had followed British Petroleum Pension Fund and 
other British institutional clients in its expansion throughout Europe and the U.S.397
394 A survey was commissioned by Cushman & Wakefield and Healey & Baker, and conducted by Louis 
Harris & Associates, which polled senior management from more than 900 American and European 
firms, "European Business Real Estate Monitor" brochure, 1990. The poll showed that of those 
American companies that already have facilities in Europe, 54 percent are in the manufacturing 
sector.
395 The strategies included: (1) opening branch offices in Berlin, Paris, London, Barcelona, Frankfurt, 
Brussels, and other global real estate markets; (2) merging with a reputable firm that planned to enter 
the United States; (3) acquiring a European service firm; and (4) establishing a joint initiative, or an 
affiliation, with a foreign firm.
j96 E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, 1989, pp. 13-14; and,
E. Davis, G. Hanlon and J. Kay, ‘Internationalization in Accounting and Other Professional 
Services’, (April 1990), pp. 11-12.
397 Confirmed in interviews with author, H.C. Carey and R. McLean, Cushman & Wakefield, 1991.
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Figure 3 . Cushman & Wakefield Management Structure, 1975.
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Figure 4. Cushman & Wakefield Management Structure, 1990.
Even with an established reputation among its multinational corporate clients and 
European and Japanese institutional investors, Cushman & Wakefield’s management 
committee believed—as Davis and Smales documented in their research of service 
corporations—that a local presence in both domestic and foreign markets was essential 
to attracting customers to the real estate advisory service firm.398 Recognizing from 
its own U.S. practice that cultural conventions played a central role in securing both 
domestic and foreign clients, Cushman & Wakefield decided that the risk inherent in 
international expansion would likely be reduced by forming an alliance with a reputable 
foreign firm that shared a similar business strategy.399
Cushman & Wakefield chose London-based Healey & Baker, because it owned 
and operated 12 offices in eight European countries and because of the two firm’s 
complementary strategies—commitment to employees, to market research, to 
multidisciplinary team efforts, and to long-term relationships with clients.400 
Moreover, Healey & Baker had a long history of centralized management and control 
by 32 equity partners.401 Cushman & Wakefield valued Healey & Baker’s 170 years 
of practice as respected British chartered surveyors and its successful penetration of 
several retail markets across Europe.402
j98 E. Davis and C. Smales, o p . cit.. p. 4.
399 Ibid, pp. 12-14.
400 Confirmed in interview with author, R. McLean, Cushman & Wakefield, 1991.
401 Healey & Baker, ‘A Guide to our Services’, unpublished corporate service brochure, 1989. In
addition, more recent information was obtained from Chartered Surveyors 1991. ed. L. Parkin 
(Oxford: Ivanhoe Press, 1990), p. 203.
402 Cushman & Wakefield/Healey & Baker, ‘A Global Real Estate Initiative’, unpublished corporate 
service brochure, 1990; and, interview with H.C. Carey, Cushman & Wakefield, 1991.
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In April 1990, the two companies formed a joint initiative, known as Cushman 
& Wakefield/Healey & Baker. Each firm moved a senior manager into the other’s 
headquarters, yet consciously decided to maintain independent corporate control. No 
equity was exchanged, yet they did consult with one another on expansion plans, overall 
business strategy, and multinational clients.403 While Healey-& Baker’s core services 
were somewhat different than those of Cushman & Wakefield, notably its retail 
consulting and property management, both firms viewed these differences as an 
advantage in strengthening their respective knowledge of local markets. The allied 
partners explicitly sought to capitalize on the rise in cross-border activity and to compete 
successfully against such firms as the $3 billion Prudential Global Real Estate Investment 
Program, managed jointly by London-based Jones Lang Wootton and Prudential 
Company of America. Even so, neither Cushman & Wakefield nor Healey & Baker 
pursued a systematic integration, whereby their individual corporate networks would be 
linked as one, instead choosing to remain as two separate entities of one loosely 
interdependent system.404 This strategy contrasted with those implemented by direct 
competitors Jones Lang Wootton and Orix.
6 .3  J on es  L ang  W oo tto n
Jones Lang Wootton was the largest real estate advisory service firm worldwide, 
with 60 offices in 22 countries. The firm was founded in 1783 as a sole partnership in 
London, originally providing auctioneering and land surveying services. By 1840, it had
40:5 Cushman & Wakefield/Healey & Baker, ‘Background: The Joint Initiative Between Cushman & 
Wakefield and Healey & Baker’, press release, 1990. Also, E. Davis and C. Smales, op. cit.. p. 12.
404 Confirmed in interview with author, H.C. Carey, Cushman & Wakefield, 1991; also, see A.D. 
Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure (1962), pp. 31-33.
235
expanded into estate agency for residential and commercial property owners, responding 
to ther rapid rise of land development throughout England. The modern firm of Jones 
Lang Wootton was established in 1939, when chartered surveyors Jones Lang & Co. 
merged with Wootton & Sons (founded in 1892).405
Geographic Expansion
Over the next 20 years, through the post-World War II decades, the firm 
remained comparatively small, ranking among the mid-range of chartered surveyors in 
the U.K. and limiting its activities to domestic clients. In 1958, when Jones Lang 
Wootton (JLW) opened the first foreign office in Australia, the firm had eight partners 
and 80 employees. By 1970, however, JLW had expanded to 1,300 professionals, with 
350 staff in Australia alone (Figure 5 and Table 21).
Two JLW partners initiated the move into Australia. They were introduced to 
the market by an existing U.K. client and perceived sufficient investment opportunities 
to open an office, even though Australia offered only a fledgling investment market at 
the time. The partners developed additional business and investment prospects, and 
introduced other U.K. clients, including major insurance companies, developers, and 
investors.
In addition to its entry into Australia, the firm logically extended its investment 
and chartered surveyor practice across the Channel to Belgium, opening an office in 
Brussels in 1965. From this base, JLW opened new offices during the 1960s and 1970s 
across Europe and the South East Asian and Pacific regions—New Zealand (1964), 
Belgium (1965), Ireland (1965), The Netherlands (1970), France (1972), Hong Kong
405 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘The Story of Jones Lang Wootton’, unpublished brochure prepared for the 
firm’s 200th anniversary (1990), pp. 1-3.
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(1973), Singapore (1973), Germany (1973), and Malaysia (1974).406 Since the 1960s 
the film’s principal expansion strategy--in both services and new markets—was to respond 
to the real estate activities of existing clients. Deliberate expansion into new markets 
enabled JLW to provide local expertise and an international perspective for those clients 
that sought advice across national boundaries. A network of.JLW-owned offices and 
JLW-trained staff, and a core of multinational clients were the key elements of this 
strategy.
The first German office, for example, was established in 1973 when JLW was 
retained by two British-based clients, developer MEPC and institutional investor Pan- 
European Property Unit Trust (managed by Montagu Investment Fund), to advise them 
on their entry into the Frankfurt market.407 The firm’s international network provided 
a solid foundation for entering Germany, as it did in other new foreign markets. 
Seventeen years later, in 1990, Frankfurt-based developer BTG retained JLW specifically 
because of its established presence in 25 European cities. The real estate advisors 
acquired, managed, and leased the BTG office/warehouse development near the 
international airport, letting the space to international firms based in the U.S., Holland, 
the U.K., Italy, and Turkey.408
By the mid-1970s, having established a profitable network of offices across 
Europe and Asia, the firm’s senior partners developed a global marketing plan. This 
centered around JLW’s entry into the U.S., conceived to capitalize on the rise in cross- 
border direct real estate investment by British, Middle Eastern, and Asian investors. The 
four-person office in New York City provided advisory services to existing and
406 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘The Story of Jones Lang Wootton’ (1990).
407 Confirmed in interviews with author, A. Burt, F. Chamock, and M. J. Hodges, Jones Lang Wootton, 
29 July 1991.
408 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘International Property’, unpublished corporate services brochure, 1990.
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prospective foreign clients that were unfamiliar with the American market as well as 
U.S.-management standards and appraisal techniques.
By the early 1980s, JLW enjoyed a superior position relative to its U.S. 
competitors, including Cushman & Wakefield, because it offered direct access to several 
foreign investment markets and a broader array of core advisory services. In 1983, for 
example, JLW represented Prudential UK in the purchase of an 836,000-square-foot 
office building in Houston, Texas, and leased and managed the building for its British 
client.409 By the mid-1980s, the firm expanded its services beyond investment sales 
and purchases to include financial services for corporate clients and major pension 
funds.410 Among the largest projects of this kind was a 1990 joint venture with 
Prudential Insurance Company of America and Japan Air Lines Development Group (a 
partnership of four Japanese companies): JLW advised on the 3.3 million-square-foot 
Hotel Nikko mixed-use development in Atlanta, Georgia and arranged a financing 
package with a Japanese and a U.K. bank.411 As of 1990 JLW had offices in four 
U.S. cities, staffed by 20 partners and 100 professionals.412
In 1983, responding to the growing outflow of Japanese capital to major western 
markets, JLW opened an office in Tokyo in an effort to tap into the rise in export 
capital. JLW had no previous experience with Japanese real estate investors, marking 
the first time in the firm’s history that it established a new foreign operation in the 
absence of a concrete business prospect. The Japan office was organized as a 
cooperative operation with JLW’s three major regions in Europe, North America, and
409 Confirmed in interview with author, J. Lench, Jones Lang Wootton, 1991.
410 Real Estate Forum vol. 46 no. 7 (July 1991), p. 11.
411 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘International Property’, unpublished corporate services brochure, 1991.
412 Ibid.
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the Asia-Pacific region, and its principal mission was to work with worldwide offices and 
clients to secure Japanese debt and equity funds for foreign real estate investments.413 
The Tokyo office was also established to advise JLW’s corporate clients in Europe and 
the U.S. on entering or expanding their operations in Japan.
Contrary to the firm’s previous experience in establishing a foothold in a new, 
foreign market--but similar to the experience of most service firms that entered the 
Japanese market without a cooperative venture agreement with a Japanese firm and no 
innovative technology to sell to an existing national414—JLW encountered substantial 
cultural barriers in building an advisory practice in Japan: language, business customs, 
and access to major investors. With no Japanese client or affiliate to provide an entre, 
JLW discovered over time that the major trading companies were the linchpins of real 
estate export capital. It took JLW seven years, until 1990, to establish a competitive 
example, in presence among Japanese companies engaged in cross-border real estate 
investment. For example, in 1989 JLW secured $92.5 million in debt financing from 
The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., for the National Press Building, an office project developed 
by a Washington, D.C., client.415 In the same year, Kumagai Gumi UK, the British 
affiliate of one of Japan’s largest contractors, retained JLW to represent it in acquiring, 
developing, and leasing a prime commercial site and two adjacent freehold properties in 
downtown London.416
41j Confirmed in interviews with authors, A. Burt, F. Chamock, and M. J. Hodges, Jones Lang 
Wootton, 29 July 1991.
414 R.M. March, ‘Foreign Firms in Japan’, California Management Review, v. 22 no. 3 (Spring 1980), 
pp. 42-50; M.Y. Yoshino, ‘Japan as Host to the International Corporation’, The International 
Corporation (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1970), p. 350.
415 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘1989 in Review’, unpublished brochure, 1990.
416 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘International Property’, unpublished corporate services brochure, 1990.
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JLW opened an office in Berlin in 1989 to capitalize on new business 
opportunities in the fledgling market economies of former Eastern Bloc states and 
establish a regional gateway to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and eastern Germany. 
Privatization of property in these countries after 1989 inspired JLW to cultivate local 
expertise in legal and cultural matters for U.S., European, and Japanese clients— 
manufacturers, hotels, and developers—that were entering eastern Europe through joint 
ventures. For example, a U.S.-based development partnership headquartered in 
Washington, D.C., acquired a large commercial parcel in Warsaw in 1990. After 
evaluating the market and the property’s competitive positioning, the group retained 
JLW’s Berlin office to lease the 280,000-square-foot office building because of the real 
estate advisory firm’s direct access to western Europe, the U.S., and Japan.417
417 Confirmed in interview with author, C. Nalen, Jones Lang Wootton, Washington, D.C., 1991.
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Figure 5. Jones Lang Wootton Management Structure, 1975.
TABLE 21
Co r po r a t e  Profile
J ones  Lang W o o t t o n , U nited  K ing do m  
1960-1990
Factors 1960 1970 ' 1980 1990
Number of Employees 
Domestic 80 1,300 2,600 3,100
Foreign _0 50 100 400
Total 80 1,300 2,700 3,500
Number of Offices 
Domestic 1 3 5 7
Foreign _0 JO _20 _53
Total 1 13 25 60
Alliances/Acquisitions 
Alliances 0 0 2 3
Mergers/Acquisitions _0 _0 _0 _0
Total 0 0 2 3
Global Client Mix
Manufacturing 45% 40% 35% 30%
Services 40% 45% 45% 50%
Government 15% 15% 20% 20%
100% 100% 100% 100%
Sources of Revenue
Manufacturing Clients 30% 25% 25% 20%
Services Clients 50% 55% 55% 55%
Government Clients 20% 20% 20% 25%
Source: Unpublished private corporate documents and author’s interviews with and data 
confirmation from Jones Lang Wootton executives.
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TABLE 22
Competitive Scope 
Services Scope
Geographic Scope
C om petitive  Sc o pe ,
S e r v ic e  D iv e r s if ic a t io n ,  an d  G e o g r a p h ic  E x p a n sio n  
J o n e s  L an g  W o o t to n ,  U n ite d  K ingdom  
1960-1990
__________I960________   1970_________   1980___________  ___________ 1990__________
Commercial brokerage Commercial brokerage Commercial brokerage Commercial brokerage
Appraisal Investment Appraisal Appraisal Development consulting
sales & purchases Investment sales & purchases Investment sales & purchases Property management
Development consulting Development consulting Appraisal
Property management Property management Financial services
Research & consulting Investment sales & purchases
Portfolio fund management 
Research & consulting
United Kingdom 
Australia
United Kingdom Australia
New Zealand
Ireland
Belgium
The Netherlands
United Kingdom 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Ireland 
Belgium
The Netherlands
France
Hong Kong
Singapore
Malaysia
Germany
United States
United Kingdom 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Ireland 
Belgium
The Netherlands
France
Hong Kong
Singapore
Malaysia
Germany
United States
Japan
Spain
Canada
Luxembourg
Sweden
Italy
Thailand
Source: Jones Lang Wootton, ‘The Story of Jones Lang Wootton’ (1990) and author’s interviews with and data confirmation from Jones Lang Wootton executives.
Service Diversification
^ JLW incrementally broadened its operations in response to new business 
opportunities presented by clients’ cross-border expansion. Unlike Cushman & 
Wakefield and several other real estate and financial advisory firms that expanded into 
foreign markets, JLW’s senior management generally chose to expand under the firm’s 
own name, capitalized by partner equity and JLW-trained personnel. Relocated senior 
managers would then hire local practitioners in each place. This strategy, while resulting 
in higher capital costs and longer lead times in such markets as Japan, enabled the firm 
to control the scope and value of professional services. The strict ’Code of Conduct’, 
instituted in 1986 and observed by all offices, was one measure of JLW’s commitment 
to a unified standard of quality.418
JLW and other internationalizing real estate advisory firms tended to introduce 
new, innovative services at a rate approximately proportionate to the firm’s rate of 
geographic diversification. During the initial stages of growth, this diversification in 
services was both a result of and the basis for broader exposure to domestic and foreign 
corporations and investors worldwide. JLW gained a global perspective and introduced 
more sophisticated and innovative services at a faster pace than its direct competitors, 
such as Cushman & Wakefield, because of its direct exposure to different national and 
local markets and its larger volume of diverse clients, projects, and transactions. By 
having 60 offices in 20 countries and representing $13 billion to $16 billion of cross- 
border transactions annually,419 JLW personnel gained a distinct advantage over direct 
competitors because of the firm’s integrated international network of offices and client-
418 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘The Story of Jones Lang Wootton’(1990), p. 5.
419 The value of transactions that Jones Lang Wootton represented annually, 1988-1990.
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advisor relationships. Initially, as Chandler and Williamson have argued, such client- 
advisor relationships were cultivated at a local level. Over time, with cross-border 
expansion, successful firms such as JLW exploited the strengths gained in one nation, 
or global financial markets, to enhance the services they provided to clients in other 
foreign markets.420 Moreover, JLW effectively and economically managed its global 
network of diversified services. The firm’s position was strengthened during the second 
half of the 1980s by the heightened importance of international real estate finance.
In recognition of the increased importance of real estate finance, JLW’s financial 
services led the firm’s revenue growth and international expansion during the 1980s and 
early 1990s (Table 23). By 1990, in fact, 75 percent of the capital transactions JLW 
represented in Europe involved cross-border investments. To be sure, the firm’s 
traditional core services in agency, surveying, appraisal, and development management 
continued to be key products in retaining and attracting multinational clients, as well as 
providing important sources of sustained revenues. They were not, however, the 
services that aided JLW in expanding into new foreign markets and formulating 
innovative vehicles for cross-border investment.421 Instead, the firm extended its 
global business and client roster by broadening the scope of financial services, portfolio 
fund management, and investment sales and purchases.
420 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scone, pp. 38-39; O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, 
pp. 56, 82.
421 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘International Property’, unpublished corporate services brochure, 1990. 
Also, Jones Lang Wootton, ‘Property Services in Europe’, unpublished corporate brochure, 1991.
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TABLE 23
S o u r c e s  o f  R e v e n u e , 1960-1990 
J o n e s  L a n g  W o o t t o n
Services 1960 1970 1980 1990
Commercial Brokerage 40% 40% 35% 35%
Land/Property Surveys 30% *25% 15% 15%
Project (Development) Consulting -- 5% 10% 10%
Property Management - 5% 5% 5%
Appraisal & Valuations a 20% 15% 10% 5%
Investment Sales & Purchases 10% 10% 10% 10%
Financial Services b - - 5% 10%
Portfolio Fund Management - -- 5% 5%
Research and Consulting _zz _ __ 5% __ 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
* General Practice services include valuation, rent reviews, lease renewals, and rating.
b Includes office, retail, hotel, and residential investment services for corporate, institutional, and
individual clients.
Sources: Private company records and reports; author’s interviews with JLW executives.
Because JLW deliberately achieved a local presence and market-based knowledge 
in all the national markets in which it operated-such as a comprehensive understanding 
and presence in Frankfurt, Germany and in Washington, D.C.— the financial services 
group was equipped to advise domestic and foreign clients on investment and tax 
regulations, legal processes, exchange rates, and accounting standards for multiple cities 
and countries. The financial staff was also familiar with the return criteria and arbitrage 
alternatives acceptable to different types of clients in various countries.422 For 
example, JLW completed 18 transactions in the U.S. in 1989, each having complex 
equity/debt structures. Because of this coverage in the world’s most innovative financial
422 Ibid.
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market, the firm distinguished its capabilities among European and Pacific-Asia clients 
diversifying their investments domestically and abroad.423
Strategic Alliances
Just as JLW’s traditional core services were the foundation for international 
financial services, so too the firm’s diversification of portfolio management services into 
foreign markets during the late 1980s was founded upon long-established core services: 
local market research, investment brokerage, tax evaluation, and property 
management.424 JLW’s multinational coverage and market expertise were the principal 
reasons that Prudential Insurance Company of America, the largest U.S. insurance 
company, entered into an exclusive affiliation with JLW in 1989, to manage jointly its 
global real estate investment fund (Figure 7). Even though Prudential had been active 
in billions of dollars of direct real estate investment in the U.S. for several decades, 
Prudential’s global investment group committed $2 billion in the late 1980s to acquire 
properties in Europe, North America, and the Pacific-Asian regions. JLW’s extensive 
ties with property owners was the deciding factor in Prudential’s choice of JLW for its 
joint venture real estate advisor.425 For the same selective factors that had influenced 
Prudential, in late 1990, the London Transport Pension Fund, a $260 million portfolio, 
also retained JLW to manage its global real estate assets and investments, located across 
Europe, North America, and the U.K.
42j Jones Lang Wootton, ‘1988 in Review’, unpublished corporate brochure, 1989.
424 Jones Lang Wootton, ‘International Property’, unpublished corporate services brochure, 1990.
425 Ibid.; and, Prudential Real Estate Investors, ‘Global Watch Report’, unpublished brochure, 1990.
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The Prudential joint venture was a first for JLW in expanding internationally 
through an alliance with a second party. Perhaps an indication of the heightened 
competitiveness of real estate advisory services in the recessionary market of the early 
1990s, the firm entered into three additional alliances during 1990-91, of which one was 
a formal merger. These alliances, together with the firm’s international office network, 
established JLW as the largest property fund manager in the world.
Alliances
•  Prudential Insurance Company of America ("The Prudential 
Global Real Estate Investment Program"), 1990
•  Deutsche Grundbesitz Investment Gesellschaft mbH (DGI),
Germany, 1990
•  Arthur D. Little, Inc. (with JLW USA), 1991
Mergers/Acquisitions/Joint Ventures
•  Balay Prenot & Associes, France, 1991
Figure 6 . Strategic alliances and acquisitions by Jones Lang Wootton of the 
United Kingdom.
The first alliance was a five-year cooperative agreement with Deutsche 
Grundbesitz Investment Gesellschaft mbh (DGI), an open-end institutional fund controlled 
by Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank, with two-thirds of its $1.9 billion portfolio in real 
estate assets located throughout Germany. Regulatory changes in 1990 liberalized cross- 
border direct investment by German funds, and DGI was now free to invest a portion of 
its capital abroad. It chose JLW to advise on strategy and implement an investment 
program in newly opened EC countries, notably the U.K., France, Spain, and Belgium-
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markets in which DGI had no previous experience and in which JLW had extensive 
experience.426
The second, with Arthur D. Little, was undertaken to diversify JLW’s 
competitive scope, thus joining with the international management and technology 
consultants to provide financial advice and asset management services to hospitality and 
leisure property owners.427 In response to the growing number of underperforming and 
insolvent assets in the hospitality sector, JLW’s senior management entered this alliance 
to provide a comprehensive approach that was unavailable from any single 
competitor.428
Finally, in 1991, JLW acquired Lyon-based Balay Prenot & Associes to extend 
the firm’s regional activities beyond Paris, where it had had an office since 1972. This 
merger departed from JLW’s traditional expansion pattern of opening new offices led by 
experienced JLW personnel. Yet JLW’s partners pursued the acquisition of the 30-year- 
old, 35-person firm because they believed they were handicapped in penetrating the 
Rhone-Alpes regional market beyond Paris absent a formal alliance with the area’s 
leading real estate advisory firm. JLW and Balay Prenot, moreover, had cooperated with 
one another on several engagements and enjoyed a solid working relationship. JLW 
chose vertical integration (acquisition) as the most economical way of diversifying into 
the Rhone-Alpes market.429
426 Jones Lang Wootton, JLWorid. unpublished corporate brochure, May 1991, p. 19; and, ‘News 
Briefs’, National Real Estate Investor July 1991, p. 16.
427 ‘Jones Lang Wootton/Arthur D. Little Joint Effort’, Real Estate Forum. July 1991, p. 22.
428 Laurence Geller, cited in ‘Jones Lang Wootton/Arthur D. Little Joint Effort’, Real Estate Forum. 
July 1991, p. 22.
429 Jones Lang Wootton, JLWorid. May 1991, p. 18. O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies 
(1975), pp. 55-56, 82.
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Ownership and Management Structure
^ For more than 200 years, Jones Lang Wootton has remained a privately-held
partnership. Twenty-four partners, known as The London Partnership, hold centralized
control of the name and the firm’s ownership (Figure 7). By 1990, each JLW office
*
throughout the world was directed by one of three regional groups which reported to the 
central management committee—the European Liaison Group, the North American group, 
and the Asia-Pacific group.430
Due to the nature of JLW’s real estate advisory practice, which for any one 
engagement or client could extend across national boundaries and call on the firm’s 
diversified services, centralized management was further delineated by core functional 
divisions, such as financial services, investment sales and purchases, and fund 
management. The "lead partners” of each service line constituted the Lead Partners 
Committee, which reported to the Management Committee. JLW established an 
integrated organizational structure to manage both geographic regions and core services 
throughout the worldwide network of 60 offices. Each office, then, was ultimately 
accountable to both an "entrepreneurial" regional partner and an "operational" lead 
(service) partner.
430 Each of the firm’s continental European operations were established as limited liability companies, 
wholly owned by The London Partnership. In Germany, because of government regulations for 
corporations, JLW set up a Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH), or a private limited 
liability company. Among these three regional groups, the European partnership of 11 countries 
was functionally integrated to capitalize on potential opportunities that grow out of the 
consolidation of the Economic Community in 1992.
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Figure 7. Jones Lang Wootton Management Structure, 1990.
6 .4  M u e l l e r  In t e r n a t io n a l  Im m o b il ie n  G m bH
^  Throughout the decade between 1975 and 1985, the Federal Republic of Germany 
ranked as the world leader of outward direct real estate investment. Since the late 1970s, 
the expansion of German foreign direct investment, from $2.1 billion in 1975 to 
$17.4 billion by 1990, paralleled the incremental growth over the same period of Mueller 
International Immobilien GmbH, the largest real estate advisory service firm in 
Germany.431 Mueller was founded in 1958 in Dusseldorf, West Germany, by Karl- 
Heinrich Mueller. It was among the first German estate agencies to focus its practice 
exclusively in commercial real estate.
Corporate Profile and Clients
To a greater extent than the three other firms, Mueller continued to center its 
advisory practice around German clients and German markets. For example, 90 percent 
of the firm’s clientele in 1990 were German-based; the remaining 10 percent were made 
up of foreign investors and developers doing business in Germany. And in contrast to 
the international networks and wide-ranging global strategies developed by Cushman & 
Wakefield and Jones Lang Wootton, Mueller specifically oriented the firm’s service 
diversification and geographic expansion to respond to the needs and potential market 
opportunities of investors residing or doing business in Germany.
The relative lack of sophistication of the German real estate market until the mid- 
to late-1970s played a central role in the evolution of Mueller’s organizational structure 
and expansion policies. Until about 1973 Germany’s commercial property markets were
431 Chapter 2, Table 3. R. Gop, ‘The League Table of Estate Agents: The Leaders Stay Ahead of 
the Field’, Immobilien Manager. February 1992, p. 16.
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dominated by owner-occupants and Mueller’s business centered around agency services 
for corporate and institutional clients (leasing, sales and acquisitions), and investment 
advice on locational matters and new building development. Mueller introduced 
consultancy that encompassed supply-demand analyses, property valuations, and 
financing strategies during the 1970s and refined these services in the 1980s as the 
speculative marketplace became more competitive. Until 1990-91 the German real estate 
market was quite localized, stemming from the republic’s fragmented political and 
economic structure. Mueller, like most real estate advisory service firms in Germany, 
specialized in certain major domestic markets—such as Dusseldorf—and not others-such 
as Frankfurt, the republic’s financial center and largest real estate market. Even though 
in 1990 Mueller ranked as the largest German real estate service firm (or, estate agency 
business), based on number of personnel, its national presence was compartmentalized 
within specific regions.
In contrast to JLW, Mueller did not actively pursue new business opportunities 
abroad. Instead, it historically regarded its primary competitive strength as the firm’s 
expertise in specific German markets and among German-based investors. Mueller 
entered only foreign markets—Paris, London, and Vienna—that matched the investment 
activities and prospects of long-standing clients, thereby dedicating corporate resources 
to broadening the firm’s presence among German enterprises and deepening its 
knowledge of rapidly changing domestic markets. In light of this conservative strategy, 
Mueller was the smallest of the four firms studied, growing from 25 employees in three
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domestic offices in 1970 to 250 professionals in eight German offices and four European 
offices in 1990 (Table 24).432
TABLE 24
C o r p o r a t e  P r o f i l e  
M u e l l e r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Im m o b ilien  GmbH  
1960-1990
Factors 1960 1970 1980 1990
Number of Employees
Domestic 6 25 75 245
Foreign _0 _0 _5 _5
6 25 80 250
Number of Offices
Domestic 1 3 5 8
Foreign _0 _0 _2 _4
1 3 7 12
Alliances/Acquisitions
Cooperative Agreements 0 0 0 3
Mergers/Acquisitions _0 _0 _0 _0
0 0 0 3
Global Client Mix
Manufacturing 50% 50% 45% 40%
Services 45% 45% 50% 55%
Government 5% 5% 5% 5%
Sources of Revenue
Manufacturing Clients 45% 45% 40% 35%
Services Clients 50% 50% 55% 60%
Government Clients 5% 5% 5% 5%
Sources: Private company documents and reports, and industry publications; author
interviews with Mueller executives.
Competitive Scope
As the largest and most prominent real estate services firm in the Dusseldorf 
region, Mueller sustained a strong competitive position in its home nation by providing
4j2 Since 1990, due to German unification and the privatization of property in newly democratized 
Eastern Bloc countries, Mueller’s operations have grown appreciably over the last two years, 
standing as of April 1992 at 355 people and 10 offices in Germany and five in western Europe. 
Personal interview, J. Pasch, Mueller, 12 June 1991; correspondence, B. Lohr, Mueller, March 
1992; and Mueller company profile, unpublished memorandum, 1991.
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core real estate services to German-based institutional investors, including pension funds,
commercial banks, insurance companies, and multinational corporations that owned real
estate for their own use-manufacturing and trade firms, service companies, and
commercial trading corporations (Table 25). Having been headquartered in Dusseldorf
%
since the firm’s founding in 1958, Mueller opened branch offices in Frankfurt, Hamburg, 
Cologne, Munich, and Stuttgart during the 1970s. The expansion represented the firm’s 
intent to establish a presence in each of Germany’s institutional investment markets and 
to capture a larger share of growing domestic and international property investment, even 
though these were secondary markets for Mueller relative to its primary competitors 
outside of Dusseldorf.
TABLE 25
Com petitive  Sco pe ,
Service  D iversificatio n , and  Geo g ra ph ic  E x pansio n  
M u eller  Gm bH , Germ any
Competitive Scope
Services
i960 1970 1980 1990
Commercial
Brokerage
Property
Management
Research & 
Consulting
Appraisal
Retail Center 
Management
Development
Project
Management
Financial Services
Germany Germany Germany
Holland
The Netherlands
Austria
France
Germany
Holland
The Netherlands
Austria
France
Common terminology to define real estate advisory services is used for all four companies for purposes of 
consistency and comparative analysis; specific terms may depart from the company’s specific terminology. 
Sources: Private company documents and reports, and industry publications; author interviews with Mueller 
executives.
To further diversify services and revenue sources, in 1982 Mueller established 
two property management subsidiaries-Mueller Management for office buildings and
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Center Management for retail properties. In 1989, it entered into a 50 percent 
partnership with hotelier Comfort to form Mueller Comfort Shopinvest. Similar to many 
German real estate service firms during this period, Mueller was motivated by the steady 
increase in foreign real estate investment in Germany and high property management 
fees.433 As a further extension of its core services, the firm established two additional 
subsidiaries in 1988, Mueller Financial Agency, to advise institutional investors and 
arrange debt and equity placements for properties in local markets, and Mueller Consult, 
to counsel a diverse array of property owners—corporations, developers, investors, and 
pension funds. Mueller Consult took over the dominant share of the firm’s consultancy 
and research activities.434
Mueller’s corporate expansion reinforced the firm’s national reputation, with its 
international expansion founded principally on the foreign investment activities of 
domestic clients. Because of the growth of German investment in real estate, 
domestically and abroad, Mueller capitalized on a dynamic market, introducing new 
advisory services and expanding its operations abroad in response to the direction and 
growth of the market (Table 26). Moreover, foreign investment activity by Mueller’s 
multinational clients provided fertile ground for the German estate agency to open 
foreign offices in the major European markets of London, Paris, Amsterdam, Vienna, 
and Brussels with minimum capital exposure, a principal means of foreign diversification 
by service firms according to Davis and Smales.435
4:0 See J. Punter, G. Keogh, M. Hsia, and J. Gosling, ‘Property in Europe’, Working Papers in 
European Property, Centre for European Property Research, University of Reading, 1991, 
pp. 62-5.
434 R. Gop, ‘The League Table of Estate Agents’, Immobilien Manager, p. 17.
4j5 See E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, 1989, pp. 5, 7.
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TABLE 26
S o u r c e s  o f  R e v e n u e , 1960-1990 
M u e l l e r  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Im m o b ilien  GmbH
Functional Services 1960 1970 1980 1990
Commercial Brokerage 100% 85% ’ ‘ 55% 40%
Property Management 0% 5% - 10% 10%
Retail Center Management -- -- 5% 10%
Development Project Management 0% 0% 10% 10%
Appraisal 0% 0% 5% 5%
Financial Servicesa 0% 0% 0% 5%
Research and Consulting 0% 10% 15% 20%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
— Service line not formally established as a separate functional group, 
a Includes investment sales and purchases.
Sources: Private company documents and reports, and industry publications; author interviews with 
Mueller executives.
Strategic Alliances
By the mid-1980s, as cross-border real estate investment continued to rise, 
Mueller (and several leading German estate agencies) recognized that a solid reputation 
in German markets and among German investors and corporations was both a 
competitive advantage and disadvantage. At one level, the firm was the most 
experienced and knowledgeable full-service real estate advisor in the major markets of 
Dusseldorf and Munich, which were then among the most attractive locations in Europe 
for expanding foreign corporations and international property investors. At another 
level, however, the firm’s national position was limited and its international presence was 
handicapped by the domestically-focused, 30-year practice. In an effort to exploit the 
firm’s local expertise and broaden its exposure among international investors and 
property-intensive corporations, in 1985 Mueller established an affiliation with The
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Office Network an affiliation of real estate advisory firms worldwide, headquartered in 
Houston, Texas (Figure 8).436
Alliances
•  Oncor International (The Office Network), U.S.,* 1985
Merger/Acquisitions/Joint Ventures
•  Comfort-Shopinvest (50% participation), Germany, 1989
•  Commerzbank AG (acquired 20% of Mueller), Frankfurt, Germany, 1990
Source: Company documents, publications and brochures, 1990; author’s interviews with
and data confirmation from Mueller executives.
Figure 8. Strategic alliances and acquisitions by Mueller International 
Immobilien GmbH of Germany.
The Network, a for-profit association, was established in 1977 to provide realty 
advisors in one nation with a cross-reference network of their counterparts in another 
nation.437 In the mid-1980s, it formed a global cooperative of real estate advisory 
service firms—in such countries as Austria, Canada, Spain, The Netherlands, Great 
Britain, and the U.S—and identified Mueller as the best prospect in Germany. Mueller 
became the only German operator among the Network’s 29 international affiliates, 
joining the cooperative with the expectation that the firm would gain greater exposure 
among foreign institutions and enterprises investing in Germany.438 In truth, Mueller 
derived minimum benefit from the alliance, with the first major joint engagement coming
4j6 In 1991, The Office Network was renamed Oncor International.
437 Mueller corporate brochure, 1991, p. 3.
438 Oncor International, press release, 3 May 1991; and, Mueller corporate brochure, 1991, p. 3.
258
after five years, in 1990, to lease and manage an office building in downtown Frankfurt 
developed by U.S.-based Tishman Speyer.439
While the Tishman Speyer match was profitable for both Mueller and the U.S.
developer, which had sought to increase its links with foreign real estate businesses, the
«
Network’s board of directors recognized over time that the organization’s mission was 
not being fulfilled, largely stemming from a loosely-held management and decision­
making structure. For these reasons, the association was renamed Oncor International 
in 1991, and management was centralized to control the quality of services and the 
selection of real estate advisory firms for specific clients and engagements.440 Oncor’s 
primary purpose—and Mueller’s intent in establishing the affiliation—was to compete 
successfully against such global firms as Jones Lang Wootton. In keeping with Coase’s 
observation that "it may be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some 
article or service"441 rather than organizing the service within the firm, Oncor and 
Mueller invested in the notion that managing international networks through multiple 
contracts was more economical than one firm dispersing its sole resources abroad. The 
29 worldwide affiliates ostensibly created a stronger office network, from one nation to 
the next, than did their direct competitors.442
In fact, Mueller’s own European network of wholly-owned offices—in London, 
Vienna, Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels—was more effective in securing new, foreign
439 For a full description of this office building see ‘MesseTurm: Facts and Figures’, an unpublished
corporate brochure, 1990.
440 Oncor International, press release, 3 May 1991.
441 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937), p. 337.
442 M.A. Klionsky, ‘Driscoll Streamlines from Loose Network to Unified Organization’, Commercial
Property News (1 June 1991), p. 3.
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clients than was the Oncor affiliation. As with many international alliances, prospective 
clients were not attracted to the combination of global advisory firms that would not have 
been attracted to one of the individual affiliates in its home market.443 Over time, 
Mueller executives recognized that equity participation in an international alliance would 
have greater prospects for gaining competitive advantage abroad than would a 
cooperative agreement. Mueller’s own capital resources were strained, however, and the 
firm required outside capital to expand throughout Germany and into the newly opened, 
former Eastern Bloc markets.
Beginning around 1985, German commercial and residential estate agency firms 
responded to the significant increase in real estate demand and property investment by 
merging with a commercial bank or insurance company. These integrations were 
intended to offer a major injection of capital to finance growth, as well as access to 
international financial markets and investors. While many of its German competitors 
sold a majority interest to these new financial partners, Mueller negotiated to sell 20 
percent of its privately-held stock to Frankfurt-based Commerzbank AG, thereby 
retaining its administrative independence. Commerzbank, in turn, benefitted by 
diversifying services and income sources. The partnership met the expansion strategies 
of both Mueller and Commerzbank.
Management and Ownership Structure
Since Mueller’s founding in 1958, ownership and management were centralized 
in corporate headquarters in Dusseldorf. During the 1960s, as a localized real estate
443 E. Davis, G. Hamlon and J. Kay, 1990, ‘Internationalization in Accounting and Other 
Professional Services’, p. 12.
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service firm of less than 10 people, the company required no formal reporting structure.
During the 1970s, with three branch offices, which grew to five throughout Germany
within the decade, each operational subsidiary manager reported to the Board of
Directors and the majority shareholder in Dusseldorf (Figure 9).444 The most dramatic
%
restructuring in management and control of decision-making ^occurred during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Mueller had grown to become a multidivisional real estate 
services firm with wholly- and partially-owned subsidiaries that were widely dispersed 
in domestic and foreign offices, such as Mueller Comfort-Shoplnvest (Figure 10). The 
Board created two holding companies: one to manage national and international
commercial brokerage, property management, and consulting operations; and one to 
oversee development project management and financial services. Even though all shares 
of the Mueller conglomerate were distributed among the Directors and the employees, 
real estate advisory services were managed by individual branch offices and centrally 
controlled by one of the two holding companies.445
444 Correspondence, B. Lohr, Mueller, March 1992. Also, A. D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and 
Structure (1962), pp. 9-11.
445 Correspondence, B. Lohr, Mueller, March 1992.
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6.5 Orix  C orporation
^  Orix Corporation was founded in 1964 in Osaka, Japan, and capitalized by three 
trading companies and five major city banks-three of which in 1990 were among the 
world’s 20 largest banks.446 Characteristic of the concentration of economic control 
in Japan, the banks provided institutional financing and, together with the trading houses, 
created the subsidiary company of Orix to engage in international services and investment 
credit.447
Orix was originally established as an independent leasing enterprise, for vessels 
and containers, office machines, aircraft, plant equipment, and automobiles. Within the 
decade after its founding, however, the company had expanded its primary mission to 
include asset-based financial services to support the mainline leasing operations and to 
diversify the firm’s credit operations. Several among Japan’s largest companies initiated 
a similar type of expansion through financial services in the post-World War II decades, 
especially those expanding throughout the global marketplace. The formation of Orix’s 
financial subsidiaries enabled the company to procure capital by borrowing from its own 
banking shareholders and other financial institutions, as well as to issue commercial 
paper and corporate bonds, and to lend to trading customers.448 During this same 
period, Orix also expanded its operations into Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, to 
engage in cross-border transactions, such as leases, installment sales, and loan
446 The original shareholders included Nichimen Company, Ltd., presently Nichimen Corporation; 
The Nissho Company, Ltd., Iwai & Company, Ltd., presently Nissho Iwai Corporation; The 
Sanwa Bank, Ltd.; The Toyo Trust & Banking Company, Ltd.; The Nippon Kangyo Bank, Ltd., 
presently The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd.; the Bank of Kobe, presently The Taiyo Kobe Mitsui 
Bank, Ltd.; and, The Industrial Bank of Japan, Ltd.
447 See M. Eli, Japan. Inc.: Global Strategies of Japanese Trading Corporations (Chicago: Probus, 
1991), pp. 1-18.
448 Ibid, pp. 76-79.
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financings.449 During the 1970s and early 1980s, Orix’s management focused on 
expanding the leasing operations and financial services into new foreign markets, creating 
subsidiaries throughout the Pacific Rim, western Europe, and the U.S.
Orix’s real estate services were introduced in the mid-1980s as an outgrowth of 
the mainline business—partially in response to client requests for diverse loan products, 
and primarily as a means for Orix and its shareholders to develop alternative investment 
vehicles in the face of deteriorating earnings from Japanese investment funds.
TABLE 27
C o rpo rate  P ro file  
O rix  Co rpo ratio n  
1960-1990
Factors 1960 1970 1980 1990
Number of Employees *
Domestic 0 0 0 336
Foreign _0 _0 _0 _66
0 0 0 402
Number of Offices a
Domestic 0 0 0 3
Foreign _0 _0 _0 _7
0 0 0 10
Alliances /Acquisitions a
Cooperative Agreements 0 0 0 0
Mergers/Acquisitions _0 _0 _0 _2
0 0 0 2
Global Client Mix a
Manufacturing 0% 0% 0% 37%
Services 0% 0% 0% 63%
Government 0% 0% 0% 0%
Sources of Revenue
Manufacturing Clients 0% 0% 0% 45%
Services Clients 0% 0% 0% 55%
Government Clients 0% 0% 0% 0%
a Includes only real estate and financial services divisions and subsidiaries.
Sources: Public corporate statements and annual reports; author’s interviews with Orix 
executives.
449 Orix Corporation, corporate history brochure (Tokyo, 1990), p. 40.
265
Management and Ownership Structure
The firm’s aggressive geographic expansion and product diversification during the 
1970s were made possible by a restructuring of ownership. In 1970, Orix’s shareholders 
reorganized from a privately-held to a publicly-traded company', and thereby increased 
the original capital base more than fourfold. By 1973, Orix was listed on the Tokyo, 
Osaka, and Nagoya stock exchanges, and the nominal value of its issued capital had 
increased to over one billion yen, from an initial base of 100 million yen in 1964. By 
1990, Orix’s paid-in capitalization had doubled to Y20.2 billion.450
Having been incorporated in Osaka with one branch office in Tokyo, Orix moved 
its headquarters in 1970 to Tokyo, where Sanwa Bank, the largest shareholder, was 
based. That same year, the company’s senior managers and major shareholders also 
restructured central management, establishing a multiregional corporate structure 
designed to increase the flexibility of managing widely dispersed operations and to 
minimize the cost of international expansion and product diversification.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Orix established several foreign 
subsidiaries, entering very different cultures from those throughout Asia—such as, Brazil 
(1974), Great Britain (1974), the U.S. (1974), the Philippines (1977), Chile (1980), 
China (1981), Pakistan (1986), and Australia (1986).451 Because of its limited 
knowledge about these foreign regions, Orix’s senior executives developed a centralized 
management structure that permitted localized decision-making within individual regions. 
Each foreign office, subsidiary, or affiliate thus adopted tactical management strategies 
tailored to the requirements of its particular market, enabling Orix managers to act
450 Orix Corporation, ‘History of Orix Corporations’, memorandum, 31 July 1990, unpaginated.
451 Ibid.
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promptly. This localized orientation created the institutional structure for the real estate 
services division to tailor regional operations to regional conditions and clients. Orix 
partners and managers abroad had sufficient independence to respond to the particular 
market’s clients and business environment, while overall corporate policy and finances 
were controlled by Tokyo. In addition, the consolidated company held to the expansion 
strategy of acquiring or affiliating with established local enterprises when entering new 
markets.452
Each foreign operation was accountable for the profitability of its individual 
operations, and thus to the holding company and Board of Directors. In conformance 
with Chandler’s theory of vertical integration through combination and consolidation, 
central management maintained control of Orix’s expansion strategy: it introduced and 
underwrote new services when local market conditions, profitability ratios, and 
competitive performance measures warranted.453 By 1989, this market-oriented central 
management was reflected in the company’s organizational structure, which decisively 
separated domestic operations (in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) and international 
operations (Figure 11).
The management structure, which remained in force in 1990, represented a classic 
example of a vertically integrated company, broadly organized by geographic scope, then 
by functional division of individual service operations. With more than 5,700 
employees—266 offices, subsidiaries, and affiliates in Japan, and 100 offices in 21 
countries abroad—the structure of the overall holding company recognized distinctions
452 This paralleled the common strategy of the American industrial enterprises profiled by A.D. 
Chandler, Jr. in Strategy and Structure (1962), pp. 16-17, 25.
453 Ibid, pp. 28-33.
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between regional markets. It did not, however, reflect wide-ranging differences between 
the holding company’s diversified leasing and financial services divisions.454
The major exception to this overall management structure was the real estate 
division: the company unified the Japan real estate division, but separated it from the 
other headquarters in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, creating a  distinct rather than an 
integrated corporate entity in the domestic market. The division reported directly to the 
president and the board, rather than domestic regional managers. Within international 
headquarters, real estate services were also a separate operation, as were leasing and 
financial services. Orix’s president and chairman in Tokyo headquarters held ultimate 
control of real estate services and thereby created a quasi-independent (not fully 
integrated) business entity in the company’s multinational scope.455 Apart from the 
formal organizational structure, the real estate services division was effectively linked 
with financial services, which enabled the business (especially in the early years) to 
capitalize on the expertise and market presence of Orix’s diversified financial products.
454 Personal communication, J.S. Nagahima, Orix Corporation, 3 July 1991.
455 Orix Corporation, corporate history brochure (1990), pp. 15-16.
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Product Diversification-International Real Estate Services
Since the 1970s, Orix’s executives believed that financial services would 
constitute a major source of the company’s global revenue growth. Access to low-priced 
investment capital through its major banking partners, particularly Sanwa Bank, 
accounted for this confidence. In advance of innovations by international investment 
banks and financial institutions, and prior to the surge in 1985 of Japanese direct 
investment abroad, Orix invested substantial capital in developing more sophisticated 
financial products and services, such as mortgage-backed securities, and was committed 
to a long-term expansion strategy centered around innovative financial services, not the 
company’s leasing operations.456
With 20 years of increasingly innovative experience in financing asset-backed 
equipment leases and operating leases, and an ongoing commitment to research and 
development, Orix was positioned by the mid-1980s to accelerate its global expansion. 
Orix competed against standard international real estate advisory services based on three 
factors: local responsiveness; cultivated expertise; and, ready access to investment
capital. As discussed in Chapter 2, the rapid increase in Japanese direct investment 
abroad beginning in 1985 stemmed from liberalization of monetary policy, strong yen 
appreciation, declining returns from interest-bearing funds domestically, and a rising 
stock market.457 Moreover, while the barriers to capital investment in Japan real estate 
remained high, due to a scarcity of overvalued property, the market in western Europe 
and the U.S., particularly, were active and undervalued, especially in light of favorable 
yen-dollar exchange rates. In the U.K. and Germany, furthermore, the liberalized
456 Orix annual report, 1990, p. 3.
457 Chapter 2, pp. 51-53.
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Euromarket permitted syndicated loan products and asset-backed investment banking by
both ^ brokerage houses and financial institutions. Orix perceived unlimited market
opportunities in real estate services, capitalizing on the reputation and client base of the
company’s international financing and securities subsidiaries. Orix thus shifted its
*
corporate strategy to focus on real estate finance, which deliberately advanced the 
globalization strategy of the controlling city banks.
Japan Real Estate Services
In 1985 Orix established a Japanese real estate services group and an international 
group. The latter principally focused on U.S. and European markets. The Japan 
division engaged in real estate financial services—residential loans, mortgage-backed 
securities, and international investment loan—and in housing and resorts development for 
existing corporate clients—such as computer service firms, and insurance and securities 
brokerage houses.
Having no direct experience in resort development yet perceiving a lucrative 
market, Orix acquired a 94 percent equity interest in Osaka-based Ichioka Corporation, 
a publicly traded property management and leisure facilities management company. By 
1990 Orix had developed a mountain ski resort, Co-Members Resort Club RES Orix, for 
which the company sold and financed time-share memberships to Japanese corporations 
for their employee-benefits programs.458 In addition, Orix built and leased more than 
50 singles dormitories in the Tokyo metropolitan area near factories of expanding 
industries.
458 Orix Corporation, corporate history brochure (1990), p. 35.
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The real estate group’s largest source of revenue, and the activity that experienced 
the greatest expansion in Orix’s domestic financial services, was international lending, 
particularly syndicated financing for foreign construction projects. Real estate investment 
financings were completed for clients worldwide as well as the company’s own account, 
which further enabled Orix to diversify revenue sources (Table 28). The largest project 
of this kind was a 30,700-acre joint venture development in Waikoloa, Hawaii, in 
partnership with the Bass Brothers of Houston, Texas. Orix invested 27 percent of the 
equity in the beachfront resort, as well as securing debt and equity funding from 
Japanese investors for the project’s long-term build-out.459
Orix’s profitable expansion into real estate services in Japan stemmed directly 
from the parent company’s competitive strength in innovative financial products and 
broad-based access to low-cost investment capital.460 This access became particularly 
important to the Japan real estate group in 1990, as well as the financial services 
division, when the Bank of Japan raised the nation’s official discount rate. Orix, to 
sustain its competitive performance, readjusted its funding strategies to obtain lower-cost 
funds and increase its reserves against interest-rate fluctuations--in essence, managing 
market and corporate mechanisms in such a way as to maintain the efficiency of 
transaction costs, internally and with clients.461
459 Ibid, pp. 34-5; and, Orix annual report, 1990, pp. 12-3.
460 Orix Corporation, corporate history brochure (1990), p. 35.
461 Orix annual report, 1990, pp. 6-8.
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TABLE 28
S o u r c e s  o f  R e v e n u e ,  1960-1990 
O r i x  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  J a p a n
Services 1960 1970 1980 1990
45%
Financial services 
Residential loan services 
Mortgage-backed securities 
brokerage 
Development project management
20%
20%
15%
Total 0% 0% 0% 100%
a Includes only real estate and financial services divisions and subsidiaries.
Sources: Public corporate statements and reports; author’s interviews with Orix executives.
U.S. Real Estate Services
The U.S. real estate services group also grew out of Orix’s asset-based financing 
activities and first commenced in 1974 when Orix opened an office in New York City. 
By the mid-1980s, with Japanese direct investment in U.S. real estate growing by up to 
50 percent annually, Orix’s president in Tokyo decided that local market knowledge and 
an established U.S. presence were essential to expand the company’s property investment 
services. He also sought to expand real estate services into development project 
management and institutional fund management, believing that the appreciation in U.S. 
property values would provide an additional source of revenue growth for the general 
company.462
Toward this end, Orix’s Board and International Real Estate Department 
commissioned New York-based investment banking firm Kidder Peabody to identify 
potential acquisition or merger candidates—domestic real estate advisory service firms 
with consistent performance in development, acquisitions, and asset management. Kidder
462 Orix annual report, 1990, pp. 10-12; and, Orix Corporation, ‘The Period Under Review’, Orix 
Update (Winter 1990), no. 2, unpaginated.
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Peabody identified one firm, Rubloff, Inc., founded in Chicago in 1930.463 In 1987 
Orix purchased 23.3 percent of Rubloff s holding company, which also included property 
management, commercial brokerage, and consulting services (Figure 12). In 1990, 
because Orix was strategically committed to only long-term capital investments, the 
Tokyo-based company forced a split in Rubloff s holding company by acquiring a 
70 percent equity interest in the acquisitions, development, and asset management 
operations; the other operating groups were reorganized under separate management.464
Alliances
NONE
Mergers/Acquisitions/Joint Ventures a
•  Ichioka Corporation (94% equity interest), Osaka, 1986
•  Rubloff Real Estate and Capital, Inc. (70% equity interest),
U.S., 1987, 1990
a Includes only real estate and financial services divisions and subsidiaries.
Source: Public corporate statements and annual reports; author’s interviews
with Orix executives.
Figure 12. Strategic alliances and acquisitions by Orix Corporation of Japan.
Orix created the new entity, Orix Real Estate Equitites Fund, to strengthen its 
global exposure (via Rubloff s U.S. clients, experience, and reputation) among private 
and institutional funding sources. For Rubloff, Orix provided direct access to Japanese
463 Confirmed in interview with author, W. Kullman, Orix Real Estate Equities, Chicago, July 1991.
464 C. Bloomfield, ‘Rubloff Property Gems Define Sinclair, Orix Mission’, Commercial Property 
News. 16 February 1991, p. 1; and, interview with author, M. O’Kelly, Rubloff, 21 June 1991.
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capital seeking to invest in U.S. real estate as well as financial expertise in asset-backed 
loan syndications. The Orix-Rubloff merger thus combined two companies of diverse, 
but complementary services. Orix acquired Rubloffs expertise in U.S. property 
markets, as much as it did the real estate advisory service firm’s existing client 
relationships and development projects. After four years, by 1991, Orix Real Estate 
Equities employed 63 professionals in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
and Washington, D.C.465
European Real Estate Services
The European real estate services group evolved in much the same way as Orix’s 
U.S. division, expanding directly out of asset-based lending, corporate finance, and 
equipment leasing. Orix opened its first European office in London in 1974. Within the 
decade, the Board founded a London-based subsidiary, Orix Europe Limited (1982), to 
coordinate operations across the continent. By the mid-1980s and continuing through 
1990, the subsidiary acted as a principal for investor clients in Japan, arranging debt and 
equity fund placements in German and U.K. real estate markets. In 1989 the company 
broadened its presence in European financial markets by forming an investment banking 
subsidiary, Orix Corporate Finance Limited, which moved into the deregulated 
Euromarket and arranged cross-border syndicates on behalf of European clients. In 
1990-91, for example, the London group arranged syndicated financing through the sale 
of investment instruments to Japanese investors for the $132 million renovation of 
Romney House, a prestigious historic building in central London.466 These two
465 Correspondence, J.S. Nagashima, Orix Corporation, 3 July 1991; and, James Nathan, ‘Ensuring 
More Bang For the Investment Buck’, Real Estate Forum (April 1992), pp. 58-9.
466 Orix annual report, 1991, pp. 18-20.
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financial subsidiaries, similar to their counterparts in other Japanese corporations, also 
played an important role in securing financing and managing investment funds for the 
parent company.467
In summary, Orix advanced a strategy of global expansion throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s that followed in the path of expanding world financial markets and capital 
investors by consistently diversifying financial services and financial products for a 
growing range of real estate clients, institutional clients, corporate clients, and its own 
account.468
6 .6  C o n c l u s io n s
Each of these four firms grew out of different cultures and different market 
conditions, and each approached internationalization independently of one another. How 
did these four real estate advisory service firms respond to rising cross-border investment 
activity between 1960 and 1990, and what factors were most influential in defining each 
firm’s prospects as they expanded into diversified, multiregional companies? From this 
discussion, several conclusions may be drawn regarding effective and efficient 
internationalization of real estate advisory service firms between 1960 and 1990.
National Factors: Cross-Border Investment Activity and Skilled Labor
The rising volume of cross-border investment activity in the world’s largest real 
estate markets appeared to be an important external macroeconomic factor in effective 
internationalization, affording each of these real estate advisory service firms a national
467 M. Eli, Japan. Inc. (1991) p. 76.
468 Orix Corporation, ORIX Update (Winter 1990), no. 2, unpaginated.
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client base to cultivate diversified and innovative services and to support expansion into 
foreign markets.
The availability of skilled labor was another important factor in the expansion of 
real estate services in each of these four firms. Even though an abundance of low-cost 
investment capital became a primary factor in the global competition among nations and 
firms during the finance-driven market of the 1980s, as S.B. Sagari documented for the 
financial services industry overall, an abundance of capital did not constitute a long-term 
factor advantage for international competitiveness.469 As discussed in Chapter 3, over 
the long-term, the U .K.’s and JLW’s sustained commitment to the education and 
professional standards of chartered surveyors, and Cushman & Wakefield’s investment 
in and retention of trained professionals was believed to have greater long-term value in 
the national and international competition among real estate advisory firms than did an 
abundance of investment capital.
Multinational Clients
Another external market factor was each firm’s ability to secure and retain 
multinational and foreign clients. None of the four companies agreed to reveal 
proprietary corporate records on specific clients and associated fee revenues, yet 
interviews with senior managers in each firm indicated the majority of clients that 
prompted or facilitated international expansion was either a property-intensive enterprise 
(such as a manufacturing firm) or a large, diversified investment fund (such as an
469 S. B. Sagari, ‘The Financial Services Industry: An International Perspective’, (Ph.D. diss., New 
York University, 1986), pp. 67-8.
277
institutional portfolio, pension fund, or bank).470 Guided by the cross-border 
investment activities of such clients, real estate advisory service firms entered property 
markets worldwide where real estate investment returns exceeded marginal profitability 
expectations in alternative markets.
Davis and Smales similarly observed from their research on the 
internationalization of accounting, law, and public relations firms that service firms could 
internationalize expediently and economically by following multinational clients into 
foreign markets. Minimal differences between nations in the practice of certain 
professional services only facilitated internationalization.471 The case studies indicated 
that those real estate advisory service firms that claimed sufficient business volume 
through multinational clients and access to foreign investment capital were able to sustain 
an extensive international network of offices and diversified services.472 Differences 
in real estate service practices among the focal countries were indeed evident, yet acted 
as a real barrier to entry only in Japan.
Service Diversification
The international expansion strategy formulated by each firm exploited the 
company’s reputation in the domestic market to establish a position in foreign markets. 
Each firm sought multinational status (1) through ongoing investment in diversified 
services, and (2) through engagements with clients and alliances with potential foreign
470 Industry publications; confirmed by author in executive interviews, Cushman & Wakefield; Jones 
Lang Wootton; Mueller; and Orix, 1991.
471 E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The Internationalization of Professional Services’, pp. 5-7.
472 A.D. Chandler, Jr. observed a similar condition among the American industrial enterprises he 
reviewed in Strategy and Structure, p. 32.
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competitors. The most significant innovations in real estate advisory services occurred 
in the 1970s and 1980s, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. Yet while service 
diversification was an important factor in successful internationalization, these four case 
studies indicated that service diversification and geographic expansion were not always 
mutually dependent strategies, nor was one strategy the stimulus for the other. Service 
diversification became the basis for the geographic expansion of Cushman & Wakefield 
and Mueller, both in their domestic markets and abroad, and geographic diversification 
inspired service innovations by Jones Lang Wootton and Orix~as each firm responded 
to the demands of a broadening array of clients worldwide.
Each of these real estate service firms initially grew by capitalizing on economies 
of scale that drew upon existing core services. The firms then achieved economies of 
scope by extending the range of core services and investing in new techniques and new 
professional capabilities. As Chandler argued, "the most common stimulus to 
diversification was the potential for economies of scope" in existing functional units.473 
For Cushman & Wakefield and Mueller, brokerage and property management services 
spawned financial services, development management services, and fund management 
services. For Jones Lang Wootton, investment brokerage and financial services grew 
into fund management services. And for Orix, real estate services grew out of asset- 
backed financing for equipment leases.
The three firms whose core real estate advisory practice was the foundation for 
growth were better positioned to diversify into new advisory services economically 
through internal expansion, rather than vertical consolidation. By extending their 
mainline businesses, they incurred lower capital costs to acquire new professional skills
47j A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scone, p. 41, 15.
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rather than having to diversify via marketplace mechanisms by acquiring or consolidating 
witlran existing business. Only Orix, which operated primarily as an independent leasing 
enterprise, diversified through classic vertical integration, by acquiring Ichioka and 
Rubloff.474
*
The fundamental weakness of the Rubloff partnership was not its intent. Instead, 
Rubloff had experienced a long period of contraction during the 1980s,475 which gave 
Orix significant leverage in absorbing the Rubloff name and management control. Yet 
because Orix’s administrative hierarchy had evolved out of the company’s original focus 
on leasing, the previously fluid integration between equipment leasing and financial 
services became dysfunctional when the structure was extended to include a different 
service discipline and an outside firm in a foreign market. The shift into real estate 
services, moreover, was not reflected in a significantly revised structure. Neither the 
international real estate division nor the newly created Orix Real Estate Equities 
subsidiary (Rubloff) acquired economies of scale and scope from the international 
conglomerate. Real estate advisory services were compartmentalized, which was 
believed to inhibit innovation or diversification and respond to market shifts. Because 
real estate services grew out of financial services and depended on financially-driven 
investments, the real estate services grouped was apparently handicapped when Japanese 
capital markets contracted in 1990. The growth of Orix, as well as other real estate 
advisory firms founded principally on access to low-cost funds, rather than expertise in
474 A.D. Chandler, Jr. observed that acquisition, or consolidation, was the most common approach to 
the formation of a vertically integrated enterprise among American industrial firms, in Strategy 
and Structure (1962), p. 29.
475 C. Bloomfield, ‘Rubloff Property Gems Define Sinclair, Orix Mission’, Commercial Property 
News. 16 February 1991, p. 34.
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local markets and clients, was restricted by a limited scope of specialized services and 
higher costs of future service diversification.
Geographic Expansion
These real estate advisory firms expanded into foreign markets to assure and 
broaden access to multinational investors, developers, and corporations, and to low-cost 
investment funds for both domestic and foreign operations. Each firm elected a different 
strategy. Cushman & Wakefield chose a non-equity vertical alliance to enter the 
European market. Seeking to diversify the firm’s business abroad without placing its 
own capital at risk, Cushman allied its practice and reputation with Healey & Baker’s 
in Europe. Yet Healey & Baker’s retail services practice effectively compromised 
Cushman & Wakefield’s international agenda and diffused the U.S. firm’s strong 
commercial reputation. Such a lower-cost foreign expansion was actually encumbered 
by diseconomies of scale. And neither firm’s domestic reputation provided a competitive 
advantage for the foreign affiliate and the alliance was largely unproductive.476
The obverse of this theory would be that "a firm with little reputation in a 
geographical market other than its own," such as Mueller in Germany, would benefit 
from the established practice and reputation of a firm in a foreign market.477 Mueller 
lacked even a widespread national reputation and understandably chose this lower-cost 
strategy. Mueller had previously expanded into markets in Germany and Europe through 
business opportunities with existing clients. Yet it chose to enter an alliance with the 
international coalition of Oncor to gain a broader presence among global investors
476 E. Davis, G. Hanlon, and J. Kay, ‘Internationalization in Accounting and Other Professional 
Services’, pp. 9, 11.
477 Ibid, p. 12.
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entering Germany. Mueller’s alliance with Oncor, however, combined two enterprises
that lacked an established multinational clientele and a sound reputation in either national
or international markets. Real estate advisory firms which had superior credentials and
broader reputations superseded Oncor’s position in the strong 1980s market. Oncor’s
*
scattered market presence was not improved in the 1990-91 restructuring, also concurrent 
with a declining economy and cross-border investment activity. Potential multinational 
clients appeared even less likely to be attracted to the Mueller-Oncor alliance in a 
recessionary investment climate than in a strong market.
The international expansion of U.K.-based Jones Lang Wootton represented the 
most effective and resilient growth strategy, though one with the highest level of 
potential risk and capital costs. JLW’s global expansion over a 30-year period aligned 
with the capacities of management and corporate capital. The notable exception was its 
acquisition of Balay Prenot in the Rhone-Alpes region of France. Beyond this one 
merger, the London-based firm entered foreign markets by following clients and 
investing capital reserves. JLW’s successful globalization provided evidence of ’’first 
mover" advantages for real estate advisory firms which preempted competitors in 
building a global office network to secure multinational clients and international funding 
sources.478 By staffing each new office with internally trained personnel, JLW 
effectively standardized services and exploited economies of scale.479
During the period from 1960 and until the late 1980s, JLW’s international 
expansion reinforced Penrose’s theory that the rate of a firm’s growth was limited by 
managerial capacity and the increasing costs of capital in moving into new markets and
478 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure, p. 34.
479 Ibid, p. 31.
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new services.480 JLW’s incremental globalization over a 30-year period was too costly 
for competitors to match in a span of one or two years once cross-border investment rose 
appreciably. Beyond sheer economic power, such other factors as administrative 
coordination, human resources, and a complex multiregional and multifunctional 
management hierarchy, reflecting what Penrose called the "progressive subdivision of 
functions and decentralization of operations", could not be replicated in a short 
period.481
The question then arose: was the size and geographic dispersion of a real estate 
advisory service firm limited? In contrast to Penrose’s theory, Stigler in The 
Organization of Industry argued that the theoretical assumption that a firm would not 
grow or diversify beyond a certain point generated a useless debate. If diseconomies of 
scale set in, Stigler observed, if the network of linkages became too complex and costly, 
the firm would contract.482 Chandler’s theory offered a bridge between the competing 
arguments set forth by Penrose and Stigler, concluding that the accretion of authority by 
managerial hierarchies was a key force of change. For a growing enterprise to continue 
to diversify and expand, Chandler argued, the corporate structure must economically 
internalize transaction costs, smooth the flow among and between service functions and 
widely dispersed regions, and consistently diversify products to meet the demands of the
480 E.T. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 
1959), pp. 88-103.
481 Ibid, pp. 24-5, 55-8.
482 G. J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 99.
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market.483 JLW’s evolutionary expansion and responsive management structure 
reaffirmed Chandler’s thesis.
However, Chandler emphasized—as did Coase and Williamson—that the primary 
goal of a firm’s growth was to economize transaction costs and increase profitability, 
internally and throughout the marketplace. Beyond 1990, declining growth rates for 
skilled labor, investment capital, cross-border investment activity, and multinational 
businesses may well limit the ability of firms such as Jones Lang Wootton to risk its own 
capital in expanding into new markets by internal combination or acquisition. Instead, 
for these and other real estate advisory service firms, lower-cost strategies such as 
alliances and coalitions will likely prevail.484
Ownership and Management Structure
International expansion by the four firms prompted changes and adjustments in 
corporate structure. The central issue for these real estate advisory service firms was: 
what was the most effective multiregional and multidivisional structure to support 
efficient and economical management of the firm? A complementary issue was: what 
influence did a firm’s ownership and capitalization structure have on the rate and scope 
of expansion into foreign markets?
48j A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure (1962); A.D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand. 
(1977); A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scone (1990); B. Supple, ‘Scale and Scope: Alfred 
Chandler and the dynamics of industrial capitalism’, Economic History Review XLIV no. 3 
(August 1991), p. 504.
484 Collaborations between two firms involve increased administrative complexity and higher risk 
regarding coordination, personnel, corporate philosophies, and expansion strategies. E. Davis, 
G. Hanlon, and J. Kay, ‘Internationalization of Accounting and Other Professional Services’,
(1990), p. 12.
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The cases indicated how executives of the different companies approached the 
problems of multiregional management. JLW and Mueller provided examples of rational 
and systematic management, in which coordination, appraisal and planning were high 
priorities. Cushman & Wakefield viewed management and expansion in more intuitive 
terms, until 1976-77 when the firm was restructured, seeking systematic, market-based 
solutions to administration and growth. The organizational hierarchy of Orix took a 
rational approach, building an administrative structure rather than a functional one. But 
when Orix introduced real estate services into the holding company in 1985 the 
organization lacked an integrated, functional structure, which was essential to exploit 
economies of scale. Such differences in approach accounted for differences in the way 
the four real estate service firms fared in internationalizing into different property 
market.
For Cushman & Wakefield and JLW, international expansion significantly altered 
the companies’ structures; for Orix, expansion minimally affected the integrated 
corporate structure. Market-oriented expansion policies and localized management 
structures became hallmarks of the real estate advisory services of Cushman & 
Wakefield, Jones Lang Wootton, and Mueller.485 Orix, while responsive to regional 
markets in the management of its international leasing operations and financial services, 
did not incorporate the real estate services groups in Japan and the U.S. into a 
regionalized structure.
Cushman & Wakefield developed an internalized hierarchy that centralized 
entrepreneurial decision-making at the local level for its U.S. office network.
485 A.D. Chandler, Jr. showed in his evaluation of industrial giants General Electric and
Westinghouse that the firms developed departmental structures that reflected the types of markets 
in which certain products were sold, in Scale and Scope, p. 28.
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Throughout the 1960s and continuing to the early 1980s, this employee-owned company- 
similar to Jones Lang Wootton and Mueller—was financially equipped to act promptly 
regarding entry into new markets because of deep reserves of retained earnings. The 
firm’s domestic strategy and structure were internally capitalized and centered around 
combination, integration, and corporate reputation. For its international expansion in the 
1990s, Cushman & Wakefield instead chose a peer group coalition with Healey & Baker, 
to use Williamson’s term.486 In addition, it sold 41 percent of the company’s privately- 
held stock to Mitsubishi (via The Rockefeller Group) in 1990 to finance both domestic 
and foreign operations and growth. Similarly, Mueller elected a peer group coalition in 
1985 with Oncor, a broadly dispersed and independently managed association. This 
stands in marked contrast to the firm’s previous expansion into domestic and foreign 
markets through internal expansion. Moreover, Mueller sold 20 percent of its stock to 
equity partner Commerzbank in 1990, to capitalize the firm’s continued expansion into 
newly opened German markets—Berlin, Hannover, Leipzig, and Essen.
Timing was an important element in the expansion strategies and resulting 
structures that both Cushman & Wakefield and Mueller chose for broadening their 
national and international operations. During the 1970s and early 1980s, growing 
domestic real estate markets and cross-border direct investment activity in the U.S. and 
Germany enabled these real estate advisory service firms to fund geographic expansion 
with excess earnings. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, when financial and 
real estate markets domestically and abroad were beginning to contract and becoming 
increasingly competitive, each firm chose an alliance to expand abroad rather than an 
acquisition that would require investing the firm’s own capital. And each chose in 1990
486 O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, pp. xi, 52-5.
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to sell a portion of the company’s stock to a major financial partner, thereby diluting 
management control yet infusing fresh capital for ongoing expansion and diversification— 
Cushman & Wakefield selling to Mitsubishi and Mueller to Commerzbank.
Retained corporate earnings and external equity infusions—or public stock 
issuances in Orix’s case—played a critical role in the rate and scope of international 
expansion by these real estate advisory firms. Real estate advisory firms, similar to 
professional service firms generally, were able only to gauge projected fees in foreign 
markets. In an expansive economic climate, these firms were willing and able to risk 
their own capital to enter foreign markets. During flat or declining periods, they instead 
required outside equity and/or a lower-cost alliance to pursue geographic expansion.
Jones Lang Wootton undertook incremental global expansion and developed a 
multiregional structure over a 30-year period, which represented the most economical 
and effective approach for real estate advisory service firms. Because of unavoidable 
inefficiencies across borders, JLW’s evolving corporate structure agreed with Chandler’s 
bias that uniform administrative coordination within the international enterprise 
"permitted greater productivity, lower costs, and higher profits than coordination by 
market mechanisms."487 Jones Lang Wootton demonstrated the greatest capability, and 
foresight, in planning and structuring an internationalized network of offices.488
487 A.D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand, p. 6.
488 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope, pp. 262-62.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS
7 .1  In tr o d u c t io n
This examination of the international growth and diversification of real estate 
advisory services in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan 
between 1960 and 1990 highlighted, among other matters, the complexity of the subject-- 
which encompassed four countries, several interdisciplinary themes, and at least 
40 professional service companies. These multiple factors necessitated that each chapter 
evaluate a specific area of the principal hypotheses. The primary hypothesis was that the 
internationalization of real estate advisory services was most efficiently and effectively 
achieved by firms that built solid reputations and multiregional organizations in their 
home nations. The secondary hypothesis was that rising cross-border investment levels 
supported the growth of real estate advisory services through the foreign investment 
activities of existing and prospective clients. This enabled property advisory firms to 
enhance their competitive standing by diversifying into new services and foreign markets 
and foreign clients. It can be concluded that real estate advisory firms did achieve 
competitive advantage by developing an international service network and a diversified 
services practice, a practice that was tailored to each local market.
7 .2  R isin g  Cr o ss-B o rder  Re a l  E state  In v estm en t  and  G r o w t h  in  Re a l
E sta te  E m plo ym ent
The globalization of the real estate industry was driven by rising levels of inward 
and outward foreign real estate investment, particularly when it reached unprecedented 
levels in the late 1970s and 1980s. Until the mid-1970s cross-border property investment
288
remained a small segment of each focal country’s economy, with inward real estate 
investment stocks for all four focal countries, totalling only 0.8 percent of the world 
stock of inward direct investment in 1975.489 The gradual liberalization of capital 
controls in the 1970s and early 1980s set the stage for an unprecedented increase in 
cross-border direct investment, as Chapters 2 and 3 conclude, including investment in 
real estate.490 Among the most significant events was the abolition of the Bretton Woods 
standard and the advent of the floating exchange rate system in 1973 and the need to 
facilitate the recycling of dollar surpluses generated from OPEC oil price increases 
during the early 1970s.
During the 1960s and first half of the 1970s, the U.K. and Germany stood as the 
largest investing countries. The U.S. gained prominence in the international arena when 
in 1980 it hosted the largest amount of inward direct investment in real estate, a position 
it sustained through the 1980s. The national government’s open investment policy and 
diverse investment opportunities in several regional markets around the country 
contributed to this premier standing. German, British and other European investors 
accounted for the majority of U.S. real estate investment during the early 1980s, while 
Japanese direct investment dominated after 1985. German outward real estate investment 
rose to unprecedented levels in 1986, 1987 and 1989, which prompted previously 
provincial German property advisors to expand to a national and international scope. 
U.K. outward investment in real estate increased much less in the 1980s than that of 
either Germany or Japan.
489 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, International Direct 
Investment: Global Trends and the U.S. Role. 1988 edition, p. 91. The world stock of inward 
direct investment is estimated at $208 billion in 1973.
490 There is virtually no research on the relationship between the growth in total foreign direct 
investment between 1960 and 1990 and the liberalization of capital controls by the focal countries.
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The four-nation historical profile in Chapter 4 suggested that the growth and 
maturation of real estate services was stimulated by consistent growth of the domestic 
economy. Confirming Casson’s theory that a nation’s business culture and economic 
history were a source of long-term competitive advantage, this thesis concluded that 
demand for real estate services in home markets influenced the competitive strength (or 
weakness) of each firm in the global market—by either providing or limiting opportunities 
to develop superior capabilities in diversified services, and gain exposure to a broad 
range of clients.491 The research also indicated that real estate advisory services in the 
U.K. and U.S. were superior to Japan and Germany because of the U .K .’s long history 
of outward expansion, especially on the continent and in the former British colonies of 
Australia, Canada, and the Asian region, and because of significant inward investment 
in U.S. real estate. Japan and Germany, by contrast, were characterized by more a 
fragmented history of domestic markets and foreign property investment.
In addition, the collective profile of 40 real estate advisory firms presented in 
Chapter 4 revealed that 92.5 percent of firms surveyed increased in size over the 30-year 
period (measured by the number of personnel employed), and 85.0 percent expanded the 
operating business into foreign countries. The experience of these 40 firms indicated that 
foreign expansion and absolute growth defined the evolution of firms within this 
professional services sector, 1960-1990. Firms principally internationalized to respond 
to the demands of multinational clients, confirming Davis and Smales’ basic premise that 
professional service firms internationalized largely through multinational clients and
491 M. Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness (1990), p. 88; M. Casson, editor, also addresses this 
argument in the introduction to Global Research Strategy and International Competitiveness
(1991), p. 11.
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enabled by minimal differences in service practices across national borders.492 
Reinforcing the findings of a recent study of London’s City Research Project, a real 
estate advisory firm’s reputation and home-base location in an international market 
capital, such as London or New York or Tokyo, made an important contribution to the 
firm’s international growth. Competitive advantage stemmed most of all from knowledge 
and reputation in local markets and a firm’s reputation and technical capabilities among 
major national and international clients. Firms were retained for objective counsel- 
avoiding conflicts of interest by independent advice and sometimes disagreeable 
conclusions—and secured their good reputations by providing clients with critical 
guilance.
Because the growth of international property services was closely related to the 
growth of cross-border direct investment and international finance, the firms having solid 
reputations in international financial centers had a competitive advantage in attracting 
international business in their home "international" market or abroad in foreign 
markets.493 It is no coincidence that the premier real estate advisory service firms in 
cross-border investment were headquartered with strong reputations in the international 
market centers of New York City or Los Angeles in the U.S., London in the U.K., 
Tokyo in Japan, and Frankfurt or Munich in Germany.
492 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope (1990), p. 41; E. Davis and C. Smales, ‘The 
Internationalization of Professional Services’ (Apr. 1989), p. 5.
49j In this way, real estate advisory service firms were similar, in part, to London law firms (which 
had national and foreign financial clients with international business) and accountancy firms 
(which followed corporate multinational into foreign markets). See R. Cohen, J. Kay, C. 
Murroni, A. Pototosching, S. Trussler, ‘The Competitive Advantage of Law and Accountancy in 
the City of London’, The City Research Project (London, London Business School, 1994).
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7.3 S k illed  P erso nn el  and  M a rk et  Kn o w led g e
It can be further concluded that the availability of skilled labor within each focal 
country constituted a primary factor in the growth of real estate services in the focal 
countries. The case studies in Chapters 4 and 6 confirmed Sagari’s argument that an 
educated workforce appeared to be an important long-term'factor advantage in the 
financial services profession.494 This was particularly evident among U.K. firms: the 
British system was unmatched in its commitment to high educational standards for 
property professionals and the regulation of professional competence through the Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors. U.S. firms had no centralized regulatory body to 
monitor professional standards and educational guidelines, yet the leading firms (defined 
by reputation and size) consistently invested corporate capital in recruiting and retaining 
well-educated professionals from quality colleges and universities.
Firm allegiance by senior managers, moreover, played an influential role in 
effective international expansion. Most leading real estate advisory firms from the U .K., 
U.S., Germany, and Japan transferred senior staff abroad to sustain corporate loyalty and 
internal coordination across widely dispersed regions. The key strengths of real estate 
advisory firms were, first, local market knowledge, and second, the firm’s singular and 
collective presence in any given market, or reputation. Both of these attributes depended 
on the quality of the firm’s professionals. Thus, while the author believes that Davis, 
Hanlon & Kay overrated the value of reputation in the competition among service firms, 
this thesis agrees with Kay’s later work in The Foundation of Corporate Success (1993)
494 S. B. Sagari, ‘The Financial Services Industry: An International Perspective’, (Ph.D. diss., New 
York University, 1986), pp. 67-8.
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that "reputation is the most important commercial mechanism for conveying information
to consumers. But reputation is not equally important in all markets."495
Reputation was often key to a real estate advisory firm establishing its value with
clients, at home and abroad: investors sought to retain property advisors with strong
%
credentials and known expertise in a particular market or technical service. Kay argued 
that reputation was such a powerful source of competitive advantage to directly affect the 
market pricing of a firm’s services as well as the firm’s market dominance.496 The 40- 
firm profile and four case studies confirmed that perceived and actual ‘value creation’ 
for clients’ property investments were crucial to each firm’s growth and profitability. 
Moreover, the size of a firm’s staff and annual revenues were a less meaningful measure 
of the firm’s reputation than were the quality of its senior professionals and major 
clients—a direct result of the firm’s service breadth and knowledge of diverse local 
markets. The case of Jones Lang Wootton reinforced the notion that pricing of real 
estate services was directly correlated with reputation: JLW remained the premier
international real estate advisory firm and commanded the highest billing rates of all 
firms surveyed.
7.4 N a tio n al  Tr ad e  P olicies and  P ractices and  In ter n a tio n a l  R ea l  
E state  Services
Each country’s tax structure and cross-border trade regulations influenced 
domestic real estate practices and market standards, and defined the competitive 
environment for international real estate advisory services. In addition, national foreign
495 Author’s italics added. E. Davis, G. Hanlon and J. Kay, ‘Internationalization in Accounting and 
Other Professional Services’ (April 1990), pp. 9-10; J. Kay, Foundations of Corporate Success 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 87 and 88-93.
496 J. Kay, Foundations of Corporate Success, pp. 87-89.
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trade policies and domestic investors’ orientation to foreign markets influenced the 
internationalization of that country’s real estate advisors.497 The U.S. established a 
favorable tax and market system, as well as a liberal trade and investment environment. 
Since the mid-1970s foreign advisors representing foreign investors were unhindered in 
the openly competitive U.S. environment, with U.S. policies and business practices 
remaining the most liberal among the focal countries.498 By comparison, U.K. real 
estate advisors prevailed in U.K. and Continental markets, having decades before set the 
standards and unofficial conditions by which all advisors operated. While liberal 
regulatory standards prevailed in the U.K., the small domestic market ultimately limited 
competitive opportunities for foreign real estate advisory firms.
Japan’s and Germany’s restrictive domestic regulations bolstered the economic 
interdependency of domestic investors and domestic advisors, which virtually closed 
service networks to foreign property advisors. In Germany, after the government lifted 
regulatory restrictions on foreign investment by large German open-end funds in 1990, 
foreign property and financial advisors began to gain prominence with German investors 
in both domestic and foreign markets. Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) remained the 
omnipresent government agency that controlled the incremental liberalization of Japan’s 
outward real estate investment, and gradually opened the highly restrictive domestic 
market to foreign investors and service firms in the second half of the 1970s. When in 
1983 the MOF lifted capital export controls and the foreign exchange value of the yen 
soared, the global expansion of real estate investment and advisory services followed,
497 Again, this confirms M. Casson’s thesis that a nation’s business culture and economic history are 
"a source of long-term competitive advantage," in Enterprise and Competitiveness, p. 88.
498 The caveat to this statement is that foreign real estate advisory firms partially diminished the 
competitive advantage of U.S. firms by hiring skilled professionals away from many domestic 
firms.
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particularly 1985-1989. As of 1990, foreign investment in Japan still remained hindered 
by explicit and tacit regulations.
7.5  C o m petitio n  and  In no va tio n
Competitive pressures prompted real estate advisory firms in all focal countries 
to introduce innovative services and diversify into new practice areas. Innovations 
typically emerged when firms perceived intensified competition from new entrants or 
lower profitability from existing service divisions. The major multinational accounting 
and investment banking firms, which operated a network of offices worldwide and which 
engaged in allied real estate disciplines, constituted the most formidable competition to 
real estate advisory firms.
An important factor affecting the innovation process and service diversification 
was the unstructured and ever-changing client market-ranging from individual investors 
to multinational corporations, commercial and merchant banks to building societies in the 
U.K. and savings and loan associations in the U.S., insurance and pension funds, 
universities and local governments, securitized investment and unit trusts, and 
international developers and construction firms. Service diversification enabled real 
estate advisors to broaden the range of potential client types, and supplemented periodic 
weaknesses in specific market segments. The degree to which cross-border real estate 
investment influenced the innovation process and service diversification can be inferred 
from the growth of foreign (versus domestic) personnel and fee revenues, based on a 
simple analysis of the 40 firms in Chapter 4. Revenues derived from foreign sources 
constituted a disproportionate amount of revenue growth over the 30-year period, 
increasing from negligible levels in 1960 to an average of 27 percent of total revenues
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among U.S. firms in 1990, 44 percent for U.K. firms, 17 percent for German firms, and 
5 percent among Japanese firms.
The experience of these 40 firms and the case studies in Chapter 6 indicated that 
functional service innovations and technical innovations became essential factors in 
attracting and retaining domestic and foreign investors through volatile investment 
cycles,499 and appeared to advance the internationalization of real estate advisory 
services throughout the 30-year period. During periods of significant changes in 
inward/outward stocks and flows, and/or volatility in the national economy, real estate 
service firms had more incentive to introduce innovative services and techniques.500 
Exceptionally active cross-border markets—the U.K. in the 1960s (outward investment), 
Germany in the 1970s (outward investment), and the U.S. and Japan in the 1980s 
(inward and outward investment, respectively)—stimulated a higher degree of innovative 
technologies during these periods.
7.6 C lient  D em an d  and  F o r eig n  E x pa nsio n
Geographic expansion, rather than service diversification, appeared to have a 
greater impact on employment growth in real estate services and the number of offices 
operated by property service firms. Foreign expansion was supported by domestic 
clients moving into foreign markets, as well as by the increase in foreign property 
investment and by the maturation of commercial real estate markets in the focal 
countries. Competition also became an important factor in the internationalization of real
499 A. Baum and A. Schofield, ‘Property as a Global Asset’, Working Papers in European Property, 
Centre for European Property Research, University of Reading, March 1991, p. 67.
500 This agrees with A.D. Chandler, Jr.’s findings in Scale and Scope, that manufacturing firms were 
highly sensitive to limitations of the nation’s economy; for example, U.K. firms expanded abroad 
due to the country’s small land area and limited investment potential, pp. 249-50.
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estate advisory firms, especially after 1985 when international investment banks expanded
and strengthened their real estate and property finance services in foreign markets.
The Chapter 6 case studies indicated that only those real estate service firms that
claimed sufficient business volume through multinational clients and access to cross-
*
border capital were able to sustain an extensive international network of offices.501 
The majority of clients that prompted international expansion were either property- 
intensive enterprises (such as manufacturing, trading, and warehousing companies) or 
large, diversified investment funds (such as pension and insurance funds). A firm’s 
experience in foreign markets and with the logistics of international expansion appeared 
to play an important role in real estate services. This confirmed Davis and Smales’ 
argument that service firms which successfully imported ’creative services’ into new 
markets acquired competitive advantage in international expansion.502
Japanese advisory firms were born into international enterprises, and foreign 
expansion typically occurred within a decade of the firm’s founding between the mid- 
1920s and mid-1950s. These firms were vertically integrated within multinational group 
companies and international expansion did not necessarily require a foreign 
establishment. Japanese real estate advisors accelerated their overseas expansions in the 
late 1980s—by counseling Japanese investors in landmark acquisitions and by acquiring 
partnership interests in U.S. investment banks and real estate service firms.
U.K. firms, by contrast, internationalized to a greater number of foreign markets 
than did firms in any other focal country. They established offices abroad between 1958
501 A.D. Chandler, Jr. observed a similar condition among the American industrial enterprises he 
reviewed in Strategy and Structure, p. 32.
502 E. Davis and C. Smales, op.cit.. p. 10. Jones Lang Wootton was the best example among 
international real estate advisors: the firm had unmatched experience in acquiring and transporting 
innovative services into a diverse and multiple array of foreign markets.
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and 1968, concurrent with a significant rise in outward direct real estate investment by 
U.K>sponsors. Foreign expansion exceeded domestic growth during the 1960-1990 
period, and U.K. estate agents secured a competitive advantage early on by cultivating 
local expertise and client relationships in diverse foreign markets. They were well- 
positioned on the Continent to assist U.S. multinationals entering European markets, the 
exception being Germany, where they (as other foreign advisors) had limited 
opportunities to penetrate German markets until 1988-1989.
Germany’s fragmented property markets until the early 1980s hindered the service 
capabilities and the professional sophistication of domestic property firms. German 
property advisors began to internationalize in the late 1970s by affiliating with a foreign 
firm or joining a global network association. Yet even while Germany led the other 
focal countries in outward direct investment during the 1980-1987 period, most German 
real estate advisory firms lacked international practices and on average entered only two 
foreign markets over the 1960-1990 period.
U.S. firms internationalized between 1975 and 1990 in response to increased 
multinational activity by domestic clients and the liberalization of globalized financial 
markets. Competition from U.S. investment banks active in Euromarket activities and 
the London market may have been the principal factor in prompting U.S. real estate 
advisory firms to move abroad in the late 1980s. Having invested substantially in U.S. 
markets, they were less adept at shaping a multinational structure and adapting to foreign 
practices.
After 1985, real estate advisory firms in all focal countries entered foreign 
financial capitals (by opening new offices and/or through correspondent relationships) to 
counteract direct competition from investment and merchant banks in corporate real
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estate services. Most major property service firms concurrently diversified into 
innovative financial services. U.K. chartered surveyors faced new competition from 
investment banks and the Big Six accounting firms. While U.K. property advisors 
gained prominence among financial institutions during the 1973-75 property crash, in the 
1980s clients demanded access to international capital sources. U.K. and German 
chartered surveyors alike were challenged in the 1986-1990 period to redefine financial 
services generally to encompass transactional representation. Japanese real estate 
advisory firms, too, expanded their presence in foreign property and financial markets 
to capitalize on their affiliations with Japanese financial institutions.
7 .7  E x pa n sio n  Strateg y  and  O r g anizatio nal  S tructure
The complexity and cost of managing several offices across different regions and 
cultures constituted the greatest challenge for internationalizing real estate advisory 
service firms. In addition, cumulative service diversification necessitated an increasingly 
more complex structure of multiple divisions, regardless whether new services were 
added or developed through staff recruitment, innovation and technical training, merger 
and acquisition, or affiliation. Yet few firms could operate on a large enough scale to 
support a fully integrated operation in every domestic and foreign market. The research 
findings confirmed Coase’s theory that the main activity of a firm was coordinating 
business relationships, arguing that the most successful expansions were tied to 
management of a firm’s move into a new market and the amount of capital placed at 
risk.503 This thesis argued that the strongest competitors among foreign clients were 
companies that developed an effective network to bring locally cultivated services into
503 R.H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica N.S.. v. 4 (November 1937), p. 65.
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the international marketplace. Moreover, a real estate service firm’s business philosophy 
and organizational structure determined its ability over the long-term to capitalize on 
economic growth and to defend a diversified, international practice in the face of periodic 
economic decline, as well as to function in various cultures and government settings 
while maintaining the loyalty of staff. But while Coase emphasized superior management 
over markets and the economy,504 while this thesis contended that growth by real estate 
advisory firms depended equally on the capacity of both management and markets.
Recognizing the limits of organic growth, most firms in all focal countries 
determined it was more efficient to affiliate, contract, or merge with a third party for 
certain services in certain regions.505 U.K. property advisors tended to enter the 
majority of foreign markets through "organic" expansion. Most U.S., German and 
Japanese firms, by contrast, chose to affiliate or merge with potential competitors in 
foreign markets. Japanese firms acquired ownership interests in U.S. firms in the 1980s 
to gain access to pools of investors and to participate directly in operating property 
assets. U.S. and German firms affiliated or merged with another firm to reduce the 
firm’s perceived risk in entering alien markets. Particularly in markets where the ‘right 
of establishment’ was costly relative to projected fee revenues, incoming property 
advisors chose to operate through an established affiliate or limited partner rather than 
invest corporate capital in a satellite office.
504 ibid.
505 O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, pp. 56, 82ff; also see, L.S. Bacow, ‘Foreign 
Investment, Vertical Integration, and the Structure of the U.S. Real Estate Industry’, Working 
Paper No. 25, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Real Estate Development, 
January 1990, pp. 16-17. Counter to the varied experience of these real estate service firms, 
E. Davis and C. Smales found that U.S. accounting firms internationalized largely by merging 
with local firms worldwide, p. 5.
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The collective profile of firms also indicated that, regardless of native country, 
a firm’s earliest or previous organizational structure influenced the manner and pace in 
which the firm grew. Firms that diversified or expanded early in the 1960s or before- 
Jones Lang Wootton, Weatherall Green & Smith, Cushman & Wakefield, Mitsubishi— 
were structurally organized to disperse more efficiently into' multiple markets in the 
1970s and 1980s and incorporate new skills and functions into the mainline business.506 
For real estate advisory firms, first mover status appeared to be a factor in achieving 
competitive advantage.
Because property service firms initially grew by capitalizing on economies of 
scale that drew upon established core services and invested in new professional 
capabilities, a semi-decentralized, multidivisional structure appeared to be most effective 
in foreign expansion. Such an organization recognized the critical importance of indepth 
market knowledge at the local level and entrepreneurial initiative and innovation within 
specific divisions. They were sensitive to market and technical trends and were able to 
exploit new services globally in a prompt and efficient manner. In addition, an 
organizational structure that evolved over a longer time period enjoyed greater 
opportunities to centralize standards of quality and decentralize authority to divisions and 
regions.507 Japanese firms, which remained highly centralized, had the least structural 
flexibility to respond to market and client shifts.
506 The experience of real estate advisory service firms reinforced G.B. Richardson’s argument that 
"a firm has to settle down and ‘digest’ large expansions before it can successfully carry out 
others, otherwise "managerial diseconomies" would resulted from rapid expansion in widely 
dispersed markets; Information and Investment: A Study in the Working of the Competitive 
Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 59.
507 This finding concurs with important theories set forth by A.D. Chandler, Jr. and E.T. Penrose. 
Penrose argued that a decentralized operation was most economical (Penrose, ‘The Growth of the 
Firm’, (1959, p. 55), and Chandler concluded that innovation occurred through multiple tiers of 
vertical integration and geographic diversification (Chandler, Scale and Scope, (p.41).
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The company profiles and case studies also revealed that privately-owned service 
enterprises, which were governed by conservative financial stewardship, gained 
competitive advantage by having greater flexibility to capitalize service diversification 
and geographic expansion. The firm’s retained capital was at risk, yet those firms that 
did invest corporate capital—either in vertical integration or a merger/acquis ition— 
typically received a greater proportion of fee revenues from foreign sources than did 
those firms that internationalized through a nonequity (and less controllable) affiliation. 
Higher investment costs tended to produce higher long-term benefits. Moreover, in 
privately held firms directly owned by partners, principals and/or employees, corporate 
managers enjoyed a greater degree of control and freedom to implement long-term 
structural changes than did, for example, public companies answerable to 
shareholders.508
The international expansion of U.K.-based Jones Lang Wootton represented the 
most effective and resilient growth strategy, though one with the highest level of 
potential risk and capital costs. JLW expanded worldwide in incremental stages over a 
30-year period, keeping pace with the capacities of management and available corporate 
capital. JLW began to internationalize in 1958 and thereby preempted competitors in 
building a global office network and securing the business of multinational clients. 
Moreover, JLW staffed each new office with internally trained personnel to standardize 
service quality and exploit economies of scale. Because JLW’s incremental globalization 
was too costly for competitors to match in a one- or two-year timeframe, when cross- 
border investment rose appreciably in the 1980s, the company’s success and global
508 This argument would be tested by a few U.K. firms (Chesteron Savills, and DTZ Debenahm 
Thorpe) which went to the public stock markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s to capitalize 
future operations and growth, a step which portended future finaicial mangement of real estate 
services.
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reputation provided evidence that there were real first-mover advantages for 
internationalizing real estate advisory firms. Beyond sheer economic power, such other 
factors as administrative coordination, human resources, and an established multiregional 
and multifunctional management hierarchy, could not be replicated by competitors in a 
short period. These were important (and sound) findings relative to the standard business 
literature, particularly Chandler’s controversial theory about first-mover advantages and 
Stigler’s argument about an efficient enterprise.509
7 .8  R e a l  E st a t e  Ad v iso r y  Serv ic es  in  th e  1990s : A F o r ec a st
The global economic restructuring that began in the U.S. in 1990 and 
subsequently moved through Japan and Europe had a fundamental impact on real estate 
markets and investors worldwide. Declining direct investment growth and recessionary 
markets in the early 1990s severely devalued property investments and prompted 
investors to disinvest or restructure the financial bases of assets. Real estate advisory 
service firms were challenged to respond to changing client demands, as well as 
significantly reduced demands for services: staff reductions and office closings replaced 
the international expansion of the 1980s. The complexity of the field, and the 
significance of real estate investments and investment advisory services, was highlighted 
by the significant impact real estate investments had on the national economic structures 
of the U.S. and Japan, primarily, and the U.K. and Germany to a lesser extent.
Economic analysts have forecast two probable scenarios for the balance of the 
1990s: one projects increasing levels of international trade and direct investment; the
509 A.D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope (1990), p. 34; G.J. Stigler defined an ‘efficient enterprise’ 
as that which ‘meets any and all problems the entrepreneur actually faces’, in The Organization of 
Industry, p. 73 and 88.
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second projects an ongoing weakness in global cross-border direct investment.510 
Regardless, the probability is high that the profile of investors in the 1990s will be 
different than that which predominated through the 1980s, as insurance and pension funds 
and corporations have less surplus capital to hold in investment real estate. The question 
then arises, what impact would slower cross-border direct investment growth have on 
strategies for and the structure of international real estate advisory services?
The negative investment climate of recent years provides some indications, in that 
the early 1990s challenged real estate advisors to redirect the focus of advisory services 
and types of clients. In all focal countries, property services shifted from a focus on 
growing investment portfolios through acquisitions and new development to maximizing 
returns (or minimizing losses) on existing assets. The emphasis also shifted away from 
staff growth to reducing overhead and operating costs. Those firms that had the greatest 
structural flexibility to respond to changing markets and shifting clients tended to be 
centralized organizations in which standards of quality and overall management were well 
defined, and decentralized multidivisional and regional authority established among 
individual managers and regional offices. Such recognition about the subject’s 
importance may even lead to more rigorous educational standards and advanced technical 
training, though regrettably the author has observed little evidence of this to date.511
510 J. Rutter, ‘Recent Trends in International Direct Investment: The Boom Years Fade’, Office of 
Trade and Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Aug. 1993, p. 13.
511 H.F. Kelly, ‘Can Universities Teach Real Estate Decision Making?’, Real Estate Review, v. 20 
no. 2 (Summer 1990), p. 81.
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APPENDIX A: DATA LIMITATIONS
The following description of cross-border direct investment data collection 
methodology applies to investments in all industries, including real estate, real estate 
advisory services, finance, and insurance. Specific insights about data collection 
methodology as it pertains to the real estate industry are noted separately in the text.
A . l  D e fin in g  Cr o ss-B o r d er  D ir ec t  Investm ent  
Basic Definition
There is no universally applied international system or method for the collection 
of data on cross-border direct investment. Thus, the statistics of the four focal countries 
are reasonably, but not strictly, comparable. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
defines cross-border or international direct investment as investment that is made to 
acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the 
investor, the investor’s purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of 
the enterprise.512 A direct investment enterprise (affiliate) is defined as an incorporated 
or unincorporated enterprise in which a single person (an individual, company, 
government, or group of related individuals) owns a significant share of the voting 
securities, or an equivalent interest, either directly or indirectly through another 
affiliate.513
512 International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Manual. 5th Edition. 1993, p. 136.
513 Ibid.
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Specific Definitions
^  Specific definitions of cross-border direct investment differ among the focal 
countries. For instance, the definition of what constitutes Man effective voice in the 
management of the enterprise” varies. Japan and the United States use a 10 percent 
minimum level of ownership of the voting securities of a foreign business enterprise held 
directly, or indirectly through another affiliate, as the threshold for identifying foreign 
investors. (Japan has no specific published minimum percentage ownership for inward 
investment, but it is believed to be defined for administrative purposes generally at the 
10 percent level.) The United Kingdom uses a 20 percent minimum ownership threshold 
for all directly and indirectly held affiliates. Germany defines a direct investor as 
anyone who holds directly or indirectly 25 percent or more of the shares or voting rights 
of an enterprise, which must have a balance sheet total equivalent to more than DM 
500,000, or who maintains branches or permanent business establishments having gross 
operating assets totaling more than DM 500,000 each.514
A .2  C o m po sitio n  o f  D irect  In vestm ent  St o c k s
In developing direct investment data, both the IMF and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have recommended that the 
composition of direct investment stocks and flows515 include:
514 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Committee on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises, Recent Trends in International Direct Investment. 1987, p. 113.
515 As stated at the beginning of Chapter 2, stocks are defined as the cumulative historical book value 
of direct investors’ equity in, and net outstanding loans to, their foreign affiliates at any point in time, 
typically at the end of a fiscal or calendar year. Flows of direct investment capital represent annual 
direct investment capital flows of equity, reinvested earnings and intercompany debt, combined.
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(1) Equity investment—any contribution of capital to a foreign affiliate in 
which the owner (parent firm) holds or acquires at least a 10 percent share 
of the voting stock or equivalent interest in the affiliate. (A less than 
10 percent interest is defined as portfolio investment.)
(2) Intercompany debt-intercompany loans between parent and affiliate, 
including the cash or other liquid assets, charges for shipments of 
products or equipment, or charges for the transfer of intangible assets.
(3) Reinvested earnings—the parent company share of foreign affiliate 
earnings not repatriated, but reinvested by the parent, is included as part 
of the direct investment stock and flow.516
Each of the focal countries, except Japan, include these three elements in their 
direct investment stock and flow estimates. Japan does not collect reinvested earnings 
data, nor are stock estimates by the Bank of Japan available by country or by industry. 
Therefore, in this thesis, "notifications data" from Japan’s Ministry of Finance are used 
instead for both total Japanese outward and inward direct investment, and for Japanese 
direct investment in real estate. Stocks include more than just the cumulative value of 
flows, taking into account changes in the value of the investment due to valuation 
adjustments (e.g., accounting write-ups or write-downs of assets due to inflation, 
deflation, fire loss, write-offs of equity including goodwill, or foreign exchange 
translation gains and losses). Foreign exchange translation gains or losses are typically 
not included in affiliate earnings (and thus not included in direct investment flows) but
516 International Monetary Fund, op.cit.; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The 
Revised Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment. February 3, 1992, pp. 14,18.
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taken directly to the balance sheet of the affiliate. Large exchange rate fluctuations can 
resuh* in major changes in stock values due to the translation of foreign-currency- 
denominated assets and liabilities of foreign affiliates into the home country currency for 
purposes of inclusion in the global consolidated net worth of the parent company.517
A .3  C om pa ra bility  of  D efinitio n s
Both the British and the German definitions are basically comparable to the U.S. 
definition, but less inclusive, chiefly because their reporting thresholds are higher. Most 
important, all three definitions rely on the use of a fully consolidated accounting system 
in which the income statements and balance sheets of foreign affiliates are consolidated 
into those of the parent company. For outward direct investment, the financial 
statements of foreign affiliates are prepared in accordance with the generally accepted 
accounting principles of the parent company’s home country for eventual consolidation 
into one combined set of financial statements for the entire company worldwide.
This does not mean, however, that the stock and flow data compiled by these 
three countries are fully comparable. There are differences between countries in 
accounting principles used to compile and consolidate financial data, and in the timing 
and coverage of government surveys used to collect data, as well as in the level of 
industry and country disaggregation of published data. Some of these differences are 
discussed below.
517 United Kingdom Central.Statistical Office, Business Monitor. Census of overseas assets. 1987, pp. 
3, 10.
A .4 D ifferences  in  D a ta  C o llec tio n  and  M e a su r e m e n t518
Besides differences in specific definitions, there are differences among the focal 
countries in the scope and coverage of the various national data collection systems. 
Also, the methods of classifying direct investment by industry and by country often 
differ.
Scope and Coverage of Data Collection
The quality of data collection may vary because different thresholds exist for 
reporting information to national governments. For example, to minimize the burden on 
reporting companies, surveys may require reports only from those affiliates with certain 
levels of assets, sales or net income. For example, Germany requires reports only from 
direct investors whose affiliates have total assets of 500,000 deutsche marks or more. 
Because relatively few large MNCs typically account for most direct investment, the total 
direct investment stock is seldom materially affected by reporting thresholds. However, 
stock estimates for smaller industries such as real estate could be affected, especially if 
a number of relatively small real estate investments below the reporting threshold were 
made in any given year.
The level of disaggregation of industry and country data collected and published 
also varies by focal country. Industry classification methodology among the focal 
countries is discussed separately below.
Stock data collected by company survey are available mostly on an annual basis, 
and sometimes quarterly. A notable exception is the United Kingdom which compiles
518 Much of the research for this section on Differences in Data Collection and Measurement is taken 
from, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, International Direct 
Investment: Global Trends and the U.S. Role. 1988, pp. 174-7.
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stock data from company surveys only on a triennial basis with no estimates for 
intervening years. Stock and flow data collected through the United Kingdom’s banking 
system are available annually. However, no country or industry detail is available.
Industry Classification
Direct investment data collection systems gather data at the enterprise level rather 
than at the establishment level. (An enterprise, or company, represents a distinct, legally 
defined business operation which may have one or more establishments with operations 
in one or more industries. An establishment is defined as an economic unit owned by 
an enterprise, generally at a single physical location, where only one type of economic 
activity is conducted.) In cases where an enterprise has a number of establishments 
engaged in different kinds of business operations, the question arises as to which industry 
the enterprise should be classified in.
The U.S. industry classification system assigns the enterprise to the major 
industry group in which the majority of its sales are made.519 For example, an 
enterprise in which sales are 50 percent in finance, 40 percent in insurance, and 10 
percent in real estate would be classified in finance, and the entire direct investment 
stock and other financial data associated with that enterprise would be classified in 
finance even though activities are conducted in other industries. Thus, direct investment 
data for real estate may be understated because real estate investment is included 
indistinguishably in other industries, such as finance or insurance. However, the degree 
of understatement cannot be determined.
519 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: 
1982 Benchmark Survey Data, p. 9.
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In the U.S. data system, however, sales data are classified both by industry of 
the affiliate (according to the method described above) and industry of the actual 
product(s) sold by the affiliate. These cross-classifications are available for both inward 
and outward direct investment. Presumably, any major differences in industry 
classification found by comparing the results of the cross-classification of sales would 
also apply to stocks, flows, assets and other financial data.
For the United States, because of the cross-classification system, only a relatively 
small proportion of real estate activity is conducted outside the real estate industry for 
either inward or outward direct investment. But, the gross book value of commercial 
property held by foreign-owned U.S. affiliates in non-real estate industries is substantial. 
In 1990, for example, foreign-owned real estate affiliates held $80 billion of commercial 
property, while affiliates in all other industries held $66 billion of commercial 
property.520 However, much of this commercial property is probably owner-occupied 
by non-real estate companies and not leased or held solely for capital opportunities. 
Unfortunately, comparable analyses cannot be conducted for the other focal countries 
because the statistics are unavailable.
A .5  O t h e r  M ea su r e s  o f  Cr o ss-B order  D ir ect  In v e st m en t
Other than direct investment stocks or flows, there are a limited number of 
alternative types of financial data—total assets, stockholders’ equity and gross book value 
of property, plant and equipment—that deal with various aspects of foreign direct 
investment. Some of the more important data and their uses as they relate to cross­
520 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United States. Operations of the U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies. Revised 1990 Estimates. 
Table D-20.
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border direct investment in real estate are described below. Only the United States 
collects and publishes these other types of data.
Total assets - defined as the historical book value of all current and fixed assets carried
%
on the balance sheets of affiliates. Total assets measures the total gross financial value 
of foreign direct investment in real estate, regardless of the foreign ownership share in 
the enterprise. Total assets values are always much larger than direct investment stock 
values because (1) affiliate liabilities—whether owed to the parent company or to 
unaffiliated third parties—have not been deducted from assets; and, (2) assets obtained 
through local borrowing instead of from funds furnished by the foreign parent are not 
included in stock values. In 1990, total assets of foreign-owned U.S. affiliates in real 
estate amounted to $112 billion, compared with an inward stock in U.S. real estate of 
$35 billion.521
Equity - or stockholder’s equity, represents the book value of an investor’s share of the 
capital stock, reinvested earnings and other capital reserves of an affiliate. Equity is 
distinct from direct investment stocks in that it does not include the net value of loans 
by the parent company to the affiliate. Stockholders’ equity can also be useful as a 
measuring device of the level of foreign ownership of total equity in private domestic 
business. Stockholders’ equity in foreign-owned U.S. affiliates in real estate amounted 
to $18 billion in 1990.522
521 Ibid., Table B-6.
522 O p . cit.. Table B-2.
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Property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) - is the single largest and most important balance 
sheets asset of most companies. It is these assets (as well as managerial talent and 
technical knowledge) that are the ultimate foundation of the profit potential of a 
company. The gross book value of PP&E of real estate companies totalled $87 billion 
in 1990, of which $23 billion was land.
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APPENDIX B
A BRIEF HISTORY 
OF RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
BY THE FOCAL COUNTRIES
This appendix reviews the chronology of the gradual liberalization of capital 
controls and other restrictions on both outward and inward investment, including cross- 
border direct investment. Historically among the focal countries, relatively few 
restrictions limited outward direct investment. Except for Japan, the focal countries had 
no formal statutory restrictions on outward direct investment. Inward direct investment, 
in contrast, was subject to more restrictions. Among the focal countries, these 
restrictions generally related to national security concerns or regulated industries. By 
1990, some specific statutory restrictions on foreign direct investment in real estate 
remained, yet the individual governments typically did not enforce them. With perhaps 
the exception of Japan before 1980, the focal countries were and remain among the 
world’s most open economies with relatively few restrictions on cross-border direct 
investment.
In addition to formal restrictions, unrelated regulations and private practices 
directly and indirectly acted as obstacles to foreign investment, such as those that remain 
in Japan.
B .l  R e s t r ic t io n s  o n  O u t w a r d  In v e st m e n t
After World War II and until the 1980s, the focal countries were among several 
nations that periodically imposed controls on investment abroad, including outward direct 
investment, usually as a means to manage balance of payments, as well as to ensure that 
financial sectors remained solvent and in response to specific and temporary industry,
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currency or monetary policy concerns. These controls were implemented primarily 
through foreign exchange convertibility restrictions, as well as through restrictions on 
domestic banks and finance companies seeking to conduct specific types of overseas 
investment with associated capital outflows.523
In 1955 the U.S. introduced a voluntary program to help reduce private capital 
outflows and improve the country’s balance of payments. In 1968 mandatory controls 
replaced voluntary constraints on outward capital flows for direct investment and the 
government introduced taxes on interest receipts arising from outward investment. The 
other focal countries maintained oversight by requiring specific government approval of 
proposed individual investments, and controlling foreign exchange transactions necessary 
to conduct outward investment. Partly in response to these restrictions on outward 
investment, newly established international monetary and capital markets surged in the 
late 1960s, such as the Eurodollar (short-term) and Eurobond (long-term) financial 
markets. These international financial markets facilitated through circumvention outward 
investment in general, including cross-border direct investment.
In 1974 the U.S. abolished taxes and capital outflow restrictions on outward 
investment, in conjunction with transforming the dollar floating exchange rate system. 
In the late 1970s and in 1980, other countries began to remove restrictions on outward 
investment: the U.K. removed foreign exchange controls, and Japan abolished the 
Foreign Investment Law, which required government approval of both outward and 
inward investment.
52:> Although there were, and in a few cases still are, outright restrictions by the focal countries related 
to national security or external policy, these generally address trade with former Communist and 
certain Middle East countries.
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Since World War II limitations on certain kinds of portfolio investment remained 
the strictest (albeit modest) and most continuous form of restrictions affecting outward 
direct investment from Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. Subsequent liberalizations of 
capital controls on outward investment by Japan and many other non-focal countries 
occurred during the 1980s, following the leads of the U.K. and U.S. These liberalized 
government policies represented an awareness to permit and facilitate access to new 
technologies and financial resources possessed by foreign firms. Importantly, Eurodollar 
markets encouraged the growth of cross-border trade and investment. And so, with the 
gradual liberalization of international financial controls in the 1980s, the globalization 
of investment markets, heightened competition, and favorable macroeconomic conditions 
in the focal countries, outward direct investment in real estate expanded rapidly.
B .2  R e s t r ic t io n s  o n  In w a r d  In v e st m e n t
Post-World War II reconstruction demands in the 1950s created a favorable policy 
climate for cross-border direct investment. This was a period in Europe and Japan when
capital was in great demand and foreign direct investment was generally welcomed.
However, foreign exchange controls were used to prevent the outflow of scarce capital 
which, in turn, limited inward investment in these countries.
But as prosperity and economic growth returned in the 1960s, many host
countries became more skeptical about the benefits of foreign direct investment, and 
some countries strengthened barriers by setting maximum levels of foreign ownership 
and/or control of domestic companies, as well as by opposing takeovers of domestic 
firms in certain industries and limiting or taxing at higher rates income remittances from 
existing foreign-owned companies. Except for Japan, the focal countries did not have
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formal new barriers and remained generally open to cross-border direct investment. 
Japan-required advance approval for new foreign investments, which typically meant that 
foreign investors held minority ownership positions or licensed technology to Japanese 
companies as a means of gaining market access. Extensive cross-shareholdings among 
Japanese companies within keiretsu groups made hostile foreign takeovers virtually 
impossible. Also, Germany had no formal restrictions but extensive cross-shareholdings 
between German companies and German banks impeded foreign takeovers.
As a consequence of slower growth and higher inflation in the late 1970s, some 
countries sought to encourage foreign direct investment and in the 1980s began to grant 
tax, financial and other incentives to foreign investors. However, until the late 1980s 
a wide range of restrictions were imposed on inward direct investment. Among the focal 
countries these restrictions encompassed limitations on foreign investment in banking, 
insurance, transportation, communications, and natural resources. Access to some of 
these sectors hinged on reciprocity conditions or involved public monopoly constraints. 
In real estate, Japan’s Alien Land Law of 1926 allowed foreigners to acquire land in 
Japan only if reciprocal conditions were available in source countries. Nineteenth- 
century laws in many U.S. states required reciprocity or prohibited foreign ownership 
of agricultural or natural resource lands. However, neither country was known to have 
enforced these laws during the 1988-1990 period. Again, restraints typically were 
designed to address concerns related to national security, economics, and public welfare.
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TABLE 29
Fo reig n  Investm ent  R e strictio ns  in 
M ain  Secto r s  in  Fo c a l  Co u n t r ie s , 1992
Banking
Germanv
LR
Japan
LR
U.K.
R
U.S.
R
Insurance - L ’R R *
Radio & Television L L - L L
T elecommunications L L L L
Road Transport C - — --
Rail Transport C L C C *
Air Transport LR L L L
Water Transport L * L L L
Mining — C L L
Oil & Gas — C — —
Fishing -- L L L
Real Estate — R — R *
Tourism — — L —
Public Utilities — L C L *
L = Limited; R = Reciprocity; C = Closed; * = Measures at a subnational level 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Code of Liberalization of Capital 
Movements. 1992 Edition. May 1992.
Foreign direct investment was encouraged by nearly all countries during the 
1980s, including the focal countries. Since there were relatively few formal restrictions 
on inward direct investment in the focal countries, the surge in inward direct investment 
in the U.K. and the U.S. stemmed principally from extraordinarily strong 
macroeconomic conditions and a shift to a global outlook by multinational corporations. 
In addition, deregulation and privatization of certain services sectors in these countries 
presented new opportunities for foreign investors. Japan was continuously liberalizing 
its inward direct investment regulations since the late 1960s and by 1988 maintained 
official restrictions in only a few sectors. In April 1991, Japan amended its Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law by, among other items, permitting post­
notification of new foreign investments, making Japan (technically) consistent with the
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foreign investment regulations of other focal countries. Japan’s Ministry of International 
Trade- and Industry (MITI) actually began to assist and offer subsidies to foreign 
investors in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, because of a legacy of impediments to foreign 
investment, inward direct investment in Japan remained relatively low due to a domestic 
cultural aversion to takeovers, higher costs and lower anticipated returns on new 
investments, and cross-shareholdings of voting securities among Japanese firms.
In the U.S., in response to the phenomenal surge in inward direct investment in 
1980 following, the U.S. Congress enacted the Exon-Florio provision of the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act in 1988. This legislation granted the President authority 
to veto proposed or reverse completed individual foreign direct investment transactions 
which might threaten national security. Between 1988 and 1991, one transaction was 
rejected, several were modified, and others likely were never proposed on account of the 
new legislation. Another section of the law granted authority to the Federal Reserve to 
refuse to designate as a primary dealer a foreign-owned U.S. bank if reciprocal 
conditions were not present in the foreign investor’s home country. In addition, 
numerous laws were proposed but not enacted that sought reciprocal treatment for U.S. 
investors abroad in certain services sectors, or sought to protect certain U.S. high- 
technology sectors from foreign dominance. These proposals might also have 
discouraged certain new foreign investments.
Tax and Recordation Fees
National tax and recordation fees for outward and inward direct real estate 
investment changed over the 30-year study period, which is discussed in the text as it 
related to investment activity and real estate advisory services. The profiles of tax and
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recordation fees (1992) for each country which follow are presented to illustrate only the 
types^of differences among national tax and fee structures for foreign investment.
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UNITED KINGDOM - TAX & RECORDATION FEES
Registration Approval: 
Registration: 
Registration Tax: 
Corporate Income Tax:
Rental Income Tax:
Annual Property Tax:
Transfer of Freehold or 
Leasehold:
Stamp Tax:
Capital Gains Tax:
Depreciation Method:
No
U.K. Inland Revenue - tax accounts 
Nominal
Regular (resident) - 30 to 37.5 percent 
Nonresident and Small Corporations - 25 percent
25 percent of NOI (operating income less 
interest and depreciation allowance)
0.7 - 0.8 percent of assessed value
Nonresident - 17.5 percent VAT (unless foreign 
investor reg istered  w ith perm anent 
establishment)
1 percent of price
Investor:
•  Nonresident - None
•  Resident - 30 to 37.5 percent on gain (cost
adjusted for inflation)
T rader/speculator:
•  Nonresident - 25 percent
•  Resident - 33 percent
No depreciation typically allowed for 
commercial buildings; up to 100 percent in 
enterprise zones.
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UNITED STATES - TAX & RECORDATION FEES
Registration Approval: 
Registration:
Registration Tax: 
Corporate Income Tax:
Rental Income Tax:
Annual Property Tax: 
Transfer Tax:
Stamp Tax:
Capital Gains Tax: 
Depreciation Method:
No (only if potential threat to national security)
Internal Revenue Service - Nonresident Alien 
Income Tax Return
None
Ordinary Income - 15 to 34 percent 
Distributed Profits - 15 to 34 percenta 
Foreign Investor - 0 to 15 percent (Branch 
Profits Tax)
Ordinary Income Tax on NOI (operating income 
less mortgage payment and depreciation 
allowance)
2 to 5 percent of assessed value 
1 to 2 percent of price 
None
28 percent of gain (less depreciation)
Straight line over 31.5 years; modified 
accelerated cost recovery system: 15-year to 20- 
year class property may use 150 percent 
declining balance.
Double taxation of income; invest directly in the asset or in a pass-through partnership entity to 
avoid double taxation.
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - TAX & RECORDATION FEES
Registration Approval: 
Registration Tax: 
Corporate Income Tax:
Rental Income Tax:
Annual Trade Tax:
Annual Property Tax: 
Transfer Tax:
Stamp Tax:
Capital Gains Tax:
Depreciation Method:
No
None
Domestic companies and German companies 
established by foreign investor:
•  14 percent normal income
•  36 percent distributed profits (dividends) 
Foreign (nonresident) Corporation:
•  46 to 50 percent
Domestic and foreign investor:
•  15 to 20 percent taxable income 
Foreign (nonresident) investor:
•  14 percent VAT
5 to 20 percent fair market value, less liabilities 
(rarely paid)
Foreign investor - tax-exempt
0.8 to 1.5 percent tax value
2 percent of price (inclusive of VAT)
1 percent of price
Owned 6+  years - 0 percent, if gain reinvested 
within 24 months
Otherwise - 23 to 25 percent (50 percent of 
corporate tax)
Foreign Investor - May be exempt if without 
permanent establishment in Germany, owns 
the property for 2 +  years, and is not 
trading in real estate.
Straight line only
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JAPAN - TAX & RECORDATION FEES
Registration Approval: 
Registration:
Registration Tax:
Prefectur Tax: 
Corporate Income Tax:
Rental Income Tax:
Annual Property Tax: 
Transfer Tax:
Stamp Tax:
Capital Gains Tax: 
Depreciation Method:
Yes
Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI)
5 percent, plus 0.6% of assessed value of 
property
3.0 percent of assessed value
Normal Income:
•  Regular - 43.3 percent
•  Nonresident and Small Corporations - 31 
to 43.3 percent
Distributed Profits (dividends):
•  Regular - 33.3 percent
•  Nonresident and Small Corporations - 31 
to 43.3 percent
$0.20 per square foot (U.S. dollars), plus
0.25 percent of total amount of salaries of 
employees occupying space
1.4 percent of cost (actual)
3 percent of price
Nominal
26 to 52 percent of gain
Straight line or declining balance. Other special 
accelerated depreciation for year of acquisition, 
depending on industry and type of asset.
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY FORM 
COMPANY HISTORY AND PROFILE
1. Number of Employees and Offices
Number of Number of - Number of Countries
Employees Offices With Offices
1960 z z z
1975 z z z
1990 z z z
2. Number of Employees in Domestic and Foreign M arkets
Number of Employees in Domestic Number of Employees in Foreign
(Home Nation') Market  (Other National) Markets
1960 z z
1970 z z
1980 z z
1990 z z
3. Number of Offices in Domestic and Foreign M arkets
Number of Offices in Domestic Number of Offices in Foreign
(Home Nation') Market (Other National Markets
1960 z z
1970 z z
1980 z z
1990 z z
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4. Composition of Real Estate Advisory Services Fee Revenue
Percent of Real Estate Advisory Services Fee Revenue from:
Domestic Clients Foreign/International Clients
1960 z . z
1970 z ' z
1980 z z
1990 z z
5. Client Profile of Real Estate Advisory Services Fee Revenue
Manufacturing Pension & Financial Development & Other Professional 
& Trade Firms Insurance Funds Institutions Construction Cos. Service Firms
1960 z z z z z
1970 z z z z z
1980 z z z z z
1990 z z z z z
6. Real Estate Advisory Services (such as, brokerage, property management, 
development consulting, appraisal/valuation, financial/investment banking 
services, asset management, market research, etc.)
1960 _______________________________________________________________________
1970 _______________________________________________________________________
1980 _______________________________________________________________________
1990 ____________________________________________________________________
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7. Sources of Capital to Fund Expansion into Foreign/International Markets 
^ (e.g., private retained earnings, public investment capital, private investment 
capital, holding company funds).
1960
1970
1980
1990
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APPENDIX D 
HISTORICAL RATES OF RETURN INVESTMENT 
-  NATIONAL ANNUAL AVERAGES YIELDS, FOCAL COUNTRIES
The comparative, multinational data arrayed in the table which follows, 
represented the most thorough presentation of cross-border investment yields which the 
author knew to exist (confirmed by economists and property professionals). Such a 
comprehensive report of multinational yield data could not be found to exist in any one 
data source, and was never previously compiled in a published or unpublished report. 
The author, therefore, sought to compile and refine systematically operating and capital 
yield data from different data sources for each focal country to achieve relative annual 
parity. While imperfect due to the lack of unity of data sources and exact comparability 
of national statistics, the table presents an unprecedented comparative illustration of 
national investment yield data. In addition, the rates of return have been provided for 
the period for the United Kingdom. These rates of return highlight the differences 
between yields and rates of return. The data also captures the relevant trends and 
movements of yields in the focal countries.
The table illustrates national averages, rather than published yield data for the 
major international financial centers in which investors actually acquired/developed 
properties and real estate portfolios. Such data is not directly relevant to the thesis topic 
of cross-border investment in the focal countries. The intent was to provide a gross 
measure across countries (and the only statistical yield measure available) which 
portrayed even to a moderate degree the investment diversification that attracted 
international investors to specific major markets in London, Los Angeles, New York, 
Washington, D .C., Honolulu, Dallas, Frankfurt and Munich.
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The purpose of professional real estate advisory services, argued in this thesis, 
was lo enhance (or create) value; one important measure of a firm’s reputation and the 
reason one investor would retain one firm rather than another. Real estate advisory 
services gained value and reputation by exceeding national and local market averages by 
identifying the highest yielding market location, property (or investment trust/portfolio), 
and financial structure.
The internationalization of the commercial real estate advisory industry was a 
result of its own goal to maximize its clients’ expected profits at a minimum risk. Given 
relative tax treatments and capital controls, the decisions on portfolio investment flows 
respond to the differences in yields across countries accounting for expectations about 
foreign exchange rate movements. Covered interest arbitrage theory argues that higher 
foreign returns can be offset, if the foreign currency is expected to depreciate. For 
example, during the early 1980s, the United States received large capital inflows. 
Returns relative to other countries were high and the international exchange value of the 
dollar was rising. In contrast, after this period foreign investors, particularly Japanese, 
have taken losses on investments in the U.S. because of the 50 to 60 percent decline in 
the dollar relative to the yen.
Given that the different data sources would be required to illustrate the most 
credible historical data, only the most respected data sources for property investment 
yields were consulted. In the U.S., the Russell-NCREIF Property Index was and 
remains the nation’s leading and most highly regarded measure of stock data, often 
compared by investors to such comparable indices as the New York Stock Exchange and 
American Stock Exchange for equities. For the U.K., Hillier Parker May & Rowden 
had the best data for yields and rates of return. The rates of return were only available
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in the U.K. and are shown to provide an example of the yields and rates of returns 
differentials during this period.
H isto r ic a l  Y ields a nd  R ates o f  Return  o n  R eal  E sta te  Investm ent  
In  the Fo cal  Co untries 
1960- 1990
United United 
States Kingdoma
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972 -  6.3%
1973 -  5.9%
1974 ~  8.6%
1975 -  8.5%
1976 -  7.1%
1977 -  7.0%
1978 16.1% 6.1%
1979 20.8% 5.5%
1980 18.0% 5.5%
1981 16.9% 5.5%
1982 9.5% 5.7%
1983 13.3% 6.3%
1984 13.0% 6.6%
1985 10.1% 7.0%
1986 6.6% 7.5%
1987 5.7% 7.7%
1988 7.0% 7.3%
1989 6.2% 7.2%
1990 1.5% 8.4%
United
Kingdomb Germany Japanc
26.1%
4.0%
3.6%
29.0%
61.7%
(4.9)%
8 .6 %
9.3%
54.7% -  9.2%
(12.3)% -  (6.5)%
14.1% 7.0% 0.3%
32.7% 7.4% (0.7)%
14.4% 7.4% (0.3)%
36.2% 7.3% 3.6%
39.3% 7.2% 4.1%
22.8% 6.7% 6.2%
16.1% 6.3% 5.6%
9.0% 6.3% 8.1%
0.2% 6.3% 4.3%
8.7% 6.3% 5.8%
9.7% 6.3% 5.5%
9.4% 6.4% 22.8%
17.8% 6.4% 9.2%
47.3% 6.4% 10.8%
29.5% 5.9% 14.1%
1.0% 5.9% 15.6%
Note: The purpose of the comparative data is simply to illustrate differences in real estate investment
performance among the focal countries during the study period. The data have been compiled, 
by necessity, from different types of sources for each country. There is no uniform global market 
mechanism which might document real estate investment return data for national markets. The 
data for the U.S., U.K. and Germany are most comparable, arraying annual yields (operating 
income and appraised capital value) of investment property surveyed by private firms, as shown 
above. In this absence of such information for Japan, the author relied instead on published
(Table continues)
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annual yield data (corporate return performance on present capital) for publicly traded property 
companies. (Japan’s data would be most comparable with the U.K. Financial Times Actuarial Series 
for British Property Companies, but the U.K. data presented in this table is more accurate in the 
context of this thesis and better reflects actual market performance.)
-- Not available.
a Defined by C. Gordon and G. Amott as the ratio of net income to total capital costs, and the overall
yield upon sale (or another capital event) relative to total development/capital costs; in "Some 
Observations on Property Financing", Investors Chronicle. Property Supplement (23 February 1962), 
p. xvii.
b Rates of return are defined by Hillier Parker and calculated as the sum of the income received in that
period plus the change in value of the investment expressed as a percentage of the initial value of the 
investment. (Investors Chronicle, June 1987.)
c According to an Asian expert of The Frank Russell Company, the leading U.S. portfolio indexer,
"Time-series real estate returns that are comparable to those recorded for U.S., U.K. and German 
commercial properties are not readily available in Japan. Japanese land prices, by contrast, have been 
more systematically tracked. As such, property companies that trade on the Tokyo stock exchange 
provide a good proxy for real estate values in Japan: Long-run returns on stock should reasonably 
reflect the underlying value of properties held in a company’s portfolio. Moreover, stock share prices 
are derived by a more objective supply/demand market trading mechanism than the more subjective 
appraisal system of return indices in the U.S., U.K. and Germany."
Sources: For the United States, Russell - NCREIF Property Index rate of return property level index in 
the U.S.; set at 100 for 4thQ77, and returns represent an aggregation of individual property 
returns before deduction of management fee; each property’s return is weighted by its market 
value, and income and capital changes are calculated individually. For the United Kingdom, 
For the United Kingdom, Hillier Parker May & Rowden property annual average yields and 
rates of return from 1972-90; in Investors Chronicle. Rates of Return, June 1987, July 1990, 
and 1994. For Germany, Weatherall, Green & Smith property yields, published in Property 
Reports 1992. For Japan, the average annual yield for net earnings (sales and operating 
income) reported by publicly traded commercial real estate companies, in Japan Company 
Directory. 1960-1973 and Japan Company Handbook. 1974-1991.
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